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Preface
Negotiations are essential mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes and
for maintaining stability in international relations. Negotiations can and should
contribute to predictability, equity, and security among states. In achieving
these goals, negotiations become important confidence-building measures.
The increasing role of negotiations and of international organizations for
managing the system of international order and for pursuing/achieving states'
interests/policies through peaceful means has produced a fundamental evolution
in the agenda, functions, and intensity of international negotiations.
In the view of both researchers and negotiators over the recent past, the
negotiations process that is organized along traditional lines is becoming more
complex, difficult, and less effective. The processes of negotiations are in general
taking more and more time and lagging behind the evolution of the international
environment. Not only are the issues themselves more complex, but also, in the
implementation of any agreements reached, the resolution of the issues involved
will need to take place over a longer time and therefore to be managed jointly or
multilaterally.
Because of the increasing complexity of issues and the fast pace of changes
affecting both national and international interests, it has become essential for
international agreements to contain sufficient flexibility in certain of their provi-
sions to permit dealing with uncertainty and the needs of the parties to adapt to
new and changing circumstances. In this sense, international negotiations and
agreements must be not only reactive but also anticipatory.
These considerations indicate that a much-needed approach is one which is
concerned specifically with bringing about a multinational, multicultural, and
multidisciplinary understanding of and perspective on international negotiations
and which also bridges the gap between practitioners and researchers.
A specific objective and unique aspect of the nASA Project on the
Processes of International Negotiations (PIN Project), which started in April
1986 and was funded by the Carnegie Corporation, is the international, multidis-
ciplinary approach brought to bear on all of the Project's activities. This was
especially evident at the nASA Conference on the Processes of International
Negotiations, held in May 1987. The PIN networks in nASA's member countries
played an essential role in this Conference. To keep the focus of the work on
substantive issues and on relevant applications-oriented results, while taking into
account the importance and impact of different cultural and political systems in
the various national approaches to negotiations, both practitioners and
vi Pre/au
researchers involved in the processes of negotiations made presentations at the
PIN Conference and took part in the panel discussions. These presentations
form the basis for the chapters of this book.
The goals of the Conference were to foster increased communication and
understanding between practitioners and researchers and among various
research disciplines, to present and discuss research results, and to identify possi-
ble future research activities. The participation and interaction of both high-
level negotiations practitioners and researchers were considered especially valu-
able and unique aspects of the Conference.
All of the subjects dealt with at the Conference have direct and obvious
relevance to improving negotiations outcomes on, and the ability to deal
effectively with, such issues as the transboundary effects (environmental,
economic, etc.) of technological risk, security and confidence-building measures,
and international economic cooperation - all of which are high on the negotia-
tions agenda of many countries.
Laxenburg, Austria
November 1988
Frances Mautner-Markhof
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Introduction
Efforts to understand and improve international negotiations will increasingly
have to take into account the complexity and unpredictability of such negotia-
tions and of the systems in which they are embedded. The reasons for this are
the impact of interdependence and globalization, and the fact that real systems
are becoming more complex.
It is no longer sufficient to treat dynamic complex systems by disaggrega-
tion into components which are more accessible for analysis, with subsequent
linear superposition. This approach may no longer suffice for the adequate and
coherent comprehension, representation, and management of complex systems.
Not only is the whole greater than the sum of its parts, but it is usually different
- and in critical ways.
Complexity is associated with information which we need but do not have
- thus the role of information is essential for dealing with complex processes
and for discerning underlying patterns.
It is necessary to consider the processes associated with international nego-
tiations in the context of their cultural and political environments. Negotiations
are dependent not only on the system in which they are embedded but also on
the various perceptions of those involved. Thus, it is important to identify and
deal with the impacts of cultural, political, and psychological factors on interna-
tional negotiations.
The viability and dynamic stability of a complex social system depends on
its capability for innovation and adaptation. The mechanisms for achieving
innovation and adaptability will depend increasingly on effective international
cooperation and negotiations, based on reliability, sufficiency, and confidence in
communication.
Negotiations are essential mechanisms for maintaining dynamic stability,
which depends on achieving an optimal balance between the options and con-
straints available to the system and its parts. Cooperation will be necessary for
identification of and agreement on changes in options and constraints. When
these are not arrived at cooperatively, crises and instabilities may result.
Negotiations enhance the capability of a system to deal with uncertainty,
unpredictability, uncontrollability, and disputes. International negotiations pro-
vide the means for developing innovative approaches for political, legal, institu-
tional, technological, environmental, and economic issues and disputes.
2 Intnxluction
International negotiations have become an integral factor in international
relations, and in some cases have achieved an ongoing or longer-term character
which reflects their increasing role in maintaining international stability and in
resolving trans-boundary problems and disputes. The rapid pace of technologi-
cal change has had and will continue to have a critical impact on the develop-
ment and stability of international and national systems. Therefore, negotiations
processes and the resultant agreements should contain sufficient flexibility to
deal not only with actual and imminent disputes, but also with technological and
other changes and surprise, and must therefore be not only reactive but also
anticipatory.
In the analysis and understanding of the processes of international negotia-
tions, a distinction can be made between approaches based on assumed strictly
rational behavior, on the one hand, and the problem-solving adaptive approaches
which recognize the limits to rationality, on the other. Knowledge of the
successes and limitations of the various analytical methods and models is neces-
sary to understand and structure problems more effectively and to evaluate more
efficiently complex alternatives. When dealing with systems and processes which
are highly complex and interdependent, and where there are limits on the capa-
city to acquire, process, and disseminate the necessary information, there are
many aspects which are more amenable to the problem-solving approach. In the
real world, the actual situation may not permit the attainment of preferred goals,
but rather the objective may have to be a sufficient outcome - or even sheer
survival.
The need to deal with the totality, diversity, and unpredictability of inter-
national negotiations requires a multidisciplinary, international, and cross-
cultural approach. The Proceedings of the Conference on the Processes of Inter-
national Negotiations, organized by the IIASA Project on the Processes of Inter-
national Negotiations, which was funded by the Carnegie Corporation, represent
a cross section of papers from practitioners and researchers from various disci-
plines, countries, cultures, and backgrounds. These papers deal with the role of
international organizations and other multilateral mechanisms, theoretical
approaches and analytical methods, cultural and political factors, and actual
experiences on international security, nuclear safety, international economic
cooperation, and environmental issues. In their breadth and depth they offer
various approaches for dealing with complexity and unpredictability in order
better to understand and improve the processes of international negotiations.
International organizations and other multilateral mechanisms have
become increasingly important for resolving disputes, for dealing with actual or
potential crises and risks, and for creating and maintaining international systems
and regimes. The processes of international negotiations in international organi-
zations and other multilateral fora are characterized structurally by the increas-
ing interdependence of states and negotiating fora and by the shift from a bipolar
to a diversified or multipolar world order. They are characterized functionally
by the increasing importance of economic as opposed to military power, and of
technological and other innovation as opposed to the sheer production of goods
and commodities.
Introdudion 3
Thus, the role of international organizations and other multilateral
mechanisms is studied to see if their capabilities match, or could be made to
match, the complexity and scope of the actual and emerging issues and the needs
of the potential sides involved, and to assess the nature and characteristics which
international problem-solving mechanisms should have.
International economic cooperation, and in particular East-West joint ven-
tures, are increasingly important areas for international negotiations. They pro-
vide new dimensions and mechanisms for improving peaceful relations among
states by enhancing their capability to deal with the needs and problems of inter-
national trade and economic development and the increased interdependence
which characterizes the global economy. Joint ventures may thus represent the
forward edge of an enhanced international modality not only of East-West and
North-South economic cooperation, but also of international financing.
East-West joint ventures have emerged not only as a form of international
economic cooperation but also as an expression of new market-oriented economic
mechanisms. Such modes of cooperation can play an important role, but only
when key issues have been studied, problems resolved, and mutual understand-
ings achieved on critical aspects of joint ventures, such as the purposes of a joint
venture, legal issues, ownership and control, management and operation, labor
policy, financial issues, and dispute settlement mechanisms.
International negotiations are, by definition, intercultural, and many of the
problems in such negotiations arise from fundamental cultural, political, and
psychological differences. The environment and culture of negotiators are
reflected in certain "negotiating styles" and perceptions whose importance has
led to an increasingly intensive study of sociopolitical and other culture-based
and observer-dependent factors. These factors include political culture; attitudes
toward cooperation, conflict, compromise and the use of third-parties; and the
concepts and role of sovereignty.
Theoretical foundations and methods of analysis span a wide spectrum.
Negotiations can be treated as part of a larger system, or as an object and pro-
cess in itself, to achieve specific political, economic, or other aims. A negotiation
as such can be studied from various points of view, e.g., as an exercise in com-
munication, decision making, conflict management, or dispute resolution. As
part of a system, negotiations can be studied and understood in terms of the
characteristics and functioning of a complex system. These and other
approaches are best considered as complementary rather than contradictory, as
elucidating different and important aspects, which yields a more coherent and
accurate representation of international negotiations.
The extensive work and accomplishments in the methodological aspects
and mathematical approaches to negotiations are well represented in these
Proceedings. Diverse mathematical approaches can be used in the search for
cooperative agreements and in conflict analysis. The general trend is to find
sufficiently realistic mathematical examples to make abstract tools more useful
for computerized analysis of negotiations problems. In the work on methodologi-
cal issues, the common thread is the stress on complexity and attempts to find
ways to deal with it.
.. Introduction
The issues and disputes that constitute the substance of present and future
international negotiations, e.g., environmental issues such as ozone and CO2,
international economic cooperation in the form of trade and joint ventures,
nuclear safety, and international security reflect the effects of increasing inter-
dependence and the growing importance of technology and in particular informa-
tion technology - as contributing both to the issues and to their solutions.
An increasingly important task il\ to investigate and develop more effective
negotiations support systems, including the use of computer systems and models,
to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the processes and outcomes of inter-
national negotiations. Knowledge bases, expert systems, and simulations are
some of the key aims of these research activities.
The training of negotiators and others involved in negotiations processes
can be enhanced by the use of computer aids and negotiations support systems,
e.g., for dynamic simulations and for knowledge bases and databases in connec-
tion with the storage, management, and retrieval of information. Research and
researchers, as well as practitioners and the experience they bring, should be
integral parts of the training process.
If useful models of negotiations processes are to be developed, it is essential
that such efforts be based on a conceptual understanding of the possibilities and
limitations of different modeling systems within the realm of systems theory.
One of the key aspects of this problem is the concept of complexity - and the
characteristics, limitations, and possibilities it brings to the reality of structuring
international negotiations.
Frances Mautner-Markhal
PART I
The Role of International Organizations
and
Other Multilateral Mechanisms

CHAPTER 1
Toward an Integral Analysis of
International Negotiations
Johan Kaufmann
Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in the
Humanities and Social Sciences
Wassenaar
The Netherlands
All theories of the decision-making process encounter conceptual difficulties
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1980).
1.1. Preliminary Observations
Decision-making and negotiations are, of course, not identical, but there is a con-
siderable overlap. Negotiators are constantly making decisions during the course
of their negotiations, and presumably aim at a result, which can be called a
"decision" , acceptable to all participants in the negotiation. Decision makers in
any social context negotiate with others involved in the preparatory process prior
to the decision.
In the international arena, many decisions have undergone elements of
negotiation prior to the decision. Indeed, many negotiations are "precooked" in
some prior process (e.g., the press communique of the seven heads of government
after their annual meeting, which is largely pre-negotiated by the so-called "sher-
pas", or the press release after the annual GECD ministerial meeting, which is
prepared by the permanent representatives to GECD). Unilateral decisions to
interrupt diplomatic relations are wholly unnegotiated internationally. The US
decision to send armed forces to Korea (later endorsed by the UN Security Coun-
cil) was essentially unilateral.
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International negotiations have a number of elements which are either
absent or normally far less prominent than those inherent in domestic negotia-
tions. These elements concern the cultural, anthropological, linguistic, and other
differences reflected in national or group negotiating characteristics that have
repercussions in negotiations - sometimes visible, sometimes below the surface
or perhaps surfacing much later. We can delineate international negotiations as
negotiations between governments or private entities (the latter including cor-
porations and nonprofit organizations) involving persons of different nationali-
ties. Contrary to the case where an individual is negotiating on a private matter
(e.g., the purchase of a house), the "delegated negotiator" will combine in his
negotiating behavior his own individual characteristics and elements deriving
from (specific or general) instructions and the general cultural or psychological
attitude of the entity (government, corporation, or other) he or she represents.
Of course, we are comparing apples and peanuts: and individual bargaining over
the purchase of a car or a house is under different constraints and influences
than the government of a superpower negotiating on nuclear arms control, to
take two extremes. To the extent that the delegated negotiator is operating
under detailed instructions from his principals, his individual characteristics are
of less importance.
1.2. Theories and Practice
One of the aims of the PIN Project is to bring practitioners and theorists closer
together, "to bridge the gap". At this time the gap remains large, and writings
on the subject have a labyrinthian character. Roughly, these writings can be
divided as follows (cf. Mastenbroek, 1984; Dupont, 1986):
Advice to negotiators. A great many books concentrate on how to negotiate
successfully. (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Nierenberg, 1968j Raiffa, 1982; Zartman
and Berman, 1982j Mastenbroek, 1984j Dupont, 1986). These books are based,
on the one hand, on common sensej on the other hand, on insights derived from
numerous case studies and (apparently less) the personal experiences of the writ-
ers.
Theoretical analysis. Following Dupont (1986, p. 129) one can roughly dis-
tinguish these theoretical approaches: psychological, sociological analysis (and
combinations) (Kelman, 1965j Jones, 1974)j economic and game theory analysis
(Schelling, 1960; Raiffa, 1982); process theories (IkIe, 1964; Burton, 1968; Cox
and Jacobson, 1974j Kremenyuk et al., 1985j Dupont, 1986)j descriptive and his-
torical works (including "case studies") (Hadwen and Kaufmann, 1958; Blaker,
1977; Kaufmann, 1987j Weiss and Stripp, 1985; and many others) In addition, it
is justified to list, as a separate category, cultural-comparative analysis (Hofs-
tede, 1984).
Undoubtedly, each of these approaches has considerable significance.
Negotiations, and certainly international negotiations, are an elastic concept
where all elements of human behavior, and of interpersonal and
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interorganizational contacts are in some way amalgamated according to patterns
which differ from situation to situation.
Functionalism and the newer neo-functionalism as put forward by Ernest
Haas (1964) would ideally have implied a facilitating approach to international
negotiations: national self-interest is supposed to become submerged under the
common ground of the objective truth to be found by experts. Yet we all know
that national self-interest continues to dominate the international negotiating
scene. The attitudes of experts involved in international negotiations, certainly
in the initial stages of negotiation, tend to reflect perceived national interests and
national traditions.
As Cox (1965) has shown, the neo-functionalist approach a. la Haas does
not explain the "political processes ... whereby inputs are transmuted into out-
puts". The essence of what I have called an "integral analysis of international
negotiations" is that not only the political processes, but all relevant variables
and constants, including especially cultural, psychological and linguistic factors,
ought to be taken into account in the analysis of and training for international
negotiations.
1.3. Toward an Integral Analysis of
International Negotiations
It can be argued that, to gain deeper insights into the nature of international
negotiations, all elements should be investigated. The need for a more
comprehensive, here called integral, approach is apparent in several of the writ-
ings referred to above. Kremenyuk et al. (1985) refer to the need to develop a
"global" formalized framework of what they call ·the negotiation situation·.
It is far from easy to integrate all relevant variables into a single model.
An effort in that direction has been made in Figure 1.1. While this figure is
intended to be self-explanatory, a few comments are nevertheless given below.
(Column) Inputs: For most negotiations, points 1, 2, and 3 (substantive
aspects and positions of the various negotiators) attract most attention. Yet the
success or failure of a negotiation can only be fully understood if cultural and
psychological aspects and negotiating styles are taken into account. In a more
refined model, cultural and psychological elements become quasi-independent
constants or variables affecting positions of governments or other negotiators.
(Intermediate column) Rules and Instructions: In most multilateral nego-
tiations there are usually agreed rules of procedures. These are, by their nature,
explicit, although interpretation may vary according to cultural differences. In
multilateral negotiations the influence of the secretariat of the international
organization under whose auspices the negotiation takes place may be consider-
able. This influence can be short-term, expressed as the secretariat position on
the subject at hand, and long-term, reflected in traditions of the organization of
which the secretariat is the custodian and to which negotiating delegations will
normally conform.
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In the case of bilateral negotiations, the absence of explicit rules can pro-
voke strange situations (e.g., at the Reykjavik summit, where the US and the
Soviet sides obviously had different conceptions of the significance of what was
or was not agreed).
(Column) Process: Here again elements which are often neglected, both in
the preparation and the execution of a negotiation, call for special attention.
The factors grouped together under "Atmospherics" and "Time Horizon" belong
to this category. When Henry Kissinger had secret encounters with the Viet-
namese in 1970, the "neutral" Paris environment became an important "atmos-
pheric" element (Kissinger, 1979, Chapter XII).
In multilateral organizations and conferences, an atmosphere of
confidence/optimism (as in most World Bank/IMF meetings) versus an atmo-
sphere of lack of confidence/pessimism (as prevailing often in certain UN, e.g.,
UNCTAD, meetings) can have an important influence on the results of negotia-
tions.
Transition from "Process" to "Output": This transition can be helped by
certain negotiating tools. One of these is the device of a "single negotiating text"
incorporating both what is agreed and what is not yet agreed. Another is a
scientific, computer-aided model. Such a model, prepared at MIT, was helpful in
negotiating (in 1979) draft provisions on deep-seabed mining during the Third
Law of the Sea Conference (1973-1982) (Raiffa, 1982, pp. 275-287). The same
Conference also made extensive use of the technique of a single negotiating text.
With factor X, the intangible factor of "increasing understanding and
trust" or "increasing misunderstanding and lack of trust" is meant. This factor
may decide at the last moment whether a negotiation is going to have tangible
results.
(Column) Output: The dividing line between binding instruments is not
clear-cut. Some UN resolutions, after having been adopted unanimously and
after having been accepted by most or all governments in their domestic laws
and regulations, assume the character of a binding instrument. Moreover, some
decisions may be binding for one party in the negotiation, e.g., an international
secretariat, and nonbinding for governments.
Often the significance of the results of negotiations is differently assessed.
An example: when the European Economic Community or the United States has
negotiated trade matters with Japan, the results achieved, while initially wel-
comed, may be in dispute later, because no precise interpretation had been
agreed upon at the conclusion of the negotiations.
1.4. Interaction between Practice and Research
Simulated negotiation excercises have occasionally served to produce research
results. A more ambitious effort would be to observe actual negotiations in as
many places in the world as possible. The paper by Poortinga and Hendriks
(Chapter 17 in this volume) outlines a methodology which combines video-
and/or audiotaping of real negotiations with an interview/questionnaire method.
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According to the latter, negotiators are asked to reply to a series of questions
before and after the negotiation. The results are reviewed by an independent
team of experts.
Ideally, an exercise of this kind should be undertaken at several main
centers of negotiation, including the UN at New York and Geneva. Obviously it
is far from easy to obtain permission to video- or even audiotape a negotiating
session, especially if its relates to a sensitive matter. A second-best approach
would be to aim at observing relatively innocuous sessions, e.g., a meeting on
cultural exchanges between two countries. The cooperation of a research
mechanism with a global network, such as UN University or UNITAR, is desir-
able.
An investigation of this kind is especially justified in the light of the paucity
of "objectively correct" material on international negotiations. Memoirs are
bound to be subjectively biased. Official archives open up only after a long time.
The PIN project, by bringing together a great many experiences and
insights, offers real hope for advancing the understanding of international nego-
tiations.
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CHAPTER 2
Increasing the Role of
International Negotiations and
International Organizations
Artem V. Serguiev
USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Moscow
USSR
A new evaluation of the role of international negotiations and their active utiliza-
tion for the resolution of disputes and conflicts between states is a part of the
new political thinking in the USSR, which is a characteristic of a new approach
to international problems. Because of this, we should like to stress the profound
interest on the Soviet side in research on how to achieve the increasing
effectiveness of international negotiation mechanisms, and in the IIASA Project
on Processes of International Negotiations in particular.
2.1. Introduction
When we speak about a New Political Thinking, we mean, first of all, an under-
standing and realistic evaluation of the present international situation, which is
characterized by the growing economic, political and cultural interdependence of
countries and by the development of modern technology.
Indeed, the present international situation with regard to all these parame-
ters differs markedly from the situation of a few decades ago. This demands
quite a different approach on the part of all states toward the questions of
development, cooperation and security, and toward the settlement of contradic-
tions and conflicts.
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Not long ago, states sought guarantees of their security and solutions of
international problems of concern to them by military means. This led to the
increasing danger of military conflicts between countries and groups of states on
a regional and global scale. As the strengthening of the military potential of a
state (even significant superiority over other states) could not guarantee its own
security, such a way of providing security is ineffective. So the security of a
country could not be built on the basis of military technical means alone and at
the expense of the security of other states. Under these conditions the security of
any country becomes an organic part of universal international security accept-
able for all countries concerned.
At present we see an entirely different situation. During the last decades
most states have seen the need for eliminating military force to serve national
interests or resolve disputes. Such a situation presents the opportunity to create
a system of international security that would guarantee the peaceful settlement
of international disputes and conflicts. The establishment of such a system of
international security has become a condition for the survival of humanity.
Above all, security for all states becomes possible and necessary no longer
on the basis of military force and superiority, but on the basis of observing cer-
tain standards of international law and rules of conduct of states, particularly on
the basis of the peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflicts.
Under these conditions bilateral and multilateral negotiations become the
main and even the only rational means for solving disputes between states and
settling international problems and conflicts. In this respect, the future focus of
the international activities of states will move toward working out bilateral and
multilateral solutions and agreements. All of this creates the necessity of
developing effective procedures and mechanisms on which states can agree.
The system(s) of international order and security can be maintained and
enhanced by qualitative strengthening of the effectiveness of international organi-
zations and institutions, the whole mechanism of international contacts, interna-
tional negotiations, the system of international law, and the observance of stan-
dards and rules of conduct of states.
In the past, when states faced any international dispute or crisis, mechan-
isms for negotiations as a rule were established after the problem appeared, often
even after a "test of forces" (military, economic, etc.). Now the problem is how
to create or to make more effective and permanent a whole system of negotia-
tions mechanisms on a global scale and how to deal with the mutual interrela-
tions of ongoing negotiations mechanisms. The United Nations and its special-
ized agencies may become a basis of such a global system of negotiating mechan-
isms.
Of course, such a system of international order can be built only on the
basis of confidence among the states concerned, which requires inter alia predict-
able conduct of states in international relations. Negotiations and the resulting
agreements can become confidence-building measures. The implementation of
and compliance with agreements may require that the agreement contain
verification and control provisions (e.g., in the areas of nuclear nonproliferation,
disarmament).
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The quality as well as the skill or art of preparation, organization and conduct of
international negotiations are factors of great importance. For a long time such
a skill or art depended upon the personality of the diplomats conducting negotia-
tions. Of course, the personal, subjective aspects and capabilities of participants
of negotiations do play an important role. But this skill should be complemented
by a solid scientific foundation.
There is a large gap between scientific thought and theoretical generaliza-
tion, on the one hand, and the practice of international negotiations, on the
other. This practice has been studied mainly in its concrete historical aspects, as
a description or history of different cases and processes of international negotia-
tions in the past.
International negotiations are both an art and a science. It is important to
develop the science aspect - i.e., to create a scientific basis for the analysis and
management of such a complicated process of relations between states, to discern
whether there are structure and laws of functioning of negotiating mechanisms
and what these are, and to equip the diplomats and practitioners with this
knowledge.
Information technology also opens new possibilities for improving the
processes of international negotiations. Nowadays, diplomatic institutions in
some countries use "computerized files" of information or data banks on the
questions and issues under discussion in the various negotiations stages. So far,
the use of computers has been mostly for data banks. The computer has not yet
begun to be deeply involved in the functions of analysis, evaluation and forecast-
ing of international systems and processes, which are necessary in the course of
any international negotiations. The (most sophisticated) functions are still per-
formed by the participants of the negotiations via traditional methods and intui-
tion.
So there is a need for the enhanced utilization of the achievements of cyber-
netics and computer technology to create the scientific prerequisites for the tran-
sition from traditional empirical methods of preparing, organizing and conduct-
ing negotiations to new, more effective methods and mechanisms of negotiations,
which would achieve more rational and faster resolutions of international prob-
lems taking better into account the national interests of various countries.
2.3. Modeling Negotiations: Stages of Development
In our view, the main path to the fulfillment of these tasks could be a methodol-
ogy of scientific modeling and the use of models of negotiating mechanisms
reflecting the practice of negotiations, on the basis of computerized systems of
information.
Science has so far not succeeded in creating a generalized model of the
negotiating mechanism for either bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Here we
mean not only a formal (mathematical) model which could be used in a
18 A. V. SertJlliev
computer system, but also a simple abstract, verbal, descriptive model of the
negotiating mechanism. The constructing of this type of model is a task for the
general theory of international relations and foreign policy.
To "build a bridge" between theory and practice by the use of modern
scientific and technical means, especially computer systems for aiding and
improving the mechanism and process of international negotiations and increas-
ing their effectiveness, involves research in the sphere of very complicated
methodological, theoretical and mathematical problems.
We believe that the whole process of creating the preconditions for using
computers to improve the information flow and feedback for the participants of
negotiations - to help them in analyzing and evaluating a situation, forecasting
changes in the object of negotiations, and working out an optimum set of deci-
sions - could be divided into several main stages, from the simple to the more
complicated:
1. The first stage would involve finding ways to use computers in the process
of providing information for and among the participants of negotiations -
in other words, the accumulation, quick search and delivery in a convenient
form of primary information, including textual, statistical, graphical and
bibliographical information.
This category of task seems to be the least complicated to realize, because
many countries have already accumulated significant experience in the
research, construction and use of such data banks, or computerized files on
various subjects. In this case the problem is how to generalize and untilize
that part of this experience applicable to tasks of information service on
international negotiations. Here, we think data banks or computerized files
could be planned and designed on the following subjects:
The net-graphic of preparations for the beginning of negotiations.
Data bank (file) of general information on the object of negotiations;
its status; estimation of the situation.
Data bank (file) on the regulations of international law, international
agreements, UN documents and other information concerning the
object of negotiations.
Data bank (file) on the official positions of the participants on ques-
tions concerning the object of negotiations (e.g., official statements
and declarations, positions of various segments of the public).
Data bank (file) of unofficial statements of government leaders and
diplomats of states or participants in negotiations on their second or
fallback positions, or on possibilities of a compromise.
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Data bank (file) of texts of statements of participants on different
questions arising in the course of negotiations.
Certainly, the subjects of data banks or computerized files on problems of
negotiations could be supplemented and significantly widened by taking
into the account the opinions and experience of diplomats and specialists
on international matters.
2. Developing the use of computers for analyzing, estimating and forecasting
changes of international systems and processes is much more complicated
and difficult. This group of tasks is connected with the analysis of the
object of negotiations, the real interests of various states, and the accurate
definition of their positions - in other words, with the qualitative examina-
tion of substantive issues, which is a basis and precondition for the begin-
ning of any international negotiation.
As experience shows, attempts to use various complicated systems of expert
estimations for these purposes (e.g., game methods, development of
scenarios) have not had as yet a significant positive effect, and usually are
not accepted by diplomats, often being dismissed as an unknown and
unproven innovation. In this context we believe that the most rational and
promising way to use computers in the practice of international negotia-
tions is the method of scientific modeling of the system and processes of
international negotiations to analyze, estimate and forecast the interna-
tional situation and to work out variants of solutions of international prob-
lems. This calls for constructing an adequate scientific model of the
mechanisms and processes of international negotiations on the basis of
complex qualitative (verbal) and quantitative (mathematical) descriptions.
We feel that the right way would be to begin with creating a descriptive or
verbal model, and then realize its formalization.
Naturally, in doing this we shall face the necessity of the preliminary exam-
ination and solution of many problems of methodology, theory and methods
of scientific modeling of international relations, and of constructing
appropriate algorithms and programs. This involves a whole set of
scientific problems, which could be effectively solved only through a
significant input of and cooperation between researchers and negotiators.
Without the knowledge and assessment of the broad framework of interna-
tional relations, the concrete international situation or problem under dis-
cussion cannot be realistically and correctly understood and estimated.
Because of that, a preliminary condition for effective modeling of the inter-
national negotiations mechanisms is research on the general problems of
creating an overall model of international relations. The results of such
research could be the creation of the theory and methodology as well as
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programming foundations of a model of the system of international rela-
tions, together with its ecological, economic, political, military and ideologi-
cal subsystems. We believe that this could represent the second stage of
our research on international negotiations.
3. The third stage of our work, we think, should be research on the theoreti-
cal, methodological and mathematical problems of creating operative
models for concrete international situations - in other words, models that
would reflect various regional and bilateral conflicts and disputes as objects
of negotiations among countries. We believe that such models of concrete
international situations and problems should be built on the basis of a sin-
gle methodology and would be a continuation and concretization of a com-
mon global macro-model of the world system of international relations.
This would help the participants of negotiations to arrive more quickly at
mutual understandings of estimating situations and of the consequences of
changes resulting from certain solutions and provisions that would be
incorporated in international agreements. The complexity of such a range
of problems undoubtedly will demand participation of significant scientific
forces.
4. The fourth stage could involve the exploration and formulation, on the
basis of scientific modeling, of a theory and practical methods of forecasting
changes in the system of international relations and concrete political situa-
tions. The creation of such forecasting models, which could provide a pos-
sibility to see trends and prospects in the development of concrete situa-
tions, would create a good foundation for a state to identify its policy aims
in any international conflict or dispute.
5. The fifth stage or set of problems involves research on the formulation of
practical methods for the construction of operative models of a "system of
aims" of any state and its representatives at negotiations. Such a "system
of aims" usually finds its expression in a set of proposals and demands put
forward by this state at negotiations. This research is needed, because a
task of great importance in the preparation of negotiations would be an
accurate and rational definition of the policy aims of a state with regard to
a given international problem or dispute.
6. All of the above-mentioned tasks belong to the sphere of improving infor-
mation and consultative services for those involved in the various stages of
preparations of negotiations. The following set of tasks deals with prob-
lems of analytical services during the process of negotiations.
The most complicated group of problems in our opinion revolve around the
use of a complex model of a concrete political situation to examine which
positive or negative results for each side of a negotiation are implied by the
realization of a state's proposals, positions or demands. We think that
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such a use - if possible - of a computerized model for examining the
consequences of the realization of various proposals could take the form of
a "What would happen if ...?" principle.
We consider that the possibility of examining, with the help of a computer
model, all variants and implications of the proposals and positions of states
or participants in the processes of international negotiations to be the most
important task of scientific modeling of the mechanisms and processes of
international negotiations. International negotiations in their essence are
an exchange of information about positions and demands of states or parti-
cipants - that is, a process of comparing demands and of achieving
compromise solutions through concession-making, for the benefit of all
sides.
In the process of such a comparison of positions and consideration of vari-
ants of solutions, it could be possible to define more efficiently or effectively
common, mutually acceptable positions, as a basis for working out agree-
ments.
The creation of such complex models would demand the solution of many
new methodological and theoretical interdisciplinary problems, which
require the participation and advice of specialists in many areas, such as
philosophy, political science, sociology, international relations, systems
analysis, programming and diplomacy. The creative unification of their
efforts in solving this complicated task is necessary to achieve useful
results.
If it turns out to be possible to develop such a set of models for the
mechanisms and processes of negotiations, this could become a ·soul· of com-
puter consultative systems in various institutions involved in the processes of
international negotiations, and a means for increasing the effectiveness of inter-
national negotiations, through aiding in the search for quicker and better solu-
tions of international disputes.
We believe the development of such models is a worthwhile task and aim,
because it represents the development of a possible means for developing and
strengthening peaceful cooperation of peoples, directed to the acceleration of
social, economic, scientific, technical and cultural progress of all countries and
people.
Our group of Soviet researchers is ready to participate actively in this work
and hopes that the cooperation of scientists from IIASA and from various coun-
tries will be possible in the solution of these large and complicated tasks.

CHAPTER 3
Multilateral Negotiations:
The Role of Presiding Officers
Winfried Lang
Ministry 0/ Foreign Affairs
Vienna
Austria
3.1. Introduction
Multilateral negotiations, which take place mainly in the framework of, or under
the auspices of, an international organization, play an increasingly important
role in international relations. They not only determine the evolution of interna-
tional law, but also have an impact on the development of the North-South
dialogue. Decision-making at regional or global levels takes care inter alia of the
environmental consequences of nuclear energy. Such negotiations also exert
some influence, albeit limited, on the defense posture and security perceptions of
a number of countries or on the debt situation of developing countries.
To the external observer, multilateral negotiations present themselves as an
intricate network of relations, a complex system 0/ interactions, which vary con-
siderably as to their visibility. Some key delegations or the respective chairper-
sons brief the media on their expectations or the outcome of a conference. Press
releases drafted by the secretariats try to catch the attention of the public;
interest groups address themselves to the press to convey to a broader circle
their positions and evaluations. To the extent that records are available to
researchers, a relatively accurate account of what has really happened can be
given, although records do reflect reality only in a very limited way; they consti-
tute the small tip of the iceberg that can be seen above the waterline. A full
account of reality would require knowing the content of the reports submitted by
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delegations, at least the most important ones, to their respective governments,
because only these reports give concrete information on the informal, private
part of the negotiation. Since such knowledge is unlikely to be obtained, any
research on negotiations has to rely also on personal accounts of negotiators, who
have participated in a conference; from this insight stems the practice of inter-
viewing negotiators, of collecting their written accounts, of screening official
records and documents against the background of these personal accounts.
This study is an effort to match academic analysis and negotiating experi-
ence by focusing on an actor who stands usually in the limelight of multilateral
negotiations - the presiding officer. To evaluate properly the role and perfor-
mance of presiding officers, it is proposed to scrutinize at first the general set-up
of multilateral negotiations, which includes factors determining the behavior of
actors, factors determining the negotiation situation as a whole and finally those
mechanisms through which the process is channeled toward its final objective.
3.2. Multilateral Negotiations
3.2.1. Factors determining the behavior of actors
To study the factors determining the behavior of actors, one has to address at
the outset the question: who participates in the negotiating process? As the
nation-state, far from being obsolete, still constitutes the main moving force of
international relations, delegations, which represent nation-states and their
governments, continue to be the key actors of multilateral negotiations. One
caveat, however, has to be inserted with respect to negotiations at which delega-
tions of regional economic integration organizations participate, delegations that
either themselves substitute for national delegations or act in parallel with the
representatives of the member states of these organizations. For the purposes of
this study such collective actors can, however, be aggregated with national dele-
gations.
Another actor in his or her own right is the presiding officer of a meeting.
Although he is usually the head of a national delegation, his non-national role
imposes upon him the duty of impartiality and obliges him to orient his
endeavors toward an objective shared by the greatest number of delegations.
Any partisan posture would be incompatible with his function and could seri-
ously jeopardize the prospects of a successful outcome.
Secretariats, in particular their respective heads and other leading officials,
have also to be considered as actors. They may even be at the origin of negotia-
tions; their performance can accelerate or delay the negotiating process; the
value of their input into negotiations, such as studies, reports, synoptic surveys
etc., may affect to some extent the actual outcome of interstate negotiations.
The role of the secretariat could be a catalyzing one, merging and matching
national positions; it should not lose sight of the common weal of the participat-
ing states, sharing in that respect the duties of the presiding officer. This com-
monality of outlook imposes on both the necessity of close cooperation and of
mutually reinforcing activities.
A fourth category of participant should not be neglected, and is gaining full
recognition as actors to the same extent as international negotiations affect areas
traditionally within the internal purview of states, such as human rights, the
regulation of economic activities, the protection of the environment, etc. These
private interest groups, labeled non-governmental organizations, represent busi-
ness, labor, human rights activists, ecologically concerned movements and oth-
ers. Some international bodies, in particular those in the human rights field, rely
heavily on these groups, the information they furnish etc. As this fourth
category of actor usually has only observer status in interstate negotiations, they
exert their influence indirectly and informally, either at home by approaching
their respective governments or on the conference premises by lobbying the indi-
vidual delegations.
Turning now to the question as to which factors determine the behavior of
these actors, answers will have to be given separately for each type of actor.
National delegations act in the first instance along the lines drawn by their
instructions. This guidance itself reflects the general position of the sending
state as regards traditional indicators of power (gross national product, degree of
socioeconomic development, population, military strength, etc.); its allegiance
toward alliances, political or economic groupings; its dependence on economic
assistance, imports of raw materials or energy, etc. Another factor determining
the content and general direction of the brief addressed to the delegation is the
interest the government has in that particular organization and conference and
its status in this framework. A main financial contributor will harbor views
different from a country contributing only marginally to the organization or to
the particular endeavor under consideration. A government represented in the
more restricted bodies of an international organization, or a government acting
on behalf of regional or political interest groups may act and react in ways at
variance with governments not considered as part of the core groups.
Of special importance is the interest the sending state has in the issue at
stake or in a particular outcome of the negotiation process. Its position in cer-
tain negotiations can be prejudiced by declarations made earlier in the same or
some other forum. Since instructions have to be carried out by delegates, the
human factor in a delegation's behavior should not be underestimated; personal
reactions toward stress and the speed of negotiations are of significance similar
to the rank of a negotiator, the latter determining to a certain extent his freedom
of maneuver with respect to instructions received. Being thoroughly familiar
with the subject matter is as important as a good knowledge of the conference
languages. National cultural backgrounds, in particular those related to
decision-making styles (contradictory versus consensual) influence negotiating
behavior as well as the individual facility of a delegate to make contacts with
other delegates, and to approach other participants with a more or less open
mind.
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Most of the factors determining the behavior of national delegations have
also to be taken into account when examining the performance of presiding
officers. They are, however, not supposed to abide by any instructions addressed
to them by national authorities; their ultimate goal should be the early and suc-
cessful conclusion of the process to the helm of which they have been called.
Presiding officers should be committed to the overall interest common to most, if
not all, delegations. The human factor, their sense of equity and fairness, their
knowledge of the rules of procedure and their empathy with respect to conflicting
positions can playa decisive role.
A mediating function can also be assumed by the secretariat, provided that
national delegations are willing to accept such a task for an actor whose main
interest should be the smooth running of the negotiation process. Members of
the secretariat are to a certain extent affected by their respective national back-
grounds, which should however not lead them to espouse one or the other
national viewpoint. Their loyalty should be directed exclusively to the organiza-
tion, its object and purpose, although one has to admit that not all concerned
comply fully with that obligation. If the international organization servicing a
particular negotiation has a more or less official "ideology", e.g., some progres-
sive attitude regarding North-South relations, this can be an important factor
determining the concrete action of the officials of that organization. If this
amounts, however, to some kind of partisan position not shared by the entire
membership, such behavior most certainly will weaken the credibility of the
respective officials as honest brokers or neutral mediators facilitating the interac-
tions of delegations. Technical expertise, full knowledge of legal and financial
implications of decisions to be adopted, awareness of previous decisions and
other relevant precedents that may have a bearing on the ongoing negotiation
are the qualities a secretariat is supposed to have. To this should be added the
availability of the secretariat for devising compromise formulae and for propos-
ing innovative solutions, which turn a zero-sum game into a positive-sum game
and results all actors can live with.
Non-governmental organizations are mainly influenced by the interests for
whose pursuit they were established - interests of an economic, social or
humanitarian nature, etc. Events such as concrete cases of human rights viola-
tions can have an immediate impact on interstate relations, if activist groups
assume responsibility for their presentation at those international fora in which
they enjoy consulative status. The behavior of these organizations is most
closely linked to partisan interests and concrete events. Whereas governments
attempt to strike a balance between the various interests they are supposed to
defend at the international level, these groups exist for the very purpose of
defending particular views and interests; they are not expected to mediate
between conflicting interests. Although these groups play only a secondary role
in interstate negotiations, their impact on the media and public opinion should
not be underrated; being frequently well versed in public relations, their com-
ments on a particular negotiation may very well mould the public perception of a
particular intergovernmental process.
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Factors that exert their influence beyond individual actors determine the overall
situation within which a negotiation takes place and constitute the second set of
elements to be considered in this context.
Most important among these factors is the type of decision that should be
the result of negotiations. This decision may be a legally binding instrument, a
political commitment, the establishment of a new international organization, an
election, etc. Actors will adjust their activities to the particular nature of the
decision to be taken. IT the result is supposed to be a convention or treaty,
lawyers will be included in most delegations as the so-called "legal niceties", fre-
quently neglected by negotiators, will acquire special importance. If a new
organization is to be created, experts on financial matters will be called in, to
give advice to the generalists normally in charge of these negotiations. If, how-
ever, a certain meeting is only a preliminary or intermediate step on the long
road of decision-making, technical experts are likely to dominate the process.
Their influence tends to decrease as the end of a negotiation is approached; this
does not necessarily imply that their impact on the ultimate outcome is lost;
quite to the contrary, it happens frequently that texts elaborated during pain-
staking sessions at expert levels acquire a life of their own, so that little freedom
of choice is left for the final round at which negotiators of a political rank
approve a text already finalized at a lower level.
Elections constitute another type of decision: eminent persons to be
selected for some special task, well-known lawyers required to fill the vacancies
at international tribunals, or countries competing for a seat in a limited member-
ship body. These elections are preceded by full-fledged campaigns; incumbents
compete with newcomers. The principle of rotation is invoked against the
advantages of continuity. Special merits are weighed against specific qualities
and important national interests. Regional groups strive to present to the
plenary body a "clean slate" , i.e., not more candidates than seats allotted to that
group. Governments sometimes declare themselves willing to vote for a particu-
lar candidate, on the condition that their candidate for some other function is
supported by the government of the former candidate. Considerations of pres-
tige are not alien to this kind of contest.
Decisions to be taken as the result of a negotiation are also viewed in their
overall context: does this decision constitute a major element, an asset or a lia-
bility within the framework of the East-West confrontation, or is it rather a
milestone in the North-South dialogue? The type of decision not only affects
individual behavior, but also determines to a certain extent the mechanisms
selected for the negotiation process.
Another factor determining the overall situation is the degree to which the
decision is linked to precedents or related to decisions to be taken in other fora.
If the subject matter under consideration allows it to be split into different ele-
ments, which can enter into a broader scheme of compensation, then the process
of mutual accommodation may be greatly facilitated, as benefits in one area may
be tradeable against losses in another field. In cases, where negotiations take
place in several subcommittees, cross-cutting deals may allow for the balancing
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of advantages and disadvantages. Such efforts aimed at equalizing the results
and leaving no participant with a net loss are the special responsibility of presid-
ing officers or middle-of-the-road delegations that assume mediating roles. No
delegation can be expected to leave the conference table without at least the sem-
blance of some positive result; if this were to happen, the government concerned
would probably not comply with that decision and would challenge its logic and
legality. It would spare no effort to reverse such a decision or to invalidate it by
an opposite decision adopted in another body more conducive to its interests.
These considerations confirm the view that a balanced result approved by con-
sensus guarantees most effectively the compliance with that decision. To con-
clude negotiations with a consensus decision means that patience and skill, pers-
everance and flexibility - and not haste and brinkmanship - are required.
The time and duration of a conference as well as its venue may have a
bearing on the negotiation and its outcome. If a meeting is convened at the
headquarters of an international organization, the "diplomatic milieu" present at
that place is likely to be familiar with the issues and may benefit from existing
informal channels of communication. The same applies to the role of the secre-
tariat, which is likely to function more efficiently on home ground than anywhere
else. Organizing a conference at another place than the seat of the competent
administrative unit may be justified on grounds of political convenience - the
opening session of a new trade negotiation may be held in a developing country
to stress the importance of this negotiation for developing countries - or
because the majority of states wishes to achieve results they do not consider to
be attainable if that meeting were held at the traditional location. Governments
may wish to host a conference at their capital for reasons of prestige, or because
they wish to identify themselves with a particular cause.
The size of a meeting room can be important for the progress of negotia-
tions; chairpersons tend to call informal consultations in their offices, the size of
which allows only for one or two persons per interest group to be present and to
participate in the core negotiation.
The duration of a conference is usually fixed in advance. If, for financial
reasons, a very short time is allotted to a particular meeting, not at all commen-
surate with its task, delegates may show themselves reluctant to be fully engaged
in that negotiation, because they believe that nothing meaningful can be
achieved during the short time available. They will press either for an extension
or for a new meeting at a later date.
Climatic conditions prevailing at the place of a conference should not be
neglected; if a great number of delegates feel uncomfortable, their eagerness to
work hard and to participate at sessions going from the early morning until late
in the night may be muted.
This list of factors determining the general situation at the negotiating
table is certainly not exhaustive. Some reference is frequently made to the gen-
eral political climate. This implies that the overall state of affairs between the
superpowers is likely to influence multilateral negotiations in certain fields, in
particular the area of disarmament and arms control. The North-South dialogue
was for a considerable time affected by the developing countries' striving for the
establishment of a New International Economic Order. Almost any negotiation
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between developing and developed countries was influenced by this posture. The
results of many negotiations were assessed in terms of this comprehensive stra-
tegy - to what extent could a particular result be considered as an achievement
or as progress toward the overall goal? The general political climate constitutes,
however, a rather vague indicator for forecasting the outcome of multilateral
negotiations. Positive results have been achieved even during periods of increas-
ing tension between East and West. Nevertheless, an easing of tensions and pro-
gress realized in a particular context may generate spill-over effects for other
fora, particularly in cases where the subjects are interdependent or at least inter-
related, e.g., confidence-building measures and the review of a treaty prohibiting
the production of certain weapons.
3.2.3. Mechanisms of the negotiation process
The multilateral negotiation process may be viewed as a two-track exercise;
although these tracks - the public debate and the informal private negotiations
- run for some time in parallel, they are expected to join toward the end and to
produce a single and final result. Events occurring on one track influence
developments that take place on the other track. Delegations showing a high
profile in the public process may play a marginal role in the informal negotia-
tions, whereas delegations almost silent during the debate can dominate the pro-
cess of negotiations proper, if for instance they are able to benefit from a well-
established bipartisan posture and are ready to submit compromise formulae, to
be innovative in the search for solutions or to induce new flexibility in opposing
parties.
Several types of mechanisms are at the disposal of actors in order to make
progress:
The so-called formal structural mechanism comprises all those organs and
institutions that constitute the official structure of a conference. These include
the plenary of a conference, its committees, its bureau and the regional groups.
The plenary serves as the main forum for delivering formal statements, electing
officers, establishing working bodies, and approving the final document. The
bureau, composed of the president, the vice presidents and the chairpersons of
the various suborgans, is supposed to function as the steering body of the confer-
ence, to prepare the procedural decisions of the plenary and to assist the
president in the conduct of business. Formally established committees and com-
missions can be open-ended or may be restricted to a smaller number of delega-
tions, which raises the problem of balanced regional participation and represen-
tation. These bodies work usually under a specific mandate, decided by the
plenary; they may deal with the first or second reading of a proposed treaty,
resolve detailed questions of a legal or drafting nature, or look into technical or
financial matters. All these bodies share one common task: preparation of the
final text (treaty, declaration, resolution), which is approved in the plenary by
the greatest possible number of delegations. Regional groups (Africa, Asia, Latin
America, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and others) perform mainly electoral
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functions related to the nomination of officers and the membership of subsidiary
organs (drafting committee, credentials committee, etc.). Such groups, almost
indispensable for the proper take-off of a conference, can acquire long-lasting pol-
itical significance, if they convert themselves into interest groups the membership
of which may coincide with that of military alliances or other political or
economic groupings.
The formal procedural mechanism covers important elements, such as the
rules of procedure that stipulate the formal requirements of decision-making and
the majorities necessary to approve amendments and to adopt the final text.
These rules also indicate the powers of the president, define the linkages between
the various main and subsidiary organs, etc. A delegation that is well versed in
the use of these rules (points of order, right of reply, etc.) may well be able to
dominate or to manipulate the formal decision-making process. Another ele-
ment, the agenda of a conference, is frequently considered a routine matter;
although this might be true in most cases, there are always instances when the
structure of the agenda may be politically significant. This applies in particular
to meetings dealing with a large number of different and competing issues. The
order in which these agenda items are arranged indicates an order of priorities;
items at the very bottom of an agenda are likely to be postponed for considera-
tion at a later meeting due to lack of time. Opposing interest groups that assign
priority to two different items may insist that one single debate be conducted on
both items at the same time, because they wish to preclude their favorite issue
receiving somewhat lesser treatment than the primary issue of the other group.
Decision-making on such preliminary matters may take precious time away from
substantive work. It has therefore become frequent practice to settle these
matters (rules of procedure, agenda, allocation of officers to regional groups)
before the conference is formally opened, either by means of informal consulta-
tions or through some preparatory committee.
A main element of this formal procedural mechanism is also the public
debate (general and special) and the decision-making itself, the voting of amend-
ments, the handling of procedural motions, the final vote and the concluding
statements of delegations, which may contain reservations or interpretations
with respect to the text adopted. Whether the final document is approved by
consensus or by formal vote depends mainly on its content; a clear-cut majority
vote is sometimes preferred to a vaguely drafted consensus text that gives too
much leeway to differing and even contradicting interpretations. Consensus
texts are, however, believed to carry more weight than documents approved by a
majority. The relative merits of each approach will have to be judged on a case-
by-case basis.
Turning to the informal structural mechanism, one is immediately faced
with those informal groups that act as the main moving force of multilateral
negotiations. These groups exist in the first instance as gatherings of like-
minded delegations, of representatives sharing the same political background or
defending identical or similar political interests; they are primarily interest
groups. But groups have also a second function - they may serve as a device
for consultations and informal negotiations, if they are composed of representa-
tives of various interest groups. Teams of negotiators instructed by their
Mu1t.ilaterol Negotiatioru 31
respective interest groups meet in a framework that has received several labels:
"contact group", "negotiating group", "working group". "friends of the
president". Actors resort to this kind of negotiating device wherever the likeli-
hood of agreement is rather low as regards proceedings in the formal committees
of a conference. Such informal negotiating groups are usually convened by the
presiding officer, and they are chaired either by himself or by another leading
officer of the conference. Selecting participants for such an exercise may reveal
itself as a very delicate task; on the one hand, the number of participants has to
be kept as low as possible to allow for a meaningful person-to-person dialogue;
on the other hand, nobody having a primary interest in the matter under con-
sideration should be left out. Quite frequently several negotiating groups are
established; they are devoted to different items and their membership varies in
accordance with the concerns expressed by delegations during public debate or
informal contacts with the chair. If delegations or interest groups join forces in
some kind of coalition, this has also to be considered under the heading of the
informal structural mechanism, although one may expect that most of these com-
mon endeavors are limited and short-lived.
A fourth mechanism contributing to progress in multilateral negotiations
may be qualified as informal procedural. In this context all interactions may be
considered that take place among delegations belonging to the same interest
group, as well as interactions that link various interest groups by means of nego-
tiating devices, such as contact groups. In this most informal environment coor-
dinators or spokesmen of interest groups receive detailed negotiating mandates
from their like-minded fellow delegates. After having carried out their instruc-
tions in the framework of a contact group. and having negotiated with the oppo-
site side in the most traditional manner, these emissaries return to their interest
groups and will try to "sell" the result achieved to its members or ask for new
instructions, in order to pursue the dialogue. At this juncture the intervention of
the presiding officer, a middle-of-the-road delegation or a prominent member of
the secretariat may be helpful. Innovative proposals, to which nobody is for-
mally committed, may provide a way out of a deadlocked situation; seemingly
vague suggestions may contain a face-saving solution acceptable to all parties
concerned.
When texts agreed most informally among a small number of delegations
arrive before the official organs of a conference, the most delicate moment of a
multilateral negotiation is at hand. One can practically never be fully assured
that all delegations, in particular those that had no part in these private deal-
ings, will graciously approve these informal agreements. The risk of failure at
this point can be reduced, however, if each and every delegation having a major
interest in a particular question was continuously consulted and briefed on these
informal developments. Time constraints as well as social pressures contribute
their part to the final formal approval of agreements informally arrived at. Most
delegations show themselves reluctant to insist at the very end on minor points,
even if they are of some importance to them. because they are afraid that such
insistence might wreck the fragile compromise. Many breathe a sigh of relief or
even applaud, when the chair announces that the text has been adopted. Such
emotional reactions reflect the stress most negotiators have been under during
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long days and sometimes even weeks of arduous proceedings. After a brief
moment of euphoria, the average delegate will return to business, to brief his
own government and to assess the results against the background of competing
interests and sometimes adverse circumstances.
3.3. Role of Presiding Officers
3.3.1. Selection
The rules of procedure usually provide Jor the formal election of a president or
chairperson. This kind of democratic decision is supposed to convey to the
officer the support of all delegations, to confer upon him the authority that is
required to direct without challenge the meeting and to control the proceedings
of the conference. This mode of selection also has the advantage of giving dele-
gations, which represent sovereign states, at least the semblance of control over
the officer, his performance and his actions. Owing to the great number of
participating countries and to the fact that delegations belong to competing or
even opposing political groups, the nomination of the presiding officer has
developed in many cases into a highly political matter. In complex bodies, such
as the General Assembly of the United Nations, detailed arrangements have been
devised to assure the rotation of presidential functions (plenary and committees)
among the various political and regional groups. But even in ad hoc meetings,
such as review conferences in the disarmament field, questions of balance and
equal distribution of functions can play a certain role; it may happen that the
number of functions (vice presidents, vice chairpersons, etc.) must be increased
in order to accommodate the wishes of all regional groups. Except for expert
bodies of the most technical kind, considerations of national prestige, political
equilibrium, and general acceptability of a country and person dominate the
selection process. If a certain regional group is entitled to the presidency in a
given context, no other group will as a rule challenge the candidate proposed by
that group, although the semblance of a democratic election is maintained. Elec-
tions as the mode of selection have in fact been replaced by consultations. These
private dealings may precede the official election date, which usually coincides
with the opening of the conference, by weeks or months.
As regards the participants in this selection process, various actors have to
be considered: The secretariat in charge of a particular conference has a primary
interest to assure a smooth start. The formal opening of a meeting will have to
be postponed and time necessary for substantive work is lost, if there are com-
peting candidacies and if no preliminary understanding on the distribution of the
different functions (president, vice presidents, rapporteur, chairpersons of sub-
committees, etc.) has been reached. In cases where a series of meetings takes
place or where a permanent organ holds periodic sessions, the outgoing chairper-
son can exert some influence on the nomination of the successor. If the
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conference is more technical than political - a distinction not easily made - the
professional qualifications of a candidate might prevail over considerations of a
more political nature. In expert bodies, chairpersons are frequently elected from
among those who have a longer period of service in that particular committee,
who have already gained a profile as mediators and/or who have developed
ample experience in submitting gap-bridging proposals, thus facilitating the work
of that committee. As far as conferences of a political character are concerned,
these preliminary consultations will be dominated by some key countries, such as
the superpowers, the coordinators of the various regional and political groups,
and/or governments, which have a special interest in the subject matter being
considered at the conference.
The question as to where the initiative comes from for the nomination of a
person for a specific presidential function has no clear answer. Personal ambi-
tion or considerations of national prestige may be at the origin of a candidacy; a
country that hosts a conference at its own expense in its capital is inclined to
consider its chief delegate to that conference as a natural candidate for the
presidency. Some governments that appreciated the performance of a presiding
officer in the past may wish to see him again in the chair of a meeting covering
the same or some related subjects. These countries are likely to do the canvass-
ing for that candidate, even if he or she does not belong to their own group. In
some instances, this selection process amounts to a delicate search for an alterna-
tive solution, when a deadlock has developed between two or three equally strong
primary candidates. Although those instances are rare, they may occur in par-
ticular in areas of a very sensitive nature. A device to prevent such situations
has been agreed upon in the Conference on Disarmament, in which the
presidency is assumed every month by another delegation.
Since most multilateral negotiations take place in the realm of diplomacy,
questions of protocol and problems of precedence and rank cannot totally be
ignored. In cases where most delegations to a conference are headed by a
cabinet minister, the president of that conference is supposed to be of ministerial
rank. The same applies to meetings at which delegations are led by ambassadors
or heads of mission; a government presenting its candidate for the presidency of
that meeting will have to assure that this person holds the title of ambassador or
is of some equivalent rank in its national administration; and prominent profes-
sors and experts may sometimes be considered equivalent to such high-ranking
officials.
Expectations of various kinds are focused on the person thus elected; some
delegations expect the presiding officer to stay aloof from the ordinary give-and-
take of a negotiation and to perform a mainly ceremonial function, whereas oth-
ers have supported a candidate because they consider him an efficient negotiator,
able to push matters ahead. Still other delegations believe that they may able to
manipulate the presiding officer, either because he owes them his function or
because he belongs to their political grouping. The only expectation a presiding
officer should always strive to fulfill is that of impartiality and fairness. To what
extent he really can contribute to the positive outcome of a negotiation depends
on many factors, most of which are well beyond his control.
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3.3.2. Factors determining the actions of the presiding officer
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Some of the factors that determine the behavior of a presiding officer have
already been mentioned. Important among these are his national and profes-
sional background, his previous experience as a negotiator, and the support he
receives during the negotiation from his own delegation and from the regional
group or political group to which he belongs. To a certain extent his perfor-
mance will also depend on the secretariat and the other members of the bureau
(the vice presidents, rapporteurs, chairpersons of committees, etc). Another
important factor, which has already been identified as crucial for the entire nego-
tiation situation, but which also has its impact on the role of the presiding
officer, is the subject matter or the objective of the conference. Negotiating a
treaty or resolution places considerably more stress on the president than the
chairing of a meeting devoted only to the presentation of national viewpoints,
which are reflected more or less accurately in a concluding report.
Comparing various conferences reveals that the most important factor for
the performance of a presiding officer is the structure of a conference - the dis-
tance that separates him from the mainstream of negotiations. A conference of
plenipotentiaries, which is entrusted with the elaboration and adoption of a con-
vention, possibly has its center of gravity in the drafting committee or the com-
mittee of the whole. The president of the conference may, therefore, have less
bearing on the final text than the chairpersons in charge of either committee,
provided all outstanding issues can be settled at the level of these bodies. If,
however, certain questions remain unresolved in these subsidiary organs, it will
be the task of the president to schedule informal consultations, contact groups,
etc., to which he invites only those delegations and group coordinators he consid-
ers indispensable for the settlement of problems left open at the committee level.
Although not formally participating in the work of the official committees, the
president will follow most closely, either in person or by means of somebody
reporting to him, negotiations taking place at this lower level. Keeping abreast
with the proceedings at whatever level can sometimes be more important than
the actual direction of formal meetings. A conference that is much less struc-
tured than a plenipotentiaries conference, however, at which the presiding officer
is acting close to the mainstream of negotiations, may require from him some
direct involvement in the drafting exercise. This type of conference, frequently
called a meeting of experts, allows for the full participation of the presiding
officer in substantive work. In this context he might himself try his hand at
preparing compromise papers that chart some medium course between the
differing or opposing positions of national delegations or interest groups. The
structure of the conference and the more or less controversial nature of issues
determine quite frequently the nature of the presiding officer's activity: whether
it is a ceremonial or a steering function or a substantive negotiating role.
A factor not entirely to be neglected is the membership of the conference.
The task of the presiding officer will sometimes be less difficult if only govern-
ments sharing the same ideology, for instance, developed countries with a market
economy, participate in a negotiation. Meetings with delegations from all parts
of the globe are occasionally burdened by issues not directly related to the
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subject matter under consideration - issues, however, that may be of consider-
able importance to one or two delegations. The full powers of a delegation,
whose sending government is recognized only by a small number of states, may
give rise to a dispute. Another question that may arise is the status of regional
integration organizations with respect to their adherence to the treaty adopted
by the conference. Such side issues may delay the conclusion of a negotiation. A
presiding officer, mindful of a smooth conclusion of a conference, will use his best
endeavors to dispose of these problems at the earliest possible moment.
Ideological homogeneity does not, however, guarantee the success of a
conference. Countries that share common values to a considerable extent tend
to strive for rules and regulations that touch matters hitherto exclusively within
their domestic jurisdiction. The further these agreements advance into the tradi-
tional, internal sovereignty domain of states, the more national administrations
try to resist efforts aimed at a harmonized or uniform system of law, economic
affairs, trade regulations, environmental protection, etc. This means that even
negotiations in a relatively closed circle, such as the OECD, can be arduous and
lengthy. National interests are defended with vigor at whatever level, be it
regional or universal.
3.3.3. The powers of a presiding officer
The formal powers of a presiding officer are traditionally laid down in the rules
of procedure; these powers include the following:
Opening and closing the meeting
Directing discussions and ensuring the observance of the rules of procedure
According the right to speak
Putting proposals to a vote
(With the agreement of the conference) limiting the speaking time, closing
the list of speakers, closing the debate, suspending or adjourning a meeting,
adjourning the debate on an item, etc.
A particularly crucial moment occurs for every presiding officer when the
conference proceeds to formal voting, in particular if separate voting on amend-
ments to the basic proposal is required. If several competing amendments have
been moved to a proposal, it is up to him to decide which amendment is furthest
removed from the original proposal and should therefore be voted upon first. He
will also be well advised to dispose quickly of points of order, even at the risk
that his ruling is challenged and overruled by a majority. Although procedural
debates tend to become rather rare events, any presiding officer has to be
prepared to deal with such situations and should be fully acquainted with all the
intricacies of these rules. Formal voting has been replaced in many instances by
an adoption of texts by consensus. This mode of decision-making puts less strain
on the procedural abilities of the presiding officer. It imposes upon him, how-
ever, at least in some instances, a much stronger involvement in substantive
36 w. Lan9
negotiations and an active engagement in numerous behind-the-scene dealings, if
the delegations concerned fail to agree in their direct contacts.
The informal powers of a presiding officer are neither codified nor really
limited - whatever serves the purpose of the conference and is accepted by the
participants may be undertaken by him in order to proceed to a final document
that is approved or at least not objected to by the greatest possible number of
delegations. In this context he is entitled to take any initiative he considers
advisable: he may submit procedural or substantive proposals to break a
deadlock; convene whatever informal body he deems appropriate; circulate work-
ing papers; and put pressure on some key delegations to conclude their bilateral
or trilateral dealings, on whose results hinges the outcome of the overall negotia-
tion. As the chief officer of the conference he will also keep the media informed
of the progress of negotiations, without, however, revealing points whose public
knowledge could damage the proceedings. A full account of the negotiation will
be reserved for a final briefing at the end of the conference. The extent to which
a presiding officer may use most of his informal powers depends on the permis-
sive consensus of the participants, and in particular the key delegations among
them. If, for instance, these key delegates prefer to settle some outstanding
issues among themselves without interference from the chair, the presiding officer
will abstain from any kind of separate and intrusive activity. Faced, however,
with the likelihood of other delegations growing impatient, he will press those
key delegations to finalize their negotiations as early as possible and not to abuse
any de facto privileged position they may enjoy as a consequence of their political
power.
The powers of a presiding officer are extensive and fragile at the same time;
to what extent he avails himself of these powers depends also on his personality,
on the human factor.
3.3.4. The characteristics of a "good" presiding officer
Whoever undertakes to sketch the profile of an "ideal" presiding officer will do so
in the light of personal experience, either by judging the actual performance of
chairpersons he has become acquainted with, or by scrutinizing his own actions
in the past, if he has had the privilege to serve as presiding officer. Considera-
tions submitted hereinafter draw on both sources of information; these reflections
have, therefore, to be considered as rather subjective and personal ones. As les-
sons learned by the author in specific circumstances, they are not necessarily
applicable to all instances and every type of international negotiation. Any
recommendation given on the basis of concrete experience may reveal itself as
totally erroneous in other cases, as the circumstances prevailing in the different
negotiation situations are rarely identical. Bearing in mind these caveats, one
may summarize the qualities of a "good" presiding officer as follows:
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As regards questions of procedure, he should develop a certain degree of
firmness in order not to be manipulated by other actors; this requires that
his procedural decisions should be based on a comprehensive knowledge of
the respective rules. '
As far as questions of substance are concerned, he should display some
flexibility, because he is supposed not to have a vested interest in a particu-
lar outcome of the negotiations he is directing, except for the overall objec-
tive to obtain for the final document the broadest possible support. To
divest himself of his specific views and to exchange his own national per-
spective for some vague type of open-mindedness is less easy than expected.
It goes without saying that he should be well versed in the intricacies of the
subject matter, although he should not lose sight of the broader perspec-
tives.
A person gifted with creativity and innovativeness can be an ideal
president, provided his ideas do not go too far beyond what has been called
the permissive consensus of the participants; proposals departing too radi-
cally from well-established models of thinking may be perceived as trouble-
some and disturbing.
To be constantly aware of the mood prevailing among key actors, he should
seek the advice of the most important delegations, in particular before tak-
ing decisions related to the structure and procedure of the conference; at
the same time the mere semblance of being dependent on these delegations
will have to be avoided.
He should exercise some kind of "preventive guidance". This means that
he should be aware of delegations that may create problems and include
them, if necessary, in the inner circle of decision-making. He should foresee
most obstacles that may arise during the course of a negotiation and should
try to dispose of them even before they appear on the negotiating table.
Such obstacles may include political side issues, such as the representation
of certain governments or other questions of status (national liberation
movements, etc.); problem delegations are sometimes satisfied if the presid-
ing officer deals personally with their particular problem.
If the presiding officer is about to submit his own gap-bridging proposals to
the conference, he should do it at the latest possible moment, after the
exhaustion of all other remedies. The importance of the time factor in such
circumstances must not be neglected. If his presentation occurs too early,
these proposals risk being attacked from various quarters, thus losing their
value as a common meeting ground. Another tactic consists of presenting
various and successive drafts to informal groups, these drafts being
modified step by step in the light of comments received from delegations
participating in these groups.
An important quality of the presiding officer is his "availability", his readi-
ness to be at the disposal of all participants and his ability to listen care-
fully to all concerns expressed to him either in public or in private.
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A presiding officer who is fully involved in substantive negotiations should
not only be gifted in the art of splitting up issues and of devising alterna-
tive or parallel courses of action, but should also be able to merge the
results of separate proceedings into one single outcome.
Corresponding to this catalogue of positive requirements, which is certainly
not exhaustive, is a series of recommendations of a more negative nature. To be
efficient the presiding officer should not
Be a loner, which implies that he should seek private contacts with as
many delegations as possible and at a minimum the most important ones,
although certain decisions he will have to take alone. Keeping the
appropriate balance between too much reliance on the general sentiment
and too strong an impulse toward solitary action remains one of the most
crucial elements of a good chairmanship.
Hesitate to exert pressure on delegations that, deliberately or not, delay the
overall progress of the negotiation. To this end he may propose time limits
or target dates. He may even convey to those concerned the idea that he is
going to present his own proposal, if the opposing parties are unable to
come up with an agreed solution after the lapse of time allotted to them for
informal proceedings; this idea may be perceived by those concerned as a
threat and could facilitate agreement among them.
Impose himself as long as some movement in private dealings among key
delegations and interest groups is visible, because he should always keep in
mind that any kind of pressure is resented by delegations, unless it is
justified by the objective lack of progress in these consultations. This
amounts again to a delicate balancing act between patience and activism,
between respect for particular (minority) interests and the general commit-
ment to the early achievement of common goals.
It is sometimes a demanding task to direct a conference at which hundreds
of delegates pursuing differing, if not opposing, interests and objectives partici-
pate. The means at the disposal of a presiding officer are quite limited; as his
most important assets one should consider his reputation, authority, record of
fairness and impartiality. Drawing sparsely and carefully on this capital, he may
succeed and avoid the numerous pitfalls just enumerated. His action cannot,
however, compensate for the lack of political will on the part of the other actors.
If the great number of delegations, and in particular the most important ones,
are not ready to compromise, to accommodate their respective interests, if a
minimum amount of confidence is absent from a multilateral negotiation, no
agreement will be achieved, whatever efforts are undertaken by the presiding
officer.
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The structure of a conference, the distance that separa~es a presiding officer from
the mainstream of negotiations in a conference, will be a decisive condition for
the impact of his actions on concrete events. The influence a president perform-
ing mainly ceremonial functions can exert on the final outcome of a meeting will
be almost nil. A "steering president" , who, although acting mainly in the back
chambers of a conference, directs the overall process and coordinates several sub-
sidiary proceedings, may affect the final result to a slightly more significant
extent. If the structure of the conference allows for a "negotiating president", a
chairperson directly involved in the elaboration of the final document, his action
may be considered as important, if he makes full use of his formal and informal
powers. Such a statement should, however, be qualified to the effect that
without his active participation either the result might not have been achieved at
that very moment or a result of much lower quality and less substantive content
might have been obtained. Whatever type of presidency delegations are faced
with, they will have to assume the main responsibility for the success or failure
of a negotiation. If one were to compute the relative influence of the various
actors on the outcome of a conference, one should realistically admit that even a
"working" and "negotiating" chairperson, with the maximum of negotiating
skills at his or her disposal, will see his or her contribution to the final result lim-
ited to not more than ten percent of the total impact of all negotiators. In some
instances, however, this ten percent makes the difference between success or
failure.
Some aspects of a multilateral negotiation may be more strongly affected
by a chairperson's activity than others. The general mood prevailing among
delegates (controversy versus consensus) can probably be influenced by the
presiding officer; the same applies to the timely closure of a conference. In a
much more restricted manner the presiding officer may help to improve the qual-
ity of the final document, provided the structure of the conference and most
other factors favor such concrete action. If the chairperson deems himself
responsible for protecting minority interests and acts with some success in that
direction, he could also contribute to a broader acceptability of the final docu-
ment.
To put it into a nutshell, one could sum up the preceding reflections as fol-
lows: a bad chairperson cannot easily prevent the positive conclusion of a mul-
tilateral negotiation, if most other factors and actors are geared toward that
objective; a good presiding officer can, however, facilitate the task of delegations
having the necessary political will by accelerating the process of inching toward
the final result and assisting delegations to remove minor and medium obstacles
from the road to success.
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3.4. Conclusions
W.Lang
The foregoing analysis has been devoted to two distinct tasks. In the first
instance, when scrutinizing the forces at work in a multilateral negotiation, the
main objective was to convey a more transparent picture of reality. Concepts
such as factors and mechanisms were used as tools to throw more light on an
intricate network of complex interactions among actors, such as national delega-
tions, international organizations, etc. The group as a mechanism with two
different functions - namely, to defend partisan interests and to merge differing
or opposing interests - was recognized as one of the main elements of the nego-
tiation process. A second lesson to be drawn from this more general study would
be that informal proceedings have a much stronger impact on the final outcome
of negotiations than more or less public debates. In this respect it was also
recognized that traditional negotiating methods or tactics have not disappeared
from the realm of diplomacy, even in a context in which more than two actors
meet in order to arrive at a result satisfactory to all or at least most participants.
Whereas the first part of this study could draw on a broad body of research
on conference diplomacy, etc., as well as the personal experience of the author,
the second part turned out to be a somewhat subjective reflection of numerous
negotiations in which the author took part. This chapter, focusing on the role of
the presiding officer in multilateral negotiations, should be considered an invita-
tion extended to negotiators with a similar experience to embark on a thorough
dialogue aimed at an objective evaluation of this role. Such common investiga-
tion may help improve the performance of chairpersons in the future by assessing
the respective value of certain types of action under different circumstances.
This personal account was concluded by what is hoped was a realistic appraisal
of the contribution that presiding officers can make to the final outcomes of vari-
ous multilateral negotiations.
Realism being the hallmark of international relations, a study on multilat-
eral negotiations should not be closed without admitting that this type of joint
decision-making is far from having met all expectations. In a world of more than
150 states faced with a variety of most urgent universal and regional problems,
multilateral diplomacy has become an important instrument to mould our com-
mon future. However, in view of its many flaws, its frequent disconnection from
reality, its tendency to be manipulated either by big powers or interested organi-
zations, this instrument requires improvement.
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CHAPTER 4
The CSCE as a Collaborative Order
Esko Antola
Department 0/ Political Science
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Turku
Finland
4.1. Two Orders of the CSCE
The multidimensionality of the CSCE is a self-evident fact to every student of
the subject. It expresses itself throughout the process. Even the concept itself,
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, speaks for it. Among the
most visible dimensions of the process are those between great powers and lesser
powers, between the aligned and non-aligned states, between socialist and capi-
talist states and so on. Multidimensionality runs through the system and also
very much determines the nature of the whole process. One could also argue,
with good reason, that if some of the basic propositions of bargaining theories
were true, the CSCE should never have taken place (Holsti, 1982).
This paper focuses on one of the most fundamental dimensions of the
CSCE, Le., the coexistence between the security or competitive order and the col-
laborative order. IFor more detailed analyses, see Antola (1985 and 1986).]
These dimensions not only describe an aspect of tension in conceptual terms but,
even more, they reflect the confrontation between the basic philosophical
interpretations concerning the nature of international relations. That is, they
reflect the contrast between competitive theories, which see international rela-
tions in a constant state of conflict, and cooperative approaches, which stress the
harmony of interests as the basis of international relations.
44 E. Antola
The matters of military security and state sovereignty in the CSCE reflect
the competitive interpretaton of international relations. This argument claims
that in a world of sovereign states the only way to maintain one's sovereignty is
to be ready to defend it. International relations are in a state of competition
where no country can feel secure without relying on the eventual use of military
power: basically international relations are in a state of anarchy. This has led
to the so-called security dilemma: fear of the hostile intentions of other states
provides justifications for an arms race and provokes countermeasures (Hertz,
1950).
The collaborative order of the CSCE reflects the philosophical ideas that
are often called Grotian visions of world order. They stress the common
interests of nation-states in preserving the given international order. They start
from the sovereignty of states as the basis of international orders, but assume
that this is best guaranteed by establishing institutions of collaboration whereby
the common interests of states can be maintained.
The coexistence of the two orders in the CSCE is demonstrated in the Final
Act itself. The Principles, while constituting the basic norms and rules of the
European order, recognize state sovereignty as an untouchable principle. This is
strengthened by the postulates of anti-expansionism (inviolability of frontiers,
refraining from the use of violence). But at the same time basic preconditions of
collaboration have been included in the document and are expressed throughout
the baskets of the Final Act.
I have developed here an argument asserting that the CSCE indeed reflects
the philosophical argumentation on how interstate relations should be con-
ducted. Primacy should be given either to the recognition of the legitimate
interests of sovereigns by emphasizing the need to put constraints on the use of
force, to strengthen norms and settlements that could permit nations to restrain
their hostile or provocative behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate
(Jervis, 1982), or the main emphasis should be on enhancing collaboration
between the signatories in the widest possible areas as a means to strengthen
security. These interpretations coexist both in the letter and in practice.
The two interpretations are seen also in the ways of organizing the work of
the CSCE process. The so-called forums where special issues have been dis-
cussed have emphasized the collaborative side of the process. Forums such as
the Cooperation in the Mediterranean (1979 and 1984), the Scientific Forum
(1980), Cultural Forum (1985), Forum on Human Contacts (1986) and Forum
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (1985) are all based more on the
cooperative elements in the Final Act than on the immediate security dimen-
sions.
On the other hand, Forums on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1978
and 1984) and the Conference on Disarmament in Europe are examples of efforts
to deal with the problems of direct military security between the signatories.
The follow-up conferences as well as the Final Act and the Tenth Anniversary
Meeting have aimed at reviewing the process and add a third dimension to the
complexity of the CSCE: how to accommodate the two competing orders of
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needs and interests in order to keep the process integrated. The task is to main-
tain an optimal balance between the security aspects and cooperation aspects of
the whole endeavor.
4.2. How to Create Cooperation?
Cooperation is not only a matter of the collaborative part of the CSCE, although
one could expect better results in a shorter period of time, e.g., in matters of
economic cooperation and trade than in matters of military security. The two-
dimensionality of the process is seen in the methods of creating cooperation as
well. I shall employ the distinction between the eooperation-under-anarehy
approach and the functionalist approach.
4.2.1. Cooperation-under-anarchY approach
Much of the theoretical research on cooperation in this approach is conducted
within the framework of the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD). In particular, in the US
international relations studies community, the problem of how to create coopera-
tion under anarchy has been a widely debated matter. Robert Axelrod has
defined the problem by asking, "Under what conditions will cooperation emerge
in a world of egoists without central authority?" (Axelrod, 1984).
It is both fair and important to note that scholars interested in this type of
reasoning do not necessarily argue that international relations are in a state of
prisoners' dilemma. In fact Axelrod and Robert Keohane argue that the similari-
ties lie in the basic assumption: that both in the PD-situation and in interna-
tional relations the "myopic pursuit of self-interest can be disastrous", and that
both sides can benefit from cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986). They
further argue that political-economic and military-security issues can be analyzed
within the same analytical framework of the PD type.
Promoting cooperation under anarchy does not mean that international
relations necessarily have to be in an actual state of anarchy. In fact, the notion
of international society, or a society of states, is accepted by scholars subscribing
to the cooperation-under-anarchy school. But the direction of international rela-
tions is not structured effectively, and there are great differences between sectors
of international life. It is quite obvious that the conduct of international rela-
tions depends very much on the issue area, which should be kept in mind when
seeking to enhance collaboration in the CSCE.
The cooperation-under-anarchy school argues that cooperation is indeed
possible under two conditions: that there is a guarantee of reciprocity and that
actors can base their individual calculations on the projections of future expecta-
tions. States shall engage in cooperation expecting a continuation of reciprocal
reactions and the durability of the relationship. The message of this analysis is
obvious: cooperation is a viable alternative also in the conditions of a security
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dilemma, where trust as such is often not present and where the problem of
defection is always a real alternative.
From the point of view of the CSCE, the major implication of this
approach is seen in the notion of trust. The traditional view has been that trust
actually is the major factor contributing to the progress of detente and the
CSCE. Therefore, one should not expect any progress in cooperation unless
there is minimum of trust. In the balanced and keen military security environ-
ment of the CSCE the trust between the Great Powers is seen as the key to the
process. But the history of the CSCE, in particular in the 1980s, shows that the
signatories have been able to keep the process alive in spite of unfavorable Great
Power relations. The problem of the approach is that collaboration is not easily
created in the security order, since possible areas of cooperation are in the realm
of the hard core of national security interests of states.
The issue of reciprocity is important here. Cooperation in security matters
is normally of a type of specific reciprocity, where "specific partners exchange
items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited scope" (Keohane, 1986) - Le.,
situations where cooperation and common understanding are limited to very pre-
cise matters and values. Cooperation is intended to cover only those areas upon
which an agreement is reached and is limited to negotiations for such agree-
ments. The spill-over effect of such actions is limited.
It is fairly obvious, and well demonstrated by the problems of the Stock-
holm conference, as well as the difficulties in its follow-up, that the concept of
diffuse reciprocity would be more suitable for the CSCE. In such a case "the
definition of equivalence is less precise, one's partners may be viewed as a group
rather than as a particular actor and the sequence of events is less narrowly
bounded" (Keohane, 1986). In a system of 35 nations, vastly different in their
power bases and interests, with a number of cross-cutting alignments, the con-
cept of reciprocity must be seen in a rather loose, larger and more flexible frame-
work. This would enable a balancing of interests and the linkage of different
issues.
4.2.2. Functionalist approach
The contrasting method of initiating collaboration rests on the functionalist doc-
trine: meaningful and permanent international collaboration cannot be enforced
through institutionalizing international relations by principles and conventions,
but rather by organizing international activities according to needs. This is a
concept of cooperation reflecting the ideas of David A. Mitrany (1946). The logic
of the doctrine is, in brief: first identify the areas of collaboration, then furnish
them with appropriate procedures so that favorable results are secured and
spill-over promoted. Finally, the whole complex arrangement must be made per-
manent through institutionalization.
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In initiating collaboration, priority must be given to areas and sectors
where progress is most likely to be achieved and where the "take-off" threshold is
lowest. The likelihood of progress is determined by needs: cooperation is likely
where the need is greatest. The precondition is that 'the area selected must be
sufficiently comprehensive and far-reaching so that reinforcing results may be
obtained. The criterion of comprehensiveness implies that functional coopera-
tion must be able to deal with the subject matter in a comprehensive manner.
Issues where cooperation is promoted do not necessarily have to be of the
greatest relevance and importance from the point of view of state interests, but
collaboration must be effective in bringing about meaningful results which would
not have been achieved otherwise. This leads through a demonstration effect to
the proliferation of functional collaborative efforts.
The functionalist strategy faces three critical problems. The first is the
question of institutionalization. Institionalization is often seen as a necessary
precondition for functional cooperation: only the institutionalization of coopera-
tion makes it stable and secure. In many ways, institutions in the functionalist
approach have tasks equivalent to what future expectations have in the
cooperation-under-anarchy approach. But institutionalization is also thought to
be necessary for spill-over and learning, which are important elements of this
strategy.
In the framework of the CSCE, institutionalization means that there should
be a proliferation of permanent methods of cooperation instead of ad hoc-type
forums in various areas. It would also mean an increase in the autonomy of
these forums, which could lead to the disintegration of the process. It would be
much more difficult to coordinate the process or to balance its various elements.
But, on the other hand, institutionalization would increase the stability of
cooperation and disengage it from the problems of the political-military dimen-
sion. This would probably favor collaboration in areas that are sufficiently far
away from the hard core of national security interests.
The definition of needs is another problem area. In the original Mitranian
concept, needs were associated with welfare. In the CSCE, welfare is not
perhaps that important as a basis for cooperation. But functional cooperation is
definitely needed in the protection of the environment, in organizing transporta-
tion, in encouraging trade in Europe and in strengthening the technological
capacity of Europe. In fact the two economic systems of Europe face to a great
extent similar problems, in particular vis-a-vis the rest of the world. The whole
process of industrial restructuring serves as a platform for functional coopera-
tion.
The third problematic issue is the linkage between the competitive and col-
laborative orders. Basically there are two possibilities. On the one hand, the
hierarchical approach assumes that cooperation in non-security matters depends
on whether progress is achieved in the security matters of the CSCE. Promoting
cooperation is possible, but only if due respect is paid to the basic factors that
shape the current political and economic order in Europe. In other words,
enhancing cooperation is dependent on the security dilemma, Le., on the dom-
inant military-political structure in Europe.
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Functionalism argues that the poor performance of the collaborative order
of the CSCE is due to the practice of hierarchical linkage. Its solution to the
linkage problem is a two-tier model, which rests on the assumption of the
existence of parallelism between the two orders. The hard core of European
security, i.e., matters of military security, follows a different logic from the less-
sensitive areas. The two tiers can proceed at different speeds for as long as they
have the same direction and the basic norms of the CSCE are respected.
A functionalist element in the two-tier model implies that there will
emerge, at least in the long run, automatic spill-over to the security order.
Spill-over means that functionalist collaboration in less sensitive areas of the
CSCE will enhance collaborative elements also in matters in the political-
military spheres.
Regional cooperation might prove that this linkage is possible to establish.
If interactions, transcending block limits, on a regional basis, are regarded as
valuable and made possible, could these pockets of collaboration develop into
more comprehensive arrangements? On a regional basis, this is much easier to
achieve, because the already existing historical as well as current structures of
cooperation can be activated. Another reason for a regional approach is that
there already are numerous proposals for regional arrangements.
4.3. The Problem of Change in the CSCE
The CSCE is first of all a negotiated order and as such contrasts with the notion
of an enforced order. The two concepts point to the origins of international ord-
ers: they are either created by will and conquest, i.e., by force, or by consensus
and legitimacy through negotiations. [These terms have been used by Henry
Kissinger (1964) in his evaluation of the Congress of Vienna.] The dilemma of
the CSCE is that the post-war European international order was created by
force. It is a good example of an international system whose norms and rules are
determined largely by the winners of a major war. Once the new order is
created, stability is regarded as a virtue as such. Peace settlements do not pro-
vide specific methods or institutions for bringing about changes in such interna-
tional systems (Gilpin, 1981).
Yet the CSCE has strong elements of change. Baskets 2 and 3 (economic
cooperation and human contacts), if made effective, call for a profound transfor-
mation of Europe through collaboration. The CSCE philosophy implies neces-
sarily that the changes in question must be peaceful, although the nature of
change is very much different in the competitive order than what the collabora-
tive approach implies. Narrow definitions of peaceful change, i.e., non-war
changes, serve as the idea of change in the former interpretation. Changes are
accepted within the limits of the existing international order, under the condi-
tions of competition.
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The possibilities for changes in the course of the process are very limited.
Security matters are conditioned by so many external factors that the CSCE
contributes to them only in a very limited way. Traditionally relevant methods
would be, e.g., the revision of treaties or territorial changes. Both of these are
extremely unlikely in the realm of the CSCE. In fact, even demands for such
changes would run against the basic principles of the Final Act. Should such
changes be initiated, the CSCE's role would be that of an executive body, not
the role of initiator.
The term "peaceful" in its non-war definition implies that changes must
note the existence of the status quo and must have some sort of regularity.
Peaceful change must rely on regularized processes through which modifications
are brought about and also made effective. Those processes must be so designed
and established that they make changes possible, but do not threaten the power
bases of the existing order. The status quo must be respected and the stability
of international relations has to be maintained. And, most importantly, changes
must be negotiated on a consensual basis, and national interests regarded as legi-
timate motives.
The collaborative view of change again would imply the establishment of
an international order where institutions and common rules and laws give the
central direction to international relations, i.e., the restructuring of the interna-
tional order. This would require renouncing the use of force and war as methods
of change. Instead, institutions and procedures would be created through which
the contingent threat of war could be abolished and security established on a
non-coercive basis. If this is to be realized, state sovereignty must somehow be
limited.
The reconstruction of the European security system would imply a move
toward the functionalist idea. Mitrany was basically hesitant about the possibil-
ity of creating a conventional collective security system. In his mind there were
two possibilities: either to establish an autonomous internatonal authority with
necessary powers and force to keep the peace, or to base the future international
order on cooperation. His own proposal was a functional approach, which could
best respond to the demands of international changes (Mitrany, 1944). In this
flexible international order, the roles and functions of nation-states would also
change in the long run.
In reality the CSCE sees peaceful change as a process whereby necessary
corrections to the existing order and, in particular, to the existing status quo can
be made in order to avoid the outbreak of war and to revise the rules and power
relations of the international order for a better management of international
society. This implies the collective security approach to peaceful change.
Basically the CSCE is bound to the concept of non-war change and shares
much of the same philosophical background. Changes are needed essentially for
avoiding war, but the possible areas of application can be seen in a broader per-
spective. The principal distinction between the non-war concept and the collec-
tive security concept is that the latter applies methods of peaceful change in
modifying the status quo while the narrow definition accepts changes only within
the status quo.
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In the CSCE, transformation through collective security is close to the
Axelrodian concept of producing collaboration. Peaceful change would mean
that the experiences of the past and future expectations strengthen the subjective
elements of security. Peaceful transformation in Europe is thus promoted by
measures showing that cooperation pays and that expectations concerning the
future of the European order could be more beneficial for the parties through col-
laboration. This can be done, theory implies, without touching the premises of
the existing order.
One could also evaluate the CSCE by noting the distinction between the
individualistic and collective security concepts: the former is based on the
individual actions of each state for its own security, while the latter emphasizes
that national security problems could best be settled on a collective basis. The
individualistic security approach departs from the anarchy analogy and ends up
with the insecurity of rivalry and competitition. The collective security
approach again points to the ideas of common security interests and also to the
interdependence of states in national security matters. In other words, instead of
objective security measures (i.e., arms) subjective elements (Le., the sense of
security) are stressed. IT taken as a totality, the CSCE strengthens the subjec-
tive elements.
4.4. How to Negotiate Change through Cooperation
The basic argument of this chapter has been that the CSCE is an extremely
complicated and multidimensional process, which in many ways runs against
conventional theoretical assumptions. I have argued that the most fundamental
dimension is the tension between the security order and the aims to foster a col-
laborative order. In evaluating the CSCE from the point of view of cooperation,
a similar tension emerges between the cooperation-under-anarchy approach and
the functionalist approach. An additional problem is that the two orders should
somehow be kept together.
A further argument was made, according to which cooperation is a matter
of negotiation: one has to exclude a situation where collaboration would be
enforced and where European states were ready to seek collaborative efforts from
premises other than those of their free will. Conditions and needs actually push
them toward cooperation, but basically for their national interests. This does
not exclude the possibility that national interests and those of the whole group of
35 counries may coincide; in fact the Grotian doctrine supposes this to be the
case.
The problem of applying bargaining theories to the CSCE seems to be,
therefore, that individual preferences of states do not simply articulate them-
selves in the process. The CSCE is not a bargaining process in the normal
meaning of the concept. I believe that the multidimensionality, the cross-cutting
loyalties of the participants and the diversity of their interests shape the process
in a way that does not easily fit into theories.
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The CSCE belongs to the category of "nonconvergence" negotiations. This
definition is given by Ronald Barston (1983). He argues that negotiations in the
form of complex multilateral diplomacy are distinguished by innovative objec-
tives and considerable structural uncertainty over the form that possible out-
comes might take. He also refers to the flexibility in coping with structural com-
plexities as well as to the innovative negotiating structures. Barston further
argues that multilateral diplomacy is both disjointed and fragmented, but is also
innovative and a learning process. All of these aspects of multilateral diplomacy
describe the CSCE as a negotiation process.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the CSCE is that decisions are
made on a consensual basis. Decision-making under the consensus rule is an
essential factor shaping the negotiation procedures. J. Sizoor and R. Jurrjens
(1984) argue that the consensus method helps to minimize the negative elements
of other available decision-making procedures: the requirement of unanimity,
the principle of majority rule and the special rights accorded the great powers in
allowing them the right of veto. Maintaining the consensus rule is essential also
for the future of the CSCE.
In analyzing the possibilities of collaboration in the framework of the
cooperation-under-anarchy approach, one is naturally tempted to propose
situation-specific theories (Jonsson, 1978). They would allow negotiating
separately on a number of issues and would allow the formation of coalitions. In
the CSCE the problem is, however, that the external conditions, such as great
power relations or membership in military alliances, determine the framework of
negotiations. No matter how specific the issue, in a game-related situation one
cannot disengage it from the overall framework. Terrence Hopman (1978) has
also pointed to the problem of asymmetrical power capabilities of the partici-
pants.
No matter how big the problems of the game theoretical approach to the
CSCE negotiations are, it is obvious that the PD-type of framework will be in
the forefront of studies of collaboration there. This is not only due to recent
interest in the cooperation-under-anarchy approach, but also because the CSCE
is basically understood as a game-related process. This image is strengthened by
a number of studies of "the early days of the process, in particular of the pre-
Helsinki phase. Undoubtedly the phase of drafting the Final Act was a game to
a great extent. But one is tempted to argue that its nature has changed since
those days.
An important factor in shaping the CSCE process has been its institution-
alization. It does not have permanent institutions as such, but it has become an
institution in the relations between European states, Its establishment may have
defied the theories, but it is after all a permanent aspect of European political
reality. For some actors it has been of greatest value. The European Commun-
ity, for instance, established and formalized its political cooperation procedure
during the process. The Community spoke with one voice for the first time in
the CSCE process. For smaller countries, the N+N in particular, the system has
been valuable as well. The post-war alliance system in Europe offered very few
possibilities for them to make their views known in Europe.
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This all suggests that explaining negotiations for collaboration should take
into account the institutionalization of the CSCE. When evaluating the dimen-
sions of the institutionalized approach to negotiations, Knut Midgaard (1983)
points in particular to the relevance of such an approach to cooperative negotia-
tions. He argues that the content of institutionalized negotiations is character-
ized by four dimensions: agreement on purpose; on the set of parties; on the
time, place, and context; and on different categories of rules.
Promoting collaboration in the CSCE through negotiations should rely on
institutionalization. The CSCE actually meets most of the criteria that
Midgaard proposes. The Final Act sets the purposes of negotiations quite accu-
rately. Also the set of parties is accepted and so are most of the criteria concern-
ing the time and place of negotiations. The problem of institutionalized negotia-
tions is that the set of rules is not coherent enough. In other words, the CSeE
needs more emphasis on the principles for the conduct of its work. Among these
are principles on how the two basic dimensions of the process - the competitive
and collaborative - can be interconnected.
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5.1. Introduction
The recent sharp increase in the number of international problems on which
states have to negotiate and in the volume of the related paperwork has
markedly enhanced the role of diplomacy and the importance of negotiations as
an instrument of national foreign policy.
Stepped-up multilateral cooperation and more productive multilateral ties
and contacts are especially required in such areas as maintaining and strengthen-
ing peace and security, curbing the arms race, developing economic relations,
ensuring economic growth in developing countries, solving the energy and food
problems, preserving the environment, and the use of oceans and outer space.
Connected with this is the question of whether the international community
can build interstate relations on the basis of a new political thinking without
relying on nuclear arms, and if nuclear disarmament is feasible.
These issues are being debated by public figures, politicians and diplomats
who seek to establish facts, identify positions, find mutually acceptable solutions
and reach agreements. The debate bears directly on whether the East and the
West can define some common philosophical ground on which to build a safer
and better world. Without clarifying further the issues and actors, without the
search for common approaches or at least points of contact, there can be no
mutual understanding or confidence, nor genuine agreements in vital areas.
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Since the existence of different sovereign states is an objective reality of our
age, mankind can collectively solve global problems only on the basis of the prin-
ciple of peaceful coexistence, through joint and concerted actions and decisions.
For example, to ensure a uniform approach of states that are so different in
terms of their sociopolitical systems and the level of economic development, to
the rational use of the economic potential of the oceans, the need was recognized
for devising an international legal order that would govern the activities of all
states without exception in the use of the world's marine environment and
resources.
The Soviet Union has consistently and actively advocated international
negotiations and consultations, on both a periodic and a permanent basis.
Along with the development of interstate bilateral cooperation, the increas-
ing number and importance of multilateral relations and contacts have made it
necessary for the world community to establish a global system of permanently
functioning negotiating mechanisms. It is our view that international organiza-
tions - above all, the United Nations as well as UN-sponsored international
conferences and other international fora - could serve as a foundation for such a
global system of multilateral cooperation designed to govern interstate relations
and to work out mutually acceptable solutions.
5.2. Types of International Fora
Depending on the composition of participants, international fora are generally
divided into two categories: intergovernmental and non-governmental. In terms
of their composition, they are subdivided into universal fora in which any state
can participate; regional fora attended by states belonging to a specific geo-
graphic region, and fora comprising a given number of concerned or involved
parties.
In terms of their status, there may be permanent international organiza-
tions, organizations that meet periodically within previously set dates to discuss
a specific range of issues, and special or ad hoc fora convened to consider a par-
ticular topic.
Depending on their goals, international multilateral fora can be divided
into peace negotiations or conferences, political conferences or organizations, and
those dealing with economy, international law, and other special subjects. Also
an international forum can simultaneously deal with several topics.
Even if they may differ in terms of their specific objectives, international
multilateral fora are basically designed (a) to negotiate and adopt international
agreements or charters of intergovernmental organizations - for instance, the
1945 San Francisco Conference, which adopted the UN Charter, and the 1968-
1969 UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, which adopted the text of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; (b) to consider international prob-
lems and to draft resolutions, joint statements or other international documents
- for instance, sessions of the UN General Assembly and other international
organizations, the 1968 Teheran Conference and others; (c) to exchange views on
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specific issues - for instance, the 1963 UN Conference on the Application of Sci-
ence and Technology for the Benefit of Less Developed Areas, held in Geneva.
5.3. Work of International Fora
Delegations representing at international fora the governments of their countries
usually seek two objectives: reaching an agreement and taking the fullest possible
account of their country's interests and foreign policy stance in such an agree-
ment. It is not difficult to see that the two objectives are interdependent.
Indeed, a state has no interest in drafting an international law or rule unless its
provisions take into account that country's interests.
Early in the process of drafting an international forum's rules of procedure,
the participating countries set out to work to achieve these twin objectives.
Although the process may start prior to the commencement of an international
forum, usually it takes place in the course of the forum's work. Since the partici-
pating states now attach an ever growing importance to matters of procedure,
their discussion takes up all or most of the time in the work of preparatory
organs (for instance, the 1973 organizational session of the Third Conference on
the Law of the Sea and the 1973 multilateral consultations in Helsinki).
The drafting of the rules of procedure and work preceding the decision to
convene an international forum comprise two stages: (1) reaching agreement
among the participants on the provisions to be included in the rules of procedure
and (2) their acceptance as binding on all the participants. The second stage
may coincide with the completion of the first stage, which, as stated above, may
commence prior to the official opening of negotiations or a conference.
Once the rules of procedure have been adopted, the participants begin
drafting work based on those rules. The process of drafting may include con-
sideration of several texts followed by putting together a draft that reflects in
one way or another some of the wordings proposed earlier by individual partici-
pants. This new draft is taken as a basis for subsequent drafting work. In those
cases when there is a sin:gle draft of an international legal document prepared by
the International Law Commissi~n (ILC) or by a legal body of another interna-
tional intergovernmenral organization, the process of elaborating the final text
on its basis consists in discussing various amendments and proposals. The final
text of the document reflects in one degree or another the amendments and pro-
posals adopted.
The essence of this process consists in confronting and conforming those
aspects of the states' foreign policy positions that have a direct bearing on the
text of the document - above all, the different legal positions of states that are
relevant to the text of the document. It should be stressed that various states'
positions regarding the text of what will become an international legal document
and the content and mandatory character of the rules of procedure for that
matter will require compromise and adjustment during the process of negotia-
tion.
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These negotiations include all the discussions and contacts aimed at bring-
ing together the diverse and diverging positions of states and at achieving the
common goals of an international forum. This broad interpretation of negotia-
tions is deliberately given in order to cover all types of contacts among delega-
tions. Discussion of just a single paragraph of a resolution also constitutes nego-
tiations. In fact, at many intergovernmental fora the purely informative negotia-
tions, private meetings and informal meetings between delegates that often take
place outside the venue of the forum itself represent its most important part.
In the framework of contemporary international fora, decisions are made
through procedures and negotiations that are, as a rule, open only at the opening
and final stages.
At different intergovernmental fora, one can often witness processes that
may first seem as running counter to the main goal of the negotiations, Le.,
instead of working toward an agreement, the participants try to set up separate
groups. The creation of such groups can, in its turn, lead to conflicts between
different groupings with all the characteristics of a "win or lose" situation.
In view of the fact that, as a rule, the foreign policy positions of states
differ in varying degrees, bridging the differences and elaborating a joint text
become possible through mutual concessions. An agreement that is achievable
through mutual concessions represents a compromise embodied in the text.
Thus, the process of conforming the positions of states at international
negotiations and conferences means both confrontation and cooperation among
states. In the course of such confrontation states, as is known, create groups.
Group affiliation of states is based on similarities in their foreign policy positions
and, consequently, in their international legal positions. However, states can
achieve their goals and a conference can be successful only in those cases where,
in the process of conforming states' positions, their cooperation outweighs con-
frontation, and not only in relations among states belonging to one and the same
group, but also among states belonging to different groups.
It should be kept in mind that, in multilateral negotiation and conferences,
agreements in most case are negotiated by states at two levels. One involves the
alignment of positions between states that differ only marginally. The other
involves the narrowing of differences between groups, which actually means ela-
borating decisions of negotiations or conferences. In other words, agreements
among states participating in negotiation or conferences are not necessarily nego-
tiated directly through their bilateral contacts. They can go by way of coordi-
nating group positions, i.e., developing the collective will by groups of states in a
given conference or negotiation.
Admittedly, given the largely different positions, aspirations and foreign
policy objectives of states participating in international negotiations and the real-
ities of international politics, a state's ability to conduct multilateral negotiations
in a business-like manner and contribute to their success is now among the most
powerful indicators of the maturity of its foreign policy and its dedication to the
peaceful resolution of disputes and differences.
Analysis of multilateral conferences and negotiations also requires a
comprehensive approach - they should be analyzed in close relationship to the
practice of bilateral negotiations and conferences, for, in the final analysis, the
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success of multilateral fora hinges on bilateral agreements, on their status and
level. It is basically incorrect to prioritize international fora and oppose multilat-
eral diplomacy to "traditional" bilateral exchanges between states. If one were
to compare multilateral intergovernmental negotiations and conferences with
corresponding bilateral talks and meetings, one would not fail to see their basic
commonality, In legal terms, multilateral negotiations and conferences are of the
same nature as bilateral ones - cooperation and interaction of states. In politi-
cal terms, they have in common the main objectives of communication. In
diplomatic terms, many of their methods are similar. At the same time, one
should also take into account the specific features of international negotiations,
conferences and organizations, which constitute a relatively separate branch of
international law and require appropriate classification and codification.
6.4. Rules of Procedure of International Fora
In context, the administrative and technical structure and functioning of multila-
teral fora merit special study, The use by participating states of various rules
governing the organization, procedures and specific methods of diplomatic work,
i.e., special instruments distinguishing multilateral negotiations from bilateral
ones, affects in no small degree both the proceedings of international meetings
and their results.
Knowledge of the practices of organizing and holding international fora is
essential to acquire a better understanding of the essence of negotiations and to
turn international fora into effective instruments of cooperation for enhancing
peace and security of nations.
The rules of procedure of the United Nations General Assembly, influenced
by the rules of procedure not only of the League of Nations but also of other
intergovernmental organizations and conferences, are regarded as a major source
of ideas and specific methods of settling problems in formulating the rules of pro-
cedure of intergovernmental conferences, organizations and other multilateral
fora of today. .
It would be incorrect, however, to assume that conferences held under the
auspices of the United Nations use the same rules of procedure as the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. Such conferences adopt their own rules of procedure, elaborated
as they are on the basis of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.
It is true that the rules of procedure of the General Assembly are most
widely used in developing procedural provisions for conferences convened by the
United Nations, whereas other conferences normally use them only in cases
where the rules of procedure of a conference do not provide for a particular
situation but do provide for such a possibility. For example, the rules of pro-
cedure of the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 specified that on all procedural
matters that were not provided for by those rules of procedure, the Conference
and the Commissions would be guided, where appropriate, by the principles of
the internal regulations of the UN General Assembly.
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Despite the fact that rules of procedure and their numerous specific norms
had been known long before the League of Nations was founded, it would be
wrong not to take into account the existence of fundamental differences between
the rules of procedure of intergovernmental organizations and the rules of pro-
cedure of intergovernmental conferences. Of no small importance here is the fact
that major differences between the rules of procedure for international organiza-
tions and international conferences have existed and continue to exist, because
some of them are predicated on differences in the very forms of international
contacts while others either have just appeared or are on their way out.
Thus, in analyzing the major differences between them, it is necessary to
proceed from the differences between intergovernmental conferences and intergo-
vernmental organizations. Above all, account should be taken of the fact that
while intergovernmental conferences have a relatively short duration, intergov-
ernmental organizations operate on a standing and long-term basis. Virtually all
intergovernmental organizations tend to expand their terms of reference, eventu-
ally dealing with questions which, while related to problems for whose solution
they were specifically established and which are reflected in their charters, are
nonetheless either different from them or of a kind not envisaged at the time the
organizations were set up.
As noted above, the main reference point is the rules of procedure of the
UN General Assembly. Even the original draft of its rules of procedure con-
tained more than 100 rules. As of now, they contain 164 rules, divided into 18
sections and 5 annexes. The rules of procedure of the UN General Assembly not
only regulate the activities of the most representative body of that universal
organization but also, mutatis mutandis, have served and continue to serve as a
basis for drafting rules of procedure for other intergovernmental organizations as
well as rules of procedure for intergovernmental conferences.
As a single and coherent normative act, rules of procedure are usually
designed to regulate the activities of an international forum, and to achieve its
objectives of enhancing the efficiency of its proceedings. To achieve this dual
purpose, rules of procedure fulfill both stabilizing and creative functions. On the
one hand, they formalize the already existing international procedural relations
while, on the other, they serve to change or restructure them in an orderly and
agreed manner. These two functions are interdependent and parallel.
When states come to agreement to establish new procedural relations
within the framework of an international forum, they incorporate such agree-
ment into rules of procedure. For example, the Third UN Conference on the
Law of the Sea approved a mixed system of making decisions by a majority of
votes together with a principle of dealing with law of the sea questions "in a
package" , that is, as a single set.
The functions of rules of procedure are the decisive factor in determining
their structure; since the structure of the rules of procedure for United Nations
conferences is the most stable one, it would be useful to take them as an exam-
ple. Rules of procedure for these conferences usually consist of ten chapters,
which are in turn divided into 61-66 rules. Each of these rules contains one or
several legal norms.
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The legal norms contained in the rules of procedure basically regulate the
following matters:
- Overall organization of the conference:
• composition of delegations and credentials of representatives
• establishment of committees
• official languages
• open or closed meetings
• records of the meetings
• duties of the secretary-general and the secretariat
- General and special rights of the chairman:
• opening, conduct, suspension and adjournment of meetings
• maintenance of order at the meetings
• rulings on points of order and conduct of the proceedings
• announcing and closing the list of speakers
- Special rights of delegates:
• the right to make procedural motions
• the right of reply
• the right to raise a point of order
- Methods of making motions and decisions:
• procedure for the consideration of proposals and amendments
• the right to vote and the form or basis required for making decisions
• methods of counting votes and conduct of voting
• rules of voting
In spite of a great diversity of legal norms regulating these matters, all of
them can be divided into four basic categories governing the legal status and
activities of:
Delegations as representatives of their governments
Conference officers
Conference secretariat and its chief executive
Determination of a procedure for the adoption by the conference of deci-
sions on the substance of the issues for which it was convened.
All other norms in one way or another are related (or even subordinated) to the
norms falling under these four categories, which regulate the legal status of the
three most important components of international fora and determine a mechan-
ism for their functioning as a whole - i.e., the procedure for making substantive
decisions. Experience, particularly that of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe and the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea,
clearly shows the special importance of the norms falling into last category. As
for the norms related to those in the four categories, they regulate matters con-
cerning the establishment and functioning of working bodies, types of meeting,
working languages, etc.
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The processes taking place in the framework of international fora on the
basis of the rules of procedure are governed by actions and interactions, above
all in the decision-making process, of the three components: delegations of
states, top executives officers, and the secretariat and its chief executive.
6.6. Decision-Making Mechanism
To enhance the efficiency of decision-making processes, the provisions governing
such processes in detail are included in their rules of procedure. The decision-
making mechanism and the form of adopting decisions depend on the purpose of
an international forum, relevant provisions of its rules of procedure, and on com-
mon practices established in the course of many years.
All specific decision-making procedures can be grouped within three sys-
tems - traditional, consensus, and mixed.
The commonly used traditional system of decision-making provides for vot-
ing as a basic method of establishing the will of participating states. The con-
sensus system provides for the coordination of the participating states' positions
without voting and, in the absence of formal objections, to the adoption of deci-
sions as a whole. It means that only such decisions are worked out that could be
accepted by all conference participants. However, in some cases conference par-
ticipants, while accepting on the whole the substance of an agreed decision,
specify in the records of the meeting or in a final document the reservations
which they believe to be important. The mixed system of decision-making is a
combination of the consensus and traditional systems. It is based on the desira-
bility of reaching an agreed opinion by all participating states without voting
until all possibilities for reaching such an agreed opinion are exhausted.
Within the traditional system used today at international fora, decisions are
taken by majority vote (simple or qualified). Thus, for the General Assembly to
make decisions on major issues, such as recommendations relating to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, a two-thirds majority of members of
the General Assembly present and voting is required. The rules of procedure of
the General Assembly stipulate that abstentions are not taken into account,
which may result in a situation where the majority abstains while a decision is
still taken. At the time of working out the rules of procedure, the Soviet Union
objected. However, the majority preferred the traditional understanding that
abstentions are not counted. Therefore, in the United Nations decisions are
taken by the majority of members present and voting.
The need to elaborate new systems of decision-making was prompted by
the changes which took place in the world after World War II and, most of all by
those resulting from the unprecedented pace of scientific and technological pro-
gress and the emergence of numerous new and independent states - in other
words, by the course of major trends in the evolution of modern society. Indeed,
on the one hand, the scientific and technological revolution significantly compli-
cated problems in the agenda of various fora of recent and present negotiations.
On the other hand, the emergence of newly independent states increased by more
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than three times the number of states interested in discussing and resolving
those problems on a multilateral basis. It is for these reasons that, along with
the use of the traditional system, the consensus or mixed systems of decision-
making have come into use - for example, at international fora with a large par-
ticipation and with no basic text available in advance, although the issues on
their agenda are highly complicated and important. The consensus or mixed
systems of decision-making are also purpose-oriented processes involving the
same three stages; however the structure and duration of each individual stage is
different. The most time-consuming stage is the preparation of a text mainly
within the framework of an international forum.
The consensus system has been successfully used at the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The process of elaborating
individual documents in the Final Act is a good example of this system's effective
application by an intergovernmental conference, as well as a good indicator of its
potential. Consensus also was the working method at the UN Special Sessions
on Disarmament. This system is used at the Conference on Disarmament, and
at the Vienna negotiations on the reduction on armed forces and armaments in
Central Europe, Consensus is used rather widely in certain UN bodies, in partic-
ular in the General Assembly, the Security Council, in the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Special Committee on the Charter of the
United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, as well
as in a number of other bodies.
The use of consensus in solving highly important issues has an overall posi-
tive effect. It is called upon to preclude imposing upon states the will of others
through a mechanical majority. At the same time, the rule of consensus may
lend itself to abuse on the part of those who seek to delay, hold up or block
agreement. It is indicative that to thwart any unproductive use of consensus in
the future, the participating states of the CSCE agreed that its rules of pro-
cedure should be applied in the course of subsequent CSCE meetings. Another
negative aspect of the consensus method of adopting decisions is that it fails to
take fully into account the positions of all major groups of participating states.
Although the term "consensus" has gained wide currency in the work of
international organs and conferences, it is occasionally replaced by such terms as
"without voting", "by acclamation", "without discussion", "unanimously", etc.
While the meaning of the term "consensus" may frequently appear to be identi-
cal to the above notions, each of them has its own implication. For instance, the
chairman, vice chairmen, rapporteurs and other officials presiding over interna-
tional conferences or sessions of international organizations are generally elected
by acclamation. Adopting a decision without discussion differs from consensus
in that the latter may be preceded by a highly extensive general debate. Also, a
consensus decision may be followed by vote-explaining statements.
"Unanimity" and "consensus" are often used interchangeably, although it
would appear that while unanimity implies consensus, consensus does not always
imply unanimity, as any party to a consensus may abstain, if it is put to a vote.
Lawyers and diplomats differ on how to define consensus, and the formulations
accepted by various international bodies also differ. An interesting definition of
consensus was offered by the UN Economic and Social Council and by the
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Population Commission in an annex to the draft rules of procedure of the 1974
World Population Conference. They recommended that the Conference should
take decisions by consensus, adding that in accordance with the UN practice this
would imply general agreement without voting rather than unanimity. The Spe-
cial Committee on the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organization of the
General Assembly defined consensus as a procedure for making decisions by way
of reaching an agreed opinion, provided that such a procedure does not jeopard-
ize the legitimate rights and interests of all sides.
At present, we can mention several provisions contained in the definition of
consensus that enjoy some measure of general support - namely, that consensus
is a decision, taken without a vote and in the absence of formally submitted
objections, which does not cancel the right of any party to state fully its position.
As a rule, consensus decisions are made after informal consultation and discus-
sions at plenary sessions have taken place.
5.6. Conclusion
Analyzing the structure and functioning of multilateral fora, as well as their role
and importance in international relations and negotiations, is an urgent task that
should be addressed, given its theoretical implications and the practical require-
ments of interstate relations. We feel that, by formalizing and codifying the pro-
cedures and the functioning of the United Nations and other international fora,
we can make an important contribution to the establishment of a global system
of permanent negotiating mechanisms.
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Nothing is more important in life than finding the right standpoint for seeing and
judging events, and then adhering to it. One point and only one yields an
integrated view of all phenomena; and only by holding to that point of view can
one avoid inconsistency [11.
6.1. Introduction
Negotiations are essential mechanisms of international cooperation to deal with
risk, unpredictability, change and instabilities in the complex system of interna-
tional order. To deal effectively with the international transboundary effects of
technological and other risks, appropriate internationally negotiated instruments
must generally be in place to provide a basis for further specific legal, technical
and other actions to reduce, manage and compensate for the impacts of risk.
Examples of international negotiations that lay the foundation for dealing with
transboundary risk include the Conventions on Early Notification and Emer-
gency Assistance in the Event of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on the
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Protection of the Ozone Layer, and the Helsinki Convention on the Protection of
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area.
There are many potential and actual advantages in conducting interna-
tional negotiations within the framework of international organizations or other
multilateral mechanisms, provided they function effectively and within the terms
of their mandates. In such cases, these organizations and mechanisms are
important and unique fora that can contribute to achieving positive negotiations
outcomes. One advantage is that they are in place - there is no need to nego-
tiate on where to negotiate nor on the framework and functioning of the forum
chosen.
An extremely important factor is the confidence that Member States have
developed not only in the international organization or other multilateral
mechanism (referred to hereafter simply as international organization), but also
in each other's representatives to this international organization, through their
frequent contacts within the context of working for and through the organiza-
tion.
The international organization itself represents a kind of on-going or per-
manent international negotiation and forum for international cooperation. The
positive experiences that its Member States have gained from their dealings with
it constitute a formidable reservoir of goodwill that can be brought to bear both
in international crises and negotiations.
The existence of an acknowledged professional and impartial international
secretariat is the basis for the reputation and confidence that an international
organization has and for the possible role it can play in the processes of interna-
tional negotiations. An efficient, effective secretariat can, and can be asked to,
provide impartial expertise and possibly to serve as a neutral third party in some
cases. Further, in the implementation of and compliance with agreements, as
well as in the maintenance of certain international systems or regimes, interna-
tional organizations and their secretariats can and do playa unique role [e.g., the
IAEA in the nuclear nonproliferation (NPT) regime and the international
nuclear safety system, WMO in the international meteorological system, GATT
in the international system of trade, IMF in the international finance system,
etc.]. Inevitably, they will become important mechanisms in the maintenance
and evolution of such systems/regimes and in proposing possible ways and
means for dealing with actual or potential instabilities in the relevant interna-
tional systems.
This leads to another important role or function of international organiza-
tions: their capability and potential to identify, develop and propose innovative
uses of the processes of negotiations and of information and technology, to
increase the flexibility and adaptability of the complex international system(s) of
which they are a part. This can include initiatives by the head of the organiza-
tion, requests by Member States for initiatives by the organization, or both.
There are many important and complex international issues, disputes and
crises which cannot, or can no longer, be dealt with or managed on any but an
international basis, often only within the framework of an international organiza-
tion. The reasons for this can be found inter alia in the increasing interdepen-
dence and globalization affecting issues and national interests, more and more
International Negotiatiol1ll 67
limiting the possibility of resolution or control by an individual country or small
groups of countries. This is true for international trade and finance, environ-
mental and health issues as well as for important areas of technology (nuclear
energy, aviation) and security.
Owing to the increasing complexity of issues and disputes, and the fast
pace of changes affecting both national and international interests, it has become
essential for international agreements to contain sufficient flexibility in certain of
their provisions to permit dealing with uncertainty and the needs of the parties
to adapt to new and changing circumstances. In this sense, international nego-
tiations, agreements and systems/regimes must be not only reactive but also
anticipatory. All of this requires thorough information and effective fora for
international negotiations.
The essence of achieving such aims, Le., successful outcomes of interna-
tional negotiations leading to increased (dynamic) stability in international
regimes, is the ability to identify or create a new, optimal balance between
(mutually agreed) options and constraints on both the state and systemic levels.
This will require understanding inter alia how and why constraints/options at
the state level can become options/constraints at the international, systemic
level, and the effects that result from this. Not all constraints for a state are
detrimental to its national interests, (a narrow definition of) sovereignty notwith-
standing, nor are any and all options necessarily advantageous, especially when
viewed from the broader perspective and higher level of the complex interna-
tional system.
International organizations thus have a unique role to play and important
functions to fill, provided they are, and are seen to be efficient, effective and
capable of impartial and innovative support of and involvement in the increas-
ingly complex and important processes of international negotiations.
The negotiations that resulted in the conventions on early notification and
on emergency assistance in the event of a nuclear accident provide an effective
example of how negotiations can serve to maintain and enhance the dynamic sta-
bility of a complex international system - in this case, the international nuclear
safety regime - and of the role played by an international organization, the
IAEA.
One of the main functions of a complex system of international order, and
of the international negotiations through which it is developed and maintained,
is to reduce risks, prevent accidents and avoid or manage crises. The impact of
accidents such as Challenger, Bhopal, Seveso, Basel and especially Chernobyl
and TMI knows no boundaries; they can be considered not only crises but also
turning points. They present both unique challenges and opportunities for
increasing technological safety and reliability, promoting technological develop-
ment and application, and reducing and managing environmental impacts -
through international cooperation.
The stability of the system also depends on the development, use and con-
trol of information and technology. This is because information and technology
will provide the regulatory, communication, and adaptive mechanisms that a
complex system requires to utilize effectively the input from its environment and
to deal with potential perturbations that could lead to instabilities.
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Such systems have the capability of dealing with instabilities through re-
organization, via innovation, to states associated with higher levels of structural
and functional complexity. The key task is, thus, how change in a system can be
guided to innovation, which enables the system to evolve to new, dynamically
stable states. In an increasingly interdependent world, the main sources of inno-
vation that could provide the means for managing complex systems will depend
on negotiations, information and technology.
6.2. Negotiation of the Conventions for
Early Notification and Emergency Assistance
in the Event of a Nuclear Accident
This study, undertaken within the framework of the IIASA Project on the
Processes of International Negotiations, involves an analysis of the main
processes and impacts of the negotiations to draft the conventions on early
notification and emergency assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radio-
logical emergency - specifically, in the event of "a release of radioactive
material which occurs or is likely to occur and has resulted or may result in an
international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety
significance" .
The negotiations on the two conventions were held from 21 July to 15
August 1986, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(referred to as the Agency or IAEA) in Vienna. Governmental experts from 62
Member States and 10 international organizations participated in these negotia-
tions. The fact that these were government experts and not plenipotentiaries
presented both a flexibility and a constraint in the negotiations. The final draft
conventions were adopted by consensus. They were then forwarded, through the
Agency's Board of Governors, to the Special Session of the IAEA General
Conference held 24-26 September 1986 in Vienna. The two conventions were
adopted by the Special Session on 26 September 1986 and opened for signature
that day. The convention on early notification entered into force on 27 October
1986, and the convention on emergency assistance entered into force on 26
February 1987.
The negotiation of two major international conventions within four weeks
represents a record in terms of both time and accomplishment. The importance
and uniqueness of this exercise, which culminated in the Special Session of the
IAEA General Conference, has become apparent and widely commended.
Ambassador L.R.B. van Gorkom of the Netherlands, who served as Chairman of
the meeting of the governmental experts who negotiated the conventions, called
the Special Session "a remarkable and encouraging example of multilateral
decision-making on vital urgent issues. It gave proof of the vitality of the system
of international cooperation" .
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Throughout, the role of the IAEA has been singled out as one of the key factors
contributing to the success of these negotiations. US· Secretary of Energy Her-
rington, in addressing the General Conference, said of the Agency: "There is no
other organization to deal with nuclear safety issues that are global in
significance. Had the IAEA not been involved, I doubt that we would have been
able to negotiate the proposed new conventions on emergency assistance and
early notification as smoothly and rapidly as we did". Other statements gave
even more direct expression to this sentiment - stating that without the role
played by the Agency, it is doubtful as to when and where these negotiations
could have taken place and been completed, and what the outcome would have
been.
Many of the governmental experts taking part in the negotiations had
already known and worked with each other as part of the Vienna diplomatic
community dealing with the Agency, or from previous negotiations or other pro-
fessional interactions elsewhere. The reputation of these negotiators and a
degree of knowledge of and confidence in their negotiating behavior had thus
been established to some extent. This permitted the drawing up, informally and
in advance, of the procedural arrangements for the meeting so that, when the
meeting began, all mechanisms were in place for substantive work to begin on
the first day, which it did.
The role of the Chairman, and the Bureau (consisting of the Chairman,
three Vice Chairman and senior Agency staff) proved to be critical inter alia for
monitoring and guiding the negotiations, problem resolution, making course
corrections and breaking deadlocks.
The Chairman of the Meeting and the Director of the Agency's Legal Divi-
sion were key players in dealing with what amounted to the main procedural
issue of the negotiations - the conflicting interpretations of the operational
meaning of consensus. In the last complex phases of the negotiations, much
depended on the legal interpretation and the Chairman's implementation of con-
sensus both as a procedure for drafting the two conventions and for transmitting
them to the Board of Governors.
The draft texts of the two agreements were prepared by the Legal Division,
an Interdepartmental Group and the Director General of the Agency within
weeks and circulated by the Agency to all its Member States for consultations
and instructions [21. It organized and sponsored the meeting, and provided the
administrative apparatus to ensure its smooth functioning and the services of its
professional staff, which included highly qualified specialists in international law,
nuclear safety, radiological protection and other key areas. Agency experts
worked continuously to provide assistance and advice to the Chairman and Vice
Chairmen and, upon request, to the delegates.
The Agency's role in dealing with information should be mentioned. The
accurate and timely transmission of all proposals, drafts, etc., translated when
needed, functioned smoothly. All background information needed for the nego-
tiations was available, without information overload. Except in rare cases, no
problems arose in the process of information collection, preparation and
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dissemination. This is not something to be taken for granted - such problems
have disrupted the course of other international negotiations. The role of lan-
guage itself should also be mentioned. The fact that the Chairman or Vice
Chairmen could call open-ended or closed meetings on extremely short notice
for impromptu off-the-record discussions was greatly facilitated by the knowledge
that there would be one working language (English) and no need for translations
and interpreters. The absence of this possibility can be and has been used as a
bottleneck in other negotiations.
Another important factor contributing to the success of the negotiations
was the history of US-Soviet collaboration within both the Agency framework
and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This provided the basis for the coordi-
nation and close cooperation that characterized their negotiating positions and
even styles during the negotiation of the two conventions.
6.2.2. Negotiations processes and issues
The negotiation of the two conventions proceeded in parallel, and there was con-
stant and important feedback between the two sets of negotiations. The work
was intense. There was not only political will but also political pressure and
necessity, as well as time urgency and world public opinion. And there were
statements of world leaders -- at the Tokyo Summit in May 1986, at the conclu-
sion of the European Council in June 1986, and of General Secretary Gorbachev
in May 1986 as well as in his letter of June 1986 to the Director General of the
IAEA, Dr. Hans Blix [3]. The negotiators had constantly to take account of
these factors. The usual groupings of countries were not so apparent as is often
the case in large multilateral negotiations exercises. While the spirit of coopera-
tion, and urgency, prevailed and many problems and disputed issues could be
resolved, there were nevertheless critical problems and divergence of interests
that threatened the success - i.e., the adoption by consensus of the final drafts
of the two conventions - of the negotiations until nearly the end.
Throughout the negotiations there was constant interplay and sometimes
conflict between national political, economic and security interests, on the one
hand, and national and international public and political pressure to conclude
the agreements, on the other. This was reflected in the key issues and disputes
in the negotiations.
The key issue for the early notification convention was the scope - i.e.,
whether, in addition to all civilian nuclear facilities, military nuclear facilities,
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon tests should also be covered; also at issue
- and still to be resolved - was an unambiguous and agreed definition of the
term "radiological safety significance", and whether there should be dual or two
separate triggers for early notification in case of a nuclear accident. For the
emergency assistance convention, the key problems included emergency (pre-
accident) planning, liability, reimbursement of assistance costs, and privileges
and immunities. A definitive work on the legal and drafting history of these
negotiations has been written by the Legal Advisor of the IAEA 14\.
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There was a constant tendency to expand the scope of the negotiations to
include special issues and interests. In most cases, this increased the difficulties
and introduced new obstacles to achieving consensus. In the end, it was gen-
erally accepted that the conventions should not be 'regarded as the end but
rather as the beginning of a process to establish on a firmer and more predictable
basis the enhanced international nuclear safety regime. Thus, these and other
issues flowing from the two conventions have shaped the direction and agenda of
subsequent bilateral and multilateral negotiations, as well as the Agency's future
program and activities in nuclear safety, nuclear power and technical assistance.
An example that may have been in the minds of the negotiators of the con-
ventions on early notification and emergency assistance is the negotiations that
led to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). There have been important
achievements in nonproliferation through the NPT. However, in the case of this
international instrument for the control of nuclear proliferation, what was left
out of the nuclear nonproliferation regime (or system) - e.g., Argentina, Brazil,
Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and obligatory full-scope safeguards
for nuclear weapons states (NWS) - has become in some key respects as or
more important than what was put in. This experience brings out forcefully the
need to include in a system those component parts which correspond to the real-
ity of the system's purpose and survival. This placed an additional urgency on
the need for the international nuclear safety system to comprise all important
parts, and thus reinforced the political will and necessity to conclude meaningful,
effective conventions with the widest possible adherence.
6.2.3. Outcomes and impacts
Negotiations, seen as a mechanism for dealing with uncertainty and potential
instabilities in a complex system, must aim to be anticipatory rather than solely
reactive exercises, for avoiding and reducing as well as for managing crises. This
requires an innovative a:pproach, which was certainly present in the negotiations
for the two conventions.
The outcomes and impacts of the negotiations fall into two main categories
that overlap in many cases: innovative development and use of information and
technology; and innovative use of the negotiations process to increase the capa-
bility, flexibility and adaptability of the international nuclear safety system - all
of which require international cooperation.
In the first category the need was identified for such measures as:
• Improving radiation monitoring systems, especially in developing countries,
and the possible integration of such systems
• Establishing an effective international system of information communica-
tion and dissemination in the event of a nuclear accident
• A scientific and technical database upon which future nuclear safety
improvements - and negotiations - can draw; in particular an interna-
tional database of background radiation levels at agreed coordinated
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geographical areas, for assessing transboundary releases of radiological
safety significance in case of a nuclear accident
• Improving the safety of present-generation reactors and developing safer
reactors for the longer term
• Improved organizational and other measures for the management of
nuclear power plants and nuclear accidents
• Harmonizing radiation protection measures, such as intervention levels, on
the basis of existing international radiation protection standards [5].
• Establishing more objective criteria for early notification, including the
definition of radiological safety significance
• Strengthening international guidelines for technical safety and personnel
qualifications for nuclear power plants, which can be adopted by states as
the basis for their national standards.
Under the second category, the use of international negotiations to intro-
duce innovation that enhances the functioning and development of the system,
some of the most important outcomes and tasks were identified to be:
• The political will to conduct multilateral negotiations dealing with nuclear
energy and nuclear weapons in a forum devoted to the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy
• Bilateral and regional agreements for emergency preparedness and planning
in the event of a nuclear accident
• A mechanism for rapid, effective emergency assistance
• Conventions on nuclear liability and compensation
• Agreements to prohibit attacks on nuclear installations and to deal with
nuclear terrorism.
The Agency is playing and will playa key or lead role in many of these activities.
Another main element of the nuclear safety regime is the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which was opened for signature in
March 1980 and entered into force on 8 February 1987. The Agency also played
an important role in the drafting and negotiating of this convention.
6.3. Advantages and Implications of
International Negotiations
within the Agency Framework
The negotiation of these two conventions brought out clearly the advantages and
possibilities of international organizations in general and of the Agency in partic-
ular for international negotiations. It became clear almost immediately after the
crisis began that, if the Agency did not exist, it would almost have to be
invented. The fact that it was in place showed the potential of an international
organization to contribute to crisis management. No negotiating forum or
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framework had to be negotiated, and states - and the Agency - were able to
take advantage of this.
Some of the important questions preceding formal negotiations - prenego-
tiations - can consume a great deal of time. The fact that the states taking
part in the negotiations were also Member States of the IAEA and had
confidence in this organization was the basis for giving the Agency the tasks and
responsibility for inter alia preparing the working documents, devising the infor-
mal rules of procedure, proposing the Chairman and his team and generally hav-
ing the entire machinery for the negotiations in place. Prenegotiations on non-
substantive issues were thus kept to a minimum.
Some of the other main advantages and consequences of the use of the
Agency framework for these negotiations were:
• Inclusiveness as opposed to exclusiveness of the negotiations - that is, the
broadest possible participation commensurate with meaningful negotiations
and outcomes
• Operational awareness of interdependence and thus of the need for coopera-
tion
• Previous successful experiences (results) in international negotiations (e.g.,
the NPT regime)
• Expectation of operative principles such as fairness, cooperation, positive
sum (versus zero-sum) outcomes, etc.; "justice" could be seen to be done
insofar as there was one state one vote, etc.
• Members of the Agency's governing bodies and participants in its program
activities represent the real actors and decision-makers in the relevant
nuclear-related issues
• Existence of a system of inter- and intragovernmental relations vis-a-vis the
Agency
• Agency as a forum where negotiators, who had previous interactions with
and some measure of confidence in each other, could explore unofficially
what was and was not negotiable, define the scope of the negotiation, draw
up procedural arrangements, etc.
• Role of an international secretariat in providing neutral or unbiased exper-
tise for the development of working drafts and in serving as a potential
bridging, monitoring and guidance mechanism during the negotiations pro-
cess
• Follow-up by the Agency of the key parts of the agreements, e.g., through
studies on international conventions for liability in the case of a nuclear
accident, development of an international radiation monitoring system,
enhanced international nuclear safety standards, etc.
• Agency itself representing an ongoing institutionalized international nego-
tiation.
The fact that the Agency had a long history and acknowledged expertise
and experience in nuclear matters also facilitated dealing with what may be
called the time element of the negotiations, which consisted of:
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• The political, legal and other historical aspects of the issues and factors
impacting the negotiations
• The urgcncy of concluding these agreements, in light of public and political
pressures for action
• The possibility of limiting the duration of the negotiations to what turned
out to be an extraordinarily short time for concluding two major interna-
tional conventions. Because of the knowledge that the Agency (and its
Member States functioning through it) had of the issues, the parameters of
what was acceptable on a given issue could be largely determined in
advance of the formal negotiations
• An ability to monitor and assess important changcs taking place in key fac-
tors in the negotiations, such as government positions, successful versus
less successful procedures, etc.
6.4:. International Negotiations as a Means of
Risk Reduction and Crisis Management
The management and endurance of a complex system depends on its capability
to deal with the implications and constraints of uncertainty, unpredictability and
conflict - i.e., with risks, crises and instabilities.
Whether, how and what crises arise will depend not only on the specific
technology involved, but also on the conditions prevailing within the system and
on the environment in which the system is embedded. More specifically, there
are not only technologically driven risks, but also systemic risks, which are asso-
ciated with the system's organization, management, cultural environment and
perceptions of risk. While the origin of a crisis is system-specific, the outcomes
will have more general and widespread impact and relevance. Thus, the crucial
importance of developing, through negotiations and other means, adequate
mechanisms for maintaining systemic stability in the overall system and in its
component parts (also systems).
Here it is necessary to point out a key difference between risks and crises.
While risks can and do remain unrealized, crises are an actualization or realiza-
tion of a specific set/sequence out of many possible sets or paths of risk. Tech-
nological and other risks have been identified and analyzed, technological and
other measures have been devised, and implemented when feasible, to reduce
some risks and their consequences. Risks may be inherent, static and confined to
the technological impacts. A risk or risks made real by an event, which can lead
to a crisis and instability in the system, is no longer so confined. It is then not
only a technological risk, but also a dynamic technological, economic, political
and social perturbation in the system. This makes the prevention and manage-
ment of crises extraordinarily difficult.
So, while risks may be associated with a particular technology and environ-
ment, they can be dealt with abstractly, and the question of systemic survival
and development also remains abstract. This is not the case for crises, as their
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development and management depend critically on the specific complex system
and on the time in which they occur, and their impact may affect the survival of
the system. Politicians, governments, industry and the public react by and large
to impending or actual crises, rather than to abstractions concerning probabili-
ties of risk (cf., for example, Chernobyl, TMI, Bhopal, Basel, oil shocks, etc.).
However, after the TMI accident, the nuclear industries in a number of countries
responded in a constructive and anticipatory (as opposed to reactive) manner to
reduce the risks associated with nuclear power plants.
The two conventions and the emerging nuclear safety system are examples
of how negotiations, agreements, and international cooperation generally, can be
used to reduce risks and manage crises in the nuclear and other technological
areas. Thus, negotiations and international organizations can be mechanisms for
dealing with the rapidly increasing complexity, uncertainty and uncontrollability
associated with technological change and risk, and in particular for
• Dealing with the diffusion and control of the positive/negative impacts of
technology
• Devising innovative approaches (political, legal, institutional, technical) for
the associated issues and problems.
This will be a continuous process, to keep pace with technological as well as
social, political, and economic needs and developments, and will lead eventually
to the emergence of complex interdependent systems for the utilization, manage-
ment and control of technologically driven change.
6.5. Management of a Complex System
A complex system of international order is constantly experiencing perturbations
that could lead to actual or potential instabilities or crises. To deal with these,
the system will have to -evolve to higher levels of organization and complexity,
which requires new forms of - and a new balance between - systemic options
and constraints.
For a complex system to be dynamically stable, options and constraints
must be in some optimal balance with each other. Abrupt changes in either can
cause the system to undergo a crisis or instability. These changes are exacer-
bated by a breakdown in cooperative and an increase in competitive modes of
interaction between the system's main component parts and are accompanied by
a decrease or loss of control. Cooperation can create possibilities for new options
and needs for new constraints, to achieve systemic stability, control and develop-
ment.
Identifying acceptable options and constraints in international negotiation
must take into consideration each side's positions, interests, nonnegotiable areas
(and the possibilities of change). Options and constraints are also a function of
the negotiating environment, interactions, commitments, strategies, actions and
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goals - as well as of information, communication, perceptions, persuasion and
expectations.
It became clear that the tendency toward instability in the international
nuclear safety system, brought on by the Chernobyl accident and crisis, could be
mitigated essentially by controlled and agreed changes in the possible options or
states available to the system and to the entities (generally sovereign states) it
comprises, and/or by changing (and usually increasing) constraints to achieve an
appropriate balance with these options. This could only be accomplished
through international cooperation and negotiation.
6.6. International Negotiations as Mechanisms for Innovation
to Achieve Dynamic Stability in Complex Systems
The negotiations for the two conventions responded to the main threats to sys-
temic stability and to the requirements for increasing the system's capability for
development and for dealing with instabilities. They demonstrated and partially
filled the need for international negotiations and conventions, and the interna-
tional system they serve, to address and include preventive and anticipatory as
well as reactive and emergency provisions and mechanisms. They basically
sought to create, through international cooperation, mechanisms for increased
adaptability, control, communication and constraints to guide change and inno-
vation - for the reduction of risks and the prevention or management of crises.
These were generally associated with increased constraints on the state level and
increased options at the systemic level. Further, what appears to be an option
or constraint at the state level may be the opposite at the international or sys-
temic level.
For example, in the negotiations for the early notification convention, the
obligation to notify (especially on a nonreciprocal basis) may be considered a
constraint at the state level, but on the (higher) level of the international system
this represents an increased option or possibility for dealing with crises and
instabilities. Seen in this way, it is for a state both an option and a constraint,
which ultimately serve its interests. Similarly, the requirement for enhanced,
effective transmission of information to develop databases and communication
systems for inter alia radiation monitoring and control also represents both an
option and constraint.
Article 3 of the early notification convention, which enabled the achieving
of consensus and certainly enhanced the broad acceptability and durability of the
agreement, depended very much on an innovative solution that functions as both
an option and a constraint. It increased the scope of events (possibilities)
covered by the convention and met the minimum requirements of many coun-
tries desiring stricter, broader, full-scope coverage. At the systemic level it thus
represents an increased possibility or option for dealing with actual or potential
instabilities. For the NWS it represents an option insofar as they have the possi-
bility or freedom, but not the legal obligation, to notify in the event of accidents
involving nuclear weapons. Legally, it is an option. Morally and politically, it is
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closer to a constraint, especially in view of the statements made by the govern-
ments of the NWS on their intention to notify in the event of such accidents.
Similar considerations apply to key aspects of the emergency assistance conven-
tion, especially in the rather hotly debated areas of emergency planning and the
financial implications of nuclear liability and emergency assistance.
Thus, many provisions of these agreements represent, in a complex way,
both options and constraints at the state or systemic levels, or both. But the
main point is that on balance they serve the interests of these states, individually
and collectively.
Sovereignty plays a major role in determining which options and con-
straints can and will be devised and accepted. It is thus one of the key factors
determining what is and is not negotiable. Whether and on which issues a state
has a static (rigid) or dynamic concept of sovereignty will determine the possibil-
ities of cooperation, compromise and concessions in a negotiation. This concept
reflects not only national interests and security, but also has cultural and ideo-
logical underpinnings. Sovereignty itself represents both an option and a con-
straint. Raymond Vernon has noted that, "one of the most important things a
state can learn is how to negotiate away part of its sovereignty on favorable
terms". And perhaps this sums up one of the main objectives of international
negotiations.
A final word about negotiations. As waging war to resolve disputes and
conflicts is now seldom a viable option for most states, waging peace requires
introducing dynamic stability into a system of international order through the
creation, by negotiations and other means, of a new balance between options and
constraints that serve the interests of the system and the states it comprises.
Thus, if war was once seen as a continuation of politics by other means, negotia-
tions have now become, in many cases, a continuation (replacement) of war by
other means. In this respect, international negotiations have become indispens-
able. The various agreements thereby negotiated not only serve the interests
and objectives of the states and system involved, but also can become elements
through which cumulative confidence and trust among states may evolve.
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CHAPTER 1
Experiences of a Negotiator at the
Stockholm Conference
Klaus Citron
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Federal Republic 0/ Germany
1.1. Introduction
On September 22, 1986, the 35 states from Europe and North America that had
been participating in the Stockholm Conference [Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)] agreed on a
substantial document that, for the first time in arms control negotiations, estab-
lished inter alia on-site inspections as a matter of right.
This positive result of long negotiation was welcomed all over Europe and
in North America as an important step in the process of the CSCE (Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and as a contribution to the improve-
ment of East-West relations.
1.2. Background of the CDE
The CDE was planned at the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Madrid, 1980-1983.
The 35 participants agreed, after long deliberations, on a precise mandate that
set the negotiators the task of negotiating a set of mutually complementary
confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of mili-
tary confrontation in Europe. All 35 Foreign Ministers participated at the open-
ing of the Stockholm Conference in January 1984.
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It was a welcome occasion for politicians from East and West and the neu-
tral and nonaligned (N+N) countries to meet, in order to improve the cold cli-
mate that had developed in Europe after the implementation of the Western
"double-track" decision. Ministers encouraged the negotiators to seek new ways
to build confidence and security in Europe. It was the start of a long and patient
negotiation of representatives of 35 sovereign states. We all knew that we could
only succeed by achieving consensus of all of the 35 states, which meant that we
had to gain the confidence and understanding of all participants, large and small.
7.3. Procedures and Processes
of the Negotiations
Groupings
There were three groupings in Stockholm:
The 16 countries of NATO, united on many military issues, but often
divided on procedural matters and negotiation tactics.
The seven countries of the Warsaw Pact, which most of the time followed
Soviet suggestions, with a specific role for Romania; a group where the
voice of the Europeans was sometimes heard in favor of compromise and
moderation.
The nine N+N countries, which do not belong to any alliance, but which
have developed in the CSCE a kind of togetherness and a role of intermedi-
ary between East and West.
Starting positions
The negotiations opened with the presentation of the starting positions of the
participants. It was the task of the negotiators to find out whether the positions
were negotiable and whether there was a chance of compromise.
In the beginning the positions of East and West were far apart. The East
put the emphasis on so-called political proposals apt to improve the international
climate, e.g., a Treaty on the Non-Use of Force or an Agreement on Non-First-
Use of Nuclear Weapons. The West stressed more concrete steps in the field of
military information, notification and observation, to replace distrust by
knowledge and understanding. The N + N were rather close to this Western
approach but showed also some understanding for the Non-Use of Force proposal
of the Warsaw Pact.
E%penence, 0/0 Negotiator at 1M Stoclrholm Con/erence
Procedures and tactics
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Once the positions of all the participants were known, the task was clear: we
had to try to overcome confrontational attitudes and to look for "common
ground". This was done in Stockholm through multiple informal contacts among
the many delegations. We tried to find out whether there was room for
maneuver and flexibility. In the beginning we had to work through the N
+ N in order to get agreement even on procedural issues, e.g., the creation of
working groups.
If the West would make a proposal, the East would say "no", simply
because it came from the other side, and vice versa. As a consequence, both
groups would try to channel their ideas through some of the N + N heads of
delegations. These participants would combine Eastern and Western concepts
with their own ideas and present the result to the plenary after having tested
them with leading participants.
The Conference slowly moved along. It did so in the overall context of
improving East-West relations. This helped, because less time was lost with
propaganda speeches and harsh replies. Delegates were able to concentrate their
energies on discovering common elements instead of aiming at the opponents'
weak spots. Naturally, propaganda was not completely foregone, but it somehow
was relegated to a secondary role. For example, tough speeches would be made
by the number two or three member of a delegation, thereby indicating that it
was a mere performance of duty.
Western delegates tried to convince their Eastern counterparts that it
would be in the interest of all participants if the Conference could, first of all,
concentrate on concrete measures of military significance. They indicated at the
same time that they would be willing to consider as a compromise the
reaffirming of the principle of Non-Use of Force as laid down in the Charter of
the United Nations.
Stockholm, as other conferences in the field of arms control, proved to be a
learning process for all the negotiators and their governments.
Concessions: what, when, how
Everybody slowly realized that results could only be achieved if starting posi-
tions were revised and adapted. Tactics played a major role in the consideration
of the participants. It was the time for long internal deliberations, particularly
in the Western camp.
Should we adapt our positions?
Was it too early to do so?
Had we not learned in previous negotiations that the other side would just
take our concessions without giving something in exchange?
82
How should compromises be achieved -
through deals prepared by the N + N, or
by unilateral steps to be followed by the other side?
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The first outlines of possible adaptations of positions became visible when
the participants agreed at the end of 1984 on a new working structure. This new
structure indicated that the East was willing to pay less attention to those of its
proposals which the West considered "non-starters".
Evolution 0/ working structures
The new working structure provided for five working group sessions per week,
each one being dedicated to one or more specific subjects. This opened the way
to a more sober debate on the real issues of the Conference - namely, the ela-
boration of CSBMs (Confidence- and Security-Building Measures) of military
relevance. Two additional meetings per week - one of them a plenary - per-
mitted dealing with the subject matter as a whole or to making political state-
ments of a general nature.
This formal conference structure was step by step complemented by infor-
mal bodies apt at serving the needs of the negotiators - for example, the so-
called "coffee-groups" where representatives of the various groups would meet
informally to search for solutions.
As the Conference progressed, it became more and more important for the
participants to steer the course of events. Heads of delegations had to keep track
of developments in the various subgroups to be able to discuss with their allies
the substance and the tactics to be used, This became particularly important
when the Conference in 1986 finally started to draft the first texts of a future
final document.
Role 0/ the N + N countries
In accordance with CSCE tradition, the neutral and nonaligned representatives
were asked to act as coordinators of the various drafting groups. It was their
task to act as go-betweens, to encourage compromise, and to explore solutions to
difficult problems.
The progress of the various informal working groups depended partly on
the ability of the coordinator to convince the protagonists to settle on specific
formulas, which he then would register provisionally in his notebook. It was an
interesting experience to observe the negotiators and the coordinators at work.
It proved that, even at the time of superpower confrontation and East-West
conflict, human and intellectual qualities did playa considerable role in facilitat-
ing progress.
Erpeneme. 0/ a Negotiator at the Stoc/cholm Con/ereme
End game
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The greatest part of the concluding document of Stockholm was negotiated dur-
ing the last five weeks. Many of the elements of this document had been dis-
cussed before in the various working groups, but it was only under time pressure
that governments were willing to adapt their positions and to accept some
demands of other participants. It was indeed this concluding date of September
19, 1986, agreed upon early in 1986, which reminded all the participants that the
time for negotiations was limited and the remaining time had to be used.
It is not my intention to describe the substance of the negotiations in
detail, but it may be useful to give an example:
The most important element of the results of the Stockholm Conference
was indeed negotiated entirely during the last four weeks of the Conference -
namely, the agreement of all the participants to accept on-site inspections as a
matter of right. The Western nations had asked for such inspections since the
beginning of the negotiations, and the N + N had suggested almost the same
provision under the term "observation upon request". But the East had con-
sidered such inspections unnecessary in the context of CSBMs. Only when this
question became the decisive factor of the Conference did the Warsaw Pact
countries accept a compromise proposal of the West - namely, the limitation of
the number of inspections a country has to accept to three per year, instead of
the original demand for an unlimited number of inspections.
There was another interesting experience in Stockholm: The closer we all
came to an agreement, the more the negotiations took place among the most
interested parties, Le., the representatives of East and West whose countries
would have to implement the bulk of the provisions of the accord. The N + N
continued their role of coordinators, but much of the substance of the concluding
document was prenegotiated between Western and Eastern representatives.
7.4. Some Conclusions and Lessons
Looking back at the negotiations and trying to draw some lessons for future
negotiations, I come to the following conclusions, none of which is surprising:
A negotiator in international negotiations needs patience. Obstacles that
look gigantic at the beginning of a negotiation may become surmountable
later.
Problems cannot be solved simultaneously; they have to be approached one
at a time.
Not everything can be negotiated through "deals". From time to time, a
unilateral move may encourage the other side to follow.
Difficult knots that cannot be "opened" at the negotiating table can some-
times be solved by courageous politicians.
Polemics do not really help a negotiation, but they cannot always be
avoided.
Public relations efforts can be useful to create public support for a negotia-
tion. Pure propaganda, however, does not pay.
Sincerity, openness, reliability - all these old-fashioned virtues - seem
still to be useful tools in an international negotiation.
New technologies and theories, though not yet sufficiently recognized by
many diplomats, may become useful tools in the future to facilitate under-
standing and communication between negotiators.
CHAPTER 8
From Negotiations to Consultations
Rolf Kloepzig and Victor A. Richardson
United Nationtl Industrial Development Organization*
Vienna
8.1. Introduction
This chapter describes and analyzes two aspects of international industrial coop-
eration. In the first part and starting with political mandates arising from
UNIDO's Conference in 1975, it traces the perception and implementation of
these mandates against a background of changing international economic rela-
tionships and positions taken by various decision-makers as well as the UNlDO
Secretariat. UNIDO's Second General Conference in Lima, 1975, has to be set
within the framework of international economic relationships at that time: the
Sixth and the Seventh Special Sessions of the General Assembly on Development
and International Economic Cooperation, the earlier dismantling of the Bretton
Woods arrangements for fixed exchange rates, the beginning of the turmoil in the
international finance and currency markets, the success of OPEC in increasing
the price of oil, the ongoing North-South dialogue and the concept of global
negotiations, and the aspiration of/request (demand) by the developing countries
for a New International Economic Order. All these factors undoubtedly
influenced the parties involved in UNIDO discussions, conferences, and decisions;
but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt to link these diverse factors
to proceedings within UNIDO other than to note their relevance.
·The viewl and judgements expreeled in thil paper are thOle of the authors and do not neces-
larily reflect thOle of the Secretariat. Meesr. Kloepzig and Richardson are in UNIDO's Depart-
ment for Indultrial Promotion, Consultations and Technology.
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In the second part of this chapter, provisions made to facilitate the negotia-
tion process at the enterprise level are described, along with the means of assis-
tance upon which participants can draw when engaged in such negotiations
processes. These activities can be viewed as an innovative extension of tradi-
tional United Nations technical assistance activities. It should be noted, how-
ever, that particularly in 1975 technical assistance to the industrial sector in
developing countries was hardly traditional - the UN Secretariat Department
responsible for such activities, UNIDO, having been founded only seven years
previously. Given the relative youth of assistance to industry in developing
countries, whether in the form of technical assistance or industrial promotion,
these activities should be regarded as still evolving.
8.2. UNIDO's System of Consultations and the
New International Economic Order
UNIDO's System of Consultations received its initial definition and can be said
to be the child of the Second General Conference of UNIDO, convened in Lima,
Peru, 12-26 March 1975. This Conference adopted the "Lima Declaration and
Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation" [l.], which provided
a special focus and industrial dimension to resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-
VI) of I May 1974 adopted at the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly
on the Declaration and Program of Action on the Establishment of a New Inter-
national Economic Order. Moreover, the Lima Declaration adopted a number of
policy guidelines and quantitative recommendations, including a target whereby
the share of developing countries should be increased from the 1974 figure of less
than 7% of total world production to at least 25% by the year 2000 [2].
Specifically, the Lima Declaration recommended that a System of Consulta-
tions be established between developed and developing countries in the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization to facilitate the establishment of a
new international economic order and the achievement of the Lima target of 25%
[31. The aims of the Consultations were to facilitate the redeployment of certain
productive capacities in developed countries to developing countries, as well as to
facilitate the creation of new industrial production facilities in developing coun-
tries. In the process of these Consultations, due account would have to be taken
of information on the development of supply and demand, the cost and availabil-
ity of technology and other production factors, the possibilities and conditions of
investment, as well as the varied authority of different governments and the
dynamics of industrialization [4]. It was on the basis of this mandate that the
UNIDO Secretariat was requested to include among its activities a "system of
continuing consultations at global, regional and sectoral levels". Moreover,
UNIDO should be prepared to serve as a forum for the negotiation of agreements
in the field of industry between developed and developing countries and among
developing countries themselves at the request of the countries concerned [5].
Consultations should focus in particular on industries processing raw materials
exported by developing countries or on industries that are energy-intensive, and
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should result in concrete proposals for inclusion in the development programs of
participating developing countries [6].
The specific mandates related to Consultations and incorporated in the
Lima Declaration and Plan of Action appear to have been supported by the
international community as a whole. However, while no country voted against
or abstained on any of the clauses related to Consultations and negotiations in
the Declaration, a few countries expressed reservations or had particular
interpretations of some clauses [7]. This was not the case with a number of other
clauses contained in the Declaration and Plan of Action, nor with respect to the
Declaration and Plan of Action as a whole. In view of the evolution of UNIDO's
System of Consultations and indeed of UNIDO, this point requires further elab-
oration.
On the Declaration and Plan of Action as a whole, one country, the United
States of America, voted against, while seven countries abstained [8]. More
important perhaps were the individual clauses of the All other countries
represented at the Conference voted in favor. Declaration where there were
major differences of perception. These clauses could be placed, for the most
part, into two categories: support for OPEC-type producer associations and sup-
port to a greater or lesser extent, using milder or stronger language, for the
United Nations Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States involving
nationalization and possible expropriation [9]. An example of a clause in the first
category is found in the view that developing countries should change their tradi-
tional method of negotiation through joint action, strengthening producers' asso-
ciations already established, encouraging the creation of new commodity associa-
tions, making arrangements for consultation and cooperation among various pro-
ducers' associations, as well as making provision for mutual support as a precau-
tion against any economic or other form of aggression. An example in the second
category is the view that every state has the inalienable right to exercise freely
its sovereignty and permanent control over its natural resources, both terrestrial
and marine, and overall economic activity for the exploitation of these resources
in the manner appropriate to its circumstances, including nationalization in
accordance with its laws as an expression of this right, and that no state should
be subjected to any form of economic, political or other coercion that impedes
the full and free exercise of that inalienable right [10].
Perhaps of greater interest and certainly relevant to the North-South dialo-
gue that accompanied the evolution of consultations and negotiations was the
acceptance or acquiescence among the Western states of a number of other con-
cepts that found expression in the Lima Declaration. Thus, there was the view
that the unrestricted play of market forces was not the most suitable means of
promoting industrialization and that the activities of transnational corporations
should be subject to regulation and supervision [111. In similar vein, the view
that the policies of developing countries should emphasize the establishment and
strengthening of mechanisms and institutions to regulate and supervise foreign
investment and promote the transfer of technology was reflected. Moreover,
developed countries should adopt policies progressively leading to structural
adjustments within the developed countries and redeployment to developing
countries. Developed countries should cooperate with the governments of the
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developing countries so as to ensure that the activities of transnational corpora-
tions were in conformity with the economic and social aims of the developing
countries [12]. On the issue of cooperation among developing countries, develop-
ing countries should conclude long-term agreements on product specialization
and correspondingly allocate production or product-sharing through industrial
complementary agreements [131. With respect to cooperation between develop-
ing and developed countries, financial resources available in some developing
countries could be used for investment in other developing countries through
bilateral arrangements, through the creation of a neutral international fund, or
both. Urgent consideration should be given to the creation of such a fund, which
could be financed by contributions from the developed countries and the develop-
ing countries with available resources [14].
8.3. Industrial Restructuring and Redeployment:
Consultations and Negotiations
Subsequent to the Lima Conference, the UNIDO Secretariat and the Industrial
Development Board implemented the Conference's decisions by instituting the
System of Consultations managed by a Secretariat Unit significantly titled
"Negotiations Branch" on an "experimental" basis. Between 1977 and 1979, this
Negotiations Branch convened six Consultations at the industrial sector level,
covering iron and steel, fertilizers, petrochemicals, leather and leather products,
vegetable oils and fats, and agricultural machinery.
UNIDO's governing body, the Industrial Development Board, in requesting
the Secretariat to convene these Consultations, also decided to monitor this
Secretariat activity very closely, given the "experimental" and potentially sensi-
tive status of the activity [15].
On the basis of the experience of these six sectoral Consultations, the
Secretariat was able to conclude that the utility of the Consultation activity lay
in the fact that it provided a global forum for the assessment of worldwide
changes in various industrial sectors, for the identification of industrial sectors
and programs in which investment could be promoted, for the consideration of
alternative technologies, and for providing a context in which technical assis-
tance could be requested and provided. Moreover, the results of these Consulta-
tions gave in 1979 a broad indication of such issues as:
(a) The developing countries' share of sectoral world production by the year
2000.
(b) The problems developing countries face in achieving the sectoral goals and
a basis for negotiation and cooperation.
(c) The need to develop improved and longer-term forms of international
cooperation. for establishing the production facilities in developing coun-
tries in the specific industrial sectors.
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(d) The need to improve the terms and conditions of financing required for the
establishment of plants and associated infrastructure in developing coun-
tries.
(e) The scope for greater cooperation between developing countries themselves.
(f) The establishment of a mechanism to monitor progress in creating new
industrial capacity in both developing and developed countries [16].
The Secretariat's conclusion also noted that some of the issues discussed at
these Consultations could not be finalized without an element of negotiation
between the interested parties [171.
Redeployment and restructuring can be seen to involve decision-making by
(a) the entrepreneur (private/public) in the developed country; (b) the company
or partner in the developing country; (c) the government of the developed coun-
try; and (d) the government of the developing country. The precise role of
governments can be expected to vary according to the economic system of a par-
ticular developed or developing country and also often with the particular indus-
trial subsector. Developing country governments generally assume a role in
defining national development objectives and priorities, in establishing policies to
direct and regulate foreign trade and the flow and allocation of domestic and
external resources, as well as in defining the forms of international industrial co-
operation - private foreign investment, joint ventures, licencing and other forms
of agreements, etc. Similarly, governments of developed countries generally
assume, at least, the minimum role of determining the framework for productive
activity and for its external trade relations. Moreover, by 1987 all were aware
that questions related to external trade policy are closely interrelated to
government-determined budgetary policy and monetary and exchange rate pol-
icy.
By 1979 the UNIOO Secretariat had undertaken surveys and other activi-
ties at the enterprise level in a number of developed countries to ascertain
entrepreneurs' interests in and motivations for participating in redeployment
activities, and to identify various constraints in developed and developing coun-
tries that might impede redeployment of industry. One constraint identified was
that the small- and medium-sized firms in developed countries frequently lack
the staff, experience and international contacts needed for establishing and main-
taining a cooperation arrangement with an enterprise in a developing country.
There is often a lack of up-to-date information on country-specific and sector-
specific facts required for an investment decision. Also, there is often a lack of
well-conceived industrial projects and of defined areas of investment priorities in
developing countries. Thus, there is an ahsence of a well-functioning mechanism
or process by which priorities of the developing (host) country and the develop-
ment potential of industry in developed countries can be matched.
Furthermore, companies in developed countries seem to be confronted with
uncertainties as to government policies in both developed and developing coun-
tries affecting, inter alia, the importation of goods and components and the
transfer of resources. Uncertainty with regard to regulation and economic poli-
cies in developed countries impede the realization of cooperating opportunities:
there is fear that an envisaged reimport of the products of redeployed industries
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may be hindered by the application of tariff and other trade barriers in the
developed country or regional grouping in question. Various administrative
practices, regulations and policies in some developed and developing countries
can impede capital transfers or planned relocation of some of a company's activi-
ties to a developing country [18].
At this point, we should consider a number of issues that in 1979 remained
outstanding with regard to Consultations and negotiations. The first point
relates to the role of governments of developed and developing countries. The
second point relates to the issue of negotiations between developed and develop-
ing countries and among developing countries themselves. The third point
relates to the implementation of conclusions and recommendations of the Con-
sultation process so as to result in concrete proposals for inclusion in the
development programs of participating developing countries. It should be
emphasized that in the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial
Development and Cooperation, consultations and negotiations were regarded as
instruments that would facilitate redeployment and assist developing countries in
attaining a greater share in global industrial production, particularly in those
sectors processing raw materials exported by developing countries [19]. How-
ever, documents are available that provide fairly clear perception of developed
and developing country positions, as well as of the positions, Le., suggestions, of
the UNIDO Secretariat. These issues were considered at UNIDO's Third Gen-
eral Conference, 21 January to 9 February 1980, convened in New Delhi, India.
8.4. Consultations, Negotiations, Redeployment,
and Restructuring at the Third General Conference
in New Delhi
UNIDO's Third General Conference was a failure. It considered a large number
of major issues of relevance to the industrial development of the Third World
and international cooperation, but could come to consensus conclusions only on
relatively minor matters related to an Industrial Development Decade for Africa,
and to Women and Industrialization [20].
It should be noted here that matters related to the System of Consulta-
tions, though causing some difficulty among various delegations, did not
comprise the major area of disagreement. Major disagreement was to be found
on the issue of the external financing of development. Here, the Third World
position was formulated in the rather extreme form as the Castro proposal for
the transfer of US$300 billion to developing countries during the period
1980-1990 [211. The OECD countries adopted a position emphasizing the role of
foreign direct investment and stable investment conditions, including investment
treaties and guarantee schemes [22]. The Secretariat put forward an analysis
prophesying the debt crisis of 1982, and proposing a means of avoiding it based
on globally applied quasi-Keynesian concepts, which had some similarity to the
Brandt Commission's major proposals [23].
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A draft text of a compromise overall resolution on industrialization and
international cooperation proposed by the Chairman of the Conference was with-
drawn because of a lack of a wide support, with the result that the original posi-
tion paper of the Group of 77 (the developing countries) was put to the vote.
The developing countries voted in favor, the OECD countries voted against, and
the socialist countries of Eastern Europe voted in favor but with important reser-
vations and interpretations. The report of the Conference also contains the ori-
ginal position papers of the OECD Group of developed countries, as well as that
of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe [24]. The net result of this impasse,
however, is that we have been provided with documents with a considerable
degree of clarity for analysis.
On the question of the role of governments in the Consultation process, the
Secretariat had convened Consultations, as a matter of practice, by addressing
invitations to governments to nominate the persons who would comprise their
representation/delegations. But were these persons "representatives" or
"delegates" or merely "interested parties"? Moreover, these groups sat behind
their country's flags or nameplates, as a matter of practice. The Secretariat had
implicitly recognized the ambiguity with which these groups could be said to
represent their countries. Equally, this ambiguity had been implicitly recognized
by UNIDO's governing body, the Industrial Development Board, since the
reports of Consultations, containing conclusions and recommendations arrived at
by consensus, were subject to further review and decision by the Industrial
Development Board. Additionally, the "temporary" rules of procedure used in
the conduct of Consultations had been the extremely formal rules used by the
Industrial Development Board, i.e., the rules of an intergovernmental body.
Facilities had been provided by the Secretariat to allow for discussions to take
place in plenary meetings with simultaneous interpretation in five languages.
The most important documentation, as well as reports of meetings, were nor-
mally made available in all the official languages [25].
The position taken by the developing countries at New Delhi with regard to
the role of governments was unambiguous. Representation at Consultations of
developed countries should be at the official level so that definite commitments
could be made. The System of Consultations was seen as a means of promoting
redeployment of industry to developing countries and of assisting in the restruc-
turing of world industry. Moreover, UNIDO through the System was called
upon to serve as a forum for the negotiation of industrial agreements between
developed and developing countries and among developing countries themselves,
at the request of the countries concerned, so as to realize the potential of the Sys-
tem for redeployment of industry from developed to developing countries. All
Member States are requested to cooperate in implementing the decisions and
conclusions of Consultations [26].
The position of the OECD countries was rather different. Both with
respect to the international redeployment of industry and to structural adjust-
ment (the code word "restructuring" is not used), as much as possible reliance
should be placed on market forces to encourage mobility of labor and capital.
The role of governments was to influence indirectly market forces by providing
incentives and removing impediments. The System of Consultations had proved
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to be useful, especially with respect to its information function. Both industry
and government from industrialized and developing countries could be usefully
served by the System, particularly by bringing together participants (at Consul-
tations) from governments, industry, labor, consumer, and other groups as
appropriate from both these groups of countries and providing opportunities for
mutual exchanges and understanding. Future development of the System should
take place on a pragmatic and voluntary basis, and it was important to preserve
the consultative and open character of the System of Consultations. Direct
interventionist or regulatory approaches by governments at an international level
were not regarded as advisable [27]. With reference to the specific role of
UNIDO in this activity, the OECD countries concluded that the promotional
activities of UNIDO mainly serve the purpose of establishing contacts between
partners in the industrialization process and have contributed to the effectiveness
of UNIDO's technical assistance program. The System of Consultations should
keep its consultative and nonobligatory character, and its value, as well as the
value of its results, should be enhanced [28].
The position of the CMEA countries (the socialist countries of Eastern
Europe) was also clearly stated. In this view, with respect to UNIDO activities
related to the transfer of industries toward developing countries, UNIDO should
act on the principle that this process should endeavor to provide developing
countries with diversified industries and an independent national economy, and
to strengthen the public sector. They share the expressed views of developing
countries with respect to the inconsistency of theories on the economic and
industrial growth of developing countries being automatically stimulated by
economic progress in the advanced capitalist countries and transmitted through
market mechansisms. They warn that if trends observed in 1979 continue, the
System of Consultations would run the risk of becoming an advertising agency
for private enterprises and of not fulfilling the tasks assigned to it in the Lima
Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation.
The System must be subject to public control, with the participation of represen-
tatives of the State authorities of the participating countries, and not provide in
developing countries a springboard for the economic activities of transnational
corporations [291.
8.6. Resolution of Issues Relating to the Role
of Governments, Negotiations, and Follow-up
on Conclusions and Recommendations
One task undertaken by the Industrial Development Board after the failure to
achieve a meaningful degree of consensus at the New Delhi Conference was to
embark on drawing up formal guidelines to govern the operation of the System of
Consultations. In this exercise, the Negotiations Branch, the Secretariat Unit of
UNIDO that had been set up in 1976 to operate the System on an "experimental
basis", had an operative role to play in facilitating the work of the open-ended
working group of the Industrial Development Board. This working group was
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charged with proposing to the full Industrial Development Board a document
that could be supported by consensus by Member States. Significantly, the
Secretariat presented the working group with copies of the Lima Declaration and
Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation where references to
the System and to negotiations had received consensus, together with the rules of
procedure of the Industrial Development Board itself, as well as that of the Gen-
eral Assembly. Some twenty or thirty meetings of this working group - some of
which were very informal - were convened, at the end of which a text emerged.
It has to be admitted that this text was not linguistically clear, but it was able to
overcome the various difficulties to the extent of allowing Consultations to
proceed within a generally acceptable framework rather than through an ad hoc
arrangement with continual risks of disruption.
It must also be mentioned here that from the First Consultation Meeting in
1977, meetings had been characterized by the political caucus and "block posi-
tions", with plenary and committee meetings at times running in parallel with
caucus meetings of the various political groups - the OECD countries, the
CMEA countries, the Group of 77, sometimes indeed with separate African,
Asian and Latin American-Caribbean caucuses. This situation tapered off in
1985. These considerations also found reflection in the agreed guidelines that
were to emerge from the working group of the Industrial Development Board
and that form the legislative basis on that the activities of UNIDO's System of
Consultations operate. Selected clauses from these guidelines are quoted below
in order to provide a clear reflection of a text that had been negotiated over a
period of more than two years.
8.6. The System of Consultations [30]
Part I: Principles, objectives, and characteristics
1. The System of Consultations shall be an instrument through which the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is to serve
as a forum for developed and developing countries in their contacts and
consultations directed toward the industrialization of developing countries.
2. The System of Consultations shall relate to cooperation between developed
and developing countries and among developing countries themsevles.
3. The System of Consultations would also permit negotiations among
interested parties at their request, at the same time as or after consulta-
tions.
4. The System of Consultations, as an important and established activity of
UNIDO, is a valuable framework for identifying problems associated with
the industrialization of developing countries, for considering ways and
means to accelerate their industrialization, and for contributing to closer
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industrial cooperation among member countries, in accordance with the
Lima Declaration and Plan of Action.
5. The System of Consultations shall seek action-oriented measures toward
increasing the share of developing countries in world industrial production
and creating new industrial facilities in developing countries contributing to
the establishment of a New International Economic Order. To that end,
the problems associated with the industrialization of developing countries
shall be considered on a continuing basis from a policy, economic, financial,
social and technical point of view.
7. The formulation of solutions to the problems addressed in the process of
consultations shall take account of the experience in industrial development
of countries with different social and economic systems.
8. The Board shall consider the reports of the Consultation Meetings and the
conclusions and recommendations contained therein, as well as decide and
provide guidance on appropriate follow-up action.
10. All levels of Consultation Meetings shall be open to participants from all
member countries.
14. Consultations at the sectoral level may cover in particular:
(a) Changing patterns in the sector.
(b) The ways and means through which a substantial and effective contri-
bution can be made to the industrialization of developing countries
and to the achievement of the objectives and targets set out in the
International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations
Development Decade as well as in the Lima Declaration and Plan of
Action.
(c) Elaboration of recommendations for action at national, regional,
interregional and worldwide levels.
20. The topics and sectors in respect of which Consultations are to be held, as
well as the level defined in paragraphs 11 to 14 at which they are to take
place, shall be determined by the Board. The Board shall decide every two
years on the program of Consultations, including preparatory meetings,
taking into account, inter alia, the financial implications, for the following
biennium corresponding to a financial period.
21. Each Consultation shall be prepared and the issues to be considered shall
be identified on the basis of:
(a) Studies by the secretariat of UNIDO, and where appropriate, by other
United Nations organs, internatinal organizations, or other relevant
bodies and institution.
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(b) Discussions, individually or at appropriate meetings, of these studies
and of other documents, among experts selected by the Executive
Director, having due regard to equitable geographical distribution,
and as appropriate in consultation with the 'member States concerned.
(c) Informal contacts with bodies and institutions that can effectively
contribute to the preparation of the Consultations, and discussions
where appropriate with permanent representatives of the member
States of UNIDO.
23. Participants of each member country should include officials of govern-
ments as well as representatives of industry, labor, consumer groups, and
others, as deemed appropriate by each Government.
24. International organizations and intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations having consultative status with UNIDO shall be invited by
the Executive Director to participate in the Consultations as observers.
Part II: Rules of procedure
28. Each Consultation Meeting shall elect a Chairman, a rapporteur and up to
four Vice Chairmen. Due account shall be taken of the principle of equit-
able geographical distribution in the election of these officers who shall con-
stitute the Bureau.
37. Interpretation shall be provided in all the official languages of the Board as
are effectively required by participants in the Consultation. A speaker may
use a language other than an official language of the Board, if he provides
for interpretation into one of the languages used in the Consultation.
41. Substantive proposals and amendments thereto during the discussions may
be introduced by any participant or observer, but a decision thereon shall
only be taken by the participants.
44. During the discussion of any matter, a participant or observer may at any
time raise a point of order, which shal1 be decided immediately by the
Chairman and in accordance with these rules. A participant may appeal
against the ruling of the Chairman. The appeal shall be immediately
referred to the Bureau of the Consultation Meeting for decision. A partici-
pant or observer may not, in raising a point of order, speak on the sub-
stance of the matter under discussion.
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45. All organs of Consultation Meetings shall operate on the basis of consensus
among participants from each member country as defined by paragraph 23.
If participants from a member country do not wish to join a consensus, this
shall be made known through a spokesperson from among their number.
46. Each Consultation Meeting shall formulate a report, which shall include
conclusions and recommendations agreed upon by consensus and also other
significant views expressed during the discussions.
48. The adoption of the report shall be by consensus among participants.
49. The report of the Consultation Meeting, and the conclusions and recom-
mendations contained therein, shall be submitted to the Board for decision
and guidance on appropriate follow-up action.
When the text of the guidelines was presented to the Industrial Develop-
ment Board for its adoption, various Member States felt it necessary to take for-
mal positions or to give precision to their positions through the device of an
"explanation of vote" to be recorded verbatim. The CMEA countries were able
to acquiesce in the adoption of the guidelines by abstaining when the whole
document was put to the vote. Before this, the CMEA group forced a vote on
paragraphs 23, 41, 44 and 45 dealing primarily with the role of governments,
participants and observers. Thus, "all conferences and Consultations organized
by UNIDO as an intergovernmental organization should be held at the govern-
mental leveI....Only representatives of the governments...can and should have
decisive voice in the formulation of orientations and recommendations on the
possibilities and prospects for industrial development in the developing coun-
tries..." [31]. Moreover, the spokesman for this group of countries proposed the
deletion from article 41 of the words "any participant" and from article 44 of the
words "or observer", since contradictions were to be found between UNIDO's
status as an intergovernmental international organization and the provision of
article 23 where representatives of private capital are placed on the same footing
as the representatives of the governments of participating states. In particular,
it was felt that the representatives of the transnational corporations should not
enjoy equal rights with representatives of governments in the formulation of
agreements and recommendations [32].
A number of other spokesmen also recorded reservations without going as
far as taking the issue to a vote. Thus, the delegation of the United States of
America indicated precisely how this delegation interpreted certain articles of the
guidelines. The United States of America did not accept the Lima Declaration
and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation as the mandate
for the Consultations and did not view the System as intergovernmental negotia-
tions on redeployment of industry. Instead, there were successive decisions of
the Industrial Development Board, including the rules under discussion and
adopted, which formed the mandate for Consultations. The United States of
America viewed the New International Economic Order as a general, evolving
concept related to the desire of all nations to an expanding world economy. The
United States of America specifically did not accept the New International
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Economic Order as defined by General Assembly resolutions 3201 and 3202 of
the Sixth Special Session and by the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States. On the question of participation and article 23, participants need not
include members from all the groups enumerated nor members from any particu-
lar group. It was hoped that Consultations would continue to be characterized
by the free exchange of views and practical approach achieved previously [33].
The delegation of Iraq, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77, the develop-
ing countries, emphasized the "particular value in these rules to paragraph 3
which envisages the System serving as, inter alia, a forum of negotiations; para-
graph 8 regarding the intergovernmental follow-up of Consultations, and the
Board's role; and to paragraph 23 regarding the governmental nature of partici-
pation at Consultation meetings..." [34].
Despite the recorded reservations and specific interpretations of particular
articles of the guidelines made by various countries or groups of countries, and
which by their very nature remain unresolved, these guidelines have provided to
date a workable legislative mandate for UNIDO's System of Consultations.
8.7. The Appraisal of the System in 1982
and Negotiations of Agreements
International secretariats often have to work on the basis of mandates or legisla-
tive objectives that are inconsistent, contradictory, or both. In May 1981, the
Industrial Development Board decided to request the Secretariat to present an
analysis of costs, results and achievements of each Consultation previously held.
In fulfilling this request for what amounted to an appraisal, on quasi cOl>t-benefit
grounds, of the System of Consultations, and the work through which it was sup-
ported, the Secretariat had to define, as best it could, those outcomes of Consul-
tations which could be held to constitute "results and achievements", and in so
doing also to indicate those areas in which "results and achievements H " had not
been possible [35]. Here the focus is on the issue of negotiations. It should also
be recalled at this point that the Secretariat Unit responsible for the System of
Consultations was in 1982 known as the "Negotiations Branch".
In meeting the request for an appraisal, the Secretariat noted that the Sys-
tem was designed to bring about a better understanding and closer industrial
cooperation between developed and developing countries from which both groups
stood to gain. The effectiveness of the System in attaining its objectives
depended in part on its ability to identify problems in industrial cooperation that
were of strategic importance for the industrialization of developing countries. In
the last analysis, the effectiveness of the System depended on the active and con-
structive participation of the political, economic and social partners in working
together on those problems and in elaborating broad, mutually beneficial agree-
ments to facilitate their solution, thereby strengthening world industrial coopera-
tion [36]. The ultimate benefit to be derived from this dialogue by both
developed and developing countries depended on the systematic translation of
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the opportunities revealed by the Consultation process into implemented indus-
trial projects. In the view of the Secretariat, the Consultation process must be
followed by a negotiations phase, within or outside the System of Consultations,
so that Consultations would result in concrete proposals for inclusion in the
development programs of participating developing countries [371.
In a chapter subtitled "From Consultations toward Negotiations", the
Secretariat concluded, on the need for a negotiations phase to follow Consulta-
tions, that the basic conditions required for developing countries to achieve a
25% share in world industrial production appeared to be:
(a) The recognition by all parties concerned, in both developed and developing
countries, that there are mutual interests in negotiating indicative sectoral
agreements so as to support the accelerated industrialization of developing
countries and to overcome the current world economic crisis.
(b) The promotion of new dimensions in international industrial cooperation
corresponding to increasing world interdependence.
(c) The utilization of the authority available to governments to negotiate
agreements covering increased production in developing countries.
It was difficult to set sectoral indicative targets based on the aggregate tar-
get of 25% within an industrial framework that was continually changing.
Nevertheless, the fact that depressed economies within developed countries
needed to be revitalized might encourage policies that encouraged sales of plants
and equipment from developed countries and in so doing stimulated and
accelerated the industrialization of developing countries. It was recognized by
the Secretariat that sectoral indicative targets were dependent on input-output
relations for each industry, but the Secretariat stressed that such targets were
much more dependent on the political will to implement programs and projects
and in overcoming the obstacles caused by conflicting interests. These targets
would result from consensus, compromises, and from industrial cooperation
arrangements, and would have to move toward a future time horizon that had to
be selected and negotiated [38].
Under the subheading "The types of multilateral agreements that might be
negotiated", the Secretariat was clear with respect to this objective: "To avoid
any misunderstanding, it should be stated unambiguously that UNIDO does not
intend to provide a forum for negotiating industrial agreements at the enterprise
level nor for the negotiation of bilateral industrial agreements which lie purely
within the individual sovereign rights of governments" [39]. UNIDO could serve
as a forum for the discussion and perhaps negotiation of generalized or partial
multilateral agreements on an industrial sector in the following forms:
(a) Generalized multilateral agreements might cover the distribution of pro-
duction envisaged in the long term, together with an indication of the
resulting trade envisaged between developed and developing countries and
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of the transfer of resources and technical assistance required. Such a long-
term development program for sectoral cooperation would be indicative,
but would nevertheless serve as a general framework for the conclusion of
bilateral agreements.
(b) Partial multilateral agreements might concern two groups of countries
interested in taking concerted action regarding the future development of
one or more sectors of industry. For example, it might be possible to
envisage the establishment of mini-iron and steel plants in certain countries
through such an agreement. The agreement might also take the form, at
the request of a developing country, of an integrated program that would
involve a group of developed countries interested in coordinating their
efforts in order to develop in that developing country one (or a group of)
industrial sector(s) or to undertake an important specific activity such as
the accelerated training of industrial manpower [401.
In the ensuing debate of this issue in the Industrial Development Board, it
was stated that greater emphasis should be given to the elaboration of action-
oriented measures and programs designed to increase the share of developing
countries in world industrial production. Most sectoral Consultations had
reached agreement in principle on certain target levels for output of developing
countries, and there was now an interest in negotiating indicative sector agree-
ments which would include measures necessary to achieve these targets. Consul-
tations should be followed by negotiations and the readiness of the Secretariat to
provide such a forum at the same time as or after Consultations was appreciated.
The process from Consultations to negotiations could not be separated, since one
led to the other and should be encouraged.
Other countries, however, were of the view that the Lima target was an
illustrative goal and therefore its disaggregation among industrial sectors could
not be supported. Moving consultations toward negotiations was unacceptable
and could destroy what was a useful program. Attention was drawn to the pro-
vision in the rules of procedure that "Consultations would also permit negotia-
tions among interested parties at their request, at the same time...". Therefore,
the subject need not be reopened [41].
In providing guidance to the Secretariat, the Industrial Development Board
took note of the analysis of the System of Consultations contained in ID/B/284
as well as of consensus conclusions and recommendations of reports of Consulta-
tions convened in the previous year. With reference to chapter VI ("From Con-
sultations toward Negotiations") of ID/B/284, the Board recalled the principles,
objectives and characteristics of the System of Consultations as established in
the rules of procedure under which the System would permit negotiations among
interested parties at their request, at the same time as or after Consultations.
The Board requested the Secretariat to take into account the views and concerns
expressed during its discussions of this subject, particularly those relating to
greater focus on practical and well-defined issues directly related to furthering
progress in industrialization of developing countries [42].
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8.8. From Negotiations to Consultations
R. Kloepag and V. A. RichGrdlon
On 1 October 1985, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
acquired the status of a specialized agency of the United Nations family and
became fully responsible to its own Conference and Industrial Development
Board. Prior to that date it had been part of the United Nations Secretariat,
with a Chief Executive responsible to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. In December 1985, the Secretariat published a leaflet designed to
attract participants to Consultations. In this leaflet "System of Consultations:
A Partnership for Progress through International Industrial Cooperation", the
System is described as an action-oriented forum designed to accelerate the indus-
trialization of developing countries by encouraging the involvement of govern-
ments and industry. The System seeks measures to deal with industrialization
problems in a given sector from the policy, economic, financial, social and techni-
cal points of view. The objectives of the System are stated to be:
(a) To assess worldwide changes in industrial sectors.
(b) To identify industrial sectors and projects in which investment can be pr~
moted.
(c) To consider alternative technologies.
(d) To recommend desirable policy changes at national and enterprise levels.
(e) To promote direct negotiations among interested parties during, after and
between Consultations.
(f) To foster a better understanding of present and future industrial trends in
terms of production, raw materials, finance, training and energy require-
ments.
(g) To create a context in which UNIDO's technical assistance can subse-
quently be provided.
The reasons for participation are stated to be:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
To obtain an overview of global supply and demand, with forecasts to the
year 2000.
To learn of specific country needs in the developing world.
To appreciate the concrete, industry-specific concerns of developing coun-
tries.
To negotiate directly ways to meet identified industrial needs, in a manner
that is advantageous to all parties.
To gain an insight into suitable technologies, products and designs.
To ensure that the realities of the market place are fully considered.
To make sure that economic factors for investment and technology transfer
are fully understood.
To facilitate international cooperation for mutual benefit - both
North-South and South-South.
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(i) To identify and make initial contact with potential industrial partners.
(j) To ensure that one is not part of the problem, but part of the solution.
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In June 1986, as part of the restructuring of the·Secretariat of "UNIDO as
a specialized agency", the Organization Unit "Negotiations Branch" responsible
for this activity was renamed and its bureaucratic status enhanced when it was
officially designated "System of Consultations Division" in the newly created
Department for Industrial Promotion, Consultations and Technology.
8.9. UNIDO's Activities in the Field of
Technology Acquisition and Negotiation
Under its technology program UNIDO has developed extensive activities with
the objective of assisting developing countries to create and to strengthen their
capabilities for technology acquisition and negotiation. This has included three
main elements: (a) institutional infrastructure and information, (b) training on
transfer of technology negotiation, and (c) technological advisory services.
8.9.1. Institutional infrastructure and information
Many developing countries have established in the past regulatory agencies to
evaluate and register transfer of technology agreements, and this has resulted in
significant improvements in the overall process of technology acquisition and
development. Such regulatory agencies provide their governments with informa-
tion about the nature of technology inflows and supply conditions from different
sources and for different sectors. Furthermore, these agencies identify various
sectoral needs and coordinate actions with other policy-making institutions in
order to stimulate flows of technology to preferred areas, according to the
country's priorities. In addition, inputs are provided to national research and
development institutions in order to ensure that the operations of such research
and development facilities become more directly related to domestic technologi-
cal needs. Local technological capabilities can be defended and provision made
for fair negotiation conditions with directly beneficial effects on the balance of
payments, on conditions for the assimilation of technology and on the competi-
tiveness of local industry.
To date, UNIDO has successfully assisted many developing countries in set-
ting up an appropriate legal and institutional infrastructure in relation to
transfer of technology promotion and evaluation and has contributed continu-
ously to upgrading the performance of national regulatory agencies. Training of
staff on technology acquisition and contract negotiation has been provided,
together with the promotion of exchange of experience and data among regula-
tory agencies on conditions of technology acquisition and policies and the con-
duct of surveys and studies on international trends in selected sectors.
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8.0.2. Training on transfer of technology negotiation
Training activities aimed at improving negotiating skills for the acquisition of
technology by public and private enterprises of developing countries were either
implemented within training programs for technology transfer regulatory agen-
cies or independently of such programs. The principal objective of these training
activities has been to enable developing country enterprises to negotiate technol-
ogy transfer contracts which, within the framework of a national technology
transfer policy, will be fair and equitable. Such training activities have been
organized in various forms. Seminars and workshops of an intersectoral nature
have been designed to introduce the participants to the intricacies and major pit-
falls in technology transfer contract negotiation and have been tailored to the
requirements of the different clients.
In parallel with the organization and conduct of seminars and workshops, a
substantial effort has been made to translate all the experiences and the materi-
als amassed through the years by UNIDO into a training manual, which is
intended to cover the whole range of subjects of which negotiators, decision-
makers and government officials dealing with technology acquisition and negotia-
tion should be made aware. Such subjects include not only those directly related
to the evaluation of the agreements, but also those which have an influence on
technology options, the behavior of the parties and the results of the negotiation.
To meet these objectives, new materials have been prepared on topics such as
the role of intellectual property protection in technology transfer, sources of
finance for technology transfer, project preparation, technology transfer through
joint venture agreements, and the principles and strategies for negotiation. The
overall objective is to ensure that training capabilities can be built upon by the
countries themselves [43].
8.0.3. Technological advisory services
Together with its activities oriented to the creation and strengthening of institu-
tional infrastructures and human resources in the field of technology acquisition,
the technology program of UNIDO has been operating for several years a subpro-
gram called Technology Advisory Services (TAS) , aimed at providing rapid,
objective, and impartial advice to governments and entrepreneurs of developing
countries in negotiating technology acquisition. From its inception, assistance
under T AS has included advice on the negotiation of joint ventures, turn-key
deliveries, licensing agreements and technical assistance contracts in various
fields such as pharmaceuticals, food processing, mining and minerals processing,
and the automotive industry.
T AS is a program with proven capabilities in assisting developing countries
when these countries face concrete problems related to contract negotiation. An
increasing need for this kind of service has been identified not only in relation to
major projects but also from small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs who have
very limited access to local sources of information and specialized advice when
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faced with the necessity of dealing successfully with foreign suppliers. Major
projects require missions to the field; but in order to expand the scope, flexibility
and cost-effectiveness of T AS services, UNIDO provides a desk service to supply
advice from the Secretariat based in Vienna on selected topics of negotiation, or
to review technology contracts, or to supplement the analytical work carried out
by the recipients or by the regulatory authorities for technology transfer in
developing countries. These services are based on the work of specialized
UNIDO staff as well as outside consultants, and this work is supported by the
contributions of the different Units of the Secretariat. Thus, the work of experi-
enced negotiators of technology agreements is combined with that of technical
experts in various industrial fields.
A unique advantage of TAS is the possibility of easy access to an invaluable
amount of information on the various conditions in contract agreements that can
be collected through the Technological Information Exchange System. Govern-
ments of all developing countries may request UNIDO 's for T AS services. Pub-
lic and private corporations in developing countries may also request such ser-
vices on the condition that their governments endorse such requests. These
requests can be presented through local UNDP offices or addressed directly to
UNIDO [44]. In principle, all these services provided by the Secretariat should
be reimbursed at actual costs.
8.9.4. Program on plant level cooperation
for the transfer of technology
Creating mechansims for the transfer of industrial technology and know-how
from developed to developing countries has been one of the approaches to
upgrading technological capabilities in developing countries. One such approach
can be found in the "Plant level cooperation for the transfer of technology to
small- and medium-scale enterprises". The objective of this program is to match
enterprises from developed and developing countries as cooperating partners and
promote technology transfer agreements through the mobilization of the private
and public sector (Le., production enterprises) in the developed countries as
sources of technology to partner enterprises in developing countries. This
approach to technology transfer relies on treating technology as a marketable
commodity and puts great emphasis on the knowledge, perceptions and decisions
of individual entrepreneurs as the motive force.
At present the three ongoing projects in the program are all basically ident-
ical. Each is funded by an industrialized source country, covers three or four
selected developing countries, and concentrates on a particular industrial subsec-
tor. One project is funded by Sweden in light engineering and metalworking
industries, covering Egypt, Kenya and India; another project is funded by the
Netherlands in food processing, covering China, Mexico, Sudan and Thailand;
the third project is funded by Italy in engineering industries, covering Cameroon,
Colombia, Peru, and Tunesia. The Swedish-funded project is at the most
advanced stage and has allowed so far six enterprise-to-enterprise partnerships.
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UNIDO's role in executing these projects includes ascertaining the technol-
ogy requirements of selected enterprises in the participating developing coun-
tries; identifying potential partner enterprises in the source country with the
requisite technological expertise and interest in engaging in an international
transfer agreement; assisting matched potential partners in reaching final agree-
ments based on mutual benefit (this involves drafting agreements, mediating
negotiations, etc.); and providing follow-up assistance for adaptation or training
to supplement the agreement between partners. In carrying out project activi-
ties, UNIDO cooperates with counterpart organizations in each participating
country.
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International Trade
Negotiations

CHAPTER 9
Joint Ventures: Joint Interests
in East-West Trade?
Urpo Kivikari
Institute of East- West Trade
Turku School of Economics
Finland
9.1. Introduction
Joint ventures located in European CMEA countries with a minority partnership
of Western capital have become a particular focal point for discussion, after the
Soviet Union in January 1987 adopted a decree allowing joint ventures on its ter-
ritory.
The 15-year history of joint ventures in the CMEA region cannot exactly
be summed up as an unmitigated success story. In a joint enterprise, all kinds of
problems due to differences in the economic systems come onto the agenda. The
gains for Western capital are often inadequate to overcome all the inconveniences
anticipated. From the socialist countries' viewpoint, the joint venture serves a
wide range of primary needs in East-West trade.
Only by developing the rules and incentives for joint ventures, in order to
achieve a better balance of interests, will this form of cooperation gain ground.
Moreover, essential changes in Eastern economic mechanisms are a precondition
for developing the joint venture into a significant promoter of East-West trade.
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9.2. A Slow Start in the Shadow of
Economic System Differences
U. Kitlikari
The adoption of special operational modes in the economic relations between
socialist and capitalist countries is not as simple as in trade between capitalist
countries. That is why operations of this kind in East-West trade provoke a lot
more discussion than their actual significance might seem to warrant. In the last
few months attention has especially been drawn to joint ventures, Le., enter-
prises owned partly by Western capital although located in the CMEA region [1].
The joint venture is no newcomer to East-West trade. In 1971 Romania
and in the following year Hungary were the first CMEA countries to adopt a
joint venture law. Later, economic cooperation of this kind was made possible in
Bulgaria (1981), Poland (1986) and Czechoslovakia (1986) [2]. The reason for
the current increased interest in joint ventures is that the opportunities for such
enterprises have been considerably extended in the CMEA region as of 1987.
The most remarkable change has been the Soviet Union's adoption of this type of
legislation in 1987 as a part of the country's economic and foreign trade reforms
and in the wake of declining oil prices.
Fifteen years after the first emergence of such legislation in Hungary, the
number of joint enterprises that have started up there is approaching 100. Yet
by the end of 1986, the inflow of Western capital amounted to less than 3% of
Hungarian imports from the West in that year. As far as other CMEA countries
are concerned, a proper objective would actually be to get the first ten joint ven-
tures working well. The explanation of the hitherto modest success of joint ven-
tures lies partly in the sort of friction that has kept East-West trade at a low
level on the whole. In addition, a certain asymmetry of interests has to be noted
in this field.
Political rivalry and differences in economic systems are the two main fac-
tors that have exerted a negative influence on economic relations between the
capitalist and socialist states. The impact of these factors has varied from time
to time and depends much on which particular trading countries are involved.
The form of the foreign trade operation is significant, too. Commodity exports
and imports directly reflect prevailing political relations. Where there is political
antagonism, commodity trade is easily disturbed by a variety of constraints, such
as heavy tariffs and embargo measures. Of course, the removal of trade barriers
is complicated by differences in economic systems, too. But these problems are
not insurmountable, if political goodwill can produce an effect.
However, the fact undoubtedly is that in the adoption of more developed
operations in East-West trade it is the friction caused by different economic sys-
tems that tends to grow, while the influence of political rivalry remains more in
the background of business (see Table 9.1). A joint venture in which various
kinds of economic activity are permanently entailed puts capitalist and socialist
partners into very close and complicated contacts with each other. Dissimilari-
ties in accounting practice, pricing, marketing, risk-taking - Le., in economic
thinking and in the economic mechanism as a whole - are much more real and
disturbing in joint ventures than in commodity trade or in some simpler form of
industrial cooperation [3]. These are the facts of the matter even though joint
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ventures are released from the requirements of central planning and from many
of the regulations applied to domestic state enterprise in socialist countries.
Table 9.1. The impacts of political rivalry and differences in economic systems on vari-
ous forms of East-West economic activity.
Economic A. ctitlitlf
Relative significance 0/ negative impact 0/:
Political rivalrlf Differences in economic slfstems
Commodity trade
Industrial cooperation
Joint ventures
strong
moderate
slight
slight
moderate
strong
9.3. The Incentives as Seen from the East
IT in the past ideological grounds have served to impede the acceptance of
Western economic participation, today ideological principles appear to be of
small significance in comparison with the economic benefits the socialist govern-
ments find in joint ventures. The list of favorable features is growing long and
impressive. The order of preference might vary from country to country, but
some substantial motives are of general validity.
That East European countries have been getting deeper into debt since
19705 and that the Soviet Union has been faced with the declining price of oil
since 1985 are factors that have caused a more critical and restrictive policy
toward imports from the West. But these imports are of too great an impor-
tance to be diminished without the creation of a compensating mechanism. One
solution is to start producing inside a country's borders the good that were form-
erly imported. Production that utilizes domestic resources along with Western
resources provides an alternative to hard currency expenditure on the Western
market. When such a substitution for imports from the West is realized through
a joint venture, the socialist economy receives permanently, uninterruptedly, and
irrespective of hard currency reserves, high-quality products that might earlier
have been obtainable in smaller quantities, if at all.
The purpose of the joint venture is not only to improve supply on the
domestic market, but also to develop exports. Despite lengthy efforts, the value
and structure of exports to the West have not evolved as desired. Since the
bringing about of the necessary changes by one's own efforts takes more time
than is realized, the joint venture form is seen not only as a means of saving hard
currency, but also as a source of earning it.
The success of exports to the West depends not only on the kind of prod-
ucts but also on the ability to sell them. In marketing the channels and know-
how of the Western partner may constitute a significant contribution. Once a
common production process is in being, the transfer of Western influence will
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take place in other spheres, too. It might promote management, since
"managers" have not yet fully displaced the "directors" of the command econ-
omy in socialist enterprises. Transfer of technology will probably more success-
fully occur in the continuity of the common production, which characterizes a
joint venture, than in a situation in which there is only occasional contact. With
respect to total capital inflow, on the other hand, the direct role of joint ventures
has not been very great.
Socialist cuntries, not least the Soviet Union (cr. Andreyev and ~enaev,
1986), have expressed repeatedly their intention of using more developed opera-
tions in trade with capitalist countries. In place of commodity trade, forms of
industrial cooperation might be introduced, and such an operation could be a
basis for joint ventures. This trend might be desirable for many reasons.
Presumably one very significant point is that imported goods remain external to
domestic production and are not really absorbed into it. After being used, the
imported product has no lasting spill-over effects on the economy. In industrial
cooperation, and even more in joint ventures, Western input changes production
from inside. The impact is not restricted to material input, but expands through
the production process. "Learning by working together" also has its effect on the
whole environment of a joint enterprise.
The significance and influence of joint ventures are not strictly comparable
with those of imports from the West. The increasing interest in this sort of
operation, which so clearly intensifies growth, is easy to understand. It is highly
likely that in many cases joint ventures appear to be a profitable use of socialist
resources in the light of opportnity costs.
9.4. Grounds for Western Participation
In socialist countries the pros and cons of joint ventures are judged above all at
the macrolevel, owing to the prevailing economic systems and to the great
impact these operations have on the economy. In the West the decision to
undertake the same joint venture is made on microeeonomic grounds by a firm
seeking profitability in its business,
Apparently, the main consideration of a Western firm in establishing a
common project with a socialist partner is market access. A joint venture may
be the relevant choice when the firm has to find the best way or at least a feasi-
ble one of acquiring, maintaining or increasing its market share in a socialist
country. With time, the export of goods may turn out to be inadequate and has
to be compensated for by forms of economic cooperation. The joint venture is a
parameter of competition among Western companies insofar as it is the means
preferred by the socialist country. In the long run it may better serve to estab-
lish stable sales in the host country than other forms of trade, and it may ensure
third markets in other CMEA countries.
By locating certain activities in a socialist country, Western firms may seek
solutions to some problems of production. Savings in the costs of the labor force,
raw materials, transportation, etc., play a role. Moreover, restrictions and
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regulations concerning production (e.g., in relation to pollution) in the West also
motivate direct investments.
As a permanent partner in joint production the Western firm gets a much
better chance to ensure the intended results in regard to products, marketing,
etc., than in the simpler forms of cooperation. A joint venture is a natural vehi-
cle for the realization of two-way technology transfer. In general, techniques
applied in production do not properly benefit from the results of expansive
research pursued in the socialist countries. The joint venture provides a good
vehicle for Western firms and Socialist countries interested in the commercializa-
tion of research.
The status of "insider" and familiarity with the socialist market also give
the Western firm involved in a joint venture a relatively strong competitive posi-
tion in traditional exports from the West to a socialist country.
9.5. Impediments to Success
The prerequisite for establishing a joint venture is a very simple one. As in any
trading business, in this operation, too, mutual benefits have to be deemed ade-
quate by both partners themselves. The advantages accruing to the partner will
hardly disturb the realization of the joint venture, although the attempt to res-
trict and control the partner's gain has been widely harmful in East-West rela-
tions (cf. Kivikari and Nurmi, 1986). At the level of the individual enterprise, it
is not relevant to counterbalance Eastern and Western gains. The decisive point
for the Western partner is whether its expected benefits, usually somewhat
difficult to foresee, are sufficient to outweigh the problems and risks arising in
this kind of direct investment.
It is not unusual for the partners' primary motives to contradict one
another. The Western firm may be interested in producing for socialist markets
than in locating production in the East to reinforce the firm's competitiveness in
the West. The socialist partner might be striving to earn hard currency by new
exports rather than saving hard currency by new import-substituting production.
When profit transfer is dependent on the hard currency earnings of a joint enter-
prise, there is a certain guarantee for the emergence of a joint interest in market-
ing to the West.
Because of strict regulations, the difficulties of anticipating costs, and a fear
of bureaucracy, many Western firms hesitate to participate in a joint enterprise
in a socialist country. The Western partner's equity may not usually exceed 49%
of the founding capital. As well as being a significant restraint as such, it is also
a symbol of the necessity to adapt to the rules of the alien environment. Apart
from labor force costs, the level of cost is not too attractive for a foreign com-
pany, despite the domestically low level of costs in socialist countries. Problems
of pricing are difficult to solve when putting together Eastern and Western
inputs. How would an industrial lot and the infrastructure be evaluated in rela-
tion to Western equipment and know-how? Having to deal with unfamiliar insti-
tutions of a different economic system brings the Western partner extra
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expenses. Problems arising from differences in systems may be intensified by the
rigid and bureaucratic stand of the authorities.
Participation in a joint venture often means to a Western firm involvement
in a complex pattern of activity, the results of which may be of minor
significance. The one firm alone has to take care of manifold tasks in acquiring
equipment, know-how, financing, management, marketing, etc. This implies an
immersion in a wide range of complicated problems compared to the modest role
which participation in the joint venture might play in the firm's total business
volume, and it raises the question of whether the effort is worthwhile.
The joint venture, when not located in a special "economic zone", has to
adapt to the situation in the host country and integrate somehow into its econ-
omy. Of course, the socialist government creates for joint enterprises a set of
rules and a framework primarily from the socialist partner's standpoint. So it is
quite natural that, when problems arise, they show their darker side to the West.
Even from the socialist standpoint, all difficulties cannot be resolved in
advance by appropriate rules and legislation. It is true that matters of principle
induced by the introduction of Western ownership and motivation are to be dealt
with by legislation (d. Voznesenskaja 1986). But it is more a matter of practice
to fit together in an operating business relationship the elements coming from a
centrally planned economy and from a market economy. At any rate, a joint
venture is a halfway arrangement which presents the socialist partner with new
behavioral demands.
9.6. Lasting but Limited Support
The motives that speak for the adoption of the joint venture as an instrument for
promoting East-West trade are not of a temporary nature. Joint enterprises
serve the key interests of socialist countries in improving their ability to absorb
Western input into the economy, in developing the structure of commodity
exports and in aiding access to Western markets. Naturally, the significance of
joint ventures depends on the role economic policy assigns on the whole to the
division of labor with the West (ef. Koves, 1985).
From the Western point of view, the East is rarely as attractive an area for
the establishment of a subsidiary as is the West or the South. The same holds
for commodity exports from the Western countries to Eastern countries, which
fluctuate below 5% of the total exports of the Western countries. When the joint
venture is compared with other forms of operation in Eastern markets, it turns
out to be a viable alternative provided that joint interests are sufficient to over-
come diverging ones.
Recent reforms in socialist countries give evidence of an ever greater readi-
ness to accommodate Western interests. Of course, such steps and the
corresponding flexible attitudes will further the adoption of this quite new form
of economic cooperation. But it can still be argued that long into the future the
impediments to market integration will hinder the joint venture from developing
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into a really significant vanguard of internationalization. Nor is it to be expected
that the joint venture alone can solve any of the basic problems that hamper
East-West trade.
Notes
[1] Socialist countries own in part or in their entirety enterprises in capitalist
countries, too. These firms are engaged mainly in commerce and service
activities. They are excluded from review in this paper.
[2] Yugoslavia was the first socialist country to adopt such legislation in 1967.
The number of projects started so far is about 250. The German Demo-
cratic Republic is at the moment the only European CMEA country that
does not allow joint ventures with Western capital.
[3] It can be maintained that it is incorrect to name economic system
differences as a source of friction. Actually, the main obstacle is the inabil-
ity of the present socialist mechanism to get cooperation going between
firms: this is true even in intra-CMEA relations (cf. Inotai, 1986).
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10.1. Introduction
The main objective of the Project on the Processes of International Negotiations
(PIN) is to improve the use of research results in international negotiations.
Negotiators and policymakers have an increasing need for the theoretical
knowledge that can be gained from analysis of negotiation results.
Recognizing that a real gap exists between negotiation theorists and practi-
tioners, the PIN Project brings them together to share their insights. Attempt-
ing to understand the dynamics of their relationship is one way to decrease the
gap.
10.1.1. Some definitions
Before proceeding, some definitions are needed. In this chapter, by "practi-
tioner" I mean a person whose career lies in negotiating and concluding contracts
or agreements of any kind in the international arena.
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A "theorist" I define as any professional engaged in study, research, or
teaching in the field of negotiation.
"Effective interaction" I define as the complementary working together of
practitioners and theorists that results in communication and mutually satisfac-
tory cooperation.
Obviously, there can be no black and white distinction between practition-
ers and theorists, as an increasing number of theorists are also involved in actual
negotiation, and many practitioners find it increasingly helpful to adopt theoreti-
cal strategies.
10.1.2. Aims of this chapter
I have tried to organize some of the insights and thoughts gained from my
experience in a way that might provide a suitable framework for the develop-
ment of a logic necessary for both practitioners and theorists of negotiations, in
order to conduct this interaction more effectively. It should be noted that the
material presented should be considered as work in progress. Therefore, by
design, this chapter is empirical and not exhaustive and permits only a general
overview.
Drawing on my own experience as a negotiation practitioner interacting
with theorists during the last two years at Harvard University, I will try to point
out some of the problems we encountered and show how they affected our
interaction. I will also try to formulate some rough guidelines for bringing theor-
ists and practitioners of international negotiations closer together.
10.2. Experience
10.2.1. Background as a negotiator
For much of three decades I have been negotiating business in the international
market. As manager of my family's company, I began dealing with both market
and centrally planned economies. In the subsequent years there is hardly any
form of international business transaction I have not negotiated. Since my
experience lies mainly in negotiating business transactions, I will limit myself to
the area of my specific expertise and leave it to others to decide whether my
experiences and suggestions could also be applied to other fields of international
negotiation.
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10.2.2. Experience in interacting with theorists
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In the two years I have spent as a midcareer fellow at Harvard University, I have
had extensive opportunity to interact with negotiation theorists.
The genesis of this chapter was my experience with the Negotiation
Roundtable, a working seminar of Harvard Business School faculty and students
dedicated to learning more about negotiation. As time passed, I became increas-
ingly aware of an attitude on the part of both the theorists and the practitioners
that prevented them from seeing what each could gain from the other through
their interaction. While they had the benevolent intention to come together,
they did precious little to make the best use of all the time and intellectual effort
devoted to the process. How often obscure terminology frustrated me, when I
was unable to understand the notions and concepts during a discussion! How
often mathematical abstractions confused rather than clarified an issue by
adding chores instead of offering tools for solution! How often I saw tension
build in the theorists from my own derailments of discussion from the track they
needed to be on for their kind of thinking! One time at the Negotiation Roundt-
able this tension reached the point where I felt that the group would do better
without my participation, when it thrashed out the theoretical concepts. This
reaction is interesting, for during brainstorming and evaluating the results
achieved, my contribution was greatly appreciated.
The more I got involved in this interactive process, the more I saw
conflicting interests and potential gains in cooperation. The more I experienced
these characteristics, the more similar they seemed to the key ingredients of the
negotiation process itself! I came to the conclusion that, in order to try to under-
stand and manage the interaction between practitioners and theorists, we must
regard it as a negotiating process. Many of the conceptual tools that have been
developed for the analysis of the negotiation process can be applied to this
interaction.
10.2.3. Incentives for'cooperation
Only a few years ago, the last time a practitioner would see his alma mater
would be his graduation day. Academic institutions and scholarly works were
out of bounds for practitioners, and vice versa. Each of the two sides was per-
fectly satisfied in doing its own thing in its own world, entirely independent of
the other. They lacked no sense of fulfillment from not interacting with each
other. During the last few years, however, things have changed.
I have seen an interesting trend develop. On the one hand, academic insti-
tutions increasingly take practitioners for certain periods of time and try to use
their insights to give new dimensions to the academic environment and to
improve the usefulness of their academic work. On the other hand, practitioners,
haunted by fears of obsolescence, have begun enriching their midcareer experi-
ence by returning to academia. In this environment, both have benefited from
sharing their interests.
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I have found theorists in the field of negotiation to be increasingly frus-
trated by the immense discrepancies between the theory and practice of negotia-
tion and especially by the vast complexity of the real negotiating process. I have
seen this frustration of theorists grow, rather than diminish, as a result of the
theoretical work done in recent years. This work has often been unhelpful in
establishing meaningful links between negotiators and theorists. Theorists see
the practitioners distancing themselves from a very large part of the theory,
since they are unable to incorporate it into their daily routine of negotiation.
Practitioners have a similar frustration. They find that the mathematical
expressions with which theorists represent the world of negotiating are too com-
plicated to be of practical use. The complexity of all levels of economic and pol-
iticallife is increasing. High technology and the importance of internal as well as
external negotiations between interdependent sides is growing. In a world where
the importance of authority relations in organizations is declining and where con-
sensus has to be achieved through negotiation, practitioners face narrower limits
to what they can do without the input of theorists. These important changes are
making the work of negotiators difficult and generating fears of obsolescence.
The days are gone when practitioners could base their negotiations on little else
than their own flair and intuition or could do their jobs by across-the-table
"fencing" .
Now there are incentives for cooperation:
Enhancing reputation with peers
Through my interaction with theorists, I feel that I have gained an edge on my
competitors who remain isolated in their own worlds and that I have established
a reputation with my peers for sophistication.
Recognition by the prestigious world of academia
My new exposure to academia not only satisfies my scholarly interests, but offers
me the chance to gain recognition in the academic world - a status we practi-
tioners so often envy.
A mbition for public service
This exposure gives me the opportunity to contribute the insights I have gained
from my experience in negotiations to the advancement of the art and science of
negotiation.
10.2.4. Obstacles and hurdles to effective interaction
As compelling as the need for it may be, I have often found interaction between
theorists and practitioners obstructed. Both practitioner and theorist bring to
their interaction a whole luggage of different understandings. Even if they
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wanted to reveal them, few can describe these understandings to themselves and
still fewer can articulate them to others.
A practitioner's espoused theories are not necessarily equivalent to what he
or she actually does. The experience of a practitioner may lie in areas quite
different from those a theorist intends to examine. Very often, both people con-
fuse what they absolutely need from the interaction with what they hope it will
bring about. Many tend to feel adamant about their insights or their theories
and thus become inflexible. Empirical evidence is often fragmented and anecdo-
tal. Fears, suspicion, and hostility may lie barely below the surface, generating a
litany of irrational behavior.
Though I have often sensed that a theorist was sincere in his effort to help
me, lack of time on his part has not allowed this help to materialize. I have
repeatedly experienced theorists becoming very excited about our interaction and
getting many ideas from it and really wishing to pursue them in a continued
interaction. Because they are so overburdened with their routines and absorbed
in other undoubtedly equally exciting endeavors, however, little has resulted
from our interaction other than "interesting" dinner and lunch conversations.
More important, having focused their creative capacity on their own work, they
seem unable to make the necessary intellectual investment in this interaction.
One of the effects of the very great workload of theorists is psychological
saturation caused by their immersion in so many stimuli that a stage is reached
where, for reasons of pure self-preservation, they cannot absorb anything more
which does not fall into the very specific areas of their preoccupation. In any
case, this might be one of the reasons they develop self-defenses which do into
allow more stimuli to enter their field of perception and be processed. In other
words, very often interaction of any depth with practitioners is simply too much
for theorists to absorb.
The practitioner is used to a much shorter cycle of reward and punishment
from his work. He has had a good or bad negotiating meeting and knows more
clearly where he stands because he measures the reaction of the side he nego-
tiates with, or he looks at the partial or total result much more directly.
Theorists, however, are used to waiting a much longer time for positive or
negative feedback from their work, especially when it is research, writing a book,
or developing a theory. A practitioner experiences considerable frustrations in
academic situations from this far longer cycle of feedback. As Donald Schon
says, "The process of communication, which is supposed to lead to a fuller grasp
of one another's meanings, can only begin with nonunderstanding and nonaccep-
tance".
I have often seen destructive elements spoil the atmosphere, obstruct com-
munication, and make interaction so difficult and unpleasant that motivation
dissipates and an impasse develops. In the usual unreflective, interactive setting,
the elements of interdependence, on the one hand, and of conflict-producing fac-
tors, on the other, create an inescapable tension. Often there is lack of sufficient
preparation by both theorist and practitioner. They have no clearly articulated
guidelines, and both must feel their way along, buffeted by numerous pressures.
The great complexity of this interaction has to be recognized. A few of these
hurdles and the pressures that are brought to bear on those involved are rigidity,
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unrealistic expectations, conscious and unconscious resistance and resentment,
suspicion, bias, and memory decay - all impede interaction. So do differences
in work rhythm and decision processes, workloads, and priorities. Both practi-
tioners and theorists feel a deterioration of status while they are on each other's
turf, and the practitioner has difficulty articulating, absorbing, and generating
academic material.
Practitioners often believe that theorists have all the knowledge and that
they are in the position to conceptualize all problems or phenomena of the nego-
tiation process clearly and give answers to the practitioners' anguish. Theorists
may believe that practitioners have learned so much from experience that they
know what is really going on in negotiations and therefore can answer the theor-
ists' questions correctly. Little do they know how often practitioners blunder
along or muddle through the problems of their work!
In my experience as a practitioner, I have found that theorists often waste
a lot of time talking about things that cannot be put into effect and are com-
pletely removed from actual situations. I have sensed that theorists find practi-
tioners much too subjective, narrowly identified with their own experience, and
much too involved in the issues to be able to give the kind of objective overview
theorists need to translate that experience into their own terms. Although what
practitioners have to say may often make interesting dinner conversation, theor-
ists may think very little of it can be of real use to guide their work or to save
them from dead-end research.
Undoubtedly, a lot of myth on both sides stands in the way of either side
perceiving the other clearly.
Coming from the front line of business negotiations to academia is a cul-
tural shock that can place a great deal of strain on an individual. I went through
stages of very intense anguish and insecurity about what value my experience
could have for the theorists and about the tremendous lack of academic
knowledge on my part. On the other hand, I have often sensed theorists to be
insecure about their views on specific matters when compared with mine. Obvi-
ously, these feelings tend to build walls and to underline the differences between
the two.
10.3. Modes of Interaction
10.3.1. The "give and take" mode
By familiarizing myself with some theoretical concepts, and by trying them out
in my business negotiations, I slowly came to realize how great the contributions
of academic research can be to the practitioner. It enables the negotiator to
place his or her experience in perspective and to see the objectives, strategies,
and gains involved in each negotiation. Each case that came to the Negotiation
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Roundtable convinced me that the use of theoretical concepts can facilitate
actual negotiations. Much of the negotiating process was clarified by concepts
like "the sellers' surplus", the BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agree-
ment), "zones of agreement", the "negotiation dance", "symmetric strategic
situations", "negotiation-efficient frontier" , and "value-tree analysis" , to mention
but a few.
When I went back to Greece in the summer of 1986 and tried to introduce
these concepts to some of the executives' negotiations routines, I encountered
resistance from our managers. Nevertheless, the executives appreciated these
concepts, and I have the impression that, slowly but surely, some of the concepts
can become an integrated part of their negotiation planning and implementation.
At the same time, members of the Roundtable have repeatedly told me I
have often made contributions by not letting the discussion get side-tracked and
by stressing the necessity to narrow it down in order to come up with a concrete
result - whether positive or negative.
A year ago in two of our sessions we were discussing the problems of the
members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) who were
organizing for the GATT talks. The issue was how the interests of GATT
members influence their decisions about how to structure the talks. I remember
that the discussion could not focus. The researchers involved suggested that to
simplify the options for structuring the GATT negotiations, we assume only two
options - namely, highly structured and highly unstructured GATT talks.
Preference for structure or lack of structure, they said, reflected the complexity
of internal negotiation in each member country.
As the discussion went on to other topics related to this issue, I became
more and more conscious of our having missed a key element which I have so
often experienced in my business career as explaining the negotiating behavior of
a number of the members, and especially the smaller and weaker members of
GATT. From my experience, I knew that the main effort some countries make,
especially those which do not have the feeling that they can exert any influence
on the direction international trade takes, is to find ways to continue as many
tariffs on their imports as possible, while at the same time obtaining as many
tariff exemptions for their exports as possible. Rarely have I witnessed more
regulation-conscious bureaucrats than the alleged advocates of free trade of
GATT. I believe that my intervention helped the theorists arrive at some useful
ideas on how members could be helped to formulate their negotiating strategies
and tactics in GATT. Then they could move away from the distributive bar-
gaining attitude, so prevalent today, to trying to identify joint gains.
10.3.2. The "joint task" mode
I believe that open-ended interaction between practitioners and theorists on an
issue can often become a waste of time for both. My most useful perceptions
come from the instances when I felt effective interaction with theorists took place
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as a result of joint reflection and action on a concrete common task. I could give
no better example than my experience in a seminar on international trade given
at Harvard Law School by a professor of international business law.
As long as the general characteristics of trade law were discussed, my con-
tributions were limited. As soon as we got into the concrete analysis of the
implications of each condition of a rather long and involved business contract,
however, my input became illuminating, applicable, and thus valuable. In this
manner, as a number of the participating students told me, the whole course
gained considerably in terms of the educational experience it offered. The key
here, I believe, is that a setting had been created where not only was information
exchanged, but also practitioner and theorist, drawing freely from their
knowledge and experience, could create a far richer perspective than each one of
them had before this interaction started,
Another good example for such a creative sharing of experience was the dis-
cussion at the Negotiation Roundtable, where members reacted to some of the
thoughts I have expressed in this chapter and eventually integrated a number of
my ideas into new constructs.
It is when theorists came to realize the importance of inductive rather than
deductive reasoning, and when the interactionist approach was toward interpre-
tive analysis based on the experience and perception of the interactors, that unk-
nown aspects of the reality of negotiation evolved. It was during these instances
when theory arose from the analysis of actual experiences and from the common
emotional involvement rather than from preconceived postulates, that real pro-
gress was made. Nevertheless, tension between theorists and practitioners
invariably exists. This situation is, however, not necessarily negative. Tension
can be used creatively within the interactive process. After all, as happens in
successful negotiations, tensions created by attitudes of confrontation are put to
advantage by the different logic of the integrative process.
An example from my days as a negotiations practitioner may illustrate a
way to use tension positively. One day, the director of a foreign trade enterprise,
having unexpectedly interrupted the bargaining session, chose to make a number
of totally unjustified derogatory comments about the volume of our company's
purchases from his firm. His comments became so negative and insulting that if
I had been in a less reflective mood, there would have been little else for me to
do than to stop the negotiation and leave. With a very serious and hurt expres-
sion on my face, I put my papers in my briefcase and headed towards the door, I
could feel the tension rising. Everyone was convinced that the director's brink-
manship had failed.
Instead of opening the door to leave the room, however, I passed it and
walked around to the other side of the table, where I sat near the director,
opened my briefcase, and put my papers on the table again. Then, in a quiet
and relaxed voice, I indicated that this was a much more realistic place to sit
when we negotiate. Considering the special problems of the product we were
negotiating, our common opponent was actually the Greek market and not each
other. In this manner, tension was diffused instantaneously and thus the
impasse was broken. The demands of the Greek market were subsequently dis-
cussed in a much more constructive manner than even before the incident had
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occurred. The whole setting changed and negotiations went on successfully.
Were it not for this mending of relations, they might very well have fallen
through.
Let me come back to the issue of effective interaction between theorists and
practitioners. It is mutual awareness of differing symbols and perspectives and
their conveyance to each other in terms which are enlightening that creates the
basis for genuine interaction, which in turn produces a collective and integrating
understanding. It might be equally rewarding to consider what themes are
absent from a specific interaction and to speculate together on the many possible
interpretations of their absence. In this manner the questions of the reliability
and validity of the practitioner's experience, which so often plague the theorist,
take on a new dimension. The purpose of the interaction shifts from obtaining
information from each other to working together on a real problem.
My exposure to the different rhythm of academia enabled me to adopt a
more reflective stance in negotiating. This reflective stance not only helped me
rid myself of much rigidity, but, by helping to diffuse tension, it facilitated com-
munication. A gradual shifting of my sources of satisfaction from a constant
urge to score points to concentrating on the main issues took place.
10.3.3. Interaction: A continuous process
Interaction between practitioners and theoreticians should be continuous. It is a
dynamic process in which each can inform the other. For the reasons I have
mentioned, both sides have to understand that as time goes on, they will become
inextricably intertwined by the need for each other to do his work well. There-
fore, each side should build interaction into its work routine.
As negotiation can be viewed as a process built of three phases - the pre-
negotiation phase, the bargaining phase, and the post-agreement phase - so
interaction between practitioners and theorists is a process with three phases -
pre-interaction, interaction, and post-interaction. The benefits of interaction for
both sides can be considerably enhanced if both sides are conscious of the phases
of the process and spend the necessary time on each one of them.
For example, in the pre-interaction phase, the homework necessary for the
interaction has to be done. Efforts to deal constructively with the interaction
must begin with trying to establish a common definition of the problems to be
tackled and must continue with creating the setting for a balanced amount of
input from both sides.
Both sides' diagnosis of the purpose of the interaction and conscious effort
to formulate what they expect from it are indispensable. Although each side
should realize that its ideal solution is not attainable, its expectation should be
formulated as well as an assessment of which interests are at stake and of which
new interests could be created through the interaction. It should also be agreed
that both sides are able and willing to try to satisfy this expectation. In this
manner, practitioners with incentives and qualifications compatible with those of
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the theorists involved would be chosen, and a special effort to dovetail differences
of interest would be made. Both sides should be given a stake in the outcome of
the interaction.
In instances where this interaction requires some length of time, the ideal, I
believe, would be the system of mentors. In other words, if practitioners are
invited to academia to give and take, mentors should be provided with whom the
practitioners can cooperate and discuss problems that arise in the process of
interaction or any other part of their work in the academic setting. I believe that
a mentor relationship would ensure that preparation for the interaction and its
results would turn out best and would prevent much frustration on both sides.
For the actual interaction phase, more about the dynamics has to be under-
stood. For the post-interaction phase, inputs from each side have to be recorded
and evaluated so that the next interaction can be prepared.
An unpleasant interaction can dramatically affect future dealings. The
practitioner who is berated may be unresponsive when his cooperation is later
solicited. Indeed, building trust and confidence during the early stages of the
interaction process is vital to maintaining the relationship.
The pre- and post-interaction phases may take much more time and effort
than the interaction itself, and they must be conducted with a view to the new
situation that will be created. From this description, it becomes clear that
theorist-practitioner interaction represents a major financial and intellectual
investment, if it is to be effective.
10.4. Tentative Conc.1usions:
Prospects and Some Suggestions
If we look at the interaction between practitioners and theorists as a type of
negotiating process, we suddenly have at our disposal the conceptual tools used
in the analysis of negotiation processes. These tools can be used effectively to
help understand and improve our interaction.
The most effective form of interaction for both practitioner and theorist is
not debriefing or instructing, but working together on a tangible problem. This
"joint task" mode of interaction is the best way a theorist can learn how a prac-
titioner actually negotiates, and a practitioner can learn what he has to gain
from theoretical concepts of negotiation.
Effective interaction between practitioners and theorists is far from easy. IT
this interaction is to be of some use for both sides, it has to be part of a longer,
structured process. I would say that both practitioners and theorists have a lot
to learn about how to interact effectively and how to benefit from their
exchanges.
The purpose of this interaction is to complement the efforts made by both
practitioners and theorists to increase their effectiveness in the fields of their par-
ticular endeavor. Dovetailing interactions with practitioners into areas of actual
faculty research might address this problem. For this effectiveness to increase,
each side has to help the other achieve a reasonable balance between scholarship
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and analytical skills, on the one hand, and a solid understanding of the realities
that surround the negotiating process, on the other.
Practitioners and theorists should at all times of their interaction recognize
that each has worked out and integrated into his subconscious numerous pat-
terns, many of which differ considerably because of the nature of their work.
I fully agree with Professor Howard Raiffa that practitioners all too often
act intuitively and in ways that are far more sophisticated than they can con-
ceive of and articulate. The bridge between theory and practice is constructed
less by each side trying to extract theoretical insight from experience than it is
by cooperating with each other for mutual advantage. No debriefing can expose
the principles that guide an effective negotiator better than working with the
negotiator on a particular problem. It is through this cooperation that theorists
and negotiators see which skills and personal traits could improve their perfor-
mance and focus their thoughts. It is through cooperation that the abstract
game links with the real case and that lessons from one field of negotiations sud-
denly seem useful in another.
Solving one problem in an actual situation with some theorists did more for
my ability to think about the dynamics of negotiation than reading many
academic papers or listening to many lectures. The theorists' analyses within
this setting of joint problem-solving helped me to identify and define the issues
and led me to consider the integrative as well as the distributive aspects of bar-
gaining.
Only those who are open to integrating their ideas and who acknowledge
the wisdom of both sides will make their interaction dynamic. Only then will
insights be more than additive and emerge as new Gestalten [1]. Then the next
stage becomes possible - mapping out the conception together and getting
knowledgeable theorists to suggest an agenda for research.
I hope that some of my insights will be useful to both practitioners and
theorists, not only in planning, structuring, conducting, and evaluating their
interaction more effectively, but in developing an approach - if not a philosophy
- to this interaction that will render it a satisfying and enriching experience.
As a step in that direction, I propose that IIASA-PIN initiate a
theorist-practitioner forum in which practitioners from all fields of international
negotiation would periodically meet with interested theorists to conduct effective
interactions of the type I have described. This forum could advance PIN's objec-
tive to bridge the gap between the worlds of theory and practice in international
negotiations.
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Although I have borrowed freely from the sources listed in the bibliography, this is
essentially a practitioner's account.
Note
[1] The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language recognizes both "Ge-
stalten" and "gestalts" as acceptable plurals. I prefer the original form, "Gestal-
ten" .
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CHAPTER 11
Conceptions of the Trade
Negotiation Process
Sven B. Lundstedt
Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio
USA
11.1. Introduction
This chapter is about practitioner conceptions of international trade negotiation.
Presented are the responses to a questionnaire by eleven individuals not ran-
domly chosen and who do not constitute a representative sample. They serve as
eleven case studies that provide some initial insights about underlying processes
in international trade negotiation. Consequently, this is an exploratory effort, to
be followed by a more extensive later phase.
This initial phase of this work does not pretend to offer definitive answers
to basic questions about the underlying trade negotiation process. It only
explores a range of possibilities and suggests how we might begin to think more
critically and comprehensively about the process of trade negotiation by asking a
variety of new questions.
A practitioner is defined as one who engages in trade negotiation. It is not
uncommon to find that practitioners often cannot express in a self-analytical way
their methods of negotiation beyond limited anecdotal description, a form of nar-
rative story telling, because they are not trained or required by their work to do
so. To avoid the difficulties of unstructured narratives, interesting though they
may be, a questionnaire was created to explore systematically a number of cen-
tral negotiation issues. But, even free association, anchored by leading ques-
tions, can be a useful way to conduct surveys if respondents can reflect
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systematically and analytically. Not all people can do this. Therefore, some
guiding conceptual framework within which some free choices to respond are
possible is needed to obtain meaningful responses.
My conclusions are tentative, subject to more extensive sampling. But,
while suggestive and tentative. they imply that a greater appreciation is needed
of the psychological complexity of international trade negotiation. Practitioners
are no different from the rest of us who oversimplify complex processes. This is
normal cognitive behavior adapted to performance efficiency and is something we
all do routinely. One obviously cannot stop to think about all the subtle aspects
of one's work or it would not get done. Whatever conscious, unconscious, or
intuitive principles of negotiation and rules of thumb practitioners use, and no
matter how competent they are, the technical principles they use usually do not
describe fully the richness and the systemic complexity that underlie trade nego-
tiation. As we will see, the issues that shape our understanding of international
trade negotiation are numerous, reflect differing levels of analysis and are, for the
most part, incompletely understood. As in most art forms, the performer only
identifies the tip of the iceberg, as a rule especially when methods are used intui-
tively.
11.1.1. Criteria for a systemic view
General systems theory, which identifies the structure and dynamics of a system,
is useful to understand a phenomenon as a whole. One cannot expect to form a
useful, heuristic theory of trade negotiation that describes its overall complexity
without a systems point of view. Following are some criteria for such a systemic
view:
(1) A systems point of view assumes there is a context, or environment, with
boundaries that mark off the system from others. That context is "ecologi-
cal" in nature. That is, because negotiation is a human system, it follows
the rule of succession (aging and change) as the key people and events
involved in the system's environment act out their destinies. Given the
assumption of constant but variable growth in some direction, one can usu-
ally find a life cycle pattern underlying a trade negotiation system as is
found, analogously, in biological growth and decline. This means also that
the underlying human conditions and attributes of trade negotiation are
either in a state of evolution or devolution; they can be getting better or
worse, as the case may be, but they never remain in a steady state.
(2) Resources needed for the survival of the system are introduced to the sys-
tem according to some pattern and rate. They include not only money and
budgets, but technological know-how, physical and environmental
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attributes and, most important, people, who form the human biosocial sys-
tem within which any negotiation takes place.
(3) With reference to the goals and objectives of trade negotiation, these
resources are processed over time, which changes them. As we will see, the
concepts discussed below reflect this on-going process and constitute
aspects of a deeper element of social and procedural architecture formed by
such processes and aided by social and technological inventions and innova-
tion. But, since process and structure are always interrelated, quite
different forms of, say, communication and trading behavior will result if a
negotiation is structured bilaterally as opposed to multilaterally. For
example, it stands to reason that if teams from two countries comprise the
operational structure of a negotiation, one can expect much simpler pat-
terns of communication, and thereby fewer problems, than if teams from
several countries are involved. Usually the increase in communication com-
plexity, as measured by an increase in the number of communication chan-
nels and messages, is exponential. So, in this case "more" is not always
"merrier", but a source of increased complexity, higher risks of error and,
in general, more problems for negotiators not only in communication and
logistics, but in human relations and their management. As experience has
shown, management of the negotiation system becomes a critical issue as
sheer complexity of structure and functions increases.
(4) There are always products that result from any process, some useful and
good, others not so useful and even bad. What may seem good at the
moment may turn out to be bad later on, and vice versa. Time is also a
critical variable in negotiation and plays an important part in reflecting the
appropriate rhythm of events necessary for success of the negotiation sys-
tem. The end results, or products, of negotiation are usually hierarchically
ordered outcomes in the sense that one can always usually identify at least
three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary. Occasionally, one might
reach a fourth order. One of the paradoxes of any system's outcome is that
successful primary outcomes may not lead to successful secondary and ter-
tiary ones. Another way of saying this is that successful short-term out-
comes may lead to unsuccessful longer-term secondary and tertiary out-
comes. Paradoxically, unsuccessful short-term outcomes may result in suc-
cessful secondary and tertiary ones. One example is that successful initial
trading with a country that has high productivity, high quality and lower
prices may in the longer run create the adverse secondary and tertiary out-
comes of first capturing the trading partner's economy by price and prod-
uct competition. This may affect the economic structure of the receiving
country, creating lowered levels of productivity and higher unemployment
- a case of an initial good leading to two bads. As far as the negotiation
process is concerned, it would be very unwise not to reflect upon these
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second- and third-order effects of the negotiation system at the very
moment one is counting one's profits and making acclamations about the
sweet taste of success.
(5) The negotiation system always depends on good information for its success.
Feedback and feedforward about the system's behavior are needed to moni-
tor its process behavior and outcomes and are essential for its control and
self-regulation. Since in a negotiation two or more parties usually comprise
the system, the communication network reflects a gradient of increasing
complexity as that number increases. And if the information and language
in the network is coded and encoded using different symbols and syntaxes,
the result can be highly confusing especially where the symbolism being
used means different things to people. Semantic paradoxes are common-
place, but can significantly affect trade negotiation outcomes.
In conclusion, a general system theory that identifies structure and func-
tions in input, transformation and output relative to an environment in which
there are other competing systems is very necessary.
11.1.2. Characteristics of the sample
The background of the eleven respondents was predominately that of business,
although some came from other professions such as engineering. Some were
company presidents, some vice presidents, while one was a division manager.
One academic who had special knowledge of India was included. One was a cor-
poration lawyer who has done much negotiating. There was one banker. Most
were from the USA, but there were one each from Greece, India, the Nether-
lands, and Iran. Five were from small firms, two from medium-sized firms, one
from a multinational corporation, one from a corporate law firm, one from a
government agency and the last from a university. One noted experiences of
over 100 negotiations, one between 50 and 100, one between 30 to 50, six
reported 5 to 50 and only one reported under 5.
Each was asked to identify some key negotiation experiences and then to
judge which of the several reasons given in the questionnaire explained success
and failure. The data showed that product fit and trust were most prominent.
In the failure category politics, poor objectives, high prices and trade barriers
stood out.
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11.2. Results
11.2.1. Patterns
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The respondents were asked which problems that led to failure seemed to come
up over and over again. The answers given were as follows:
- "In most occasions sharp price diving by competitors" .
- "Limits set by economic factors; overpricing; adverse competition; unclear
goals and objectives" .
- "Lack of reliability in supplies; bureaucratic problems with the Indian govern-
ment".
- "Limits created by domestic or foreign political conditions; foreign govern-
ments had unreasonably low maximum royalties which a foreign company
could pay to a US company; problems with the foreign country's central bank
in converting to dollars and permitting transfers to US; inflation (e.g., Chile);
government ownership of real estate (e.g., Switzerland). Some of these fall
under unreasonable trade barriers" .
- "Lack of communication" .
- "Lack of trust; little understanding of the other party's culture and history;
domestic or foreign political factors" .
- "Even with our (US) demonstrated willingness to negotiate and do business,
we are not perceived as attractive partners owing to our size or the nature of
the market" .
11.2.2. Timing
When asked about the most important aspects of timing of the introduction of
different agenda items, they said:
- "Critical: often in a first meeting no specific proposals are put forth; time is
spent discussing the market situation, possible benefits of a business relation-
ship and next steps; both sides try to answer the question: is this relationship
worth building?" .
- "Key to any negotiation is putting yourself in the shoes of your opposite
number; best to find points where early agreement can be reached and where
one can easily agree to get them on the table first" .
- "Patience and the power of suggestion" .
- "One must establish trust, confidence and mutual respect before getting to
important aspects of the contract" .
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- "Exporter was seriously interested in developing products targeted to this
market" (Demand pull).
- "Get objectives and goals outlined first. If you know what is needed then
build trust and confidence that you can perform; assure that your product will
work, is the best and up to the job" .
"Timing of introduction of new arguments or repeating of arguments is very
important; listen to what the other party has to say!" .
- "Lots of preparation, monitoring, follow-up; find the highest value for your
counterpart; be conscious of any negative costs of doing business; readiness to
reopen positive negotiations if one runs aground" .
11.2.3. Duration
When asked if there is an optimal overall time period for successful negotiations,
about an equal number said yes as did no. They made these comments about
the length of successful negotiations:
- "As long as there is hope for progress" .
- "Six to nine months" .
"A very brief period for an initial agreement then as long as it takes for the
technical aspects".
- "Three to six months" .
- "Two to three hours". (Respondent was probably thinking about each daily
meeting.)
"Depends on the relationship that can be created - how much sympathy and
affinity" .
There were some variations in responses, suggesting there are probably a
wide number of norms. Perhaps there is a lot of pragmatic, contingent, behavior
required because many negotiation systems are themselves highly differentiated.
Consider also that time is interpreted differently in various cultures. For exam-
ple, Americans are known to be impatient and want things done quickly. It is
said that the Chinese and Japanese can wait much longer for the results of a
negotiation. Asked how long an average negotiation should take, one would
probably find much variation across cultures in the answers given.
Trade negotiations usually involve teams of people. There are always key
leaders who stand out, but they are usually backed up by staff. Team behavior
is critical and can result in success or failure depending upon the way a team is
formed and managed, how well the people in it get along with one another and
how well trained they are for their job. Teams always reflect the basic dynamics
of human groups. A group's performance, for example, is determined by leader-
ship behavior, and by how group members communicate, exercise social power,
develop or fail to develop cohesiveness, form standards and norms and act upon
them, develop motivation and levels of aspiration, and so on.
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Group performance is also influenced by such important leader behavior as
being supportive toward group members, team development, expecting high
standards of work from everyone (group levels of aspiration), encouraging parti-
cipation and BtakeholderBhip and providing adequate technical support to
enhance team learning and adaptation to new problems, or simply providing ade-
quate tools to do the job. Lack of development of any of these five characteris-
tics may cause problems of work satisfaction, team effectiveness and productivity
achievement.
The following answers were given to the question concerning important cri-
teria for successful performance of a negotiation team. Some of the responses are
quite interesting, others somewhat naive or even technically incorrect:
- "Avoid any antagonism in one's own team". (Highly unlikely knowing how
people work; but one should try to reduce it.)
- "The team must express capability". (We are not told what is meant by
capability.)
- "Pay attention to the behavior of the team in dress, etc.; in this respect it is
necessary to know who are the counter negotiators". (Evidently meaning
those who are working against the negotiation goals, suggesting poor selection,
coordination, commitment and even leadership.)
- "Form a small team with an obvious leader or with specific tasks associated
with each member". (Again, an answer suggesting a need for an understand-
ing of deeper group process.)
- "Establish trust, credibility, and a clear understanding of the goals".
- "Know the problems of your customer; pay attention and address all details" .
- "Sound preparation, Le., know as well as possible what the others side wants;
build trust with the other side; be prepared to give in on certain points to get
what you want; always have an outsider or superior with whom you must con-
sult on key issues; this gives one time" .
These rules of th~mb would seem to have limited usefulness in team
development, management or p~rformance activity beyond the initial stages.
They certainly provide only superficial diagnostic value and do not contribute to
a method to create, or recreate, a new team to improve an old one.
11.2.4. Style and procedure
Trade negotiations usually involve procedural methods and personal style. Pro-
cedure is the routine by which daily administrative operations in trade talks are
handled. Personal style is the unique wayan individual one carries out such rou-
tines. Procedure and style are interrelated to the extent that both influence one
another.
Some trade negotiators may be more informal than formal. Some may take
risks, others few. Some are friendly, others unfriendly. Still others are tough,
cold and calculating. It is hard to say which style works bests in all
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circumstances because there are paradoxes of stylistic conflict. Does one hang
tough with tough cynical negotiators or respond with gentleness, tact, and cour-
tesy? Perhaps there are some unusual negotiators who may be inclined to adopt
an extreme contingency rationale requiring that their styles change often depend-
ing on the social and cultural environment in which they may be negotiating.
Mercurial flexibility might appear to others that one is trying to be all things to
all people. This style has obvious weaknesses in that it may lower trust because
highly changeable behavior makes such a person hard to predict. Predictability
is very important in a human relationship. At the opposite extreme, others may
be too inflexible. A successful style is probably somewhere between these
extremes.
The formal theory for stylistic differences comes in large part from the
psychology of personality, especially the study of character. Character can be
thought of as the structure of habits or traits that distinguishes uniquely one
individual's personality from others and characterizes an individual's more or
less permanent way of behaving. Whatever its ubiquitous cultural form, charac-
ter structure pervades everything people do.
A stable character may seem to have a certain consistency over time; an
unstable one, less. Particular character traits also suggest human qualities of
strength and weakness that may be both desirable and undesirable in negotia-
tion. The effect of character traits on other people can be profound. Traits that
inflict pain will be disliked. IT they provide comfort and pleasure, they will be
liked. This is why good manners and etiquette are usually important in negotia-
tion and help to avoid conflict. Because they increase expectation of further
pleasure and reward, and reduce tension and anxiety, they encourage trust and
openness, thus enhancing satisfaction of human needs.
The motivational consequences are clear. Traits that threaten others and
inflict pain, psychic or other, invariably result either in fight or flight behavior.
Such behavior encourages win-lose or zero-sum conflict, which then usually
undermines negotiation and cooperation. Nasty, abrasive and obnoxious people
are disliked primarily because they inflict pain. On the other hand, supportive
and pleasant traits tend to reward others, creating attraction and anticipation of
reward and increased cooperative behavior.
A negotiator, therefore, usually has a reasonably clear choice of strategy
and tactics depending upon the outcomes desired. It is usually the paradoxes
that arise in the mixed cases that are often difficult to manage. One side's choice
may be to hold negotiations in such a way that they are supportive and pleasant.
The other side may express painful and abrasive traits in a combative way. This
has in the past characterized some East-West negotiations, which often have
failed to resolve differences because there was too much conflict generated by
such behavior. Mutual reward builds mutual cooperation, providing that
memories of painful past encounters can be reduced in intensity by positive
learning in the present.
Negotiation procedures reflect certain traits and suggest a range of
methods. The words strategy and tactics could be used to describe the use of
such methods. Recall, but only in a nonmanipulative sense, that in the past
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these terms were often associated with highly manipulative negotiation methods.
When negotiators engage in mutual problem-solving in a reasonably open and
trusting way, combative strategies and tactics are much less frequently needed as
a basis for negotiation. These are sources of the paradoxes of the use of social
power in negotiation.
The respondents were able to make distinctions between both rewarding
and painful styles and procedures. Rational and friendly head the list of traits
associated with success. Machiavellian and aloof behavior head the list associ-
ated with lack of success. Machiavellian behavior is commonly associated with
being cunning, devious, untrusting and aloof, a deadly combination resulting in a
personal assessment of such persons as sneaky and mysterious. Add to this bad
image the traits of being ideological, tough and reticent and one has a recipe for
potential conflict and failure in negotiation, if the other side is behaving
differently. By contrast, appearing genuinely rational, friendly, participative,
open-minded, sincere and supportive would seem to be a better basis for success
because these traits reward and reassure others of one's good intentions and
promise rewarding, successful outcomes.
Success in negotiation seems to be associated in the minds of these respon-
dents with procedures that are flexible, creative, pragmatic; and lack of success,
with procedures that are inflexible, highly controlled, rigidly formal and routine.
But the high negative rating given to a high degree of delegation of functions
seems unusual, yet is not hard to understand when one recalls that in negotia-
tion a team's activity centers around a chief negotiator, who acts as a lead per-
son, and not the staff. In another sense, if one wishes to encourage participation
and involvement in a team, a team leader usually would try to increase the dele-
gation of some functions. Perhaps trade negotiation is still seen in the light of a
hierarchical command structure of management. If so, there are alternative
forms of management that are not autocratically command-oriented and yet
quite effective in reaching goals within an organized team social structure.
Other human characteristics associated with negotiation include learning,
confidence and trust, interpersonal risk behavior, goodwill and benevolence, rank
and status behavior, knowledge of culture, history and institutions, language
ability and openness or glasnost.
11.2.5. Learning from past experience
A question was asked about the value of successes and mistakes as learning
experiences which upon reflection help one to improve negotiation systems. The
responses were that such learning was highly valued. They said:
"Keep your mind open and flexible" .
"Very valuable, but should not be the only guiding principle".
"History is always a good teacher" .
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- "Learning from mistakes better prepares one for future negotiations" .
- "Once burned - twice learned" .
Since most people of the kind represented in this sample place a high value
on education and learning, one would not expect a different response. But these
aphorisms are almost cliches, which is not what was asked for by the question.
Yet, that level of response is in itself informative. It seems some practitioners
cannot reflect thoughtfully on deeper aspects of their own learning process
without some prompting and use of leading questions. We can speculate
whether their responses would have been different if the respondents had been
given a basic prompting framework within which to think about learning and a
value checklist about what is worth learning as opposed to ignoring. It is also
not uncommon to find that even educators cannot reflect critically on their own
learning processes. "Know thyself", a phrase said to have been written on the
Delphic Oracle, is a cybernetic process that probably still eludes most of us
unless we are helped to search knowingly for it. Perhaps most people have
difficulty in introspection.
Closely related to the issue of learning and how it should take place are
evaluation and feedback. One critical aspect of any system's successful function-
ing is its ability to be a learning environment, encourage people in it to make
corrections based on experiences and be self-regulating. The proper evaluation
of actual experiences in trade negotiation requires that someone who is objective
reflect systematically on the negotiation process, and then make available this
diagnostic information, whether in staff meetings, seminars or some other form
of briefing, in a way that promotes adaptive learning from experience. However,
I suspect that this important adaptive way of judging how changes have to be
made is already done intuitively in better negotiation systems, and perhaps not
done at all systematically or even consistently in others.
11.2.6. Confidence and trust
Confidence and trust were rated high as very important in trade negotiation.
The comments, which speak for themselves, were:
- "The counterpart negotiator must have the feeling that the final result is good
for both parties" .
- "With the distances involved in most international trade there can be no suc-
cess without confidence and trust all around".
- "Without it [trust] no one wishes to invest".
- "The paper you sign is not worth anything if you do not agree in principle" .
- "There is very little effective control or recourse that you can take, if the
foreign company is untrustworthy. Trust is everything. H I do not like them
as people and have a bad feeling about them, I would end the negotiations" .
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- "H you do not have confidence and trust, there will be no positive results" .
- "H there is no trust in the other party, optimum· negotiations are perhaps
impossible" .
- "Are you talking to the correct people? Can they deliver on their commit-
ments? Do they perceive you as credible? Is there a history of business suc-
cess in the past? [trust most important]".
11.2.7. Interpersonal risk-taking
In 1964 I developed the concept of interpersonal risk behavior to account for
some underlying attributes of trust (Lundstedt, 1966). I argued that trust was a
tautological concept (it does not explain causality in "trusting" behavior very
well), although still a very important descriptive concept. Not only did trust
require confidence in another, but more importantly it actually requires a will-
ingness to share power and influence. Interpersonal risking is a willingness also
to empower others; to share with them a part of one's influence and control,
one's goodwill, information and knowledge and other intangible resources
without too much suspicion and defensiveness. Trust always involves being a lit-
tle vulnerable because one gives away some of one's perceived influence and con-
trol by sharing information and disclosing to others about one matter or another.
Lack of trust has the opposite effect of lowering the rate of positive social
exchange.
There is also a form of subjective risk assessment in use by everyone to
judge events. Personal risk probability assessment is a probability assessment of
the possible recurrence of either painful or rewarding events. It may not only be
a function of the frequency of occurrence of the past event that determines its
positive or negative weight in one's risk assessment, but its intensity plays an
important part as well. This would help to explain why it is so hard to regain
the trust of some people, because of the frequency and intensity of painful earlier
experiences which can aCcumulate cultural1y and historical1y to affect an entire
people so that it becomes a norm of routine behavior to be suspicious and on
guard. The famous anthropologist Ruth Benedict reported evidence of just such
differences in the Dobu culture and society in her well-known book, Patterns 0/
Culture. Interpersonal risk behavior interprets an aspect of these complicated
cultural responses and is an essential part of the process of negotiation across
cultures and nationality groups. The respondents comments are given below:
- "Sharing information, if it is later found to be factual [true], builds trust.
Openly discussing strengths and weaknesses". (In this example "expert
power" in the form of information is given away.)
- "Builds the bridge of trust" .
- "H you share your technology and trade secrets you must trust them" (assess
the interpersonal risk to be low).
- "Helps to build strong relationships" (taking interpersonal risks).
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11.2.8. Goodwill and benevolence
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These attributes refer to being good-natured, considerate, amiable, solicitous,
kind, compassionate, as contrasted with being unkind, malevolent, ruthless,
heartless, cynical, cruel, and so on. The following are the responses given:
- "Probably not relevant during the negotiations, though useful in the social
activities that usually accompany them" .
- "In the long run goodwill increases your chances of success. People who are
considerate of each other will give you the benefit of the doubt and be more
willing to work with you when the going gets tough".
- "Helps to build necessary social relationships and openness" .
"Treat others as you would expect to be treated" .
- "I would not do business with unkind, ruthless, cruel people. It is not condu-
cive to long-term relations" .
- "Negotiators should not be enemies" .
11.2.9. Rank and status attributions
This category is concerned with deemphasizing invidious rank and status attri-
butions toward others, and avoiding inadvertent, or conscious "put-downs· of
others by approaching them as respected and valued persons and with preserving
the negotiation relationship by deemphasizing personally cruel, chauvinistic,
haughty, insolent, overbearingly arrogant or other prejudicial attributions. The
responses were as follows:
- "Anyone who would act otherwise should not be negotiating" .
- "Too much deemphasis in this area could result in loss of respect or face.
Treat each situation as an individual case". (Where rank and status are very
important, this is perhaps true. But there are qualitatively different forms of
ranking behavior. Not all are demeaning of others.)
- "Highly unnecessary behavior. You rarely know who you are talking to or
what they could mean to you in the future" .
- "Highly unnecessary. Individual respect reflects upon one's company and on
the country being negotiated with".
- "Alienating others in this way will damage relationships and begin on the
wrong foot".
- "If the opposite number feels you have no respect for him/her as a person, for-
get successful negotiation" .
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11.2.10. Culture, history, and institutions
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This category is about knowledge of culture, history and institutions in the other
party's country. It involves an ability to talk knowledgeably about all three and
to use such knowledge of domestic political and economic systems, philosophy,
art and music, literature and great historical events.
The positive response was only moderate, indicating some uncertainty as to
the value of this kind of knowledge in negotiation. This is somewhat unexpected,
as the prevailing wisdom strongly suggests that such knowledge is essential to
good relations. Perhaps this reflects a certain amount of ethnocentrism in the
respondents. When a larger group is studied, we may find that such prevailing
wisdom is indeed true. Suggestive respondent remarks are as follows:
- "Helps to build trust and understanding about how one's opposite thinks" .
- "This has never been a factor; however, I have only worked with European
countries" .
- "Within Europe this is less important". (Perhaps because Americans share
European culture and history.)
- "This builds confidence and trust with the other party and leads to a more
relaxed atmosphere in negotiations" .
- "Showing an interest by going to museums or art galleries is more important
than knowing all the background. This assumes that encyclopedias and
guidebooks have been read prior to discussions" .
- "This knowledge shows interest and communicates to the other side that you
are serious in your efforts" .
- "Helps one to understand what motivates the other party and what turns
them off. Gives a better understanding of marketing, personnel, and political
problems" .
11.2.11. Language ability
Language ability is the ability to speak and read some of the other party's lan-
guage. It received a lower rating, and there seems to be some uncertainty about
the universal importance of knowing a language, given the easy availability of
interpreters. However, this is a very small sample, as was already pointed out,
and we might find a quite different pattern of responses in a larger sample. Here
are the written comments about language ability:
- "Most foreign negotiators that I have dealt with speak excellent English. In
one case where I was dealing with Germans and spoke German, discussions
became more relaxed as we continued in English".
- "[Language] helps build trust and most importantly, away from the negotia-
tion table, helps one to understand what is in your opposite number's head".
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- "[Knowledge of language] prevents misunderstanding through use of a transla-
tor" .
- "Less room for misunderstanding; easier to explain one's position [with lan-
guage knowledge]".
- "[Language is important.] It is like remembering a person's birthday or name
- it is just a good show of earnestness and good faith".
- "Our motivation is monetary success. Language barriers are less important.
However, almost everyone I have been involved with in trade negotiation
speaks English or has someone on his staff that speaks English".
- "Avoid any barrier that can influence your own position in a negative way".
(Language is important.)
- "A few words are important. A good translator who knows you and your
goals and product can be the most important and most impressive help" .
11.2.12. Openness
The final characteristic in this group is openness, which curiously enough
received mixed reviews. Openness (glasnost) in the questionnaire is defined as
candor and unsuspiciousness, but not naively unaware of realistic dangers. Some
rated openness as most important, but not all.
It is easy to understand why in some negotiations guardedness, rather than
openness, could be the rule rather than the exception. Initial suspicions are
reduced only when one learns to trust, risk and have confidence in others; this
usually comes later, only after one acquires them by experience rather than by
verbal personal declarations of forthrightness and honorable behavior. Some
forms of openness are also condemned as simply gullibility, and some may actu-
ally be forms of credulousness. But this has always been true. If openness leads
to more information about the other party that improves the negotiation process
and the relationships underlying it, then it is to be encouraged. The test of sin-
cerity in others usually takes time unless they come highly recommended by
reputable former contacts. But perhaps it is also better to have trusted and lost
than not to have trusted at all, providing the stakes are not too high. The
respondents said this:
- "Lots of things go wrong after the deal is signed and you must be able to work
together on a flexible basis to solve future problems". (This is not quite an
answer to the question, but certainly implies openness.)
- "This is the quickest way to build confidence and trust; may save time" .
- "If you don't open up, chances are the other party will remain closed as well.
Then how do you get into the other persons mind?" (to understand him or
her).
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11.2.13. Starting negotiations
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The question was asked: given your own style and procedures, what is the best
and proper way to open or reopen negotiations to make them successful? Are
there special ceremonial things to do - customs, routines, timing, etc? This is a
far from simple question and, as we know, first impressions are lasting. The
respondents said this:
- "It is best to open with an informal event - e.g., a dinner away from the
negotiation site where interpersonal rapport can commence" .
- "No [special events]; it depends on convincing others that there is mutual
benefit" .
- "An open and friendly basis first. Get to know others on a somewhat person-
to-person level. Never jump directly into negotiations" .
- "The first meeting is normally to qualify for future business. Who are we?
What is our philosophy of business? Who is the other party? What is their
philosophy of business? Usually done at a lunch or dinner" .
- "No [best way]. Each situation is different".
- "Develop a relationship which will create trust and warmth. Meeting and
entertaining family members, 1 found, develops this trust" .
- "Short informal talk that leads automatically to the subject. Some prepara-
tion necessary" .
- "Get to know your counterparts; what their needs are; what motivates them.
Spend social time with them" .
11.2.14. Ending negotiations
The question was asked:' Given your own style and procedures, how do you end
trade negotiations to make them successful? Are there special ceremonial things
to do, etc.? The respondents commented:
- "Let the other side know you value them, their business and that you appreci-
ate their time and effort. Be sure to leave an indication that everyone came
out a winner" .
- "Nothing special other than to be sincere and to continue to develop a special
relationship with the party and family as well as other members of the firm" .
- "Give your counterpart the idea they have negotiated tough, but fair" .
- "I usually celebrate with an expensive dinner" .
- "Always have an informal dinner and do not discuss events of the negotia-
tion" .
- "Usually have no discrete end; relationships usually evolutionary, either gra-
dually becoming more important and more complex or dissolving and ter-
minating" .
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- "There are no special events or considerations" .
- "There should be some written, signed document as tangible evidence of the
work done; then an informal meal or other social event".
It is evident from this limited sample that there is no uniform technique of
beginning or ending negotiations. But one cannot help wondering if there is not
more to it than just this? The initial and final processes are probably not only
complex, but very important, for future relations.
11.2.15. Negotiation etiquette
The question was asked: are there any basic rules of negotiation etiquette? That
is, customs, social codes, norms, values, and right or wrong behavior which are
necessary and upon which success is dependent? The answers were, for the most
part, disappointing and clearly showed a lack of awareness of specific customs
and norms except in one case where the respondent said: "In China one must
eat what is prepared; failure to do so is considered an insult". The rest were
much less specific. Again, this suggests an inability to come to grips with their
own experiences in a reflective way. Yet, having researchers and educators put
facts and concepts (often just their own prejudices) in the minds of practitioners
by giving them lectures on comparative culture also does not always assure that
negotiation will be better understood or, for that matter, cross-cultural under-
standing improved. Somehow practitioners have to learn these things from their
own experiences or perhaps aided skillfully by simulated learning experiences.
Perhaps learning how to be observant and reflective in other cultures is a good
place to start.
From the point of view of social anthropology, the study of social customs
has always been of interest, especially those surrounding important instrumental
social behavior such as the management of conflicts, resolution of disputes and,
of course, the conduct of negotiation. From this perspective, international trade
negotiation falls into the category of the study of comparative cultures, an
approach from which much of value has already been learned. Research on prac-
titioners is not unlike participant observation in ethnographic studies. Trade
negotiation is part of the economic system, but goes beyond business transac-
tions to include broader normative considerations such as other social customs,
political behavior and a variety of other social system considerations.
One of these considerations is how normative behavior, such as ethical
choice, actually occurs in negotiation. Ethical and legal practices in one culture
often do not apply in another, or if they do are ignored based on reasoning using
principles of situational ethical relativity of the form: "The cost of doing busi-
ness in country A is to make side payments [even if it means breaking the law]" .
Yet if caught doing this, one may be liable for prosecution in one's home country
if the law or other norm there forbids this behavior. This is an interesting para-
dox of cross-cultural ethical and legal conflict management for which there are
no simple answers. As the number of countries involved in a trade negotiation
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increases, the potential for legal and ethical conflict also increases. So if one
chooses to respond in an ethically relativistic way, using situational ethical rea-
soning, one can often find oneself in an exquisite moral or legal dilemma, a sort
of ethical and legal swamp from which there may be no escape. But there are
equally disturbing paradoxes which arise from a very rigid use of ethical codes,
which perhaps serve even as an abuse, or absolutist interpretation, of religious or
other dogma. The solution often is to become the victim of the unresolvable
conflict of ethical principles which this may entail and thus to cause some
unhappy individuals to acquire as a defense against the pain of moral conflict a
form of anomie, or normlessness, often leading to indifference and cynicism.
Living with such value contradictions for very long may be costly to the
personality of an individual and may even destroy some integrity. Under these
circumstances such protracted negotiations may become a way of inducing
"burn-out", cynicism, or even more serious psychopathology. Such crucibles of
moral conflict apparently are not for the faint of heart, or those unable to retreat
from them strategically to rest, but who may eventually suffer a hardening of the
heart, too. Perhaps, as a defense, this is how a person acquires that form of
unfortunate alienation and detachment where one never can make any really
meaningful moral choices, always standing apart as the real business of life goes
on. This entire issue needs much critical study.
I explored this issue in a superficial way with this sample of respondents
and found some interesting responses. When asked about dishonesty and subter-
fuge, or how one handles fraud, cheating, dishonesty, duplicity, and lying, the
action most frequently cited as necessary was honest compromise, if that is even
possible. This is also supported by a higher number of "no" answers to the ques-
tion on whether to refuse to do business and break off negotiations. The two
response sets are almost symmetrical. Does this, therefore, suggest that some
are users of situational ethics, are pragmatic and single-mindedly problem-
solving oriented to the neglect of ethical matters? Perhaps some are. But this is
not the whole story. A number chose to correct fraudulent behavior and cheat-
ing and refuse further negotiations. Some chose to compromise, refuse to do
business and call attention to cheating and fraudulent behavior and refuse
further negotiations all at the same time - a tough job even for the most hardy
pragmatists.
The other fundamental dilemma of international trade negotiation arises
from cross-cultural norm conflicts. Often this is resolved for some by having
subsidiaries run by foreign nationals handle these touchy normative conflicts by
acting as a moral fiduciaries. To what extent does this way of approaching the
ethical dimension affect the success or failure of actual negotiations? Quite prob-
ably in significant ways, including even culpability by remote association.
Another side of this dilemma is the issue of whether or not a business person or
government official is acting unethically when he or she does business with
adversaries, a somewhat politically overdetermined and misunderstood issue of
late in the United States. Or whether in so doing they are acting on behalf of a
higher economic principle of some kind, such as comparative advantage and free
trade, or the less elevated behavior of just ordinary greed.
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11.2.16. Third-party neutral outside advisors and negotiators
The question was asked if one ever used third party negotiators, such as neutral
personal or technical advisors, and how did they work out. Use of such adjunct
personnel may often make the difference between success and failure in
deadlocked situations. Yet how do practitioners view their usefulness?
It is not surprising that, when needed, they were seen as essential. But
equally surprising were the judgements of best use, which placed language and
cultural problems highest. Deadlocks, technical matters, communication and
conflict resolution seemed to be less important. Perhaps this is a bias from the
small sample size. But it is clear that the functional tasks which such inter-
venors are given more often than not are directed at restabilizing the negotiation
system and bringing parties together. This role goes far beyond mere interpreter
functions and is a highly critical one.
11.2.17. Special contacts within the other party's organization
The question was asked as to whether the practitioners knew of any very special
individuals, or so-called insiders, in the other party's trade negotiation group or
bureaucracy who were particularly helpful in making the negotiation successful.
They may have done so by using creative ways to get around bureaucratic red
tape or help one to reach key people who sped up procedures because they
understood local customs. In a sense, these individuals were actually informal
third-party helpers who had special local knowledge and skills.
As to their location in the social system, five respondents placed them at all
levels - the top, middle, and bottom of the bureaucracy or other organization.
Only one thought they existed, but had never met any. One heard others speak
of them, but had no experience with them. Three concluded they should be used
to facilitate negotiation, as an informal, unofficial source of help. Two thought
they should not be used, as they would break protocol and undermine negotia-
tions.
The concept that illustrates this widespread practice is a well-known socio-
logical distinction between formal and informal social structure and social pro-
cess. The formal organization, with its unrelenting "routinization of charisma" ,
rationalization through rule-bound behavior, and other normative encumbrances,
has only certain prescribed levels of functional efficiency. No matter how hard
one tries one can never find a formal organization that works to its fullest
efficiency and effectiveness, a result caused in part by the rather natural human
tendency to fight against the deindividualization that comes from the controlling
nature of much bureaucracy. To adapt to these painful rules and controls people
usually just work around them and take informal shortcuts to reach their goals,
or use the formal system in illegitimate ways to block productivity. Without an
informal system to offer an alternative, the formal system would probably not
work at all.
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Moreover, in the informal system people can occupy certain functional roles
such as guides, purveyors of information or combinations of them. In the United
States there have in the past been some who have been referred to a bit sardoni-
cally as "inside dopesters" - the word dopester meaning someone who has spe-
cial knowledge unattainable through the formal system and has it ready to give
away for a price (not always a monetary one) before anyone else does. Earlier I
made reference to the fact that negotiation takes place within a system. It is
always a social system and has within itself both informal and formal subsys-
tems. Successful, experienced negotiators seem to know intuitively how to use
both.
Organizational theory and development, directed to improving organiza-
tional life, have since their inception tried to find ways to make the formal organ-
ization work more efficiently and effectively with fewer errors in work, less turn-
over, lateness, absenteeism and greater work satisfaction. Although this reme-
dial process of learning is very complex, it can be characterized as an effort to
make the formal organization more informal through increased participation,
communication, freedom, supportiveness, and better team development. But
even with these obvious improvements informal systems will still continue to
exist to perform special human functions.
Trade negotiators would benefit by using informal systems, providing they
do not have malevolent functions or do not undermine the true mission of trade
negotiation by subverting its legitimate mission. Here are some comments by
the respondents:
- "People with high political contacts can really speed things up and cut
through the bureaucracy" .
- "Lawyers and accountants from one side can often meet their counterparts
from the other side on a professional basis apart from the negotiations".
(Implying thereby a meeting to work informally.)
- "An export manager provided introductions to a financial director and to
investment bankers tci improve a relationship" .
- "In one case a French manufacturer asked the French government to find a
US distributor. This third party was helpful to both sides".
- "Sometimes they are helpful and speed up negotiations, but often there is con-
fusion and delay in successful negotiations". (Apparently, here is an exception
to the rule above.)
There are also principles which guide the proper use of informal contacts -
a code on the appropriate use of the informal contact, if one wishes to call it
that. An honest broker or go-between can be an enormous help. A negotiator or
informal contact, however, who as inappropriate motives can undermine negotia-
tions by his or her presence and actions in the system. Illegitimate informal
practices, where they form a kind of "black market" of services, can be very
costly to everyone. There is much to be said for keeping the trade negotiation
process more or less pure.
11.2.18. Systemic concepts of negotiation
This category is based on the recognition that trade negotiations are also more
than the sum of their parts. This simply means that all the parts of a trade
negotiation (procedures, timing, style, etc.) have to be seen as a whole to be
properly appreciated and understood. This is another argument for adopting a
systems perspective of negotiation and one that recognizes the "ecological" deter-
minants in negotiation which affect the life cycle of negotiations and their success
and failure. The elements that comprise the "whole" of a negotiation system,
however, seem to vary among these practitioners.
Below are listed some of the elements of the whole elicited by this question:
"What are some of your ideas about how, in trade negotiation, one achieves this
integration?" .
- "Timing - beneficial need by both parties" .
- "Economic conditions of countries involved" .
- "Political attitude of countries involved" .
- "Willingness to take risks" (both parties).
- "The qualification process - establishing credibility" .
- "Background and history of other party" .
- "Knowledge of competitors and other relationships" .
- "Knowledge of the products under discussion" .
- "Desire to establish long-term relationships" .
- "Openness to serendipitous outcomes" .
"Team development and education" .
- "Know one's goals and the other party's goals" .
- "Set specific goals and procedures to deal with this party" .
- "Do everything possible within normal guidelines to close deal" (exhaust all
options).
- "Recognize and assure mutual gain" (emphasize mutual rewards).
- "Recognize that negotiation is expensive" (assess costs and benefits).
- "Be conscious of the limitations of top management's capacity to negotiate"
(formal power is not all-efficient).
- "Delegate sufficiently to others in the team".
- "Recognize that negotiation is often a long-term evolving process" .
Eventually, as the size of the sample of respondents is increased, we should
begin to see a factor grouping in terms of central and peripheral factors in the
negotiation process. There still remains, however, a determination of the
configurational properties and functional patterns of these principles relative to
different kinds of trade negotiation including one-on-one negotiations (dyadic
negotiation), and what Howard Raiffa calls N-person negotiation systems which
comprise groups of three or more negotiators representing different constituen-
cies. The behavioral properties of such larger groups still remain to be explored
and characterized more thoroughly.
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At least two levels of analysis must be kept in mind as we attempt to find
out how trade negotiation takes place successfully. The first level comprises the
manifest processes of negotiation that are most immediately apparent to an
observer. The second is the underlying latent process structure, or "deep struc-
ture", of the negotiation process. Since each influences the other, knowledge of
both is needed to complete the picture. Practitioners seem to be less aware of
the latent structure than the manifest one. Being concerned with practical
problem-solving and getting results, their behavior is naturally more action-
oriented without too much deep introspection about what they are doing. This
may seems true of most practitioners. Surely negotiators would benefit by
understanding the presence of latent processes both for diagnostic evaluation of
the negotiation process and its eventual remediation if needed.
11.3. Concluding Remarks
This has been an exploratory analysis of a small sample of practitioner responses
to a questionnaire about international trade negotiation. It is evident that the
trade negotiation process today is not conceptualized well by those who are prac-
titioners of this art. This conclusion alone suggests that some practitioners may
benefit by learning about the trade negotiation process from others in new ways,
and from researchers who bring more complex theories, so that the overall con-
cept is widened and enriched by more theoretical variety and detail.
Practitioners also do not seem to reflect systematically upon what they do,
as evidenced by the paucity of responses to some questions. This seems to be a
function of an action orientation and perspective more than anything else, and
not some lack of analytical capacity. Evidently this can be learned and, if sud-
denly valued by practitioners as being required for success in trade negotiation,
would be learned. Much remains to be done also to understand the beneficial
side effects of successful' trade negotiation, for example, as in the indirect, posi-
tive but appropriate contributions it can make to cross-national diplomacy.
On the theoretical side it is evident that some form of general systems
framework is an asset in practice, teaching and research about trade negotiation.
Reference to such a theoretical framework was given in the introduction to this
chapter. International trade negotiation is multidisciplinary in nature, requiring
the conjoint appreciation and use of several disciplines including economics,
psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, history, and decision sci-
ences, not to mention other technical and scientific disciplines necessary for an
understanding of the product itself. This will place a burden for intellectual
renewal upon those who want to study this kind of negotiation from the narrow
perspective of a single discipline. Limited factor theories for subjects such as this
one will never work nor lead to an understanding of the more complex forms of
multilateral group negotiation. Our research theory and methods have to be
integrative.
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CHAPTER 12
International Joint Venture Negotiations
Fritz F. Heimann
General Electric Company
Fairfield, Connecticut
USA
12.1. Introduction
This chapter addresses f9ur main topics: first, the role of joint ventures in GE's
business strategy; second, case studies of three GE international joint ventures;
third, some lessons learned from GE's joint venture experience; and fourth, com-
ments on the new Soviet decree covering joint ventures with foreign firms. As a
lawyer for GE, a large US corporation, my focus will be pragmatic, rather than
theoretical.
12.2. The GE Perspective
GE has long been the world's largest electrical manufacturer. From its tradi-
tional base in electrical products, GE has expanded into such fields as jet
engines, medical equipment, plastics and financial services. GE's annual reve-
nues are around $40 billion, of which $8 billion come from outside the USA.
The non-US business is almost equally divided between export sales from the
USA and sales from foreign-based operations. GE is the third largest US cor-
poration, after mM and EXXON.
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Most of GE's markets are now international in scope. To survive and
prosper, GE must be an effective world-class competitor. World leadership in
terms of technology, market share and cost structure are the foundations on
which GE's competitive strategy is based. These in turn shape GE's approach to
joint ventures.
From GE's perspective there are four principal reasons for entering into
joint ventures:
1. There are many national markets around the world where independent
entry by an American corporation is difficult or impossible because of legal
or political restrictions. Working with a local partner becomes a condition
of entry.
2. To compete effectively may require some capabilities that GE does not pos-
sess. A partner can bring such additional resources into play.
3. An undertaking may be so large, or so risky, that joint venturing becomes a
prudent way to limit our investment or our risk exposure.
4. Working with a partner may provide GE with a competitive edge, through
costs savings, influential local contacts, foreign financing support or other
advantages.
Generally more than one of these reasons for joint venturing will be present, as
the following case studies demonstrate.
12.3. Three Case Studies
12.3.1. The gas turbine manufacturing associate program
One of GE's most successful joint venture programs has been in heavy duty gas
turbines - that is, gas turbines used for electric power and industrial applica-
tions, as distinguished from aircraft engines. The program has been in existence
for more than two decades and involves what we call "Manufacturing Associate
(MA)" relationships with companies in the UK, Italy, Norway, Holland, Ger-
many, Japan, and now China. The MA relationships consist of long-term con-
tracts, generally for ten years; they do not involve the formation of joint venture
corporations.
Under the MA program, GE makes available to the manufacturing associ-
ates the designs and technology to manufacture the stationary parts of the gas
turbine. GE supplies the rotating components - roughly, a 50:50 split. The
split makes sense because GE retains responsibility for the parts which require
the most expensive machine tools, as well as the most critical quality control.
The MAs make the components which have to be customized for the specific
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application. Both GE and the MAs sell complete units to customers all over the
world.
The program has clear advantages for both GE and the MAs. The MAs
are able to sell a broad line of the world's best gas turbines. For GE it provides
increased market shares in areas where we have difficulty penetrating on our
own. For example, the relationships with our MAs in Norway and Scotland have
resulted in larger sales in the North Sea gas fields than GE could have achieved
on its own. Similarly, when it comes to sales in countries where low-cost financ-
ing is a key factor, GE gains a competitive edge by working with joint venture
partners whose governments provide more generous loans than the US
Export-Import Bank.
On a project of the dimensions of the Soviet gas pipeline from Siberia to
Central Europe, the MA program provided a vehicle for dividing the workload
and the risk among GE and several MAs. That also made sense to the Soviet
Gas Ministry, the purchaser of the gas turbines. During the current period of
depressed market conditions, we have been able to continue development pro-
grams on larger and more efficient machines by drawing on the resources of the
manufacturing associates.
12.3.2. GE Yokogawa Medical Company
GE has been a leader in medical diagnostic technology for many years, going
back to the early development of X-ray equipment. In the last two decades GE
has developed new diagnostic techniques including computed tomography
scanners (CT), ultrasound and, most recently, magnetic resonance. Yokogawa
became GE's distributor in Japan for CT scanners in 1976. Initially, Yokogawa
was very successful, winning a large share of the Japanese market for CT
scanners exported from the USA. However, our market share in Japan began to
decline when other Japanese manufacturers developed lower-cost scanners.
In 1982, GE and Yokogawa formed a joint venture company in which GE
held 51% of the stock and Yokogawa 49%. It had two objectives: first, to
increase the market share in Japan for GE products, and second to manufacture
products in Japan for worldwide distribution by GE. The program has been
very successful in both CT scanners and ultrasound. The JV company is now
also developing a lower-cost magnetic resonance machine. Our market share in
Japan has been increasing rapidly, and the JV has also become a significant
source of new products which GE sells around the world. Recently, GE's equity
in the joint company was increased to 75%.
The joint venture uses the complementary strengths of GE and Yokogawa.
GE provides worldwide product planning, distribution and technical support.
Yokogawa provides a distribution network in Japan, and an excellent engineer-
ing staff capable of rapidly developing lower-priced models of equipment first
developed by GE's US engineering organization.
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12.3.3. GE-SNECMA'8 CFM-56 jet engine joint venture
F. F. Heimann
The joint venture between GE and SNECMA, the French aircraft engine com-
pany, was initiated in 1972 to develop the CFM-56, a new jet engine in the
18,000-25,000 pound thrust class, a fairly small engine for short-range aircraft.
(By comparison, the engines for trans-Atlantic aircraft are in the 50,0D0-60,OOO
pound thrust range). The objective was to develop an engine with significantly
lower fuel consumption, less noise and reduced exhaust emission levels.
The joint program was attractive to SNECMA, and to the French govern-
ment, because the technical, marketing and financial risks involved in the
development of a new engine were considered too great for SNECMA to shoulder
alone. GE was selected after a competition with RoUs Royce and Pratt & Whit-
ney. The joint program made sense to GE for two reasons. We were in the
midst of a costly program to develop a new family of large engines and were not
ready to start another program on our own. GE also recognized that at least
half of the market for the new engine was outside the USA and that a European
partner could help win those orders.
The joint program got off to a very slow start. The US government was
concerned about the transfer of advanced engine technology abroad. The issue
was taken up at a summit meeting between Presidents Nixon and Pompidou in
May 1973 at Reykjavik. That meeting led to a government-to-government agree-
ment which defined the timing and scope of technology transfers.
The commercial negotiations began with a six-page memorandum of under-
standing, negotiated by the top executives from both sides. Thereafter, it took
another year to develop a 200-page definitive agreement. One of our less appre-
ciative clients remarked that it took the lawyers more time to do the paperwork
than it took the engineers to design the engine. A 50:50 subsidiary corporation
was formed under French law in September 1974. Airline orders were very slow
in coming. The first order was not received until 1979. In recent years the pro-
gram has grown into a great success. More than 3,000 engines have been
ordered.
The joint venture operates under the direction of a twelve-man Board of
Directors, six from each parent company. The directors include the head of
GE's jet engine business and the President of SNECMA. The joint venture cor-
poration has a French president. It has a small staff composed of people on loan
from both parents. The bulk of the work is subcontracted to the parent.
Every effort has been made to split the work on a 50:50 basis. Because
accounting systems and pay scales are so different, the work split is based on a
manhours of work, not costs. Basically, GE makes the high-pressure portion of
the engine and SNECMA the low-pressure portion, There are two assembly lines,
one in France and one in the USA. Each portion of the engine is delivered to the
joint venture company at an agreed price and each parent retains the profit on
its portion of the work split. Because of differences in accounting systems, it is
impractical to try to track costs and divide profits. Warranty obligations,
insurance costs and other liabilities are split 50:50. Engine sales are made by the
joint venture company with full backup guarantees from both parents.
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12.4:. Lessons Learned
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GE's experience with joint ventures has been extensive. While these three case
studies are success stories, we have also had our share of failures. A number of
lessons have emerged from our experience.
Perhaps the most important is to be sure you know what your partner can
do. That sound simplistic. However, GE's experience has shown that, while we
are usually realistic in understanding our own limitations and recognizing the
need for a partner, we can be too optimistic about the help the partner can pr<r
vide. Let me illustrate.
During the mid-l960s, became popular in the USA to form joint ventures of
electronic and publishing companies to enter the education market. The idea
was that education could be improved by developing electronic learning equip-
ment and software programs for classroom use. GE decided to participate.
Because we did not know much about educational software, we formed a joint
venture with Time Inc. GE had experience in electronics and Time was the most
successful publishing company in the USA. The announcement of our joint ven-
ture received a good deal of publicity, and the stock market was duly impressed.
An elegant dinner was held to celebrate the signing of the agreement. After
both sides has toasted each other with Chateau Margaux, one of the GE officers
candidly admitted that we knew little about the education business and
expressed his delight that we were working with a partner with the experience of
Time Inc. One of the Time officers replied, with equal candor, that Time did not
know much about education and had assumed that GE, with its outstanding
reputation for strategic business planning, has figured out what the joint venture
was going to do.
The discovery that neither one of us knew what we were doing was embar-
rassing, particularly after all the publicity. The solution decided upon was to
hire an expert from the education field to be the chief executive. A search found
just the right candidate, a former dean of the most prestigious school of educa-
tion in America, who was then serving as the top education official in the US
government.
Our education expert was successfully recruited and another dinner was
held to celebrate his arrival. He gave an eloquent speech expressing his pleasure
at joining two companies with the know-how of GE and Time. He was sure that
they would make up for his lack of business experience and tell him what the
joint venture was supposed to do. Needless to say, the joint venture never did
develop into a real business, and was quietly buried after several years of losses.
The lesson from this experience is obvious. Neither GE nor Time had criti-
cally examined the capabilities of the other party. That mistake is easy to make
because the negotiation of a joint venture is like a courtship. This tends to
inhibit the critical faculties of otherwise astute businessmen. If two American
companies can be as unrealistic about each other as GE and Time, the potential
dangers are even greater when the prospective partners must overcome
differences in language, in culture, and in economic systems.
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Two variations on the same theme deserve comment. First, it is essential
that joint venture partners must have compatible objectives. The objectives do
not need to be the same. However, if they are not compatible. the joint venture
will have constant friction. For example, GE's relationship with our gas turbine
associate in Scotland involved different objectives. Their principal interest was
to obtain manufacturing workload for their plant in Scotland. GE's interest was
to obtain entry into new markets. While the two interests were different, they
were compatible.
My second point is that both sides must have consistent views about the
time element. If one party wants the joint venture to be successful quickly, while
the other is prepared to wait for a decade, disagreements over how to manage
the joint venture are inevitable. Even if the expectations of both parties are con-
sistent, it is essential that the prospects be analyzed realistically in order to make
sure that the expectations are achievable. Over-optimistic projections of how
long it will take to achieve success will undermine the credibility of the manage-
ment of the joint venture, and erode the support of the parent companies. The
GE-SNECMA jet engine joint venture is unique in my experience in the length
of time the parent companies were willing to wait before success was achieved.
This unusual level of management patience was the result of the close involve-
ment of top executives from both parents. Because they were directly involved,
they had a realistic feel for the problems to be overcome. As a result, they did
not become over-optimistic and avoided the danger of unpleasant surprises.
12.6. Soviet Joint Venture Decree
The new Soviet decree issued by the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Janu-
ary 13, 1987 provides for the establishment of joint ventures between Soviet
organizations and firms from foreign countries. I would like to make a few com-
ments on how the decree looks from the standpoint of a US lawyer.
There are some clear pluses. The very fact that the USSR is encouraging
joint ventures with foreign firms is a dramatic step forward. In addition, the
broad scope envisioned for such joint ventures is impressive. It includes indus-
trial production, raw materials and foodstuffs; attracting advanced technology,
know-how and managerial expertise; as well as development of exports and
reduction of imports.
Other positive factors include the provisions giving joint ventures flexibility
to develop their own plans, without having quotas assigned by government plan-
ning bodies, as well as flexibility to control their own import-export operations.
Also helpful are provisions for some exemptions from taxes and from custom
duties, and assurance of freedom from administrative requisitions.
The decree includes some features that appear negative from our perspec-
tive. These include the requirement that limits the foreign partner to a 49%
interest, and the provision that both the chairman of the board and the manag-
ing director must be Soviet citizens. For a company such as GE, which
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considers itself an industrial leader, being confined to a junior partner role is a
drawback. The issue is not one of pride, but of the ability to determine the suc-
cess of the joint venture and to manage the risks.
Another area of concern is the provisions dealing with ruble convertibility.
These appear to limit transfers out of the USSR to sums produced by the profits
of the joint venture. Thus, if the joint venture is unsuccessful, the foreign party
would apparently lose his entire investment. Similarly, the provision that all
foreign currency expenses must be covered from sales of foreign markets would
not be workable if the principal purpose of the joint venture is to serve the
Soviet market. Differences between the official rate of exchange of the rubble
and its market value represent another problem area.
The provision prohibiting joint ventures from divulging information to
foreign governments would present serious problems for an American company.
We must be in the position to make disclosures required by US tax laws, export
control regulations and other US government requirements. Moreover, a joint
venture involving a major US company and a Soviet organization would receive
considerable publicity. Thus, it must be conducted so that both the US govern-
ment and the Soviet government are kept informed and are satisfied that the
joint venture meets the national interests of both countries.
In addition to these positive and negative factors, some areas of uncertainty
will require further exploration. Perhaps most important is the issue of how a
market-oriented joint venture would function in a state-controlled economy.
While the decree provides that joint ventures will not be assigned quotas by
government planning bodies, it is unclear how it will obtain supplies or how it
will find a market within the USSR.
A second area of uncertainty relates to differences in accounting practices.
In discussing GE's French joint venture, I commented on the differences between
French and US accounting practices. The differences between Soviet and US
accounting are undoubtedly much greater. These problems are not insuperable,
but will require time and ingenuity to resolve.
A third issue is the' subject of dispute resolution. It critically influences the
confidence with which we approaCh international joint ventures. A businessman,
going into a joint venture where his partner is an agency of a foreign govern-
ment, will be concerned whether fair and objective methods for resolving
disputes will be available. His level of confidence will be much higher if the
dispute resolution mechanism is in a neutral country and involves a familiar
mechanism, such as ICC arbitration.
Before concluding, let me comment briefly on how GE evaluates interna-
tional joint venture opportunities. The issue for corporate management is
always one of making the best choice among competing investment alternatives.
GE's top management uses return on investment as a key measurement. Any
investment opportunity must pass the test - whether it involves the construc-
tion of a new plastics plant, the purchase of a television station, or the establish-
ment of an international joint venture. The financial analysis is based on a
discounted rate of return. That means that profits more than five years out
count much less than nearer-term profits.
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GE also evaluates the risks. Here we differentiate between risks over which
we have some control - risks that can be influenced through additional invest-
ment, more research spending, or by assigning more management talent - as
distinguished from political and other risks that are essentially beyond our con-
trol. Any transactions involving substantial risks beyond our control must be
carefully structured to minimize our risk exposure. A key objective in negotiat-
ing a properly structured joint venture should be that neither side suffers large
losses if the joint venture has to be terminated for reasons beyond their control.
In conclusion, let me reemphasize that the issuance of the Soviet joint ven-
ture decree represents an exciting step forward. I suspect that the key to its suc-
cess will lie in how flexibly it is administered. As my examples have illustrated,
joint ventures can be structured in many different ways to meet the conditions of
the particular project. The greater the flexibility permitted by the legal rules,
the greater the ability of the parties to shape the joint venture to make it suc-
cessful. Particularly at this stage, when participants on both sides have much to
learn about each other, it is essential that the legal rules serve as a point of
departure, and not as a set of stone tablets.
CHAPTER 13
Hungary's Accession to GATT
Janos Nyerges
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13.1. Introduction
The accession of Hungary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and the negotiations leading to that result, should be seen in the first
place in the context of Hungary's situation preceding, surrounding, and to a very
large extent determining the process of the negotiation.
The internal situation can be summed up in the short statement that the
extensive method of development, the economic policy based on the hitherto
valid assumption of large reserves of manpower, became completely inadequate,
even counterproductive. No rational allocation was possible; the constant and
losing struggle with "bottlenecks" had a discouraging psychological and political
effect not only on the working population, but also on the economists and
planners as well. The most striking feature, especially as regards the external
economy, was the persistent imbalance in trade and payments, due to the fact
that the country was and remains very dependent on foreign trade.
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As to the external situation, it was soon recognized that the easing of ten-
sions between the East and West provided the opportunity to inftuence the trade
policy situation of Hungary vis-a-vis the West. The slogan describing somewhat
euphemistically that situation was that "trading is lagging behind politics". The
interplay of these elements created an extraordinarily great impact on the think-
ing of economists, planners and the general public when looking for adequate
solutions.
The main elements of the solution with respect to foreign trade policy, ena-
bling Hungary to seek accession to GATT, were the change in the method of
planning, the autonomy of enterprises involving broad possibilities for direct
foreign trade activities, the profound changes in price formation, the establish-
ment of organic links between external and internal prices, and - last but not
least - the introduction of an effective customs tariff. The socialist character of
the ownership of the means of production, the planning system and the mono-
poly on foreign trade have been maintained. It should be emphasized, moreover,
that all these measures were designed to reform the economic mechanism and
not in order to gain access to GATT. This accession should be regarded as a
logical and welcome by-product of the reform.
Prior to the accession, Hungary's trade policy situation - the legal frame-
work - was determined by a series of bilateral trade agreements (there was no
such agreement with the USA) providing in most cases most favored nation
(MFN) treatment and some specific clauses for pricing to avoid so-called "market
disruption"; bilateral quotas, diminishing in number, were still present. Discrim-
inatory treatment of the import of Hungarian goods was, while decreasing, still a
characteristic feature. With the EC negotiating on behalf of its members, the
member countries renounced their existing bilateral agreements.
Hungary, for its part, activated its participation in international trade pol-
icy fora, such as the Economic Commission for Europe and UNCTAD, with the
aim of securing on a reciprocal basis most favored nation treatment and non-
discrimination.
It was in this context that the possibility of acceding to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade was considered by the decision-making bodies.
Precedents with respect to socialist countries - long-standing Contracting
Parties (Czechoslovakia and Cuba) and the conditions of accession of Yugosla-
via, Poland and Romania - were taken into consideration.
The aim of such a move had to be defined in a realistic manner, avoiding
illusions created by the friendly welcome of Hungary's new economic mechanism
in the West, and by the precedents created by a number of socialist countries.
While defining those aims, fears and misgivings of an economic, social, ideologi-
cal and political nature had to be dealt with.
Specific interests of economic sectors, represented by government agencies,
such as the Ministry of Finance, National Planning Office, National Board of
Materials and Prices, to mention but the most important, had to be harmonized
in complicated and cumbersome interagency negotiations. After the conclusion
of these internal interagency negotiations, a government decision was adopted,
with a mandate to begin the negotiations.
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13.2. Phases of the Negotiation Process
13.2.1. Phase 1
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The first phase was preparatory, informal and noncommittal in character. The
type of contacts and talks varied from personal talks seeking information, points
of possible agreements and disagreements, to semi-official but still informal meet-
ings on the premises of GATT under the chairmanship of the Director General
with the participation of the key Contracting Parties and Hungary.
In connection with the identification of specific problems it became clear
that issues involving the procedural mechanisms of the negotiations, the legal
framework and the functioning of GATT as an institution had to be dealt with.
Extended talks, conducted during the whole process of negotiations, were held
with the Secretariat of GATT. This was not a negotiation, but rather a learning
process, which provided necessary knowledge that could be used as a valuable
negotiating asset.
13.2.2. Phase 2
The second phase was the carrying out of the formal procedures, involving the:
Presentation of the memorandum relating to Hungary's economic mechan-
ism, laws and regulations; the status of the Hungarian enterprises; and
trade policy aspects.
Study of the questionnaire presented by the Contracting Parties to Hun-
gary.
Analysis of these written communications.
Scrutiny of the existing Hungarian economic mechanism.
Behind the procedure lay the beginning of the substantive negotiations: all
that was written or said had to be scrutinized and decided upon not only on the
merit of each case and problem, but also as a part of the negotiating position.
The aim of the Hungarian negotiator in this phase was to find out the intentions
of the key Contracting Parties, before making any definite commitments.
Who were these key Contracting Parties? First of all, the members of the
European Communities (EC), the main trading partners of Hungary. Their aim
was clearly stated - they were interested in Hungary's accession for political
and trade policy reasons. The political motives were, and are today, to loosen
the ties of the small socialist countries to Comecon - and the Soviet Union; they
were thus considering at the beginning making some differentiation between
those countries whose trade policies are "inspired by the principles of GATT"
(as a decision of the EC has put it) and those that are not. Specific encourage-
ment was given to the Hungarian representatives by a number of EC member
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states. The trade policy aim was to consolidate the EC's discriminatory policy,
consisting of applying quantitative restrictions against Hungary, by having it
accepted in one form or an other through an eventual protocol of accession.
The United States had a similar aim as far as general policy was concerned,
but opted for a more GATT-like solution - the accession of Hungary without
any qualification. They were against the maintenance of discriminatory quanti-
tative restrictions against Hungary, because they regarded these measures, not
without reason, as being contrary to the main thrust of GATT - Le., non-
discrimination. They had well-justified fears that the legalization of discrimina-
tory measures, regardless of their impact on Hungary's exports, would mean the
maintenance of bilateral trade, arrangements, thus excluding them from the
totality of the prospective Hungarian market which, owing to the reform, was
offering them some increased possibilities. Their position was legally weakened
by the fact that new US legislation did not permit the establishment of relations
with Hungary on the basis of the unconditional most favored nation clause, and
they made it clear that they would have to invoke Art. XXXV of GATT. (In the
case of the accession of Poland, they did not invoke this article, because the US
legislation at the time of the Polish accession did not prevent their establishing
MFN relations).
Other key Contracting Parties, such as Japan, Canada, Australia, etc.,
were equally interested to "have Hungary in", but opposed the maintenance of
discriminatory quantitative restrictions against Hungarian exports for the same
reasons as did the United States.
Having this in mind Hungary had two goals:
(1)
(2)
To accede to GATT without the political implications hoped for by the key
Contracting Parties.
To accede to GATT on the basis of the observance of the unconditional
most favored nation clause (Art. IV) and of the rule of nondiscrimination
(Art. XIII).
Thus, the negotiations had a cooperative character insofar as the wish of
the Contracting Parties and of Hungary coincided with the accession of Hungary
to the General Agreement. On the basis of this concordance, the negotiations
started. As to the conditions of accession, there were serious differences about
which very heated discussions took place. The debated issues, especially the
hitherto discriminatory treatment of Hungarian exports by the EC countries
(and by some other, smaller countries of Western Europe), became essentially
controversial and gave the negotiations a distinctly competitive character.
The main question for the Contracting Parties was to find out how firm the
Hungarian position was. Their anticipation was that Hungary, after all, would
"give in" in one way or another, as had some other countries in similar positions.
They anticipated that the accession to GATT was for Hungary a "must", which
had to be achieved by the Hungarian negotiator at any cost, preferably by work-
ing out loose and compromise solutions and texts.
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This anticipation proved to be completely false. Hungary maintained its
intial position during the whole negotiating process. This was a strategic
surprise, which had its effect. As a matter of fact, the instructions to the Hun-
garian negotiator gave him liberty to abandon the negotiations, if the conditions
specified in his instructions were not met.
This leads to some general observations as to the peculiarities of interna-
tional negotiations. Countries, parties to such negotiations, are led in each case
by a double aim. One is "political", establishing "good relations" , or the inverse,
to "demonstrate strength" and so on. These political aims are in most the cases
linked with "higher considerations" such as the strengthening of one's own alli-
ance or promoting some principles - all very respectable, but not always related
to or determined by the countries' economic interests. In most cases, these
interests are conflicting. This is especially true in the case of countries in a weak
bargaining position - politically, economically, or both.
The dilemma facing the decision-maker, who has to instruct his negotiator,
is to decide the priority of conflicting aims. The most frequent mistake is to try
to avoid this dilemma while drafting the instructions. The moment of truth
comes when the negotiating partner presents the negotiator with his own
dilemma. One can witness in many cases a situation when the negotiator, hav-
ing to pursue two or more strategic aims, had to abandon in a disorderly retreat
essential economic interests, rights and claims for the sake of "higher considera-
tions" .
The problem is not whether these considerations are really "higher", but
the fact that the decision-maker forgot to answer the question: "How high are
these considerations?" or, more simply, "What price are we willing to pay for
these considerations?". Hence, enigmatic texts emerge, interpreted by the
partners having a better bargaining position in ways that in most cases are
harmful to the economically weaker without being of any use in the noneconomic
field.
As the above-mentioned example shows, a clear decision setting priorities
permitted the Hungariah negotiator to avoid the trap so often encountered by
many others involved in similar negotiations.
13.2.3. Phase 3
The third phase was bargaining in its purest form. Bargaining and negotiating
situations had to be handled, such as one player against many, use and misuse of
precedents, and so on. The result of the bargaining finally emerged in the form
of presenting texts that contained specific provisions of an agreement between
Hungary and the Contracting Parties of GATT. The context was highly legal
and professional; the substance was political.
The precondition for an agreement was a balance of rights and obligations.
Hungary, being in the relatively weaker position, strived to clarify these rights
and obligations.
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As a matter of fact, GATT is a perfect legal instrument, at least formally,
as regards the balance of rights and obligations. An accession without
qualification would have automatically given the benefit of this balance to the
acceding party. This was, however, not the case. Specific situations and posi-
tions had to be resolved; here the balance of rights and obligations had to be
considered very carefully.
Two such specific situations should be described here. The most important
specific situation was Hungary's trading methods vis-a-vis a number of socialist
countries not necessarily or exclusively member countries of Comecon. The Pr~
toeol of Accession to GATT gives Hungary the right to maintain its existing
trading regulations with those countries (listed separately in Annex A of the Pr~
toeol of Accession). The actual situation was and still is that, as was pointed out
in the Report of the Working Party on Hungary's Accession: Hungary does not
apply customs tariffs to goods from countries listed in Annex A, because the
method consisting in fixed quotas and prices does not permit tariffs to be
applied. (It should be pointed out in this respect that on imports from socialist
countries such as Yugoslavia, where no compulsory quotas and prices exist,
tariffs are applied. Tariffs are also applied to goods imported from countries
listed in Annex A in those cases where they are outside of fixed quotas and paid
for in convertible currencies.)
This could be accepted by the Contracting Parties, under the condition
that "these trading regulations or any change in them ... shall not impair her
(Hungary's) commitments, discriminate against or otherwise operate to the
detriment of Contracting Parties" (Protoeol of Accession of Hungary to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Para. 3). A quasi-waiver has been
granted to Hungary balanced by the above-mentioned Hungarian undertaking.
The other specific situation was linked with the wish of some Contracting
Parties, mainly of the European Community, to depart from the general regula-
tions dealing with market disruption, as provided for in Art. XIX of the General
Agreement. The EC and other Contracting Parties sought and obtained a
"selective safeguard" formula. This, however, was balanced by the confirmation
of the commitment to liquidate the still-existing discriminatory quantitative re-
strictions. The deal appears in Para. 9 of the Report of the Working Party on
the Accession of Hungary:
Members of the Working Party considered it important to have in a protocol of
accession a specific safeguard clause. Representatives of countries maintaining
quantitative restrictions against Hungary's exports indicated in this connection
that the inclusion of such a safeguard clause would facilitate the removal of the re·
striction referred to in paragraph 8 above. The representative of Hungary could
agree to the inclusion of a safeguard clause, prolJided it operates on a reciprocal
basis. He also stated that his acceptance of such a safeguard clause was "in antici·
pation of early elimination of quantitative restrictions maintained against imports
from Hungary inconsistently with Article XIIr [emphasis added].
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Two remarks should be made in this connection:
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(1)
(2)
The Hungarian representative made it clear that this important departure
from the general rule is conditional.
A similar disposition exists in the Protocols of Accession of Poland and
Romania, but without the explicit condition of the early elimination of the
discriminatory quantitative restrictions.
From the legal point of view, this disposition is not a perfect balance of
rights and obligations. The Hungarian side paid an important extra price in
order to enjoy its legal rights under the General Agreement. This could be con-
sidered as the expression of unequal positions of strength.
13.2.4. Phase 4
The fourth phase was to give form to the agreement. Here again the formal con-
straints came to the fore (Protocol of Accession, Report of the Working Party
attached to the Protocol). The Hungarian schedule of concessions was a specific
negotiating issue involving tariff concessions as a price of accession. Bargaining
and real positions were to be reconciled between Hungary and its 21 negotiating
partners. Tactics determined by the MFN-clause had to be found. Negotiations
on the draft texts became the most important activity.
13.3. Texts and Language
Having studied carefully the Romanian and Polish Protocols of Accession, it was
clear to the Hungarian representative that these texts were very poorly drafted,
at least from the viewpoint of Hungary's interests. They lent themselves to vari-
ous interpretations and were silent on substantial issues. Experience had taught
him the simple truth expressed by a French author: "Rien n'est pire en
diplomatie que Ie silence des textes, car il vaut accord au profit du plus fort ou
du plus entreprenant" [Nothing is worse in diplomacy than the silence of texts,
because it means an agreement to the benefit of the stronger or to the more dar-
ing party] (Alain Plantey, La negociation internationale - principles et
methodes, p. 179). Or to quote another expert in this matter: "The careful
grammarian should precede the shrewd politician" (Frederic II of Prussia,
L'Antimachiavel, XXVI).
One memorable incident of the negotiations on Hungary's accession should
illustrate this point. After having agreed that the quantitative restrictions
should be progressively eliminated at target dates, on the insistence of the EC
the following additional text was adopted: "If for exceptional reasons, any such
prohibitions or restrictions are in force as of January 1975 the Working Party ...
wiJI examine them with a view to their elimination".
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Knowing the real intentions of the EC, in the face of its relentless attempts
to seek loopholes for the maintenance of such restrictions, a very complicated
debate took place to determine the relevant elements of such an examination.
The EC offered an amazing variety of such elements, all implying that the mere
existence of the specific price system prevailing at that time in Hungary should
justify the maintenance of discriminatory quantitative restrictions. This was in
clear contradiction to the dispositions of the General Agreement, so the EC was
not in a position to declare its intentions openly. Hence, an array of subtle,
unclear texts emerged.
While examining these texts, the Hungarian representative repeated his
very simple question: "According to your text, will you be entitled to maintain
quantitative restrictions inconsistent with Article XIII of the General Agree-
ment?". The replies were evasive to put it mildly. The Hungarian question was
repeated again and again: "Yes or no - will this text give you the right to
discriminate against us?". Since the EC was unable to reply with "no", this final
text was adopted: "The Working Party will take into account all relevant ele-
ments in order to evaluate the situation..,. The mere existence of the price sys-
tem in Hungary as distinct from its effects is not to be considered as the only
relevant element" (Report of the Working Party on Hungary's Accession Para. 8;
emphasis added.)
Another example of the interpretation of texts by the strong could be given.
The dispositions providing for the elimination of discriminatory quantitative re-
strictions stipulate that it should be implemented "progressively". The fact is
that after the signature of the Protocol of Accession, no substantial progress was
made and the bulk of the discriminatory quantitative restrictions remained.
Conceptually, if one single quantitative restriction is eliminated in each decade,
the process of elimination can be qualified as "progressive". The mistake of the
Hungarian negotiator was that he failed to insist on the common determination
of the meaning of the word "progressively".
There was another problem linked with the texts - the language, or
rather, the terminology. The General Agreement has its own language, com-
posed of notions of market or market-like situations, on legislative or judiciary
texts prevailing in the signatory states at the time of the drafting of GATT, and
on the texts of resolutions, decisions adopted later that became an integral part
of the body of the dispositions. Some colloquial shortcuts, which refer to cases
instead of quoting them, are widely used and correctly understood by the persons
involved in the daily life of GATT, such as "grandfather clause", "escape
clause", "enabling clause", "an Article XIX case", etc. This secret language is
not understandable to the outsider, even if he is a business or chief executive of a
huge multinational enterprise in a market economy. All this had to be
translated into Hungarian for the information and use of the Hungarian authori-
ties and of the members of the Hungarian negotiating team. A difficult task
indeed, involving many misunderstandings and misrepresentations. Parallel
difficulties arose when Hungarian legal texts were presented for scrutiny.
These differences in cultural background were sometimes visible, or better
said, audible while listening to the argumentation of the different Contracting
Parties. The representative of the EC spoke in French, while all the others
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spoke in English. This was, however, not the only difference. The argumenta-
tion of the EC was unmistakably based on the peculiar interpretation of the
letter and spirit of the General Agreement, which implies that the Agreement is
a rather loose set of principles, freely interpreted by each Contracting Party,
thus creating considerable obstacles to finding out what was exactly the subject
matter under consideration.
It became clear that the context of the negotiations made them a "rule-
oriented" rather than a "power-oriented" negotiation. This was, from the Hun-
garian point of view, an asset rather than a liability. Discriminatory measures,
which had been used hitherto toward Hungary, were clearly against the rules.
No Contracting Party could therefore deny from the outset the benefit of these
rules to a "newcomer". The heavy liability on the Hungarian side was that the
Hungarian reform, the new economic mechanism, was completely new and unk-
nown to the Contracting Parties. The burden of proof lay on the Hungarian
side. The Contracting Parties' general interest in taking a hard look at the new
Hungarian management system was a legitimate one. It was, however, clear to
the Hungarian negotiator that the inquisitive attitudes of some Contracting Par-
ties were motivated by the wish to find legal pretexts for the justification of their
discriminatory policies.
The Hungarian experiences showed, however, that there is no such thing as
a pure rule-oriented negotiation with no element of power diplomacy in it. But
GATT as a negotiating framework strengthens the "rule" element, thus provid-
ing a valuable shield for a weaker participant.
As far as the role of the Secretariat is concerned, it was not limited to prcr
viding the necessary knowledge of the procedures, precedents and legal aspects
to a newcomer, but was to some extent the role of a mediator and even an arbi-
trator. This can be illustrated by the following example.
Hungary, at the time of its accession, maintained a regulation according to
which imports under cooperative contracts between Hungarian and foreign com-
panies were eligible for individual tariff reductions or exemptions. Contracting
Parties considered this M a case of conditional most favored nation status - not
in conformity with Article I of the General Agreement.
The case was resolved against Hungary by the insertion of the following
paragraph (Para. 12) into the Report of the Working Party on Hungary's Acces-
sion to the General Agreement:
Members of the Working Party took note of the regulations submitted by the
Hungarian delegation with respect to cooperation contracts, with particular refer-
ence to the question of tariff exemptions and reductions granted in this framework.
Several delegations said that the implementation of such provisions would be
inconsistent with Article I of the General Agreement. In response to a request for
a legal opinion the GA TT Secretariat while emphasizing that questions 0/ interpre-
tation 0/ the General Agreement were matters/or the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
and not lor the Secretariat, gave certain comments, inter alia that the prerequisite
of having a cooperation contract in order to benefit from certain tariff treatment
appeared to imply conditional Most Favored Nation treatment and would,
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therefore, flot appear to be compatible with the General Agreement. The Hun-
garian representative took note of these comments [emphasis added].
The cautious wording illustrates how rules have influenced the de facto arbitra-
tion of the Secretariat. In other cases, as mentioned before, the Secretariat pro-
vided its good offices toward finding compromise solutions on heavily debated,
crucial parts of the texts.
The role of the Chairman of the Working Party was even more important.
The Chairman's prerogatives were not limited to the legal and procedural
aspects of the negotiations, but covered also the substance. He was active in
seeking solutions acceptable to all concerned. These activities took place in the
formal meetings of the Working Party, but more frequently informally, to the
extent that, in the sauna of the Finnish Ambassador, negotiators were discussing
and deciding important issues, presented later in official meetings as compromise
solutions arrived at with due respect to the formal rules of procedure.
In this context it should be mentioned that informal contacts, talks and
even negotiations were permanent features. These informal meetings took place
mainly during the numerous meetings of the Working Party, which lasted more
than four years. The Hungarian negotiator was very soon aware that the
decision-making powers of the local representatives were limited, and that the
central authorities in the capitals were not always given a clear picture or at
least a picture that represented an authoritative description of the Hungarian
positions, thus offering a better insights into these positions. Having this in
mind, the Hungarian negotiator visited several capitals. He was aware, espe-
cially in the case of the EC, that the decision lies as always in the hands of the
member countries. He knew that the so-called committee of Article 113 of the
EC dealing with trade policy questions had a crucial role. He visited the chair-
man of the COREPER (Committee of the Permanent Representatives) in
Brussels; members of this committee, however, refused to join such talks.
In all these meetings, the "power diplomacy" element unmistakably mani-
fested itself.
In these talks in the capitals specific interests, problems, views and con-
siderations were debated openly, observing the strictly confidential character of
the communications given and received. The Hungarian negotiator and his
partners observed strictly this confidentiality, which helped to arrive at an
acceptable solution.
13.4. The Protagonists
During the years of negotiations it turned out that the main opposition to the
Hungarian claim came from the EC, so the substantive discussions took place
practically between these two sides. Other Contracting Parties, while actively
participating, recognized that the EC had a stake, e.g., in maintaining a discrim-
inatory policy against Hungary even if it became a Contracting Party. A very
interesting description of this non-negligible specific factor in the negotiations
over Hungary's accession appeared in the Journal 0/ World Trade Law:
For the EC in particular it is very important to maintain the right to accord less
favorable treatment to the N.M.E.'s [non-market economy countries]. The cited
reasons for this go beyond the perceived need for special means of dealing with
market disruption. The reluctance of the N.M.E.'s to recognize the EC as a legal
entity in such fora as the United Nations has created much ill will, and encouraged
intransigent positions. They also maintain that the right to discriminate is an
important element in maintaining a bilateral relationship in which the EC's bar-
gaining power is enhanced. A frequent off-the-record cited factor is the animosity
of some of the EC's chief negotiators toward all communist regimes (Patterson,
1986, p. 185).
There were formally, as well as substantively, only two delegations, each
consisting of several members: one representing the Hungarian side, the other
representing the European Communities.
Let us consider the Hungarian delegation. The task of conducting the
negotiations with the Contracting Parties was assigned ex officio to the Ministry
of Foreign Trade, the ministry responsible for the conduct of foreign trade pol-
icy. The head of the Hungarian delegation was thus the Director General of the
Department of International Organizations and Tariff Policy. The administra-
tive and substantive preparation fell under the competence of this Department.
The preparation for the actual negotiations consisted in the drafting of position
papers, the collection of relevant documentation, statistics, precedents, etc.
Tactics, fall-back positions, etc., were discussed by the delegation. This
delegation consisted of representatives of the Department of Bilateral Trade Pol-
icy, Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Finance, the
National Planning Office, the National Office of Prices and Materials, and the
National Bank. The persons were chosen on the bases of their competence and
their participation in the' elaboration of the Hungarian customs tariffs.
Members of this delegation did not come from a homogeneous background:
their specific concerns and interests were determined by the conceptions and
approaches of the respective institutions which delegated them. At the begin-
ning, these specific features came to the fore. The head of the delegation had to
represent the general and, to some extent, the strategic policy considerations.
On him, and on him only, rested the whole burden of responsibility. This gave
him the necessary authority to make decisions. He reported regularly to the
competent authorities. During the work of the delegation, a unity developed as
to the perception and approaches, so the members of the delegation identified
themselves with the actual tasks lying before them.
The EC delegation consisted of fewer members: the head of the delegation,
a Director General of the EC from the Department of External Economic Rela-
tions, and a few civil servants of the EC. The representatives of the EC member
countries were also present and took an active part in the negotiations. The EC
decision-making process seemed more complicated, cumbersome and on some
occasions more time-consuming than that of the Hungarian delegation. This
172 J. N1Jerge,
illustrated that the EC was not as sovereign in its decision-making as it pre-
tended to be. It was not clear, however, to what extent the method of reporting
back and asking for instructions was used as a tactic.
13.6. Precedents
In negotiations, especially in multilateral negotiations, precedent even by impli-
cation plays a very important role: it is sometimes tacitly recognized as an
almost binding rule. Article I of the General Agreement is a classical example of
precedent codified as a rule. "Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any Contracting Party to any product originating in or destined for
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other Contracting Par-
ties" (GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Volume IV, Geneva,
March 1968, p. 2; emphasis added).
Having illustrated by this quotation the capital importance of precedent in
international negotiations, especially of an economic character, it is important to
recall that, prior to the Hungarian request for accession, the Contracting Parties
considered the issue of an eventual accession of the centrally planned economy
countries to the General Agreement and came to the conclusion that: "The
CONTRACTING PARTIES' approach to the question of trade relations with
centrally planned economies should continue to be on a pragmatic country-by-
country basis" (conclusions adopted on 24 November 1967; emphasis added).
Precedents were, however, frequently and forcefully invoked by the Con-
tracting Parties. Two centrally planned economy countries acceded to the Gen-
eral Agreement prior to the Hungarian accession: Poland and Romania. In both
cases, in the absence of tariffs the respective countries have accepted quantitative
import commitments. Poland undertook a 7% increase of its imports from the
Contracting Parties, and Romania undertook that the same proportion of
increase of its overall imports would be granted to the imports from the Con-
tracting Parties. As to the elimination of the discriminatory quantitative restric-
tions, Poland agreed that their elimination will take place after a "transitional
period" which, for reasons that never were clarified, was not determined by the
relevant instrument of accession.
Romania, on the other hand, agreed to consider that the eventual increases
of the discriminatory quotas have to be regarded as measures of elimination of
the discriminatory quantitative restrictions. These cases were invoked by several
Contracting Parties, mainly by those who wished to maintain discriminatory
quantitative restrictions not consistent with Art. XIII of the General Agreement
against Hungary.
The Hungarian delegation consistently and successfully refused to accept
these cases as valid precedents. Formally, it referred to the above-mentioned
conclusions of the Contracting Parties, providing for a country-by-country
approach. As to the substance, it pointed out that the only tariff concessions
could be Hungary's. As to the dispositions dealing with the elimination of the
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quantitative restrictions, the Hungarian delegation pointed out that while accept-
ing the "progressive" elimination, a target date for ~heir final liquidation was
necessary; thus the loose-ended Polish formula was not acceptable. As to the
"precedent" of Romania, the Hungarian delegation refused it on the grounds that
it was nothing more nor less than the legalization of quantitative restrictions
inconsistent with Art. XIII of the General Agreement.
The negotiating behavior of the main partner, the EC, was very peculiar.
They insisted persistently: the case of Poland, for instance, was evoked no less
than 149 times. This gave the Hungarian delegation a welcome opportunity to
demonstrate on each occasion the inconsistency of the Polish text. The case was
overdone by the EC and proved to be a tactical error. This was due to a miscal-
culation as to the final stand of the Hungarian delegation.
As to the negotiating behavior of the Hungarian delegation, it did not
engage in lengthy discussions. It gave its reasons in a succinct form at the begin-
ning and for years flatly refused any further considerations. "La mot sans
phrases" was the vote of Abbe Sieyes during the long debate over Louis XVI's
fate in the French Convention, thus ridiculing the weak character of those who
felt the need for justification of their political will. A strong position is weakened
by a surfeit of arguments.
The Hungarian delegation made use of some precedents, rather as an argu-
ment in discussion. Such was the case when the Contracting Parties tried to
examine Hungarian actions according "to the books", whereas in identical cases
they were transgressing the rules laid down in the books and "got away with it".
In one case, however, the precedent was embodied in the instruments of
accession. In the part of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
Hungary dealing with the notification of eventual subsidies, "the representative
of Hungary stated that Hungary undertook in accordance with Article XIV: 1
and in accordance with the practice of CONTRACTING PARTIES to notify
regularly [o~ its measures falling under Article XVI" (emphasis added).
13.6. Results
Seen from a purely legal, formal point of view, the results of the negotiations
embodied in the Protocol of Accession, and the Report of the Working Party on
Hungary's Accession to the General Agreement, are satisfactory for alI parties
concerned.
The rights and obligations contained in the instruments of accession, as
welI as those contained in the General Agreement to which Hungary became a
fulI Contracting Party, are balanced.
The dispositions of these instruments required, however, a substantial
change in the trade policy behavior of the signatories, especialIy of those whose
trade policies were inconsistent with the dispositions of the General Agreement.
These changes took place in a relatively short time in the case of smalIer Euro-
pean market economy countries. The United States later disavowed Art. XXXV
in all respects, except for the granting of most favored nation treatment in the
174 J. Nyergu
tariff field, as stipulated in The bilateral trade agreement between Hungary and
the United States.
The EC has failed so far to fulfill its obligations. It sought legal cover in
the fact that the term "progressive", with respect to the elimination of quantita-
tive restrictions inconsistent with Art. XIII of GATT, was not defined. They
tried to give their own interpretation of the term "discrimination". They first
advanced the thesis that only those quantitative restrictions should be regarded
as discriminatory which are applied to Hungary alone; if a discriminatory meas-
ure is applied to one market economy country, this, according to the EC, is not
to be regarded as "discrimination". Later they pretended that discriminatory
measures applied to countries which they qualified as "state trading countries"
are not discriminatory because of the differences in economic and social systems.
From a legal point of view, this does not hold. Paragraph 1 of Article XIII
says:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any Contracting Party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other Contracting Party or on
the exportation of any product destined for the territory of any other Contracting
Party, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries or the
exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or res-
tricted (BISD, Volume IV, Geneva, 1969, p. 22; emphasis added).
The illegal character of any such restriction was explicitly confirmed by a
legal opinion of the Secretariat of GATT during a subsequent meeting of the
Working Party on Trade with Hungary.
Concerning the reference to the different nature of the Hungarian economic
and social systems, it is worth mentioning that the Report of the Working Party
on Hungary's Accession to the General Agreement "... considered that the Hun-
garian trading system had to be considered in the light of the existing system of
economic management in Hungary, of which the adoption on 1 January 1968 of a
customs tariff was an integral part". This text was adopted by the EC without
reservation. The late emergence of the thesis about the "state trading countries"
is a well-known "reservatio mentalis" with no legal force whatsoever, the more so
as any interpretation of the dispositions of the General Agreement is a matter for
the Contracting Parties and not for individual signatories.
The analysis of this situation is beyond the scope of this chapter. From a
theoretical point of view only, one question could be examined: what if the more
powerful party disregards the agreement arrived at after negotiations?
Hungary became a Contracting Party to GATT on 12 September 1973.
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CHAPTER 14
International Multiparty Negotiation:
The Electrolux-Zanussi Case
Pietro Gennaro
Pronim Co. and Strategia e Oraganizzanone S.R.L.
Milan
Italy
14.1. The Problem and the Opportunity
Zanussi, a company employing originally about 18,000 people, with headquarters
and major plants in Italy and Spain, had dominated the home appliance industry
in Europe for a number of years. Mismanagement followed the death of its
founder, Mr. Zanussi; in 1984 it was technically bankrupt. The company was
considered a national problem, involving unions, banks and politicians.
The FIAT company nominated a new President, and an emergency plan
was drawn up and agreed upon by the unions, reducing the work force and re-
structuring the business's portfolio. The plan called also for an injection of new
capital, which the Zanussi family could not provide. The Electrolux company,
which had developed quickly in several countries and wanted to become a world
leader in home appliances, was approached by influential people; but they
refused to consider a company in such a state in a country not familiar to them.
A meeting in Milan with Italian financiers failed also to gather the needed
financial support. The new President resigned. A temporary President, a
member of the family, was nominated to try again, while the Minister of Indus-
try, prodded by politicians and unions, was trying to take care of the problem.
Zanussi had high market shares in the Federal Republic of Germany,
Spain, the United Kingdom, France and, of course, in Italy. High operating
losses and high indebtedness equaling sales were the major problems.
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14.2. The Negotiation Parties
Actually, the case concerned a party, Electrolux, called to negotiate with several
other parties. Figure 1-4.1 describes the main links, both formal (solid lines) and
informal (dashed lines).
Italian
competitorsZanussi
family
, I
, '
,
Local
/ politicians
Local/"/
unions
Foreign Wallenberg
/
banks" /~ holding
... ~ectroluv
---~ \Italian
National
unions
"'\/
/ banks
Minister
of Industry
Figure 14.1. The Negotiation Parties.
14.3. The Negotiation Process
Mr. Rossignolo, President of the SKF Italian subsidiary - SKF being part of
the same Swedish holding company that owns Electrolux and is controlled by the
Wallenberg family - was asked by the influential FIAT Managing Director
Cesare Romiti to try and convince Mr. Wallenberg to consider acquiring Zanussi,
something they had refused a year before. Mr. Rossignolo pointed out to Mr.
Wallenberg and the Electrolux top management that many Swedish companies,
including SKF, had prospered in Italy for years; that Zanussi's high market
share in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and
Spain fit in well with the Electrolux global strategy; and that the Friuli local
government had offered to refinance the company. He finally convinced them to
explore the opportunity.
Mr. Werthen and Mr. Scharp, Electrolux President and Managing Direc-
tor, respectively, agreed to come to Italy in May 1984. Mr. Rossignolo arranged
meetings with the Minister of Industry and with the top management of Italian
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banks. Mr. Werthen and Mr. Scharp, on the basis of their first impressions,
assigned to Mr. Rossignolo the role of negotiator for Electrolux.
In the meantime a team of Electrolux experts had come to the company
and raised doubts about the feasibility of negotiating with so many diverse coun-
terparts, but also confirmed Zanussi's market position and industrial capabilities.
Electrolux promised to shift their orders for refrigerators and washing machines
from independent suppliers to Zanussi; they also mentioned their interest in buy-
ing components (pumps, compressors, plastic and metal components, etc.) from
Zanussi plants.
The Swedish and international press maintained that it would be very
difficult for Electrolux to rescue Zanussi; whenever rumors about the impending
deal emerged, Electrolux shares fell on the Stockholm Stock Exchange.
Mr. Rossignolo had to keep discussing and explaining not only with Elec-
trolux, but with the local and national unions and politicians and the banks. In
July 1984 the experts concluded that the work force cutback (about 30%),
enacted the previous year, was now adequate; and Electrolux confirmed to the
unions that they would guarantee the present level of employment.
In August 1984 after Electrolux agreed with the Zanussi family to buy their
shares, an audit report about a foreign exchange contingent liability influenced
them to reconsider; but in September they decided favorably. On the recommen-
dation of Mr. Rossignolo, Electrolux persuaded Mr. Verri, then Managing Direc-
tor at RIV-SKF in Turin, to accept the position of Managing Director. Mr. Ros-
signolo had already been designated as President.
Electrolux issued a "letter of confort" to the banks, and asked them to res-
tructure the debt. Negotiations started.
From September to December 1984 other negotiations were conducted with
the local politicians controlling Friuli Region, a development bank owned by the
local government. Finally, in mid-December, after many hours of heated discus-
sion, the Electrolux plan was accepted; the stock capital was canceled and new
capital subscribed by Friuli Region (10%), Electrolux (49%) and a number of
financial institutions. Electrolux had an option for a further increase in their
capital investments, which would give them control.
Negotiations with banks were concluded a short time later, providing for a
consolidation of debts at low rates and a medium-term repayment plan.
But Mr. Rossignolo and Mr. Verri, revising the Electrolux plan in January
1985, found that the employment agreement with the unions could not be kept:
of 18,000 employed, taking into account the foreseen plant automation invest-
ment in three years, almost 4,500 people would have to be made redundant.
They decided to present the facts and discuss them openly. In mid-February
1985 a meeting with delegates of the local and national unions was organized in
Rome. The three national unions participated. The meeting, actually a long
and heated negotiation session, lasted from Thursday to Saturday morning
without interruptions, with breaks threatened more than once. At the end the
Zanussi plan was accepted under the condition that its progress would be closely
monitored by the unions.
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14:04. Results
P. Gennaro
The first check in February 1986 was troublesome. Instead of dismissing 2,500
people in 1985, Zanussi laid off 2,800. On the other side the success of the new
marketing effort, and higher than expected orders from Electrolux prompted the
Zanussi management to ask for temporary overtime (which, according to Italian
law, must be agreed upon by the unions). Discussions followed, and a strike was
called. After three months, however, overtime was permitted.
Zanussi announced reduced losses in 1985, to about 30 billion lire (against
125 billion lire in 1984). At the beginning of 1987 they announced a profit for
1986 of more than 30 billion lire. A new advanced washing machine was intro-
duced in 1986. The Zanussi top management stated that, since no new invest-
ment had been made, the results were due entirely to the new spirit that all
Zanussi people had acquired, following meetings, seminars, job rotations, the
launching of new projects, and a restructuring of the top management roles with
a "management committee" headed by Verri - actions that had required a huge
investment of time and attention by the top management.
14.5. Some Final Comments
This case could provide some valuable lessons on how to manage a complex
negotiation process with many parties. First of all, it is necessary to define each
party and their specific interests and motivations. Then one has to try to priori-
tize the agreements to be concluded, giving top priority to the agreements that
can or should be made first, to influence the following ones. Agreement with the
unions had to come first, in this case, because a strong argument could be made
that no agreement with the present and future shareholders and the banks could
be developed in the absence of an agreement with the unions. At the same time,
such an agreement provided social pressure on the other parties, who could not
easily appear to destroy a social settlement.
Another lesson is probably that being frank and honest, but firm, can over-
come emotional positions of the counterparts, provided one has enough time and
patience. And last but not least, social and political pressures can be directed to
work for rather than against a negotiator; but, of course, this requires excellent
negotiation skills.
CHAPTER 16
How to Negotiate for Joint Ventures
Gottfried A. Wolf-Laudon
Siemens AG Austria
Vienna
Austria
16.1. Introduction
Joint ventures, a form of partnership, are as old as commercial relationships.
Precedents can be found in Roman law and in the English common law, but such
customs also can be found in earlier societies.
We may define a joint venture as a productive partnership-agreement the
result of which is uncertain because there is risk of loss or failure as well as the
chance of gain or success.
Special problems have to be managed when a joint venture is negotiated
and initiated, e.g., in a country which may have different laws, customs, com-
mercial practices, and political and social institutions. The parties, while ack-
nowledging the problems, must deem it worthwhile to solve them.
Negotiation is a process in which the parties (larger social systems, indivi-
duals, groups, organizations) with their own specific interests exchange and com-
municate knowledge, skills, motivation, resources and information in order to
make and coordinate goal-oriented - e.g., joint venture - decisions. Decision
making and negotiations are not identical, but there is a considerable overlap.
Negotiations for joint ventures are an elastic concept, where all elements of
human behavior and of interpersonal and interorganizational contacts are in
some way amalgamated according to patterns that differ from situation to situa-
tion. No elements should be neglected.
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In his biography of Dr. Armand Hammer, Bob Considine (1975) docu-
mented the negotiations and joint venture strategies, tactics, operations and the
life of one of the most fascinating and successful pioneers of East-West joint ven-
tures. I recommend the book to anyone interested in the subject of negotiations
in general or joint ventures in particular.
15.2. The Framework of a Joint Venture Negotiation
The framework in Figur~ 15.1 may be of help in orienting themes to suitable lev-
els, and in indicating negotiating and decision-making strategies, tactics, and
operations for joint ventures.
Just now, the changing political climate favors development of East-West
joint ventures. For example, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, held in Helsinki in 1975, and continuing in Vienna, recognized the value
of such economic and technological cooperation as industrial joint ventures. The
participating countries in that conference supported development of industrial
cooperation, expressed determination to promote measures to create industrial
cooperation and recognized that new forms of industrial cooperation and educa-
tion can be applied to meet specific needs. Hungary, in the forefront of these
agreements, had already in 1972 created legal preconditions to accredit, under
Hungarian law, joint associations with enterprises from the West (see Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975).
Substantive aspects and positions of the various negotiations for joint ven-
tures attract most attention:
Negotiating style (individual, group, organization, larger social system,
national governments)
Substantive long-term and short-term aspects (political, operational, stra-
tegic, tactical, methodological objectives)
Complexity of negotiation situations (political, technological, economic, and
social changes, problems, decisions, potential problems).
Investment in CMEA countries is now a very effective joint venture stra-
tegy. It has been possible to set up joint companies in Hungary since 1972 and
in the Soviet Union since 1987. It is necessary for Western companies to learn
on the spot what the CMEA markets need now and for the future, to exploit
fully the unsaturated markets of the East.
This chapter is based on a case analysis of a successful East-West joint
venture: a joint corporation between Intercooperation AG in Hungary and Sie-
mens AG of Austria. I conclude that it is possible to have a successful commer-
cial relationship in the form of a joint venture in another country, if certain con-
ditions are met which include knowledge of that country's legal system, cultural
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norms, political and social institutions and business practices. It is always much
more than just a matter of understanding commercial practices alone.
First of all, success is based on excellent negotiators on both sides who are
able and willing to analyze, to use synergy effects, to create a favorable new
environment during managing in an unfavorable environment until the joint ven-
ture objectives are realized (see Figure I5.e).
NO SYNERGY SYNERGY
WEST EAST
joint ventures
Figure 15.2. Creating a favorable negotiating environment through synergy effects.
15.3. How to Negotiate for (East-West) Joint Ventures
To understand a person from another group, organization, larger social system
- especially one from a different culture and a different mentality - with whom
discussions are being initiated, a negotiator must have the ability to listen and
observe. An effective negotiating style is hardly possible unless one is prepared
and able to listen and observe, as well as to motivate, participate and integrate.
These are the basic traits of the successful consensus-oriented negotiator.
He should also have a marked readiness to learn and understand, and he should
possess the gift of insight.
Under these conditions it may be possible to find common ground between
thought processes often contradictory on the surface, thereby creating a negotiat-
ing symbiosis.
15.3.1. Integration style
Successful negotiations for joint ventures should be based on a consensus-
oriented integration style, which demands the following:
How to NegotiaU for Joint Venture.
The will and ability to cooperate
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In general the joint venture philosophy demands that all those working on a joint
project or within a joint corporation should cooperate intensively. An open
interchange of ideas, which includes taking the trouble to appreciate the way the
other side is thinking, is a basic requirement.
The balance between adaptation and innovation
One should strive to behave in a way appropriate to the situation while
endeavoring to improve and use human capabilities. Joint synergy-improvement
groups are an expression of a culture geared to adaptation and innovation
through cooperation.
The ability to participate
Full participation in decision making and realization of decisions through work-
ing together characterize an effective joint venture management philosophy.
High motivation through target setting by consensus
The strategy, culture and structure of joint ventures have to be defined. This
can be achieved in negotiations with the contributions of all partners using syn-
ergy effects. The discovery and development of attractive reciprocal services is
equally important.
A capability to cooperate and integrate
Observing and harmonizing relevant demands and expectations through a
cooperative way of thinking based on consensus is crucial to negotiating
effectively for joint ventures.
Negotiations based on these five and other indicators not only increase the
creative potential of all involved in the negotiation, but also mobilize the negotia-
tion to everyone's advantage in an integrated fashion.
15.3.2. Contract negotiations
When negotiating for (East-West) joint ventures with a view to drawing up a
contract, the following points should be observed:
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Harmony
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A favorable new joint venture environment (strategy, culture, structure) lays
great emphasis on compromise and consensus, avoiding unnecessary disputes.
The development and preservation of a harmonious business relationship, rather
than the achievement and maintenance of positions of advantage, is the essence
and purpose of negotiations. Differences of opinion between partners are there-
fore rarely fought out legally. A consensus is usually sought.
Information and preparation
It is important to collect and analyze information and data. Preparation for the
talks is therefore just as important as careful preparation for the decision.
Social hierarchy and courtesy
Effective negotiations for (East-West) joint ventures should have a highly
developed social hierarchy and system of courtesies in mind. They should not
only be outwardly polite at contract negotiations, but should also bear in mind
that the person leading the discussion is not necessarily the highest ranking
member of the group - his position as leader might be determined by relevant
specialized linguistic ability or technical knowledge.
Language
Negotiators on both sides should speak slowly and in short sentences, using sim-
ple words. Short, simple and slowly uttered sentences are important. All pic-
turesque expressions and idioms not in common use should be avoided. Effective
negotiators hear and think selectively. They are masters of not hearing and
ignoring what seems to be superficial.
Translation and interpretation
Negotiators for joint ventures should take an experienced interpreter with them.
It is not useful to rely on the other side's interpreter for the whole of the negotia-
tions. Apart from the fact that interpreting is difficult and exhausting, one's
own interpreter should know and interpret one's position, which needs thorough
preparation. Negotiators for East-West joint ventures often do not let a
foreigner know if they have really understood a certain statement, let alone if
they agree with it. They are often artists in saying No.
How to NegotiaU for Joint Venture.
Behavior
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A calm and relaxed attitude indicates seriousness to the negotiating partners.
Hyperactive, partly aggressive behavior and impatience can be interpreted as
lack of discipline or untrustworthiness. Often negotiators do not make notes
during a negotiation; and if one side does not, it is often better not to do so at
all.
Body language
In the West people rely too much on verbal communication. Eastern negotiators
are usually good observers, especially when it comes to a slight change of expres-
sion of gesture. When negotiating for joint ventures, one should also take note of
nonverbal communication, Le., body language and behavior.
The capacity to be silent
Silence, to experienced negotiators, does not mean that one does not agree, but
that the partner is considering and thinking something over. One should not,
therefore, become uncomfortable and try to bridge over or interrupt a negotiat-
ing partner's silence.
Addressing the negotiating partner
One should address the members of joint ventures negotiating team as a group
and not as individuals. The highest in rank in the group may hold his position
because of his length of service rather than because of great technical or other
knowledge. Perhaps he is a very good negotiator. He must, however, in any case
consult his colleagues before he can make a binding declaration. It is wrong to
expect an answer from him immediately.
Moreover, pressure is usually seen as a means of concealing seriousness.
Unsubstantiated personal assurances do not enjoy great credibility. Starting
from a higher or lower price with the objective of reaching a compromise price,
or attempting to reach a delivery date in the same way, is not effective for nego-
tiating joint ventures.
15.3.3. Levels of negotiation
It is important to negotiate different themes for joint ventures only on the levels
listed below (see also Figure 15.1).
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Effectiveness questions
G.A. Wolf-Laudon
Why? What for? What? In negotiations with politicians or top manage-
ment, basic political long-term strategic questions should be discussed. Details
should be delegated as these are the business of middle management. What?
With what? Concrete business field strategies, objectives, and planning ques-
tions should be discussed with the management division responsible and are
passed on to top management as information.
Efficiency questions
With what? How? Tactical, methodological and technical questions should
usually be discussed with those responsible, or with representatives of all depart-
ments affected by the decision. This is done after careful preparation. How?
When? Where? To what extent? All detailed questions or questions con-
cerning concrete know-how and the completion of certain activities should be dis-
cussed with those who will carry them out.
The framework in Figure 15.1 may be of help in orienting themes to suit-
able levels, and in indicating negotiating and decision-making strategies.
16.4. Creating a Favorable "New" (Joint Venture)
Environment while Managing in
an Unfavorable Environment
The mobilization of human resources and their mental potential for the purpose
of successful joint ventures should be given greater emphasis in the future than it
enjoys today.
The driving forces in the structural change in the economies and societies
of the industrial countries in the East and the West, but also in the developing
nations, especially those of the Pacific, will be directed into new channels by
increasing:
Internationalization and globalization (market demand and technology
push).
Informatization and communication (know-how transfer).
Humanization in the sense of tolerance of human nature and automation
(office, network and factory of the future).
Flexibility and mobility (synergy effects, creativity, innovation, etc.).
Freedom in the sense of an ethic of responsibility (the ability to do more
than we have to do).
At the same time there is a new way of thinking of the matter as a whole,
which is developing and which can be observed worldwide. This holistic con-
sciousness today characterizes the behavior of many politicians and managers,
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especially in internationally oriented institutions and enterprises. IIASA is a
good example of this.
What characterizes effective joint venture and human resources manage-
ment? It seeks to:
Be effective - that is, to do the right things in the efficient, right, way.
Be innovative - that is, to increase its ability for self-criticism and
-renewal constantly, by knowing more, being capable of more, wanting
more and having more courage of its own convictions.
Awaken the mental abilities and talents hidden in the joint venture work-
ers.
Concentrate its own motivation and that of the workers on the strategic
concerns of the joint venture and the specific demands of the new joint ven-
ture market and competition.
15.5. Common Joint Venture Practices
Joint ventures demand a cooperative, moral consciousness and behavior; Le.,
putting a high ethical value on the undertaking. Experience shows that about
60% of the success of a joint venture depends on the relations between the per-
sonalities involved in the cooperation.
Joint ventures demand reciprocal understanding and recognition of the
partner's logic in thinking as well as the development of a joint logic in thinking.
This means a joint venture management must be capable of completing the set
tasks cooperatively taking into account their specialist nature, character, and
influence.
Managers in a joint East-West corporation need to learn, first of all, how
to manage the very new social system of this cooperation and how to manage
themselves in it. Joint management practices have to be focused on joint
effectiveness.
Effectiveness is not a quality a manager from East or West brings to a joint
situation. Effectiveness is best seen as something a joint management produces
from a common task, goal or situation by managing it appropriately.
Effectiveness represents output, not input. Effective common management prac-
tice must
First of all:
- do right things
- produce creative alternatives
- optimize resource utilization
- obtain results
- increase profit
Strategic thinking:
KNOW WHY, KNOW WHAT
Later:
- do things right
- solve problems
- safeguard resources
- follow duties
- lower costs
Tactical thinking and operation:
KNOWHOW
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Joint venture managers must think in terms of performance, not personal-
ity. It is not so much what a joint venture manager does, but what he achieves
together with his colleagues. Effectiveness should be measured as the extent to
which the joint venture management achieves the output requirements - syn-
ergy effects - of their joint position. In practice, these are:
The development of new areas of cooperation between those enterprises
having a share in the joint company and the economic organizations and
associated companies connected with those enterprises.
The optimizing of research, development, production, distribution, assem-
bly, maintenance and service capacities, as well as the joint development of
raw material, intermediate products and software capacities.
The concentration of joint forces on third-market projects which, without
this breadth of synergy, could not be realized.
The establishment and extension of lasting partnerships in scientific, tech-
nical, economic, organizational and legal spheres.
The above-mentioned bases of a joint enterprise afford joint venture
management the chance to:
Solve country-specific tasks and diverse problems more expeditiously, due
to the common legal basis.
Achieve continuous joint intent, target and strategic planning as well as a
methodical employment of all resources.
Appraise and calculate more realistically the possibilities and risks of new
areas of cooperation.
Achieve faster and more satisfactory solutions of large and complex techni-
cal and economic problems.
Extend the application of cooperation to synergy areas of advanced tech-
nology.
Choose, train and further educate suitable staff in a target-oriented way.
Communicate continuously and hold coordination meetings, which will
enable conflicts of interests to be discussed daily.
Joint ventures that are oriented toward their customers' needs and the
future market demands require creativity, motivation and optimism and thereby
also increase their ability to use joint synergy effects.
Productivity and effectiveness can be increased by improving performance
with joint human resources. A mechanism for achieving strategic long-term
increase in joint productivity and effectiveness is shown in Figure 15.9.
How to NegotiaK for Joint Venture.
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-
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Figure 15.9. Strategic long-term increase of joint productivity and effectivess.
16.6. Key Elements for Effective (East-West) Joint Ventures
A joint venture is a special economic field and covers the new technical-economic
possibilities that lie between the maintaining of independence in competition and
the building of enterpises. It represents a synthesis between cooperation and
competition, which is so difficult to imagine.
A joint venture is always closely connected to practice and leads to a cumu-
lation of knowledge. As a part of an enterprise's strategy, its importance grows
continually and is on the point of becoming a new basic dimension of the econ-
omy.
A joint venture is possible on three bases: horizontal, vertical, and comple-
mentary:
Horizontal joint venture: when two or more enterprises with the same
objective decide on joint venturing in one or more functions.
Vertical joint venture: between the functions of companies, one subor-
dinate to the other.
Complementary joint venture: concerns the so-called cooperation
between companies whose markets, products and services complement each
other.
In addition to development, manufacturing, and marketing functions, the
following are also preferred areas of joint ventures: data processing, automation,
construction, project planning, consulting, engineering, education and training,
maintenance and service, organization, and quality control.
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Joint venturing as a rule develops increasing intensity in the following
stages:
Exchange of experiences and specialist symposia.
Joint information-gathering and evaluating in the frame of market and sys-
tem studies.
Separating of an enterprise function.
Separating of several enterprises' functions.
Forming a joint venture management.
Legal separation of a joint venture management.
Founding a joint company.
The obligations and rights of the executive branch of a joint East-West
enterprise are characterized by the following features:
Joint basis in law.
Joint staff.
Joint management.
Joint capital basis.
Joint organization.
Shared risks and benefits.
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Cultural Predictors of
National Negotiation Styles
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16.1. National, Professional, and Organizational Cultures in
International Negotiations
Negotiators in international negotiations, by definition, have different national
cultural backgrounds. "Cultural" is used here in the sense of "the collective pro-
gramming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of peo-
ple from another". National culture is that component of our mental program-
ming which we share with more of our compatriots as opposed to most other
world citizens. Besides our national component, our cultural programs contain
components associated with our profession, regional background, sex, age group,
and the organizations to which we belong. National cultural programming leads
to patterns of thinking, feeling and acting that may differ from one party in an
international negotiation to another.
The most fundamental component of our national culture consists of values.
Values are broad preferences for one state of affairs over others. Values are
acquired in the family during the first years of our lives, further developed and
confirmed at school, and reinforced in work organizations and in daily life within
a national cultural environment. Values determine what we consider as good
and evil, beautiful and ugly, natural and unnatural, rational and irrational,
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normal and abnormal. Values are partly unconscious and because of their nor-
mative character, hardly discussable. We cannot convince someone else that
his/her values are wrong. It is essential that negotiators share the national cul-
ture and values of the country they represent, because otherwise they will not be
trusted by their own side.
Other components of national culture are more superficial - that is, visi-
ble, conscious, and easy to learn even by adults. They include sllmbols: words,
gestures, and objects that carry a specific meaning in a given culture. The entire
field of language consists of symbols; and a culture group's language can be
learned by outsiders. Besides symbols, a culture has its collective habits or ritu-
als, ways of behavior that serve to communicate feelings more than information;
these, too, can be learned by outsiders, although not as easily.
Those involved in international negotiations will have developed a profes-
sional negotiation culture, which considerably facilitates the negotiation process.
This professional culture, however, is more superficial than their national cul-
tures: it consists of commonly understood symbols and commonly learned habits
more than of shared values. Different types of negotiators will have their own
kind of professional cultures: diplomats, bureaucrats, politicians, business peo-
ple, lawyers, engineers, etc. Negotiations are easier with people from other coun-
tries sharing the same professional culture than with those who do not.
Finally, organizations, too, develop their own cultures. In the field of inter-
national negotiations, international bodies, such as IIASA, the IAEA, and the
various other UN agencies, can play an important role because their internal cul-
ture facilitates communication. Again, and even more than in the case of profes-
sional cultures, these organizational cultures are superficial - that is, they reside
on the level of the easily acquired common symbols and habits. Organizational
cultures are not always an asset; they can develop into liabilities, too, by block-
ing communication instead of facilitating it.
The behavior of negotiators in international negotiations will thus be
influenced by at least three levels of culture: national, professional, and organi-
zational, besides the contribution of their own personal skills and character.
16.2. Dimensions of Differences in National Cultures
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to national culture differences and
their supposed impact on negotiation styles, because it is in this area that the
author's research has been mostly focused. National culture differences, as we
argued, reside to a large extent in values acquired in early life, and are therefore
quite deep-seated, often unconscious and hardly discussable.
National cultural value systems are quite stable over time; elements of
national culture can survive amazingly long, being carried forward from genera-
tion to generation. For example, countries that were once part of the Roman
empire still today share some common value elements, as opposed to countries
that did not inherit from Rome.
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National cultural value systems have been measured in international com-
parative research projects. Such projects use samples of people from different
countries as respondents on value questions. These samples should be carefully
matched - that is, composed of similar people from one country to another,
similar in all respects except nationality (same age, sex, profession, etc.). They
need not be representative of the entire population of a country, although if this
is possible, it makes the samples even more attractive. Two such international
comparative value research projects were carried out by this author (Hofstede,
1980, 1983) and by Bond (1987), respectively.
16.2.1. The Hofstede-mM study
The Hofstede research used a data bank containing 116,000 questionnaires of the
values of employees of the multinational business organization IBM in 72 coun-
tries, and collected between 1967 and 1973. These employees represent
extremely well-matched subjects of each country's population, because they do
the same jobs with the same technology in the same kind of organization, have
the same education levels, and can be matched by age and sex. Initially, data
from 40 countries were analyzed; later on, this number was extended to 50, and
data from 14 more countries were grouped into three geographic regions - East
Africa, West Africa and Arab-speaking countries - bringing the total number of
cultures covered up to 53. As the data were collected inside a capitalist enter-
prise, the socialist countries are not covered in this research project. However,
matched data from a Yugoslav organization selling and servicing IBM equipment
are included.
The IBM project revealed that the 53 countries covered differed mainly
along four dimensions:
1. Power Distance, that is, the extent to which the less powerful members of
organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that
power is distributed unequally. This represents inequality (more versus
less), but defined from below, not from above. It suggests that a society's
level of inequality is in the followers as much as in the leaders. Power and
inequality, of course, are extremely fundamental facts of any society, and
anybody with some international experience will be aware that "all societies
are unequal, but some are more unequal than others" .
2. Individualism on the one side versus its opposite, Collectivism. This
describes the degree to which the individuals are integrated into groups.
On the individualist side, we find societies in which the ties between
individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and
his/her immediate family. On the collectivist side, we find societies in
which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-
groups; often their extended families (with uncles, aunts and grandparents)
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continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. The word
"collectivism" in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group,
not to the state. Again, the issue addressed by this dimension is an
extremely fundamental one, relevant to all societies in the world.
3. Masculinity versus its opposite, Femininity. The distribution of roles
between the sexes is another fundamental issue for any society to which a
range of solutions are found. The analysis of the IBM data revealed that
(a) women's values differ less among societies than men's values; (b) if we
restrict ourselves to men's values (which vary more from one country to
another), we find that they contain a dimension from very assertive and
competitive and maximally different from women's values on the one side,
to modest and caring and similar to women's values on the other. We have
called the assertive pole "masculine" and the modest, caring pole "fem-
inine". The women in the feminine countries have the same modest, caring
values as the men; in the masculine countries they are somewhat assertive
and competitive, but not as much as the men, so that these countries show
a gap between men's values and women's values.
The three dimensions described so far all refer to expected social behavior:
toward people higher or lower in rank (Power Distance), toward the group
(Individualism/Collectivism), and as a function of one's sex
(Masculinity/Femininity). It is obvious, that the values corresponding to these
cultural choices are bred in the family: Power Distance by the degree to which
children are expected to have a will of their own, Individualism/Collectivism by
the cohesion of the family versus other people, and Masculinity/Femininity by
the role models that parents and older children present to the younger child.
4. A fourth dimension found in the IBM studies does not refer to social
behavior, but to man's search for truth. We called it "Uncertainty
Avoidance": it indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to
feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations.
"Unstructured situations" are novel, unknown, surprising, different from
usual. Uncertainty-avoiding cultures try to prevent such situations by
strict laws and rules, safety and security, and on the philosophical and reli-
gious level by a belief in absolute truth: "There can only be one Truth and
we have it". People in uncertainty-avoiding countries are also more emo-
tional, and motivated by inner nervous energy. The opposite type,
uncertainty-accepting cultures, are more tolerant of behavior and opinions
different from what they are used to; they try to have as few rules as possi-
ble, and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and
allow many currents to flow side by side. People within these cultures are
more phlegmatic and contemplative, and not expected by their environ-
ment to express emotions.
Culturol PredictDn 01 NalionDl Negotialion StlJe. 197
Table 16.1 lists scores for the S3 cultures in the IBM research, which allow
positioning them in each of the four dimensions (plus a fifth, which we will
describe in the next section). These scores are relative: we have chosen our
scales such that the distance between the lowest- and the highest-scoring country
is about 100 points.
16.2.2. The Bond study
The other comparative value research project relevant to our topic was carried
out by Michael Bond of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He asked a
number of Chinese social scientists to prepare in Chinese a list of basic values for
Chinese people. After discussion and elimination of redundancies, this led to a
4o-item Chinese questionnaire, which was subsequently translated into English.
Through an international network of interested colleagues, this Chinese Value
Survey was administered to 1000 students in a variety of disciplines (SO male, SO
female) in each of 22 countries from all five continents; the only socialist country
covered was Poland. Wherever possible, translations into the local language
were made directly from the Chinese. To a Western mind, some of the items
such as, "filial piety" look exotic - so exotic that it was explained: "obedience
to parents, respect for parents, honoring of ancestors, financial support of
parents". Of course, to the Chinese mind, some of the items on the IBM ques-
tionnaire, designed by Western social scientists, may have looked equally exotic.
A statistical analysis of the 22-country Chinese Value Survey (CVS)
results, based on the relative importance attached in a country to each value
versus the other values, yielded again four dimensions. Twenty out of 22 coun-
tries were covered earlier in the IBM studies. Thus, we could compare the coun-
try scores on each CVS dimension to those of the IBM dimensions. One
CVS dimension was very similar to Power Distance, one to
Individualism-Collectivi~m(most of the Chinese values being associated with the
collective pole), and one to Masculinity-Femininity. This in spite of the com-
pletely different questions, different populations, different moments in time, and
different mix of countries. One dimension from the IBM studies, however, is
missing in the CVS data. We did not find a CVS dimension related to Uncer-
tainty Avoidance. We earlier associated this dimension with man's search for
truth; it seems that to the Chinese mind, this is not an essential issue. However,
we did find another quite clearly marked dimension. It is made up of the follow-
ing values:
on the positive side
- persistance (perseverance)
- ordering relationships by
status and observing this order
- thrift
- having a sense of shame
on the negative side
- personal steadiness and stablity
- protecting one's "face"
- respect for tradition
- reciprocation of greetings, favors
and gifts
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Table 16.1. Scores on five dimensions for 50 countries and 3 regions: rank number: 1:= lowest; 53
:= highest (for CFO: 22 = highest)
Power Individ- Uncertainty 8;:uuclanDistance ualism Masculinity Avoidance namlsm
Wdeij Rank Index Rank Wdex;) Rank ~deli Rank ~dex RankCountry POI (lOV) MAS UAI CFO)
Argentina 49 18-19 46 31-32 56 33-34 86 39-44 - -
Australia 36 13 90 52 61 38 51 17 31 9-10
Austria 11 1 55 36 79 52 70 29-30 - -
Belgium 65 34 75 46 54 32 94 48-49 - -
Brazil 69 40 38 27-28 49 27 76 32-33 65 18
Canada 39 15 80 49-50 52 30 48 12-13 23 4
Chile 63 29-30 23 16 28 8 86 39-44 - -
Colombia 67 37 13 5 64 42-43 80 34 - -
Costa Rica 35 10-12 15 8 21 5-6 86 39-44 - -
Denmark 18 3 74 45 16 4 23 3 - -
Equador 78 45-46 8 2 63 40-41 67 26 - -
Finland 33 8 63 37 26 7 59 22-23 - -
France 68 38-39 71 43-44 43 18-19 86 39-44 - -
Germany, F.R. 35 10-12 67 39 66 44-45 65 25 31 9-10
Great Britain 35 10-12 89 51 66 44-45 35 6-7 25 5-6
Greece 60 26-27 35 24 57 35-36 112 53 - -
Guatemala 95 51-52 6 1 37 11 101 51 - -
Hong Kong 68 38-39 25 17 57 35-36 29 4-5 96 22
Indonesia 78 45-46 14 6-7 46 23-24 48 12-13 - -
India 77 43-44 48 33 56 33-34 40 9 61 17
Iran 58 24-25 41 30 43 18-19 59 22-23 - -
Ireland 28 5 70 42 68 46-47 35 6-7 - -
Israel 13 2 54 35 47 25 81 35 - -
Italy 50 20 76 47 70 49-50 75 31 - -
Jamaica 45 17 39 29 68 46-47 13 2 - -
Japan 54 21 46 31-32 95 53 92 47 80 20
Korea, Rep. of 60 26-27 18 11 39 13 85 37-38 75 19
Malaysia 104 53 26 18 50 28-29 36 8 - -
Mexico 81 48-49 30 22 69 48 82 36 - -
Netherlands 38 14 80 49-50 14 3 53 19 44 14
Norway 31 6-7 69 41 8 2 50 16 - -
New Zealand 22 4 79 48 58 37 49 14-15 30 8
Pakistan 55 22 14 6-7 50 28-29 70 29-30 0 1
Panama 95 51-52 11 3 44 20 86 39-44 - -
Peru 64 31-33 16 9 42 16-17 87 45 - -
Philippines 94 50 32 23 64 42-43 44 10 19 3
Portugal 63 29-30 27 19-21 31 9 104 52 - -
South Africa 49 18-19 65 38 63 40-41 49 14-15 - -
Salvador 66 35-36 19 12 40 14 94 48-49 - -
Singapore 74 41 20 13-15 48 26 8 1 48 15
Spain 57 23 51 34 42 16-17 86 39-44 - -
Sweden 31 6-7 71 43-44 5 1 29 4-5 33 12
Switzerland 34 9 68 40 70 49-50 58 21 - -
Taiwan 58 24-25 17 10 45 21-22 69 28 87 21
Thailand 64 31-33 20 13-15 34 10 64 24 56 16
Turkey 66 35-36 37 26 45 21-22 85 37-38 - -
Uruguay 61 28 36 25 38 12 100 50 - -
USA 40 16 91 53 62 39 46 11 29 7
Venezuela 81 48-49 12 4 73 51 76 32-33 - -
Yugoslavia 76 42 27 19-21 21 5-6 88 46 - -
Regions:
East Africa 64 31-33 27 19-21 41 15 52 18 25 5-6
West Africa 77 43-44 20 13-15 46 23-24 54 20 16 2
Arab Countries 80 47 38 27-28 53 31 68 27 - -
Bangladesh
- - - - - - - - 40 13
Poland
- - - - - - - - 32 11
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For some countries, the values on the positive side are relatively more
important; for others, those on the negative side. All of them are already found
in the teachings of Confucius, dating from 500 B.C. However, the values on the
positive side are more oriented toward the future (especially perseverance and
thrift), those on the negative side toward the past and present. Bond has there-
fore called this dimension Confucian Dynamism. Country scores on Confucian
Dynamism for the countries surveyed with the CVS are listed in the last column
of Table 1, raising the total number of relevant dimensions to five. Interestingly,
Individualism (both in the Hofstede and in the Bond study) is strongly correlated
(r = .84) with a country's wealth (per capita GNP), and we can prove with
diachronic data that the causality goes from wealth to individualism. Confucian
Dynamism is strongly correlated (r = .70) with a country's economic growth
over the past 25 years (increase in per capita GNP), with a likely causality from
Confucian Dynamism to economic growth.
16.3. National Cultures and International Negotiations
Negotiations, whether international or not, share some universal characteristics:
• two or more parties with (partly) conflicting interests
• a common need for agreement because of an expected gain from such agree-
ment
• an initially undefined outcome
• a means of communication between parties
• a control and decision-making structure on either side by which either
side's negotiator(s) is/are linked to his/their superiors.
However, in international negotiations, the following characteristics vary
according to the national negotiation styles of either side:
• the nature of the control and decision-making structure on either side
• reasons for trusting or distrusting the behavior of the other side (a certain
amount of trust is an indispensable ingredient for successful negotiation)
• tolerance for ambiguity during the negotiation process
• emotional needs of negotiators, e.g., ego boosting or ego effacement.
IT one knows the approximate position of a country's national cultural
value system on the various cultural dimensions listed in Table 16.1, one can
predict aspects of the negotiation style of its negotiators.
1. Larger Power Distance will lead to a more centralized control and
decision-making structure (key negotiations have to be concluded by the
top authority).
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2. Collectivism will lead to a need for stable relationships, so that negotiations
can be carried out among persons who have become familiar with each
other over a long time (often, several years). Every replacement of one per-
son by another is a serious disturbance of the relationship, which has to be
reestablished from scratch.
In collectivist cultures, mediators or go-betweens have a more important
role in negotiations than in individualist cultures. Formal harmony is very
important in a collectivist setting; overt conflict is taboo. Mediators are able to
raise sensitive issues with either party within an atmosphere of confidence and to
avoid confrontation.
3. Masculinity leads to ego-boosting behaviors and sympathy for the strong on
the part of negotiators and their superiors. Masculine cultures tend to
resolve conflicts by fighting rather than compromising. Femininity leads to
ego-effacing behaviors and sympathy for the weak. Negotiations between
two masculine cultures are more difficult than if at least one of the cultures
is more feminine. A historical comparison that can be cited in this respect
is the difference between the solution of the Aland Island crisis between
Finland and Sweden in 1921, and the Falkland Island crisis between Argen-
tina and Great Britain in 1983; the first was resolved peacefully through a
plebiscite, the second is still unresolved in spite of a bloody war. Both Fin-
land and Sweden in our research are found on the feminine side of the
scale; both Argentina and Britain on the masculine side.
4. Uncertainty Avoidance leads to a low tolerance for ambiguity and distrust
in opponents who show unfamiliar behaviors; negotiators from
uncertainty-avoiding cultures prefer highly structured, ritualistic pro-
cedures during negotiations.
5. Confucian Dynamism leads to perseverance for achieving desired ends even
at the cost of sacrifices.
Obviously, such predictions should be checked in empirical research.
Chapter 17, by Poortinga and Hendriks, in this volume is an example of how
such research can be conducted.
16.4. Conclusion
For success in international negotiations, it is important that parties acquire an
insight into the range of cultural values they are going to meet in the negotia-
tions. This includes an insight into their own cultural values and the extent to
which these deviate from those of the other side{s). Such insight will allow them
to interpret more accurately the meaning of the behavior of the other side{s).
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In addition to insight, cultural differences in international negotiations
demand specific skills:
• For communicating the desired information and emotions to the other
party by the spoken word, the written word, and nonverbal behavior.
• For preparing, planning, and arranging negotiations: making an appropri-
ate use of go-betweens, choosing places and times for meeting, setting up
the proper social gatherings, etc.
It is important that cultural differences in international negotiations be
recognized as a legitimate phenomenon, worthy of study, and as a liability that
skilled and well-trained negotiators can turn into an asset.
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CHAPTER 17
Culture as a Factor in
International Negotiations:
A Proposed Research Project from
a Psychological Perspective
Ype H. Poortinga and Erwin C. Hendriks
Tilburg University
The Netherlands
AJJ a medium of relationships between nations, negotiation can only gain from the
quality of communication between states and between their emissaries. In other
words, its success depends on often imponderable intellectual, psychological and
social factors; and its failure is sometimes attributable simply to a misunderstand-
ing based on the difference between value systems.
17.1. Introduction
This statement was made by Alain Plantey (1982, p. 536), a well-known and
experienced French diplomat. It is an example of the widely held view that
differences in cultural and psychological background between participating teams
are an important reason why international negotiations often progress less
smoothly than anticipated. It appears to us that most laymen as well as many
experts agree with this viewpoint. Any experienced negotiator in international
settings can relate some striking incidents where culture had a dramatic impact
on the negotiation process, most often in a negative way. Like other expatriates,
negotiators tend to have well-developed ideas about the personality and the
204 Y. H. Poortinga and E. C. He~
characteristic mode of behavior of the typical member of a particular culture.
Statements about how the Arab, the Indian, or the Japanese will act and react
and also how you have to act in different cultural settings are easily obtained.
In such evaluative statements the term culture is used in a very broad and
loose sense. It encompasses a wide range of phenomena, including norms and
values, national character traits and aspects of language. Striking incidents can
easily be interpreted retrospectively in terms of culture. This concept is so com-
plex that one will find invariably some factor that can serve as a plausible expla-
nation for whatever one wants to explain. Without denying the importance of
cultural variables for international negotiations, we would like to emphasize that
ad hoc use of culture as an explanatory concept resembles the deus ex machina in
a bad stage play: when the plot has become too complex, the gods are called
upon by the writer to provide the ultimate solution.
In the extensive research literature on the influence of sociocultural and
psychocultural factors in the negotiations process, empirical evidence in which
prevailing notions are critically examined is rarely found. In the present chapter,
an approach is outlined which should permit making a more accurate assessment
of the importance of culture in relation to other factors, notably the individual
characteristics of negotiators and the substantive issues in a negotiations process.
It is widely believed that cultural factors influence the process and outcome
of international negotiations, but scientific research is lacking on the manner in
which these factors operate. The need for empirical evidence is substantiated by
an analysis of the concepts of culture and personality, and an elaboration of the
problem of attribution. A descriptive study is proposed, in which five groups of
antecedents to success and failure in international negotiations are distinguished:
cultural traits, cultural conventions, individual traits, specific reactions of indivi-
duals, and negotiation issues. Information on the (relative) influence of these
factors is to be collected from three sources: participants in international nego-
tiations, external observers, and social scientists.
17.2. Psychological Studies of Negotiations
A framework for research on international negotiations was outlined by Sawyer
and Guetzkow (1965). The core of their article is a model, which in a slightly
modified form is presented in Figure 17.1. This figure gives an overview of the
various influences on the outcome of negotiations. From our point of view, the
most interesting parts of the model are the aspects "goals" and "background fac-
tors" . Here Sawyer and Guetzkow emphasize that impact of cultural-,
individual- and issue-linked factors.
The appeal by Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965, p. 467) for more research was
followed up only with respect to the individual- and issue-related factors. On
cultural variables there have been only a handful of reported empirical studies,
mostly following a single approach. The laboratory experiment is the research
method; the subjects are mostly students; the bargaining situation is almost
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Antecedent Concurrent Consequent
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GOALS PROCESS OUTCOME
e.g., communality of goals -. e.g., preparation of negotiation
-
e.g., clarity of outcomes
specificity of goals communication continuity of negotiation
modification of alternatives
r r
BACKGROUND FACTORS CONDITIONS
e.g., cultural variation e.g., setting of negotiation
personality of negotiator number of participants
attitude between parties timing of negotiation
Figure 17.1. A model for negotiations (after Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965).
always some sort of game (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma) and the focus of research is
the type of bargaining style displayed. The culture factor has been introduced
by replicating this kind of study in different countries. Consequently, the
differences found are crosB-cultural differences in intr~cultural bargaining.
This kind of research does not give much insight into the effects of cultural
variables on international negotiations, where inter-cultural interactions are
important. In this respect, the plea by Sawyer and Guetzkow for more research
still remains unanswered. Empirical evidence is needed in which the interactions
of persons from different cultures is analyzed.
17.3. Culture as a Psychological Variable
The Dutch sociologist Bouman (1938) has given the following definition: "Cul-
ture is the lifestyle of a society. This lifestyle is the unity of mind and material
form, the organic and impenetrable relation between belief and art expression,
between intellect and technology, or between need and economic organization".
He adds that any definition trying to achieve exhaustive description is bound to
end up in vagueness. Bouman's definition is only one of many that can be found
in the literature. They all have an essential aspect in common - namely, that
culture permeates all aspects of the life of its members.
In further attempts to specify culture, social scientists have emphasized the
observed coherence in behavior patterns. Often culture is conceived of as a sys-
tem. Culture is then seen as an entity consisting of interrelated parts, each of
which only can be understood with reference to the context in which it occurs. A
related notion is that of the "Gestalt", where the total is more than the sum of
the constituent parts. Culture in this sense is an integral aspect of the behavior
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of a person. For a recent analysis along these lines, we refer to Rohner (1984),
who defines culture as a system of symbolic meanings. In this definition mean-
ings imply beliefs, values and norms that, by and large, are shared by the
members of a cultural group. Notions such as Gestalt or system only make sense
if it is assumed that there are organizational principles inherent to culture.
These principles can be defined at the level of the culture as a whole, or at lower
levels of inclusiveness, such as the kinship system or value system.
In cross-cultural psychology there is a second orientation in which the
importance of culture as a determinant of behavior is equally assumed. How-
ever, the analogy of a system or a Gestalt is missing. Culture is taken as a set of
conditions analogous to the treatments or conditions in a laboratory experiment
(Strodtbeck, 1964). From this perspective culture is reduced to a set of
antecedent factors that can be analyzed and measured separately. An outspoken
adherent of this viewpoint is Segall (1983, 1984). In his opinion, cross-cultural
analysis starts with the observation of some important difference. The goal of
empirical studies is the identification of variables in terms of which that observed
difference can be explained.
In this second approach culture is conceived of as an array of distinguish-
able and rather unrelated antecedent variables. Their effects, which lead to
differences in specific behaviors, can be traced without the need for a higher-
order explanatory concept of culture. It has even been suggested that culture
can be seen as a set of conventions, in the sense of more or less arbitrary agree-
ments about what is right and what is proper, e.g., in social interactions, in the
expression of art, or in traffic rules (Van de Koppel and Schoots, 1986; Poortinga
1986; Poortinga et aI., forthcoming). The arbitrariness of conventions is taken as
evidence that they cannot be related to broader aspects of psychological func-
tioning, such as the national character or value system.
Although we concur with the view that the study of a culture as a Gestalt
or system can provide valuable insights, we disagree with the opinion that a cul-
ture can be studied only in that way. When the antecedent variables to a cul-
tural difference have been identified, we assume that we have not missed some
kind of essence that should be taken into account. For a proper representation
of culture in an empirical research project, both the systems and the conventions
orientation should be included. The results will have to show to what extent
each of the two is valid.
Another major consideration in cross-cultural research has to do with the
fact that anyone, be it researcher or negotiator, can only operate from the back-
ground of his or her own cultural experiences. Throughout any analysis of
cross-cultural interaction, the difficulties in establishing effective communication
between communicators should be realized. Three potential stumbling blocks on
the road to effective communication can be distinguished (Kaufmann, 1968, p.
163): linguistic difficulties, intellectual short-circuits, and conceptual roadblocks
(resulting from different cultures and value systems). This problem area has
received considerable attention in the cross-cultural literature, (e.g., Bochner,
1982). We shall not deal with it here, but merely note its importance for the
preparation of any cross-cultural research project.
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17.4. Conceptions of Personality
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Not only are people generally inclined to attribute broad psychological effects to
culture, they tend to do something similar in the case of personality. Why does
someone not perform his job properly? Because he is neurotic. Why does some-
one quarrel with his neighbors? Because he is aggressive.
In personality research stable structural psychological properties of individ-
uals are referred to as "traits". Every person is assumed to possess each trait to
a greater or lesser extent. We label a person by those traits that we see as
predominant in his behavior pattern. If an individual's behavior can be
described in terms of stable traits, it should be possible to predict his future
behavior on the basis of this description. However, empirical research based on
this approach has often shown disappointingly poor results. This has affected
the theoretical status of the trait concept, (e.g., Mischel, 1968).
These research findings are quite in contrast with daily experience. The
subjective evidence for stable characteristics in the behavior of a person is very
convincing. There are plausible explanations for these suggestive but incorrect
impressions. First, the constancy that we perceive is located not so much in the
invariant behavior of the other person as in his invariant physical appearance.
Somatic aspects, such as style of movements, are embedded in the image which
we ourselves form of another person, (e.g., Argyle, 1975, p. 137). Second, there
is so much information in the behavior of others that we cannot monitor and
process it all. Traits are convenient categorizations that create a structure, even
if this exists only in the eye of the beholder (e.g., Shweder, 1982). We organize
our own reactions according to the traits we ascribe to someone. A mismatch
between trait and actual behavior rarely creates problems., If a nasty fellow
does something kind, we do not change our overall impression, but see it as an
exception ("Who ever thought he would do that!"). Third, a striking difference
has been noted between the interpretation of our own behavior and that of oth-
ers. We tend to describe our own actions in terms of the demands of the situa-
tion or our goals and intentions. It is mainly the behavior of other that we label
with trait-like consistent properties. We shall return to this attribution process
later, as it has played an important role in the conception of the present study.
Simultaneously with the rejection of the trait concept, researchers began to
attach more importance to external antecedents of behavior, i.e., determinants in
the environment. In many respects, behavior is a reaction to the situation in
which a person finds himself. Here a distinction is needed between the percep-
tion of a situation by a person (the subjective situation) and by others (the so-
called objective situation). The subjective situation is colored by previous
experiences and by personal expectations about the effects of one's own behavior.
In the perception of situations there is undoubtedly regularity, especially if we
study personality cross-culturally. A common cultural background leads to simi-
larity within cultures in the reactions to specific situations. On this point there
is no controversy, but the question is whether an observed difference can only be
generalized to a set of situations that belong together in a particular culture on
the basis of an (arbitrary) convention, or whether it reflects a trait-like difference
that will manifest itself in many divergent situations.
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Negotiators, as do all other people, interpret the behavior of others. In this
chapter we try to trace these interpretations, both at the level of traits and at
the level of more incidental events and reactions to a particular negotiation ses-
sion.
17.5. The Problem of Attribution
In psychology, the process of seeking an explanation for an act of behavior in
terms of antecedent factors is called attribution (e.g., Harvey, et aI., 1976).
Several research results have emerged, which all indicate that the human being is
not capable of carrying out an attribution process accurately (Ross, 1978).
The most important principle observed in attribution research, at least in
Western countries, is the so-called "actor-observer divergence" (Jones and Nis-
bett, 1971). It has been frequently found that actors and observers systemati-
cally differ in the attribution of an act of behavior. When an actor is asked to
describe the cause of an event, he is likely to do so in situational terms. An
observer, on the other hand, is more likely to do so in personal terms. A well-
known example to illustrate this is the car crash. While investigating a car crash
a policeman questions both the driver and a passing bystander. When asked for
an explanation, the bystander will answer that the crash was caused by driving
too fast. The driver himself, however, gives as an explanation that the road was
slippery.
It will be obvious that the above-mentioned distinction between situation
and trait explanations of personality can be conceived of as different attributions,
Le., attributions to situational factors and attributions to internal psychological
factors.
The actor-observer divergence does not hold for every situation. It is
dependent on the outcome valence of the event. When the outcome is negative,
actors and observers are likely to react in the way just described. However,
when the outcome is positive, attributions in more personal terms will be made
by actors (Jaspars and Hewstone, 1982); see Table 17.1.
Outcome
Positive Negative
Actor Personal Situational
Observer Personal Personal
Table 11.1. Actor-observer differences in attribution.
A possible explanation can be found in the notions of "egocentric motiva-
tions" and "informational perspective". The first notion states that actors are
egocentrically concerned with receiving credit for situations that have positive
consequences and avoiding blame for situations that lead to negative outcomes.
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For the actor in a negative situation, this leads to attributions to situational fac-
tors. In this way he is not responsible for the outcome. In a positive situation,
however, situational attribution makes no sensej it would deny personal credit.
Therefore, the attributions will more likely be to the person himself.
The notion of "informational perspective" accounts for the more personal
attributions of the observers. The actor knows his own behavior in many situa-
tions, and is aware of its cross-situational variability. However, the observer
may know nothing more about the actor than his behavior in a limited range of
situations. He is likely to interpret incidental behavior as typical behavior, and
make more personal attributions than the actor.
It is obvious that these findings can have important implications for the
negotiation context. During negotiations, a negotiator is an actor. Therefore,
when asked to describe the causes of the outcome of negotiations, he will respond
as an actor. In the case of a negative outcome, this is likely to result in attribu-
tions to factors outside his own person and, by extension, his own side. In the
case of success, the negotiator will be inclined to attribute cause in a more per-
sonal way. He is likely to refer to his own individual skills and to those of his
delegation.
17.6. Negotiation Issues
It is clear that there is more to the outcome of international negotiations than
cultural and individual factors. One can think of political relations between the
parties, divergence of opinions, the need for a solution, and numerous other fac-
tors. But most important, the outcome of negotiations depends on the extent to
which there is conflict or disagreement about the issues on the table.
It is frequently noted that the solution of a conflict on one or more issues is
a sine qua non of negotiations (e.g., Rubin and Brown, 1975, p. 6). Therefore, it
is hardly surprising that a large proportion of the scientific effort in negotiations
research has been devoted to issues and issue-related factors. In their overview
of the literature on bargaining effectiveness, Rubin and Brown (1975) suggest
that a distinction should be made between tangible and intangible issues. By
intangible issues, they refer to those factors that threaten bargainers with dam-
age to their honor, self-esteem, face, reputation, status, or appearance of
strength. These intangible issues can become superimposed on the tangibles, i.e.,
the problems and differences that are the actual reason for the negotiations.
It should be noted that issue-related intangibles as described can overlap
with aspects of personality, as discussed earlier. It depends on the perspective of
an observer whether the situation, or the person, or even his culture is con-
sidered as the explanatory factor. Despite the importance of the distinction
between tangibles and intangibles, between strategies and tactics, or between
abstract and concrete issues, negotiation issues are treated as a homologous
category in our research. There are two reasons for doing so. First, the boun-
daries between the categories within each distinction are difficult to capture. To
map them would require a considerable extension of this project. Second, the
210 Y. H. Poortinga and E. C. Heflll.r'ib
distinctions are not essential for our objectives - namely, to assess the contribu-
tion of cultural and individual factors to negotiation outcomes.
17.7. Method of the Proposed Project
Information on the influence of various factors on the outcome of international
negotiations can be collected from three sources. The first source is ratings by
the negotiators who participate in actual negotiation sessions and the prepara-
tions for these sessions. Negotiatiors can give an overall evaluation of the impor-
tance of the five categories. A more detailed and complete picture on the relative
importance of the five factors will emerge when for each factor a set of questions
is asked so that various aspects are covered more systematically. When this is
done both for one's own party and the other party, it is possible to check the
subject's ratings for various sources of attributions. In other words, negotiator-
as-actor and negotiator-as-obserlJer perspectives are incorporated in the design.
The second source of information consists of reports by others, i.e., external
obserlJers who had nothing to do with the negotiations. These persons differ
from negotiators in the sense that they cannot be regarded as actors. Presum-
ably they have little interest in the negotiation. Therefore, they are likely to be
less susceptible to shifts in attributions.
The third source of information consists of ratings by social scientists
(experts), who observe some specific aspect of the negotiation process on which
they possess special competence. Experts can include psychologists, linguists
and anthropologists. Their ratings are based on detailed objective analysis, as
opposed to the overall impressions, which form the basis for the opinions of
negotiators and external observers.
In the present phase of the project, the most important source of data is
ratings by participants in real negotiation sessions. They will be asked to fill in a
questionnaire. There are two kinds of questions: (1) on culture-, individual-,
and issue-related factors; and (2) on the relative influence of each of these groups
of factors on the negotiation process. The questions pertain to both one's own
side and the other party in a two-party negotiation session.
Apart from standardized items, raters will also be asked to describe
incidents that in their opinion had a critical impact on the progress of the nego-
tiations. These case materials should prove to be valuable for training in cross-
cultural communication. It may be noted that, contrary to prevailing practice,
the incidents collected in the present project can be checked against the ratings
of negotiators and experts.
Ideally, information on attributions should be collected from the negotia-
tors not only after, but also before the negotiation process. Therefore, the nego-
tiators will be asked, if possible, to fill in a questionnaire before a negotiation ses-
sion and after the negotiation session has ended.
A slightly modified questionnaire will be completed by the external
observers. They will do so on the basis of audiovisual recordings. Episodes with
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sensitive information can be deleted before the tapes are passed on to the exter-
nal observers, if necessary.
In a later phase of the project, the audiotapes and videotapes will be used
again, this time by experts. Psychologists, for instance, will direct their atten-
tion to nonverbal aspects, such as gesture. Linguists will focus on linguistic and
paralinguistic aspects, such as the length of pauses between interventions by
speakers from various cultures. Cultural communication experts will try to iden-
tify cultural antecedents of negotiations styles and strategies.
17.8. Conclusion
The outline of culture, personality, and negotiation issues in the previous sec-
tions forms the basis for the design of our project. Five categories of factors are
distinguished, namely:
• Cultural traits, i.e., broad psychological characteristics common to the
members of a culture, which "color" behavior in a wide range of situations
(e.g., cultural values).
• Cultural conventions, Le., the culture-bound aspects of behavior, lan-
guage, communication, customs, etc., which are situation-specific.
• Individual traits, Le., the psychological characteristics of an individual
delegation member, by which he distinguishes himself from other members
of his group in a wide range of situations.
• Specific reactions of individuals, i.e., reactions of an individual person
that are not seen as typical of his behavior pattern.
• Negotiation issues, Le., the problems and differences of opinion that are
the actual reason for the negotiations, as well as the ways in which issues
are handled to reach agreement, Le., strategies and tactics.
The groups of factors are seen as important antecedents to which success
and failure of international negotiations can be attributed. The central question
we address is: What is the influence of each of the five categories on the outcome
of international negotiations? To answer this question we shall make use of
questionnaires as well as observations. Apart from participants in actual nego-
tiations, relevant data will be gained from external observers and from social
scientists who have expertise in the assessment of specific aspects of behavior.
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CHAPTER 18
New Political Thinking and
International Negotiations
Sergey L. Kambalov
Diplomatic Academy
USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Moscow,
USSR
18.1. Introduction
The two central premises of the new political thinking are the concept of an
integral, interdependent world, and the indivisibility of security. These ideas
were recently developed into a practical policy with the formulation by the 27th
Congress of the CPSU of the idea of a comprehensive system of international
security.
Naturally, this is a concept yet to be introduced effectively into world poli-
tics. The idea of a comprehensive system is only at the very beginning of its
difficult journey toward actual implementation in specific agreements and joint
actions to create a safer and more stable world, and to build a system of mutu-
ally beneficial cooperation in many different fields. New political thinking is not
an ad hoc adjustment, or correction of policy, but a new methodology for the
conduct of international affairs.
International negotiations necessarily play a major, integral role in the
implementation of the new political thinking on at least two counts. First, prac-
tically speaking, there is no other method to translate the idea of new political
thinking into real practice of international politics. Certainly, unilateral actions
can sometimes be really important. They could provide a decisive positive
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impetus necessary to make a radical breakthrough in seemingly deadlocked situa-
tions. But it is solely through an advanced system of international negotiations
that a meaningful movement toward a universally acceptable solution of world
problems can be assured and the results of this movement solidified in substan-
tial and durable agreements.
Secondly, international negotiations are closely connected with the new pol-
itical thinking because, to be effective in a changing world situation, interna-
tional negotiations must proceed from new premises. Indeed, if the principles of
interdependence of interests of the members of the international community and
of the integral character of security are ignored, if there is an attempt to put
pressure - be it political, economic, or military - on a party in a negotiation,
an agreement secured in such a way is prone to create more problems than it
solves.
Similarly, an attempt to "solve" a problem taken in isolation out of the
context of its environment could be truly successful only if that solution is clearly
understood to be merely a stage or an element in a larger process of dealing with
the entire complex of related problems.
The process of implementation of the new political thinking in world poli-
tics is certain to influence the way international negotiations are conceived,
prepared and conducted. Let us suggest just a few of probable consequences and
demands.
18.2. Developing a Hierarchy of International Problems
The great number and variety of international negotiations undertaken in recent
years (and their modest success so far) naturally create a desire to concentrate
special efforts on vital problems that must be handled without delay. In other
words, one is tempted to develop a hierarchy of problems to be solved through
international negotiations.
Some experts doubt the wisdom of this approach and prefer to stress
another feature of the emerging system of international negotiations - the inter-
dependence or interrelatedness of subjects. Indeed, sometimes we come across
unexpected, even paradoxical connections between seemingly independent
processes. Therefore, the temptation to include any negotiation - even on a
subject of "tertiary" importance - is quite strong for a scholar who dislikes leav-
ing outside of the framework of his scheme even minor components of a process.
But both common sense and the scholarly analysis of problems facing humanity
demand that we develop a hierarchy of those problems. The criterion to be used
is an assessment of the potential of a problem seriously to affect the interests of
humanity on a global scale. By this criterion problems of security and survival
- to which the new political thinking is specifically addressed - necessarily take
the top place in the hierarchy.
The purpose of developing such an hierarchy is to create an environment in
which a possible failure of a negotiation on a subject of "lower" importance is
less likely to have an adverse effect on negotiations of a higher standing in this
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hierarchy. But a necessary precondition for such a safety mechanism is the
acceptance by the negotiating sides of the proposed hierarchy of subjects of
international negotiations. Otherwise a search for agreement on substantive
issues could be burdened - or even displaced - by differences about the rela-
tive importance of this or that problem. Examples of trouble with exactly this
kind of differences in the past are well known.
The task of developing a universally acceptable hierarchy is a very compli-
cated one. Suffice it to say that the very notion of, for example, rational or irra-
tional is intimately bound up with the speCific cultural heritage of various people,
different political cultures, traditions and many other things. To find a common
denominator is quite a problem.
Nevertheless, it seems imperative that agreement be reached on determin-
ing a number of issues that are of overriding, global importance and that certain
corrections in the approaches to these issues be made. National and group
interests - not to mention demands of internal politics - should be unequivo-
cally subordinated to the task of finding a solution to the grave problems facing
humanity. We believe the USSR has provided a good example of such a re-
evaluation of its approach to international issues in the spirit of responsibility,
realism and the supremacy of interests of mankind.
18.3. Cooperation and Interdependence
The priority given to problems of security and survival should not be construed
as suggesting that other issues are not worthy of dedicated and urgent attention.
On the contrary, the experience of the 19708 and 19808 shows quite clearly that,
if major agreements are to be realized, they should be based on a solid founda-
tion of contacts, cooperation and accords in many different spheres of interna-
tional relations - trade, humanitarian issues, sports, information, and other
areas. These positive processes create an environment where agreements on
major issues are accepted as something natural, understandable and reasonable
and therefore can be implemented comparatively easily. On the other hand,
even a major breakthrough in negotiations on a vital issue is often viewed with
suspicion, if it occurs against a background of disruption of contacts and curtail-
ment of cooperation.
Cooperation in various spheres is immensely important by itself. More-
over, it should be the bedrock or material foundation of healthy political rela-
tions. Yet, it is quite clear that such a positive political effect will not material-
ize automatically. Experience shows that neither trade, however large the
volume, nor cultural ties, nor extensive cooperation in other spheres can provide
a solid guarantee of stability and positive development of political relations. We
know that there were cases when problems of trade developed into a cause of
worsening political relations. In other words, cooperation in many different
fields is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
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It seems that for cooperation to be politically effective it has to have certain
qualitative characteristics. Among them are stability, a large number of partici-
pants, and actual and perceived mutual benefits. The whole process is of a
cumulative character, and its real political effectiveness appears only at a certain
stage of its maturity.
Interdependence, the interrelation of constituent elements of the system of
international negotiations, should not in any way result in a situation where the
failure or delay of a certain negotiation - however important its subject -
affects negatively other negotiations. IT we allow this to happen, the scale of a
setback would seriously overshadow the initial problem, because it could a slow
down (or even reverse) the process of building a general foundation, as men-
tioned above.
18.4. Confidentiality versus Openness
A problem we should examine thoroughly is the ratio of confidentiality and open-
ness in international negotiations. On the one hand diplomacy in general and
international negotiations in particular are simply impossible without reasonable
confidentiality. Confidentiality is a certain insulation against the temptation to
use negotiations for a side's own narrow political purposes. Unfortunately, this
is exactly what often happens. The demands of internal politics dictate that
negotiations and their results be publicly presented as a "victory" over the
opponent. This naturally provokes the other side to issue publicly an indignant
denial. The consequences for negotiations on the real substance can often be
negative and unfortunate.
But the other extreme situation in a negotiation, when the positions of the
sides or even the very fact of ongoing contacts is being kept secret, may be no
less counterproductive. If negotiations do not result in an agreement, an unex-
pected announcement that negotiations took place - and brought no results -
can only increase distrust, suspicion and skepticism.
Again, the unexpected announcement of successful negotiations is usually
greeted at first by a chorus of congratulations and a general expression of satis-
faction. But very soon critical, skeptical commentaries start to multiply.
Doubts are expressed as to the effect of the agreement on national interests.
Procedural violations (no adequate prior consultations with relevant bodies) are
alleged, and so on. As a result, to strengthen the agreement (sometimes to save
it) a hastily thrown together campaign of public education is introduced to
explain the motives for agreement, its advantages over possible alternatives, etc.
But it is always easier to educate than to re-educate.
Is there a way out of this contradiction? We believe we should clearly dis-
tinguish two things: negotiation contents and negotiation subjects. In the first
case we have in mind such things as positions of the sides in a negotiation, their
tactics, etc. Here a healthy amount of confidentiality is vital and unavoidable.
In the second case it seems prudent and useful to have as wide a discussion of
substantive issues as possible to develop various promising approaches and
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points of view in order to take into consideration everything meaningful and to
weed out the rest.
18.5. Conclusion
The issues mentioned above are but a small fragment of a complex of problems
facing negotiators today. We believe that many of these problems can only be
dealt with on the premises of the new political thinking. That, in its turn, leads
to the need for continuous and dedicated education - and re-education - of
those engaged in the negotiations process directly or otherwise. Here the role of
education and training establishments, such as diplomatic academies and insti-
tutes, is crucial.

CHAPTER 19
The Role of Forecasting
International Relations in the
Process of International Negotiations
Plamen Pantev
Institute 0/ International Relations
and Socialist Integration
Sofia
Bulgaria
19.1. New Needs for Regulating the International System
A crucial problem faces more than 160 countries of the world: will the states at
the end of the twentieth century be able to shape their own national interests in
such a way that the traditional conflict of these interests is peacefully
transformed into an interaction manageable by all sovereign states in the common
interest and on the principle of equal rights o/states?
The volume of international relations managed on a coordinated basis is
rising and the mechanism for coordination of the positions of different subjects of
international law and international relations is becoming more complex and
varied. A typical example is the number and importance of international organi-
zations and treaties. At the same time, any attempt or claim to neglect the
sovereignty of a particular state bears grave risks for peace and security.
A very useful means of management in the international system is contem-
porary international law. It guarantees the most effective and peaceful function-
ing of the global system of international relations, preservation and respect for
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the sovereign rights of each state and the coordinated management of the sys-
tem.
In the sphere of regulation of international relations two tendencies dialecti-
cally counteract: the objective increase in the need for regulating international
relations through contemporary international law, on the one hand, and the
intensification of the attempts to put international law aside and to legalize the
threat or use of force as a dominant regulator, on the other hand.
Based on the common interests of mankind there arises the need for stable
management of international relations and for greater predictability of the foreign
policy behavior of states and of the international system. A better perspective is
needed in all spheres of human and social activity to avoid any situation that
endangers the existence of society, and to improve the conditions of its develop-
ment.
International negotiations are no exception. On the contrary, they are a
specific instrument for solV1·ng or managing different problems of international
relations. They have an increasing importance in the functioning and develop-
ment of the international sl/stem.
The effectiveness of this instrument for regulating the system of interna-
tional relations greatly depends on the hierarchl/ of national foreign policl/ priori-
ties embodied in the negotiating positions of states. The more that narrow
national interests can be subordinated to common interests of mankind, the
greater the possibility of effective negotiations. And vice versa: any declaration
or claiming of "spheres of influence" or "spheres of vital interests" over terri-
tories, areas or space outside those of national jurisdiction of states do not bring
about successful management of problems through international negotiations.
Every country involved in international negotiations tries to implement its
own negotiating position as much as possible, thus realizing its foreign policy
interests, purposes and principles. The effectiveness of any negotiation depends
on the compromising character of the attitudes of the partners, Le., each side
must be sure that it is profiting, although it drops voluntarily some of its initial
positions for the sake of common interests of mankind or of some legitimate
interest of the partner.
International negotiations would be more effective if the necessity of a com-
mon purpose of the global sl/stem of international relations - the construction of
a peaceful, demilitarized world - is realized and accepted. A more secure and
predictable future for every state is an objective need of the international system
nowadays. That need requires new political consciousness and behavior in inter-
national relations. "The new political thinking is called upon to raise civilization
to a qualitatively m,w point. Even only for that it is not a single correction of
the position but a methodology of conducting international affairs" (Gorbachev,
1987).
When the principles and norms of international law and common interests
of mankind are considered as a main source of the negotiating position of state
A, the uncertainty of the future foreign policy of that state is greatly diminished
for the forecasting of state B. As Karl Deutsch (1971) noted, the main task of
law is to make life more predictable. Therefore, the predictability of the foreign
policy of a state and of its negotiating behavior increases if its guiding principles
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and purposes, its acts and results, are based on international law and the con-
cept of peaceful coexistence of states. Thus, international negotiations them-
selves can reflect and enhance predictability in international relations.
19.2. National and International Forecasting
of International Relations
The problems and tendencies discussed in the first section raise some questions
concerning the necessity of new approaches and a new pace for international
negotiations and the enrichment of the forms of national and international
research to aid the international political process. The problems of national and
international forecasting of international relations may provide a chance to
analyze the process of international negotiations from a new viewpoint and to
bring some new ideas to research on international negotiations.
10.2.1. National forecasting
The forecasting of international relations in a state has many and different aims
with respect to its negotiating position. One of them may be to enrich the
options for the negotiating position and to prepare a more flexible transition
from one to another when conditions change. A second aim may be to study
possible combinations of interactions of positions of the negotiating partners and
the potential results. A third aim might be to anticipate the consequences of
different possible outcomes of a negotiation. Discerning and studying the com-
mon interests of the negotiating states may also be an objective for the forecas-
ters.
Another aim could be the study of the internal and external political condi-
tions during the time of the negotiations. This aspect of national forecasting is
important because it may throw light on the problem of the ability of the states
participating in the negotiations to manage the political processes inside their own
countries so that a consensus is reached for constructive outcome of the negotia-
tions. Garthoff (1977) wrote about his experience as a SALT negotiator:
"Nowhere more clearly or frequently than in SALT have internal governmental
differences asserted and reasserted themselves and shaped and reshaped our
negotiating approaches and objectives in a way which undercuts and greatly
complicates pursuit of a consistent and effective negotiating strategy toward the
Soviet Union".
National political forecasting, as already mentioned, plays an important
role in the preparatory activity for international negotiations - forming the
positions of the delegation, working on the final document, etc. In the process of
the forecasting study, the possibilities and probabilities of realization of different
political tendencies are revealed. In that context an important question is the
type of regulating factors of the forecast.
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Such a methodological position has a great practical value. Forecasts in
the social sphere have a normative character and the so-called "effect of the fore-
cast" or "self-fulfillment of the forecast" is that political decision-makers carry
out their activity by fulfilling (or by preventing the fulfillment of) the forecast.
A question arises during the formation of the negotiating position of a
state: must the forecast of international relations comply with the requirements of
international law or not? There are at least two scientific arguments and one
legal argument in favor of the obligatory compliance of any foreign policy fore-
cast with the principles and norms of international law.
First, any human activity is an instrument in the process of acquiring
knowledge of the world we live in. International law is no different and a fore-
casting study should take this into account. Furthermore, international law pro-
vides not only knowledge of the effectiveness of a managing instrument, but also
of the readiness of a state to use peaceful means in settling its relations with
other states. Second, international law has demonstrated in the last thirty-five
centuries that it has a specific position and role in international relations and the
tendency is that the importance of international law is growing. A forecast,
intending to be scientific, should consider that fact, too.
The legal argument is that a forecasting procedure in the process of con-
structing the negotiating position of a state ends with a forecasting document
having an official character. Its estimates are taken into consideration when
planning the negotiating strategy and building the negotiating stance. All this
activity is carried out by responsible state officials and agencies or by other peo-
ple and institutions in the state. State activities and political forecasting should
also serve the goal of implementing a state's international obligations according
to international law.
19.2.2. International forecasting
More national and international research efforts are needed to help in coping
with many important and complex problems, such as the global problems facing
all countries, the identification of the common interests of mankind, the need for
coordinated management of international affairs (international law having a spe-
cial role), the reality of an interrelated and interdependent world, the generally
increasing role of international institutions in the process of national political
decision-making and the urgency for greater efficiency in international negotia-
tions. Both international negotiations and international forecasting are tools in
the process of managing of the global international system.
International forecasting of international relations should be differentiated
from the international consultations and discussions of scientists and diplomats,
organized by research institutes. It differs from the participation of experts in
governmental delegations as members or advisers, including at the United
Nations and other international organizations and conferences. It is different
from the representation of a government in a specialized international organiza-
tion or conference and from specific scientific and technical negotiations, whose
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objective is to carry out a technical study as a part of important political nego-
tiations.
International forecasting of international relations may use the experience
of all these forms of expert participation in assisting the international political
process, as well as particular specialists who are needed for a specific forecasting
research corresponding to the object of the negotiations. International forecast-
ing for the purposes of international negotiations may be organized on a per-
manent or an ad hoc basis both within and outside the framework of an interna-
tional organization.
Alexander Szalai (1978), a supporter of the idea of the necessity of forecast-
ing of a systematic and methodical character in international organizations, espe-
cially in the United Nations, sees its major importance "in adding a new dimen-
sion to policy making, planning, and administration by enforcing a conscious and
systematic consideration of a wide array of probabilities, alternatives, and pros-
pectives" , Le., as a significant source of orientation of national planning.
The practical importance of international forecasting of international rela-
tions in the process of international negotiations lies also in the possibility for the
negotiating sides to set coordinated objectives for the forecasting team, composed
of representatives of the negotiating states as well as specialists from other coun-
tries, if the negotiating governments agree on that. Such tasks, which are
significant for the constructive preparation of the negotiations, may include the
study of the various aspects of the problems of the negotiations in relation to the
potential common interests of the negotiating states and to common interests of
mankind, as well as the possibility and variants of common purposes, objectives
and positions in the process of negotiations.
There are certain requirements to which international forecasting for inter-
national negotiations should respond. Possible disagreements (about the topic
and title of the forecast, its structure, methods, level of scientific expertise, etc.)
should not turn into ideological and political polemics.
It is also necessary to follow the rules of scientific discourse, whose primary
obligation is not to falsify facts. Governments should aim to give political
instructions that do not contradict the interests of the political, economic, mili-
tary, ecological and ethological security of mankind, the negotiating partners and
other states. Further, no international forecasting forum should be used as a
maneuver to divert the attention of public opinion from the core of the problems
of the study, or to carry away the accent from the real negotiations to the fore-
casting research by the negotiating states.
Szalai (1978) expresses some doubts about the range of issues that member
states of an international organization would agree to discuss in a forecast study,
especially those in the spheres of peace, security and sovereignty, i.e., topics at
the heart of international politics. At the same time, he provides arguments for
the possibility and necessity of such forecasts, deriving these arguments from
Articles I and XIV of the Charter of the United Nations.
Another very important argument in that direction can be added. In the
agreement reached at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the member states of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe obligate themselves to
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exchange annual plans of certain types of military activity as well as other infor-
mation on security matters. Hence, taboos of discussing some delicate security
issues might be lifted - in proportion to the political good will of building
confidence among states with different political and social systems and to the
real progress in arms limitation and reduction. The realization of the Stockholm
Conference accords may serve as a test case, which, if successful, would lead to
more radical measures in the confidence-building area of the CSCE countries.
19.3. Implications for the Education and Training of
International Negotiators
Some ideas concerning the required skills of international negotiators arise from
the problems discussed in Sections 19.1 and 19.2:
To be able to view international negotiations as an instrument of managing
the international system through managing its subsystems and concrete
international relations.
To try to realize the great responsibility of policymakers and international
negotiators for the common interests of mankind, and to cultivate a com-
mon purpose for the global international system - namely, the construc-
tion of a peaceful world based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.
To be able to evaluate all problems of negotiations in terms of the criteria
of international law.
To be able to place the common interests of mankind above narrow group
or national interests.
To be able to balance all regulating factors of international relations when
forecasting international development, not overestimating the
military-technical ones nor underestimating the political and legal ones.
National forecasting activity as well as the forecast document should be in
compliance with international law.
To participate competently and constructively in international forecasting
studies of international relations.
A preliminary discussion might be carried out to outline the objectives and
content of a training program for international negotiators in connection with
the development of these skills.
19.4. Conclusions
National and international forecasting of international relations may become a
very useful instrument in the process of international negotiations, if carefully
organized and subordinated to the constructive development and outcome of the
negotiating process. Its major significance lies in the opportunity to use the
The Role 0/ Forecamng International Relatioru in the Procell 0/ International Negotiatioru 225
results of the forecast study directly or indirectly in the process of international
negotiations, thus combining the efforts of theory and practice in that field.
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20.1. Introduction
In the past, states sought to protect or implement their political objectives
abroad, i.e., their interests toward other states, chiefly in two ways: by using or
threatening to use military force, or by means of diplomatic negotiations. In any
case, diplomacy got the shorter end of the stick. It was needed, above all, when-
ever the point was
To gain the time needed for establishing military superiority
To frame coalitions that promised to be successful in a military conflict
To make maximum use of a military success through conquest of land, war
indemnities, or any other increase in power, and to prevent the enemy as
long as possible from regaining his strength
Or, in case of a defeat, to keep losses within tolerable limits and to set the
stage for a new round in the trial of military strength.
At the present time, military force has ceased to be a means of achieving
national interests abroad, owing to the destructive power of weapons, especially
nuclear and chemical ones, and the resulting vulnerability of our planet and the
danger of mankind's annihilation. Thus, war has ceased to be a way of
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continuing policy by other means, and there remains the difficult art of living
together in peace, regardless of all differences in world outlook, social systems,
race or religion. Relations of peaceful coexistence have become the only way pos-
sible for states to live together.
In these conditions international negotiations, Le., the discussion of the
modalities of interstate cooperation with all parties concerned, and the agree-
ment on these modalities with the sovereignty of all states preserved, as well as
the settlement of existing problems on a basis of mutual understanding, have
become the most important or, what is more, the only applicable means of pro-
tecting the interests of states and of conducting their international relations.
Disputes, too, can no longer be settled by power politics and unilateral actions of
states but only by negotiations, which have become the only reasonable alterna-
tive to the use of power and to the policy of confrontation. If they are taken as a
permanent, systematic process they will secure the peaceful functioning of inter-
national relations.
In view of the importance of international negotiations to the survival of
mankind, it is necessary to develop the art of negotiating, to reach an under-
standing on the priorities of, and preconditions for, successful negotiating and to
design a mechanism that helps promote cooperation, peaceful competition and
the peaceful solution of controversial issues.
20.2. The Relationship between Interests and
Readiness to Negotiate
The success of international negotiations is determined by the political will of the
parties to reach a mutually acceptable result. Lack of will cannot be replaced or
compensated for by any negotiating technique, neither by diplomatic cleverness,
nor the use of negotiations support systems and computer aids. As all states
first of all proceed from their own interests, governments will only agree to con-
duct negotiations if they
Consider the solution of a certain question to be necessary in their own
interest, and
Recognize the principle that there is no possible solution except by coming
to a mutual understanding, which can only be attained through negotia-
tion.
A novel development in our time is that the interdependence of states has
increased greatly. Mankind has begun to regard itself as one and to become
aware of the regional and global interrelations not only between peoples and
states, but also between man, society, and nature. The tendency is that this will
lead to an increasing interest in negotiations and in substantial results. The
common interest in mutually acceptable negotiation results includes issues relat-
ing to security, environmental protection, prevention of disasters and accidents,
combating diseases and epidemics, and securing energy and food supplies. These
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and many more tasks confronting mankind cannot be solved on a unilateral basis
any longer, but only jointly. The tendency will increase to reach solutions by
mutual understanding, and this in turn will increase still further the importance
of international negotiations.
20.3. The Relationship between a State's Self-Interest and
Legitimate Interests of Its Negotiating Partners
For a state to conduct negotiations with an eye to reaching practical results
means that it must not place its own interests above international law or above
the common interest and that it must recognize that the other sides, too, have
legitimate interests. The starting point for any search for a negotiated solution
will be to define the legitimate interests of each side with mutual respect. On
this basis alone it is possible to reach a positive negotiation result, Le., to agree
by mutual consent on either
The exchange of equal benefits in the political or any other field, observing
the importance of the principle of reciprocity and mutual give and take, or
A settlement of interests on the basis of mutual concessions.
States with diverging interests can cooperate only if they are ready, on a
reciprocal basis, to arrive at a balanced compromise, which should take into
account the interests of all parties concerned in a fair and well-balanced way and
lead to mutual advantage, and not be directed against the legitimate interests of
any side. Negotiations must not be linked with demands in the form of an
ultimatum. Making preconditions is as inadmissible as the presentation of
accomplished facts. Negotiations must be conducted with the aim of reaching an
understanding that preserves in the future the principle of sovereign equality and
equality of rights between states, rather than with the aim of establishing a new
winner-loser relationship.
20.4. The Relationship between a State's Security
and the Security Interests of Other States
Because of the destructive nuclear potential that exists, all states have an objec-
tive interest in negotiations to preserve peace, prevent nuclear war and foster
arms limitation that maintains and enhances international security. This com-
mon interest is a major basis for the chance of success.
To turn this objective interest into agreements under international law, it
is necessary to recognize the fact that in our time there can be no unilateral secu-
rity. It is impossible to base the security of one state on the lack of security of
others. There must thus be a recognition of the legitimate security interests of
others.
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20.6. Creating an Atmosphere of Trust and Dialogue
H. Grunert
Lack of mutual trust is one of the main obstacles to successful negotiations.
Confidence cannot be created either by decree or by mutual agreement.
Confidence can only develop in an atmosphere of cooperation, and this presup-
poses result-oriented negotiations in the interest of the peaceful functioning of
the system of international relations. The most important method of promoting
confidence, thus facilitating negotiations and making them a success, is political
dialogue - indeed, this is a method acceptable to everyone. By a policy of dialo-
gue the German Democratic Republic means the holding of meetings of high-
ranking and top-ranking state representatives, which, leaving aside accidental
and other short-term considerations, would be aimed at
Stating one's own position, explaining one's aims in foreign policy and stat-
ing the reasons for it
Conducting an exchange of views and information, thus clarifying the
partner's aims and intentions
Better understanding the partners' behavior and the motives for their
actions
Making the actions of both partners more predictable
Clearing the way for an understanding or agreements on a compromise
basis
Preventing friction or tension, even if no mutually agreed solutions are
arrived at.
This will be possible if the dialogue
Succeeds in making clear and delineating the positions
Leads to a reaffirmation of the principle of the peaceful settlement of
disputes
Promotes the continued search for promising starting points to reach a set-
tlement on a compromise basis that is in the interests of each side
Confirms the necessity of peaceful coexistence and of cooperation in terms
of international norms.
PART IV
Theoretical Foundations and
Methods of Analysis - 1

CHAPTER 21
International Negotiation:
A Process Worthy of Reexamination
Marcel Merle
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Universiti de Paris-Sorbonne
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21.1. Introduction
If one were to lIBsign a rung on the scale of values to every concept of interna-
tional vocabulary, negotiation would have a prominent position among the terms
lIBsigned a positive connotation. On the scale permanently fluctuating between
war and peace, it would be located on the right side of the beam, at lellBt at first
glance lIB a substitute, if not an alternative, to the use of force. There is no
doubt that better procedures exist to ensure understanding among nations.
However, arbitration or international adjudication are more difficult to apply in
that they require prior consent of the parties concerned, while the realm of neg~
tiation knows no formal conditions of access, nor any limits in time or space.
The preference for negotiation by all those concerned with preventing or settling
conflicts is hence bllBed on a long and solid experience. This also explains the
concern with studying the mechanism of negotiation, to improve its use and
increllBe its capabilities.
It is not surprising, then, that one turns to game theory. This allows one
to formalize different cllBe studies that actually occur and provides actors with a
minimum of training necessary to exploit fully the techniques, which are usually
sophisticated. Quantification introduces stringency in a field where intuition hllB
often dominated. It also helps one to control accurately the results obtained.
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Without underestimating the importance of such a procedure, the observer
well acquainted with the empirical data is led to question the limits of this
approach. To obtain significant findings, game theory assumes that the protag-
onists face each other in a duel. Throughout the process, which can be measured
precisely from beginning to end, each party maintains control over all the ele-
ments that make up the problem to be solved: identification of the stakes; and
cost and risk analyses inherent in all possible solutions. The ideal model for this
confrontation is provided by a game of chess during which two players are
engaged in a singular struggle under the eye of a watchful, though silent and
inert public. Yet, every actual negotiation, including, of course, international
negotiation, takes place in a context that tends to influence the behavior of the
players (when it does not perturb the development of their strategy). All the
parameters included in this environment must be reintegrated into the analysis,
if one expects to understand the true mechanism of negotiation.
One comes to realize that the role of negotiation is less in clearing the way
for compromise between two competing logics than in providing the place and
time in which multiple contradictory claims of an undetermined number of
actors compete with one another.
21.2. Nature of Negotiation
The first observation deals with the simplistic nature of the distinction between
what De Martens (1831) called "amicable negotiation" and "assault", or to use
the more figurative terms of Abbot de Pradt (1815), the opposition between "the
sword" and "reason". Unfortunately, common sense reinforces the etymology
that gives negotiation (as for commerce or business) the sense of a peaceful
activity, based on the search for and advantageous compromise among honorable
interests. Are not the terms of "bargaining" among those concerned, or of
"brokers" for third parties, associated with that of negotiation? Common sense
is unfortunately mistaken, just as is the vox populi, when it clamors for "negotia-
tion" to resolve a diplomatic or social deadlock.
It is a mistake to think that negotiation can always be a substitute or an
alternative to the use of force. In some cases, and unfortunately there are many,
it can only sanction the existence of a power struggle in which one of the parties
finds itself able to dictate its resolve over the other. When Chamberlain and
Daladier signed the Munich Agreement in September 1938, they were merely
bending before a force higher than their own. In this case, it would be preferable
to speak of capitulation. Once one admits that "not everything is negotiable"
(the principle beyond which no value's security can be saved), one is delimiting a
space inside of which the conclusion of an agreement can do nothing more than
ratify what has been or is being carried out.
Even when the power struggle is not simply masking a simple abdication,
force or the threat of force is rarely absent from negotiation. Machiavelli mocked
the "disarmed prophets". Abbot Mably (1757) acknowledged that "virtue,
stripped of force, reveals its own weakness" and that "a state which only defends
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itself against its powerful neighbors with justice and moderation will be defeated
sooner or later". Blackmail, implicit or explicit, is hence always capable of falsi-
fying the development or end of a negotiation once the shadow of force spreads
over it. In any case, the two protagonists hardly ever go to the negotiating table
on an equal basis, in contrast to chess players who start out with the same pieces
placed on the board in identical fashion.
To conclude on this first point, every analysis of a negotiation must take
into consideration the state of the existing power struggle. All the means of
pressure that both protagonists can use against each other must be considered:
weapons, economic potential, geopolitical configuration, state of domestic public
opinion, etc. Each means of pressure must be evaluated in light of the goal of
the negotiation (military, political, economic, cultural, etc.) without, however,
neglecting the possibilities of interaction among the different variables.
21.3. The Actor in Negotiations
The second observation seeks to clarify the position of the actor in negotiations.
Classical terminology, in reflecting ancient and outdated practices, can contri-
bute to putting people off the track. In diplomatic vocabulary, a negotiator can
only commit the state authorities he represents if he is entrusted with "full
powers" (plenipotentiary). Legal formality is necessary here as a guaranty sine
qua non of respect for the will of the parties present. However, the legal status
does not always cover the political reality. The granting or the exercise of "full
power" (as when a negotiation is carried out "at the summit", e.g., between
heads of state or governments) seems to suggest that the negotiator has every
latitude to engage the battle with his protagonist. Clearly, every wise statesman
or diplomat is well aware beforehand that his margin of maneuver is restricted
by a series of constraints that are set by domestic conditions and by the amount
and strength of the support that can be expected from his allies. He must use all
his insight to detect the margin of maneuver of his protagonist in order to most
accurately define the grounds for an understanding.
Nevertheless, the confrontation that culminates in negotiations cannot be
reduced to a duel wherein each one moves as he pleases in relation to the
assumed reactions of the adversary. This might have been the case under exceJr
tional circumstances, whereby two men face to face had the capacity to deter-
mine the fate of nations (or at least that of their fellow countrymen), by virtue of
their sole and unique free will. This level of effectiveness is uncertain even for an
absolute monarchy. Cardinal Dubois, Foreign Affairs Minister under Louis XV
noted in his memoirs: "I always found it harder to negotiate with my own Court
than with foreign Courts".
Today it is widely accepted that the domestic political scene projects its
shadow over areas that once were the province of diplomatic sparring. Henry
Kissinger (1979) shed light on the fact that every negotiator must simultaneously
struggle on two fronts, domestic and foreign. On the subject of the Paris negtr
tiations over the conclusion of the Vietnam War, he wrote, "During this time,
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Hanoi stayed out of the fray, coldly observing how the US negotiated, not with
her adversary but with herself". This assertion can be verified by the naked eye
in the case of democracies, where foreign policy is rarely carried out in secrecy
and is thrice controlled: by parliament, public opinion and mass media. In the
case of authoritarian countries, the existence of a domestic debate does not
always appear as clearly. However, the split between "hawks" and "doves", the
army and the party, and rival bureaucracies may nonetheless paralyze the nego-
tiator who is active on the international scene.
When domestic pressures are clearly present before the start of a negotia-
tion, the negotiator must attempt to insert them into his calculations. This will
help facilitate his evaluation of his margin of maneuver. However, when the
domestic pressures arise during the negotiations (as we have seen during the
East-West disarmament talks or on the fixing of European farm prices), the
negotiator must be careful to maintain a balance between the concessions that
must be made to his foreign protagonists and the reactions these concessions can
provoke within his own country. President Wilson had neglected this elementary
precaution when he participated in the Treaty of Versailles and the League of
Nations. The Senate's repudiation, which followed, set the United States back
into an extended period of isolationism that unbalanced the international system
between the two world wars. When a French agriculture minister agrees to a
level of farm prices with his European counterparts, he knows (or should know)
that he must offer compensation to the French farm sectors most affected by the
revenue losses arising from the EEC tariffs.
The negotiator today is hence a Janus, a two-faced person, who must con-
stantly maneuver with one eye on his foreign counterpart and the other on the
domestic scene. The image of dialogue could still be considered an appropriate
term for negotiations, provided that this dialogue takes place permanently on
two levels: between states and within states. H one fails to keep this particular
characteristic in mind, one can understand nothing about the "diplomatic"
aspect of negotiation. Some negotiators refuse to take a reasonable risk in their
discussions with their counterparts so as not to stir up problems on the domestic
fro~t, to avoid weakening their electoral position. Others are encouraged to mul-
tiply the number of spectacular concessions to stir up trouble in the ranks of the
enemy camp over the heads of their partners at the negotiating table. The
countless events of the disarmament negotiations (including the failure of the
Reykjavik summit) are examples of both kinds of cases.
Contrary to the binary outline, induced by game theory, it is not two
rationalities that confront each other in the framework of international negotia-
tion, but two forces. Each one obeys a double rationality: maximize one's
chances and minimize one's losses simultaneously, on two different checker-
boards - that of the international power struggle and that of the domestic
struggle [1]. In this difficult exercise, every error in calculation can be fatal for
the one who makes it. When General De Gaulle negotiated Algeria's indepen-
dence with the FLN, he knew that the major risk involved was to provoke the
outbreak of a civil war in France. The maneuver that allowed him to achieve his
double goal, after four years of efforts under particularly difficult circumstances,
can be considered a model of "negotiation". In spite of noteworthy efforts to
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correct the mistakes of their predecessors, the Nixon-Kissinger team did not
manage to find an honorable way out of the Vietnam quagmire (the loss of South
Vietnam and the discrediting of the presidency). However, General De Gaulle,
no doubt carried away by a striking series of diplomatic successes, neglected to
cover the "domestic front" and to keep close enough watch on the management
of domestic problems. In 1968 he was forced to face a protest movement, which
greatly shook his international prestige, right up to the end of his mandate.
Under these conditions, is it possible to continue treating negotiation as a
confrontation between two players free to play out their own hands and able to
assume all the risks with full knowledge of all the facts? A positive reply would
only be conceivable if one were dealing with perfectly homogeneous rival camps
("speaking in unison", to use the legal expression), or with exceptionally organ-
ized minds able to master all the facts of the game, as well as to anticipate all
the reactions of both their multiple partners and their adversaries. These two
possibilities seem all the more unlikely today in that the debate on two fronts
puts the negotiator under pressure from the subnational actors whose random
behavior grows with their number. International competition over the control of
telecommunications, which has already been going on for several years and
which has not yet been settled, is a good example of the inextricable confusion
among national ambitions, cultural stakes, industrial interests, financial specula-
tion and bureaucratic rivalries.
One arrives at the ultimate case where the traditional divisions
(public/private, internal/external; technical/economic/political) become blurred
to such an extent that they cloud the issue and block every attempt at a one-
dimensional interpretation. There is no longer one negotiation in a linear
fashion, but several negotiations developing simultaneously, which are linked.
Their end result (should there be one) will not be the whole of all the partial
results reached during the previous phases. Yet, a situation of this type is not,
or is no longer, unusual in that the goal of negotiations is oriented more and
more toward solving problems that integrate dimensions (technical, industrial,
financial, cultural) which do not come under diplomacy in the traditional and
narrow meaning of the term. Have not the methods of observation and analysis
that served to decipher the behavior of past great statesmen (Talleyrand, Met-
ternich, Bismark, Delcasse, etc.) become obsolete? Should the task of modern-
day researchers not be to invent new methods of investigation adapted to a pro-
tean negotiation? (cf. Merle, 1980).
21.4:. Changes in the Dimensions of Negotiations
The third observation tends to emphasize the importance of changes that have
occurred in the dimensions of negotiation. Once again, we run the risk of becom-
ing victims of a model that deals with forms which are disappearing. Tradition
has given us two models: the face-to-face situation between two states and the
multilateral conference. In both cases negotiation represented an episode that
was specific and easy to define, because it was structured according to an
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unchangeable scenario: preparation, the actual talks and the conclusion (positive
or negative). However, both procedures, bilateral and multilateral, usually
remained separated in time and space. Of course, occasionally there were excep-
tions, e.g., when an international conference was used as a framework for a side
settlement of a bilateral conflict. However, as a general rule, congresses or
conferences had a collective mission to carry out, whereas bilateral negotiations
were supposed to settle a specific problem between two concerned states.
Yet, these distinctions no longer relate to present-day practice. Even if the
classical modalities of negotiation have survived (ad hoc, tete-a-tete), negotiation
has become a permanent, continuous and universal instrument of international
relations today.
From this moment on, limits in time no longer have significant meaning.
Discussion of the leading international problems (disarmament, the North-South
dialogue) are constantly on the agenda. Their development follows a continuous
course, marked by ups and downs; yet no episode can be considered as decisive,
not to say definitive. Within the framework of GATT, commercial negotiations
have hardly ever been interrupted from one round to another. The continuity of
negotiation has certainly been favored by the activity of international organiza-
tions, which has become permanent, and whose deliberations have led to results
that effectively conclude a negotiation (i.e., the Conference of the Law of the Sea.
whose final working stage spanned over nine years). In this instance, a bulky
case study, full of information on the multilateral negotiating process, is avail-
able. However in many other cases, one can simply isolate arbitrarily and
artificially a chronological sequence in a series that follows the law of perpetual
motion. Because of our inability to limit an event in time, negotiation cannot be
properly grasped.
To this difficulty one must add that of the limits of space. The isolation of
negotiations in relation to each other is just a memory. Today the same problem
is the object of simultaneous multiple negotiations in different milieu and places.
A "trade" negotiation can take place at the same time in the framework of
universal organizations (GATT, UNCTAD), within regional ones (EEC), among
restricted partner groups (EEC/Third World for the multifiber agreement;
EEC/USA for farm exports), and on a bilateral basis between two states linked
by a trade agreement. The situation is similar for economic aid issues, which are
the subject of bilateral bargaining, as well as of multilateral negotiations at the
OECD, IMF and World Bank, to mention only the major partners present.
Henceforth, every fragmentary grasp of a piece of negotiation runs the risk
of introducing some distortion into the analysis. A state can be willing to lose on
one ground because it knows it can win on another; it can concede today what it
expects to win back tomorrow. The simultaneity and ambiguity of negotiation
activity paves the way for games of hidden compensation, which escape the
observer who is concentrated upon a specific moment or place. Bargaining can
even occur from one area of negotiation to another, although they appear to be
unrelated. A good-will gesture in human rights can constitute a psychological
advantage in a disarmament negotiation; direct or indirect financial aid can lay
the groundwork for the conclusion of a military alliance, or reinforce it.
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It is therefore becoming harder and harder to define an area of investiga-
tion within which a rigorous study of the mechanism of negotiation is possible.
In a world in which actors and factors are more and more interdependent, situa-
tions are becoming so blurred that one cannot isolate one element without run-
ning the risk of changing its nature.
21.6. Conclusions
IT these observations are correct, the lesson to be drawn would perhaps be to put
aside the microscopic approach, or at least always to associate it with a macros-
copic approach.
Rather than attempt to follow the details of a maneuver, which at best
comes down to tactics, it appears preferable to start with the strategy of the
actors present. This assumes in the beginning that the actors are not only
identified, but that their characteristics can be determined and classified accord-
ing to an adequate typology. Next, one should determine the hierarchy of the
stakes for each political entity present. Thirdly, one should analyze the relation-
ship between the objectives to be achieved and the means available in the
different areas where a power has the ability to act. It is on the level of the
intersection among the strategies used by the forces present that negotiation
finds its place and uncovers its true face.
Reduced to a collection of recipes that the wisdom of nations has already
codified, negotiation holds only a secondary interest. Only by situating it in its
context, does it take on its full significance. It is a link in a chain that is inter-
rupted by maneuvers. What distinguishes it from other links is that it offers the
parties present an opportunity to resolve, at least temporarily, a part of their
differences peacefully. However, this privileged moment cannot be understood or
correctly interpreted, if one adopts the methods detaching it from what is hap-
pening upstream, from what is simultaneously occurring in the other theaters of
operation, and from what will be happening downstream, No matter how perfect
the techniques may be which improve its progress, negotiation is not an end in
itself. It is merely an instrument to serve a policy - or, more precisely, to serve
competing policies that temporarily find it convenient to seek accommodation.
At the least, its study should not be used as an alibi to disguise the game of
ambitions and the seriousness of the tensions that are becoming more tangled in
a chaotic world.
Notes
[1] The same situation can be found in the area of labor negotiation. When unions
negotiate with the government or with employers, it is always with the risk of
being bypassed or repudiated by the rank and file afterwards (cf. the failure of the
first Grenelle Agreements in 1968). However, since unions are often in a competi-
tive situation among themselves, they are risking both their credibility and their
audience in every difficult negotiation.
240
References
M. Merle
De Martens (1831), Precis du droit dea gena moderne de l'Europe, Tome II, p. 19.
de Pradt (1815),Du Congrea de Vienne, p. 9.
Kissinger, Henry (1979), White Houae Yellra [French ed.], A. Fayard, p. 316.
Mably (1757), Principles dea negocilltiona pour aervir d'introduction IIU droit public de
l'Europe Jonde aur lea trlliUa, p. 22.
Merle, M. (1980), The negotiations, in: Poutloira, P.U.F.
CHAPTER 22
In Search of Common Elements in the
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22.1. Introduction
Like the famous blind men who confronted the elephant and brought back
conflicting accounts of its salient characteristics, contemporary analysts of nego-
tiation appear to be talking about different things under the name of the same
phenomenon. Some have even called for a search for a common understanding of
the subject so that analysis can proceed on the same epistemological track. This
review, however, suggests that a common understanding of the negotiation pro-
cess has already developed and analysts are using it. The diversity that can be
found in a number of approaches - five of which are identified - merely
displays different ways of talking about the same phenomenon, and in fact even
involves the same questions and parameters presented from different angles and
under different names. There is more unity than some have suspected and more
complementarity, too, as different approaches reinforce and complement each
other's analysis. However, many aspects of the process still remain to elude this
common, but multifaceted, analysis. The common notion of the process has led
analysts to confront these continuing problems, but there is, of course, no cer-
tainty that further answers' to obdurate problems will not produce new terms of
analysis and even new notions of the whole process.
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22.2. Problem, Paradox, and Approaches
I. W. Zartman
It is paradoxical and perhaps confusing that there is no single dominant analyti-
cal approach to negotiation. The confusion arises from the presence of many
different attempts at analysis, sometimes inventing their own wheels to carry for-
ward their insights and sometimes cross-referencing from a number of different
analytical approaches. See cases in Zartman (1986, 1987a, 1987b). The fact that
all of these are studies of great value only confirms the analytical confusion. The
paradox arises because, behind this analytical diversity, there lies a single
phenomenon to be analyzed. Although some authors have a hard time seeing the
essential identity of the negotiation process [e.g., Young (1975)], most others,
including those who then focus on different subtypes for analytical purposes,
start with a common definition of the phenomenon [see, for example, Pruitt
(1981), Raiffa (1982), Walton and McKersie (1965), and TIde (1964)].
Negotiation is a process 0/ combining conflicting positions into a common
position, under a decision rule of unanimity, a phenomenon in which the out-
come is determined by the process (Kissinger, 1969, p. 212). The essential ele-
ment of process is important because it posits a determining dynamic, not just
an assortment of scattered actions or tactics. The challenge then becomes one of
finding the nature of that dynamic and its parameters. It is because this chal-
lenge has not been met to universal satisfaction that there are still a number of
contending approaches to the study of the process. The same reason also
explains, in part, why there is such resistance among practitioners of the process
to adopting and applying the work of analysts to their own practice.
The question still remains: H there is a single recognized phenomenon, and
if the various approaches that are employed to analyze that phenomenon are all
insightful, why is there not greater consensus on how to explain negotiation?
This study will propose some answers to that question, but in the process it will
heighten - but also seek to remove - the paradox. The answer proposed is
that each of the analytical approaches puts forward a deterministic analysis in
its most rigorous form, but useful insights only when the unreal conditions of
determinism are dropped; it is the clash between deterministic integrity and real-
istic looseness that keeps each of them separate from the others, trying to over-
come its internal problems of analysis rather than facing external problems of
coordination. The fact that many of the separate approaches are supported by a
disciplinary basis also keeps them locked in their internal analytical problems.
However, the underlying paradox is that the approaches are really more similar
than has been recognized, not only in their study of the same phenomenon, but
also in their answers to the same or similar questions in the same or similar
ways, but under different disciplinary labels. Exorcising these differences may
permit an economy of side movement and an increase of forward movement in
the analysis of the negotiation process.
The basic analytical question for all approaches to answer is: How are
negotiated outcomes explained? To find generalized answers and to get away
from the idiosyncrasies of history, the analyst must find dominant operationaliz-
able variables that provide terms in which the answer can be given. These in
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turn should be able to provide useful insights - indeed, even strategies or
behavioral rules - for practitioners seeking to obtain the best possible outcomes
for themselves. Thus, a practical form of the same question is: How can each
party deploy efforts to obtain an outcome favorable enough to be acceptable to
that party, but attractive enough to the other party to draw it away from its
own attempts at a unilateral solution and win its acceptance of an agreement?
Or, in the terms of the classical Toughness Dilemma, when should a party be
tough and when should it be soft, knowing that conceding little will mean hold-
ing to its position but decrease the chances of an agreement; whereas conceding a
lot will increase the chances of an agreement but move it away from the posi-
tions it values [Bartos (1987), Sebenius (1984), Zartman and Berman (1982)1?
Five different "families" of analysis will be examined to see how these questions
are handled and where the differences and similarities of the approaches lie [for
attempts to show the differences in some or all these schools, see Walton and
McKersie (1965), Young (1975), and Zartman (1978, 1987c)].
22.3. Structural Analysis
Structural analysis is based on a distribution of elements - in this case, of
instrumental elements or power, defined either as parties' relative positions
(resource possessions) or as their relative ability to make their options prevail (or
to counter the other's efforts to make its options prevail). See Schelling (1960),
Wriggins (1987), Bacharach and Lawler (1981), and Habeeb (1987). Structural
analysis is the most commonplace, even journalistic, approach, and its deter-
ministic statement that "the strongest side wins" is usually tautological and post
hoc. To avoid the tautology, the definitional identity between power structure
and winning has to be broken, by using an independent measure of power and by
focusing on the way in which sides of different relative strengths achieve their
outcomes. The latter has received some attention in the analysis of situations of
asymmetry, where better performance by the weaker of the two sides presents an
interesting challenge for explanation. While the general category of explanation
given can be called "tactics", those tactics generally serve to restore the struc-
tural equality of power between the two parties [Snyder and Diesing (1977, pp.
118-244), Hopmann (1978), Deutsch (1973), Zartman (1985b), and Wriggins
(1987)]. Various tactics provide various prescriptions for overcoming asym-
metry.
Another body of literature associated with the same approach starts with a
different structural assumption - of symmetry rather than asymmetry. Based
on the finding that parties do best in negotiation when they are or feel equal
(Rubin and Brown, 1975, pp. 199,214-21) and that negotiation takes place when
parties' unilateral achievement of their goals is blocked either by the other's veto
or by their own incapabilities, some analysis has used structures of symmetry to
identify situations most propitious for negotiation, using when to negotiate as a
key to how to negotiate [Saunders (1985); Zartman (1985a)].
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By these paths, by the time that structural analysis has moved away from
its initial post hoc formulation that outcomes are determined by the power posi-
tions of the parties, it has shifted toward simply tactical analysis based on a
different definition of power. Power no longer is a position or a possession -
something a party "has" - but a way of exercising a causal relation - some-
thing one "does" to bring about an outcome, and not just the ability to do so
[Habeeb (1987), cr. Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, p. 75), Simon (1957, p. 5)].
While such studies may also be termed structural because they deal with power,
that element is treated as a responsive, incidental and situational characteristic
rather than as an element in a theory or conceptualization of the negotiation pro-
cess. This is a common problem with studies of power, and in the case of nego-
tiations it has produced an array of insightful, if idiosyncratic, books of proverbs
on how parties can be brought to agreement. Karass (1970), Nierenberg (1973),
and Fisher and Ury (1981) emphasize various angles of insight into the negotia,..
tion process.
Yet despite a lack of theoretical focus or coherence, these studies do pro-
pose ways to induce one party to accept the other party's current offer or to
induce it to improve its own offer. Whether stated or not, these tactics operate
on either current offers, expectations, or alternative outcomes obtained without
negotiation (security points). They do so in one of two ways - either by alter-
ing the value of current offers relative to the other two points of comparison
(expectations and security points) or by identifying certain procedures ("frac-
tionate" or "trade off") or atmospherics ("trust" or "confidence") that facilitate
the basic process. All these tactics are acts of (attempted) power, and all of
them are ways to bring about acceptance of a given offer. Furthermore, they all
focus on a part of a common and general process of replacing unilateral and
conflicting positions with a common position or outcome, whether that process is
explicitly stated as such or not. Explicit statements about the nature of the pro-
cess would be useful and would facilitate links between approaches, but even in
their absence it is clear that the process is the same.
22.4. Strategic Analysis
Strategic analysis is also based on an array of elements, but its structure is one
of ends, not of means. Strategic analysis, as portrayed in game theoretic
matrices, begins with the assumption that outcomes are determined by the rela-
tive array of their values to the parties, under conditions of rational (Le., pre-
ferred) choice. The standard strategic models - Prisoner's Dilemma Game
(PDG) and Chicken Dilemma Game (CDG) - are symmetrical and therefore
incorporate the same assumption of equality as that often found in structural
analysis. It has frequently been noted that game theory excludes any use of
power as a result of its rigorous analytical forms and its clear logic of determin-
ism; it records values as given and shows the strategies that will be chosen and
the consequences of doing so [Young (1975); Axelrod (1984)1.
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As a result, some have objected that strategic analysis is of real value only
in comparing the decision to negotiate with the decision to hold out, again like
the insights gained from an analysis of symmetrical structures. Since game
theory values are given (and indeed, at worst, sometimes inferred from the strat-
egies adopted), there is no way to fractionate or trade off, only to enter the value
of any such external operations into the appropriate box in the matrix; and there
is no way to change any of those values within the matrix, only to record any
changes that may have occurred from one matrix to another.
Yet when the rigorous assumptions that provide the basis for its determin-
ism are relaxed and game theory presentations are used heuristically as the start-
ing point for analysis, a number of the associated limitations fall away and new
possibilities appear. Strategic analysis shows that the only way to break out of
deadlock is through asymmetry and that, therefore, instead of working to
improve offers or cooperation (CC) (absolutely or in relation to expectations,
which cannot be shown on a matrix), parties are best advised to alter the payoffs
or perception of payoffs associated with nonnegotiated or unilateral outcomes
(DD), Le., the costs of defection or deadlock. This in turn brings in new under-
standings of power, seen as the use of security points to induce or resist changes
in bargaining positions [Snyder and Diesing (1977), Zagare (1978), Brams
(1985)].
Movement is the essence of the negotiation process, and movement cannot
be shown on a matrix. But the conditions that produce movement - again,
power - can be shown on a matrix and analyzed from it, just as movies result
from a succession of stills. The result is the same process as indicated in the
relaxation and refinement of structural analysis, in which parties move from
their unilateral options to a common cooperative decision so shaped as to be
more attractive than their security points.
The problem with strategic analysis at present is not its rigidity, but its
limited scope. Many of the important and more detailed questions on how to
move parties toward a common solution lie outside the analysis; even such
important insights as the ways to reinforce commitment [Schelling (1960) and
Baldwin (1987)] are triggered by a need to consider security points, but are out-
side game theory analysis. An effort to render more precise the importance of
the security point (DD) in comparison to unilateral demands (CD, DC) and mul-
tilateral compromise (CC) is an important new advance of the strategic
approach, but the actual calculation of Critical Risk depends on a difficult shift
from ordinal to cardinal values in the matrix [Ellsberg (1975), Snyder and Dies-
ing (1977)].
On the other hand, strategic categories of encounters can help answer some
of the puzzling analytical questions of negotiations. For example, the Toughness
Dilemma may be resolved by use of the two game theory dilemmas: Whereas
parties who see their situation as a PDG may do best by playing soft to open
and tough to punish [Axelrod (1984)], parties who see themselves in a CDG do
better by playing tough to demand and soft to reward (see Chapter 13 by J.
Nyerges in this volume). But this, in turn, confirms an answer from structural
analysis to the Toughness Dilemma, based on appropriate tactics for strong and
weak powers, respectively. Further examples could be produced where strategic
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analysis, despite apparent limitations, ends up discussing elements of the same
process, and often the same process - power - as other approaches, but in
different terms. In so doing, it enriches the search for answers to the causal -
or power - question.
22.6. Process Analysis
Process analysis has the common feature of explaining outcomes through a series
of concessions determined by some element inherent in each party's position.
The particular element varies slightly according to the particular version of the
theory; most process analysis is based on a security point theory in some form,
although there are also a few other variations used. Process analysis indicates
that the party will concede on the basis of a comparative calculation of its own
versus its opponent's costs or of its own costs versus some acceptability level
[Zeuthen (1975), Cross (1969), Pen (1975), Hicks (1975), Snyder and Diesing
(1977)1. On this basis one can determine which party will concede how much
until the final point of convergence is reached. This, of course, provides a way of
diagramming a negotiation process that is the same as that discussed by other
approaches.
Other variations are end point theories and concession rate theories, the
first analyzing the parties' movement as a way to maintain a mutually fair and
maximizing outcome and the second analyzing the parties' movement on the
basis of reactions to each other's degree of concession, the two being parts of the
same process [Bartos (1978), Zeuthen (1975), Nash (1975), Cross (1969), cf.
Pruitt (1981)]. These latter variations (endpoint and concession-rate theories of
process) are prescriptively deterministic; that is, they indicate how parties will
act and where they will end up if they want to reach a mutually fair and maxim-
izing outcome. But they also serve the useful function of providing a baseline
against which unfairness and power can be measured, and hence they are
relevant to some understanding of the process [Pillar (1983)1.
But it can be seen that process theories, which originate in economics, are
in fact structural theories that indicate that the weaker party will concede until
the tables are turned, at which point the other party will concede in its turn, and
so on to agreement. Hence, they too are theories of power, with power measured
in terms of a comparison between offers and security points, or in terms of a
comparison between offers and security points, or in other words, in terms of
critical risk factors. Although they are constant-effect theories, to the extent
that parties can alter each other's or their own security points, they can exercise
power as well as simply possessing it; that variant reduces the deterministic pos-
sibilities of the theory but increases its reality. The similarity between process
and strategic theories has long been recognized [Harsanyi (1975), Wagner
(1975)1, although their mechanisms are indeed different. The similarity with
structural theories should also be registered; although many structuralists would
probably not "read" game theory or "talk" bilateral monopoly, their analyses are
complementary, covering the same phenomena within the same process.
In Seanh 0/ Common ~rnenb in 1M Analyail 0/~ Ne~on Proce•• 247
The neatness of process theory only works in idealized situations and then
only with idiosyncrasies [Khury (1968), Bartos (1974, 1987), Hamermesch
(1987)]. Concession behavior does not always match; often it mismatches or
separates (tracks) [Pruitt (1981)1, and parties do not even concede responsively
but rather try to teach and learn, respond and elicit responses, at the same time,
combining several types of behavior that makes theoretically neat patterns
unrealistic [Cross (1969), Bartos (1987)]. But the point is that in the process,
analysts are discerning both involuntary and voluntary, mechanical and manipu-
lative, process and power elements that make up negotiation, all of them
clustered about a similarly understood effort to combine conflicting positions into
a common one.
As the references in this review are beginning to show, analysts do not even
belong exclusively to one school or another but sometimes borrow naturally from
different approaches. Yet the fact that the field is seen as pluralistic as it is, or
that bibliographies remain largely in the author's discipline [Rubin and Brown
(1975)], means that there is not enough natural borrowing and cross-referencing.
22.6. Behavioral Analysis
Behavioral analysis provides an obviously different explanation of negotiated
outcomes by using the negotiators themselves as the focus of analysis [Jonsson
(1978)1. The terms of analysis used are the personalities of the negotiators,
either directly or in interaction. Personality in social psychology can be used to
refer to personal predispositions that exist at a number of different levels, from
biologically ingrained needs to more influenceable attitudes. At whatever level,
this school of analysis responds to a common belief about negotiation - that "it
all depends on the personalities of the negotiators". The challenge then becomes
to translate that popular perception into identifiable and non-tautological vari-
ables that can be used for analysis.
A more literary and intuitive basis for behavioral analysis began with
Nicolson's (1939) distinction between Shopkeepers and Warriors. It has been
extended and developed through a number of forms into Snyder and Diesing's
(1977) Softliners and Hardliners. There are many characterizations possible for
these basic types, but some can be given in terms already used by other schools.
The Hardline Warrior sees situations as a Prisoner's Dilemma Game and acts as
a mismatcher, expecting toughness to lead to softness (and victory) and softness
to lead to toughness, whereas the Softline Shopkeeper sees situations as a
Chicken Dilemma Game and follows matching behavior, expecting toughness to
lead to toughness (and deadlock) and softness to lead to softness. Thus,
behavioral analyses take the same parameters as elements of the same process as
other approaches, classifying them into typologies in terms of behavior.
A more developed approach involves categorizing personality types accord-
ing to their Interpersonal Orientation (10), an approach that is both more
insightful and more complex because it is not merely dichotomous and because
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its effects depend on interaction rather than on simple or direct taxonomic asso-
ciations. Opposed to a Low 10 type are two types of High lOs - Cooperators
and Competitors; either produces a positive result when negotiating with the
same type of personality; but when cross-paired, the match is unproductive
because the two types grate on each other. Rather than explaining an outcome
in its own terms, as the previous typologies tend to do, 10 analysis operates on
the basis of a causal interaction [Rubin and Brown (1975)]. It also identifies
different types of outcomes, depending on joint or comparative maximization, a
point also developed in studies of Motivational Orientations (MO) [Rubin and
Brown (1975), Filley (1975)]. But this approach, too, deals with such elements
as the propensity to compromise, to construct positive-sum or divide zero-sum
outcomes, or to adopt a tough or soft line (Le., a flatter or a steeper concession
rate) during the process of combining conflicting positions into a joint decision.
22.7. Integrative Analysis
Integrative analysis, like behavioral analysis, would seem to constitute an excep-
tion to the general understanding of a negotiation process. Although it, too, con-
ceives of negotiation as a process, its process runs through stages, in which the
outcome is explained by the performance of behaviors identified as specifically
appropriate to each successive stage [Gulliver (1979), Saunders (1985), Zartman
and Berman (1982), Zartman (1978), Druckman (1986)1. Rather than seeing a
process that works from fixed points of discord to a common point of conver-
gence, integrative analysis emphasizes the disarray of parties' interests in their
own minds and the need to manipulate conceptualizations of the problem into
mutually satisfying positive-sum outcomes before proceeding to an elaboration of
a detailed division of the spoils. By extending its concept of the negotiation pro-
cess back before the time when positions appear as fixed points, integrative
analysis not only allows for greater and more positive manipulation of those posi-
tions [Fisher and Ury (1981)], but also meets practitioners' understanding of
negotiation by drawing attention to the pre-negotiation part of the process [Ben-
dahmane and McDonald (1984, 1986), Zartman (1985b)].
But again, these positive aspects of the approach should not obscure the
fact that the subject is the same process as analyzed elsewhere. Its emphasis on
opening options is preliminary to a focus on closure, using expanded possibilities
of mutual benefit to buy agreement with an outcome that is less - or at least
different - than original demands: the same process can be described as giving
something to get something, a process of establishing terms of trade for an
exchange of items in the absence of fixed prices and even of fixed monetary units.
In previous terms, integrative analysis explores the mechanics of the Shopkeeper
but also, more realistically, of the Shopkeeper confronted with Warrior aspects of
the problem and with the need to get around them. Negotiators - at least
diplomatic negotiators, but probably most others - are not merely Shopkeepers,
who can make a deal on any issue; there are items better postponed and interests
that are properly nonnegotiable, and there are limits to acceptable deals that are
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imposed by security points. IT finding a common agreement through this maze is
more than a matter of convergence, it is a matter of convergence as well.
A growing branch of this analysis focuses on precise mechanisms for identi-
fying the best possible deal that can be gotten by both sides, given the
differences in the nature of their interests. While this is a complex extension of
the Nash (1975) solution that occupies a basic position in the strategic and pro-
cess approaches, the complexity of stakes makes a simple positive-sum outcome
too schematic to be useful [Valavanis (1958), Ikle and Leites (1962), Barclay and
Peterson (1976), Raiffa (1982), Sebenius (1984)]. The process involves finding as
many dimensions of components to the parties' interests as possible in order to
provide the best trade-offs and thereby insure the greatest durability to the out-
come. In addition to finding how much of a conflicting position a party must
give up to gain assent, the process also involves finding how much of a non- (or
less-) valued position a party can trade to gain a more valued position [Homans
(1961), p. 62]. But the element of conflict is never absent, and the process of
shaping a single multilateral decisions out of conflicting unilateral claims
remains.
22.8. Negotiation as a Process
It should be clear that the study of negotiation has come a considerable way in
the past two decades in building and expanding on a common concept of a pro-
cess, sharpening the much looser characterization given in the International
Encllclopedia 0/ the Social Sciences [Ikle (1968)] as "A form of interaction
through which [parties] ... try to arrange ... a new combination of some of their
common and conflicting interests". The "form of interaction" has taken shape as
a process of combining conflicting positions into a common outcome by joint
decision, allowing more specific focus of attention on how this is done, whether
by power, by patterns of movement, by restructuring stakes and values, by
interacting personality types, or by a series of steps. Yet, just as clearly, there is
much more to do to know the process, although many of those further directions
are indicated by using the common concept of process as a starting point and the
concept of power as the causal question.
22.9. Evaluation of Success
One problem raised by the notion of negotiation as a process is that of measuring
success, an answer to which is necessary to an evaluation of behavior and
prescriptions for its improvement. The question of success is more complex than
it may appear [Zartman (1987a)]. The nature of negotiation is to arrive at the
largest mutually satisfactory agreement, with anyone (and therefore, each) side
getting the best deal possible and the other (and therefore, each) getting at least
enough to make it want to keep the agreement. By that very nature, negotiation
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is not a process of winning and losing, so that success must be evaluated against
the problem, not against the adversary. There is, however, a subcategory of
negotiations in which one party's aims are to deny the adversary a particular
payoff rather than to get as much as possible for itself, making positive-sum
evaluations more complex. Thus, a number of criteria are potentially relevant
for the evaluation of success, but none of them gives a completely satisfactory
answer.
First, signature of an agreement is a prima facie or nominal sign of success,
because it indicates a judgment by the parties that they expect to be better off
with the agreement than without and that they can do no better by either con-
tinuing negotiations or chosing an alternative outcome. Second, this perception
can be verified empirically to see if the parties are indeed better off, either by
comparing their condition before and after the agreement or by comparing their
position afterward with their presumed position at the same time in the absence
of an agreement (a more relevant comparison, but a counterfactual one that
involves some judgment). While nothing says that the parties must be equally
well off or even equally better off, further evaluations could also investigate how
unequally better off the agreement made them and also whether they were
Pareto-optimally better off - that is, whether or not they had missed opportuni-
ties to improve the condition of either of them without making the other less well
off. Since some negotiations may be designed to redress power inequities while
others may reflect power inequities, the criteria of success based on the relative
improvement of the parties' positions will vary. Third, the results can be
evaluated against the parties' opening positions, with all the caveats about the
initial vagueness and inflation of demands that is inherent in the process. Nash
solutions and Bartos solutions, discussed above under end-point determinism,
are a function of opening positions and can serve as a baseline to evaluate actual
outcomes. But all three of these criteria for evaluation have flaws and complexi-
ties that call for further work - there is currently very little - on systems of
evaluation.
22.10. Division, Creation, and Exchange
Another topic of concern is the analysis of negotiations for three very different
types of stakes: those solvable by division, those by creation and those by
exchange. Although much of the earlier literature on negotiation focused on the
more obvious topic of division [Schopenhauer (1896), Nicolson (1939), Schelling
(1960)] with its notion of negotiation as winning or losing, much more attention
lately has been drawn to the improvement of exchanges [Homans (1961), Axelrod
(1970), Nash (1975), Sebenius (1984), Zartman (1987a)] with its notion of mutual
satisfactions.
The importance of resolving problems by exchange bears much emphasis,
for in their conflicts parties often forget that resolution by multilateral decisions
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means "buying" the other party's agreement by inducements through items that
he values in order to make agreement attractive to him. At the same time, such
emphasis carries a different image of negotiation from an encounter of conceding
and winning, portraying instead a positive-sum process where "everyone wins
(something)". Unfortunately, this is not the whole picture. Just as there must
be a little Warrior in every successful Shopkeeper, so there is inevitably some
zer~sum aspect to every positive sum. Once parties have created a greater
good, there is some need to decide how to divide and share it. Furthermore,
there are some stakes that are indivisible, and there are others that are unex-
changeable and therefore necessarily divisible. These aspects of negotiation still
await exhaustive or definitive treatment, and they are somewhat different from
the earlier, insightful analysis of redistributive bargaining [Walton and McKersie
(1965)].
To date, there are three ways of thinking about the problem of division.
The first is to replace it in the context of exchange by means of eompensation.
By determining what the item is worth, the other party can counterbalance it
through compensatory concessions. Unfortunately, some stakes have absolute or
infinite worth, so that no compensation is possible. The second is to restrueture
perceptions of the stakes so that things are seen differently and the zer~sum
nature of the outcomes is removed. Again, some stakes escape such creative
reformulation, or even when the subject of an attractive formula they prove
intractable in detail. The third is to manipulate notions of justiee, which can
then be translated to the specific - an idea akin to the previous notion of a
creative formula. But that is merely to intellectualize the problem without solv-
ing it in many cases, since it is the conflicting notions of justice that make the
problems of division so intractable. Obviously, practitioners need more help in
ways of dealing with the zer~sum aspects of negotiations - the "Jerusalem
Problems" - that lie beyond positive-sum creativity.
22.11. Toughness and Softness
A third topic of continuing inquiry highlighted by the generally accepted notion
of the negotiation process is the Toughness Dilemma. The question of when to
be tough and when to be soft, and the paradox on which it is based, has already
been identified as the major tactical question for analysts and practitioners alike.
By now, it is plain that there is no way out of the dilemma as presented,
and that correct and insightful answers depend on some intermediate variable,
such as personality, timing, phase, power, etc. But there is still no sense of any
hierarchy among these intermediate variables - other than the eternal debates
among disciplines as to which gives the best analysis - and no notions as to
which are trumps. Somewhere between the anecdotal proverbs and the unopera-
tionalizable theory lies a not yet fully mined terrain of inquiry that may require
new parameters.
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22.12. Multilateral Bargaining
I. W. Zanman
Finally, an area of negotiation that falls outside the current paradigm is multila-
teral bargaining. The current process notion has thus far worked to exclude
effective consideration of multilateral negotiations, and those that have been
treated well tend to be reduced to bilateral analysis. When not reduced to
dyads, multilateral negotiation tends to be treated merely descriptively, even if
insightfully, a problem that has posed particular challenges in regard to the suc-
cessive GATT rounds [Preeg (1979), Evans (1971), Cline et al. (1978), Winham
(1987)]. There have been a number of excellent attempts to devise an approach
to multilateral negotiations [that is, large number of participants, not merely a
few more than two, as in Raiffa (1982), Zagare (1978)1, which indicate some
promising directions [Zartman (1987c)].
One set of approaches treats multilateral negotiations as a problem in
coalition-formation [Rubin and Brown (1975, pp. 64ff), Snyder and Diesing
(1977, pp. 349ff), Raiffa (1982)]. However, coalition is a very different process
from negotiation, and to the extent that it covers the shaping of outcomes to be
decided up or down by some sort of weighted decision rule, it hides a separate
negotiation process. There is something going on in the interstices of coalition
that needs a separate analysis that is not yet available. Like the strategic
approach to bilateral negotiations, to which it is related, coalition analyses study
what happens between negotiations and impinges on them, but does not capture
them. Two concepts, preferences and scaling, have been used in some different
and imaginative ways by Sebenius (1984), Friedheim (1987), Nagel (1986), Hipel
and Fraser (1984). But they, too, indicate ingredients to an agreement rather
than the process by which it is obtained; as in coalition, negotiation becomes vot-
ing or at least approaches it. Other approaches are conceivable, but have not
been used. For instance, small group dynamics might provide a new analytical
context, as might a conceptual examination of the construction of an agreement
out of individual pieces.
In multilateral negotiation as in the predominant bilateral mode, the two
categories of ingredients are parties and stakes. Negotiated agreements are made
of stakes by parties. Bilateral negotiation has its general process model as a
basis for analysis, which permits many approaches to coexist and reinforce each
other. Multilateral negotiations needs either to fit into that concept of process or
invent its own basic model to enjoy the same benefits. In any case, in regard to
bilateral negotiations, there are many blind men but only one elephant, and the
two should not be confused with each other.
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CHAPTER 23
International Negotiations and
Cognitive Theory:
A Research Project
Christer Jonsson
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Lund
Sweden
23.1. Introduction
This chapter outlines an ongoing research project at the Department of Political
Science of the University of Lund, Sweden, the main purpose of which is to
assess the role of cognitive factors in international negotiations. The project has
branched out into three subprojects, which are described in turn.
First, concepts and insights from semiotics and attribution theory are com-
bined to construct an analytical framework for the study of the communication
aspects of international negotiations. The focus of this approach is the
signification process: How do messages and signals acquire meaning in the
course of negotiations? Diplomatic history is surveyed in an effort to confirm,
disconfirm or modify hypotheses derived from semiotics and attribution theory.
Second, an in-depth case study of the weB-documented 1919 Paris Peace Confer-
ence is undertaken in an attempt to assess the significance of cognitive factors
relative to situational factors in accounting for the process and outcome of nego-
tiations. Third, in coBaboration with Michael Shapiro of the University of
Hawaii and Matthew Bonham of the American University, a modified version of
the cognitive mapping technique is applied to international negotiations. In this
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new version, the emphasis is on discursive rather than psychological imagery,
and the idea chain or "path" is privileged over the "actor". The cognitive map is
thus conceived less as a psychological template than as a discursive space.
As this chapter reports on a research project in progress, it therefore deals
primarily with research design rather than results. The project "International
Negotiation and Cognitive Theory", which receives financial support from the
Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, aims at
assessing the role of communication and cognition in international negotiations.
This entails a focus on aspects neglected in the traditional game-theoretical
approach to the study of negotiation. Game theory is essentially static in nature;
it tends to homogenize actors; it "black boxes" the information processing
aspects of negotiations; and it envisages unitary and perfectly rational actors (ef.
Jonsson, 1983: 141). In our project, we are looking for a vantage point that per-
mits dynamic analysis, takes actor differences into account, has a realistic con-
ception of the actor's information processing, and allows for the lack of cohesion
and international bargaining within states.
From the viewpoint of game theory, negotiation can be seen as communica-
tion superimposed on a game. The human capacity to acquire, reveal, and con-
ceal information then becomes crucial, and creates the problem of interpretation
associated with communication moves [Shubik (1967: 261), Rapoport (1964:
122-24), Goffman (1969: 4).
Cognitive variables are needed to explain what images adversaries have of the
game and of each other and what strategies each devises for play, for shaping
opponents' perceptions of the game. Communication variables must be introduced
to show how adversaries modify their initial images and strategies - or resist such
modification - in the light offeedback from the other side (Sigal, 1979: 571).
Models focusing on information processing have indeed been suggested by
students of negotiation. For instance, the economist Alan Coddington (1968)
has suggested a skeletal model that has been adapted and developed by political
scientists interested in international negotiation [Snyder and Diesing (1977: 282-
339), Jonsson (1979: 15-16)1.
Drawing on such conceptualizations, the present project attempts to
integrate hypotheses and insights from contemporary approaches to communica-
tion and human cognition in a framework for the study of international negotia.-
tions. The project branches out into three partially overlapping subprojects,
described in turn in the following subsections.
23.2. Communication in International Negotiation
Perhaps the most neglected aspect of bargaining has been the role of various kinds
of communications (Tedeschi and Rosenfeld, 1980: 225).
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Bargaining and negotiation are subclasses of social communication. Fisher
and Ury (1983: xi, 33), for instance, define negotiation as "back-and-forth com-
munication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have
some interests that are shared and others that are opposed", and argue that
"without communication there is no negotiation" .
Social communication involves the transmission of messages to which cer-
tain meanings are attached. These messages can be either verbal or nonverbal
(cr. Johnson, 1974: 66). Thus, Schelling (1963: 21) introduced the term "tacit
bargaining" for a communication process "in which adversaries watch and inter-
pret each other's behavior, each aware that his own actions are being interpreted
and anticipated, each acting with a view to the expectations that he creates".
Just as the verbal components in a normal person-to-person conversation have
been estimated to carry less than 35% of the social meaning (Johnson, 1974: 74),
so nonverbal messages and "body language" constitute important aspects of bar-
gaining between states.
In fact, both behavior and nonbehavior may constitute messages, especially
in a negotiation setting. "Activity or inactivity, words or silence, all have mes-
sage value: they influence others and these others, in turn, cannot not respond to
these communications and are thus themselves communicating" (Simons, 1976:
50).
Consider, by way of analogy, the story about one psychoanalytically
oriented school of social work where students were considered hostile if they
came to class late, anxious if they came early, and compulsive if they came at the
appointed hour (Simons, 1976: 42). By the same token, whatever a diplomatic
negotiator does or does not do is willy-nilly scrutinized and interpreted by the
adversaries. All of his behavior and nonbehavior, words and silences, assume
message values. We can, for instance, recall Metternich's reputed reaction to the
death of a Russian ambassador in the midst of sensitive negotiations: "I wonder
what he meant by that" .
In any negotiatory setting - either national of international - "saying is
doing" and "doing is saying". As for the international environment, it has even
been described as a "universal communications network" (Cohen, 1981: 29-30):
All acts, verbal or nonverbal, intentional or unintentional, are potential signals
which feed into the network and are liable to reach all listeners and be read by
them for the message which they convey. Moreover any message may be read
together with, and understood in the light of, the collective body of evidence
already communicated or later to be communicated by the actor about his expec-
tations. The plea, therefore, that the meaning of a certain action has been misin-
terpreted is irrelevant. AB in all systems of communications, the meaning of the
information transmitted cannot be arbitrarily determined by the sender alone. It
means what others understand it to mean in the light of the underlying grammar.
Put another way, it is the reasonably foreseeable effect, not the announced inten-
tion, which defines the meaning and hence perceived purpose of an action. It is
not what you intend to say that counts but what others take you to mean.
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Whereas cognitive consistency theorists assume that people see what they
expect to see by assimilating incoming information to pre-existing images and
interpreting new information in such a way as to maintain or increase balance,
attribution theorists are concerned with the individual's attempts to comprehend
the causes of behavior and assume that spontaneous thought follows a systematic
course that is roughly congruent with scientific inquiry.
No longer the stimulus-response (S-R) automaton of radical behaviorism, pro-
moted beyond the rank of information processor and cognitive consistency seeker,
psychological man has at last been awarded a status equal to that of the scientist
who investigates him. For man, in the perspective of attribution theory, is an
intuitive psychologist who seeks to explain behavior and to draw inferences about
actors and their environments (Ross, 1977: 1974).
Attribution theory focuses on the perception of causation. Specifically,
attribution theorists seek to discover the principles of "naive epistemology", the
rules and heuristics laymen use in gathering and interpreting data. There are
several competing models of the attribution process. For instance, theorists
differ in their assessment of laymen's causal sophistication. Whereas Harold
Kelley's influential work (1967, 1971) emphasizes the similarities with statistical
rules of inference, the "judgment" school highlights biases in people's judgment
(cr. Fischhoff, 1976). These differences do not seem to be as sharp today, when
most attribution theorists tend to agree that people rely on certain "judgmental
heuristics" or cognitive rules of thumb rather than analysis of covariance, but
that this does not necessarily imply irrationality.
Perception researchers have shown that in spite of, and largely because of, people's
exquisite perceptual capabilities, they are subject to certain perceptual illusions.
No serious scientist, however, is led by such demonstrations to conclude that the
perceptual system under study is inherently faulty. Similarly, we conclude from
our own research that we are observing not an inherently faulty cognitive
apparatus, but rather, one that manifests certain explicable flaws (Nisbett and
Ross, 1980: 14).
Whereas semiotics and discourse analysis offer valuable concepts and
classifications, attribution theory has yielded several hypotheses of obvious
relevance to the study of communication processes in international negotiation.
Let me briefly outline a few and suggest how they may apply to international
negotiations.
23.4.1. "Representativeness" and "availability" heuristics
People tend to rely on "judgmental heuristics" that reduce complex inferential
tasks to simple judgmental operations. The representativeness heuristics implies
"the application of relatively simple resemblance or 'goodness of fit' criteria to
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probleIDB of categorization" (Nisbett and Ross, 1980: 22). In the context of
international negotiations, this points to the common tendency among statesmen
to think in terIDB of historical analogies. In Ernest May's (1973: ix) apt sum-
mary:
Framers of foreign policy are often influenced by beliefs about what history
teaches or portends. Sometimes, they perceive problems in terms of analogies
from the past. Sometimes, they envision the future either as foreshadowed by his-
torical parallels or as following a straight line from what has recently gone before.
The availability heuristic means "objects or events are judged as frequent,
probable, or causally efficacious to the extent that they are readily 'available' in
memory" (Nisbett and Ross, 1980: 7). Psychological research indicates that
vivid information is more likely to be stored and remembered than is pallid infor-
mation (ef. Nisbett and Ross, 1980: 45). Translated to international negotiators,
this implies that certain traumatic events are readily available and therefore tend
to condition their interpretation of moves in the bargaining situation at hand.
People are strongly influenced by events that are recent, that they or their country
experienced first-hand, and events that occurred when they were first coming to
political awareness.... Many statesmen saw World War I as avoidable, and this
fed appeasement. In turn, the obvious lesson of the 19308 was that aggressors
could not be appeased and so post-World War II decision makers were predisposed
to see ambiguous actions as indicating hostile intentions (Jervis, 1985: 22).
23.4.2. The fundamental error of attribution
Attribution theorists have pointed to a common tendency to overemphasize
dispositional factors (stable personal traits) when explaining or interpreting the
behavior of others, while stressing situational factors to account for one's own
behavior. This hypothesis goes back to Fritz Heider's pioneering work in the
19508 in which he argued that people tend to attribute their own reactions to the
object world and those of others, when they different from their own, to personal
characteristics in others (cf. Kelley, 1967: 221). This idea was developed by
Edward Jones and Richard Nisbett (1971: 80), who brought the difference
between actors and observers to the fore, pointing to "a pervasive tendency for
actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers
tend to attribute the same action to stable personal dispositions" .
Translated to international relations, Daniel Heradstveit's (1979) study of
Arab and Israeli elite perceptions suggests that among adversaries the tendency
is to explain one's own "good" behavior as well as the adversary's "bad"
behavior in dispositional terms. Conversely, "bad" behavior of one's own side
and "good" behavior by the other are attributed to situational factors. In brief,
"I am essentially good, but am occasionally forced by circumstances to behave
badly, whereas you are bad but are occasionally forced by circumstances to
behave well" .
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The fundamental attribution error has been observable in US-Soviet nego-
tiations over the years. The tendency to judge the adversary by who they are
rather than by what they do has frequently blinded the superpowers to impor-
tant nuances and changes in the adversary's negotiating behavior.
23.4.3. Exaggerating the centralization, planning and coordination
of others
The fundamental attribution error is often coupled with, and reinforced by, a
common tendency to see the behavior of the adversary as more centralized,
planned, and coordinated than it actually is (Jervis, 1976: 319-332). Henry
Kissinger's (1979: 52) observation on US-Soviet perceptions provides a good
illustration:
The superpowers often behave like two heavily armed blind men feeling their way
around in a room, each believing himself in mortal peril from the other whom he
assumes to have perfect vision. Each side should know that frequently uncer-
tainty, compromise, and incoherence are the essence of policy-making. Yet each
tends to ascribe to the other a consistency, foresight, and coherence that its own
experience belies.
23.4.4. The principle of non-common effects
When a perceiver observes an action and at least some of its effects, his basic
problem is to decide which of these effects, if any, were intended by the actor.
The "principle of non-common effects" , formulated by Edward Jones and Keith
Davis (1965), holds that it is behavior that conflicts with expectations that tells
us most about an actor. Jones and Davis (1965: 228) argue that "the more dis-
tinctive reasons a person has for an action, and the more these reasons are
widely shared in the culture, the less informative that action is concerning the
identifying attributes of the person"; and also that "behavior which conforms to
clearly defined role requirements is seen as uninformative about the individual's
personal characteristics, whereas a considerable amount of information may be
extracted from out-of-role behavior" (Jones and Davis, 1965: 234). In the con-
text of international negotiations this points to two sets of expectations derived
from the national and negotiator subcultures, respectively: national stereotypes,
on the one hand, and "normal" diplomatic bargaining behavior, on the other.
Also of relevance to negotiations is the observation that "beneficial actions
tend to be much more ambiguous than harmful actions when it comes to decid-
ing on the actor's true intention or his ultimate objectives in the situation. The
ambiguity of beneficial actions centers around the extent to which ulterior,
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manipulative purposes may be served by them" (Jones and Davis, 1965: 259).
Especially in negotiations between adversaries, concessions are frequently inter-
preted as tactical tricks, designed to lull one's vigilance.
23.4.5. The false consensus proposition
Related to the principle of non-common effects is the proposition that people
tend to "see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common
and appropriate to existing circumstances while viewing alternative responses as
uncommon, deviant, and inappropriate" (Ross, 1977: 188). One consequence of
the propensity to assume that others generally share our reactions is "a tendency
to attribute differing views to the personal characteristics of their holders" (Kel-
ley and Michela, 1980: 464).
For example, to Western negotiators a pragmatic, "inductive" approach is
normal: specific details are worked out before the general agreement is wrapped
up, following Talleyrand's advice that "On s'arrange plus facilement sur un fait
que sur un principle". Soviet negotiators, by contrast, prefer a "deductive"
approach, insisting on an "agreement in principle" before negotiating the details
of the agreement. This is considered the normal method - witness, for instance,
the Soviet chief negotiator, Tsarapkin, in the nuclear test ban negotiations
(quoted in J6nsson, 1979: 71):
H we insist on first reaching agreement on the basic question this is not due to any
personal considerations of ours, but is a natural requirement for conducting nego-
tiations in a normal and businesslike manner.
Consequently, he described the Western approach as inappropriate:
You are proposing to work on the details before agreeing on the foundation. This
is tantamount to putting up a building without a foundation or a framework.
Such a building will, however, collapse while it is still under construction (quoted
in Jonsson, 1979: 72).
23.4.6. Misinterpreting the effect of one's own actions on others
Harold Kelley (1971: 8) has made an observation of direct relevance to negotia-
tions:
Interdependent persons often have occasion independently and simultaneously to
plan and commit themselves to actions having mutual consequences. ... Failing to
take account of these temporal patterns, persons may seriously misinterpret the
effects their actions have on others.
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In a negotiatory setting, this means that each party "tends to attribute to
himself those actions of the other person that are consistent with the attributor's
own interest" (Kelley, 1971: 19). The other side of the same coin is the common
failure to realize that one's own behavior may be seen as threatening by the
other side.
You yourself may vividly feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party,
but you cannot enter into the other man's counter-fear, or even understand why
he should be particularly nervous. For you know that you yourself mean him no
harm, and that you want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety;
and it is never possible for you to realize or remember properly that since he can-
not see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurance of your
intentions that you have (Herbert Butterfield, as quoted in Jervis, 1976: 69).
23.4.'7'. Exaggerated confidence in one's inferential capability
Robert Jervis (1986: 495) has argued that, "Since people often underestimate
ambiguity and overestimate their cognitive abilities, it is likely that statesmen
think that they can draw more accurate inferences from what the other state is
doing than in fact they can". Others have commented on the tendency among
decision makers to "perceive more order and certainty than exists in their uncer-
tain, disorderly environments" (Kinder and Weiss, 1978: 723) and to make
"unwarranted assumptions of certainty regarding opponents' intentions and the
correctness of one's chosen policy" (Snyder, 1978: 353). Conversely, it has been
argued that "the ideal negotiator should have a high tolerance for ambiguity and
uncertainty as well as the open-mindedness to test his own assumptions and
opponent's intentions" (Karrass, 1970: 37).
To summarize, international negotiators may be regarded as "intuitive
semioticians". Attribution theory complements semiotics, insofar as it points to
certain "judgmental heuristics" employed by "intuitive semioticians" when inter-
preting signaling in international negotiations. This brief outline of relevant
hypotheses derived from attribution theory has been suggestive rather than
exhaustive. In my continued research I shall elaborate these and other
hypotheses in order, at thf' next stage of research, to survey diplomatic history
for examples and counteH:xamples by which the hypotheses may be confirmed,
disconfirmed, or modified.
23.6. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919
The second subproject consists of an in-depth case study of the extensive nego-
tiations following World War I, carried out by research assistant Stefan Persson.
In contrast to most contemporary diplomatic negotiations, the Paris Peace
Conference is extremely well-documented. Not only are almost all central
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documents from the interstate negotiations published, but also the archives of
the main actors have been opened to researchers. We are thus able to gain
insights into the internal, within-nation bargaining process as well.
Briefly, the study is organized as follows (ef. Persson, 1986). First, agenda
items where turning points can be identified in the negotiation process are
selected for study (the Saar issue is one such agenda item). Second, extant
theoretical works on negotiation are surveyed in search of explanations of change
and adjustment on the part of the negotiating actors. Three distinguishable per-
spectives - the manipulative, cybernetic, and cognitive - suggest themselves.
The first perspective, which draws on yet departs from game theory, is
what Oran Young (1975: 317) has labeled a "manipulative" conception of bar-
gaining. This perspective focuses on the attempts by each player to outwit the
other by means of "strategic moves" - such as commitments, threats, and
promises - designed to modify the opponent's utilities and probabilities. Tho-
mas Schelling (1963, 1966) is a prominent representative of this approach.
The "manipulative" conception is based on the assumption of uncertainty
rather than complete information on the part of the negotiating actors, as in
game theory. The choices of two or more actors engaged in strategic interaction
are reciprocally contingent, which inevitably leads to an "outguessing" regress
(Young, 1975: 14). Negotiation is thus seen as "the manipulation of the informa-
tion of others in the interests of improving the outcome for one's self under con-
ditions of strategic interaction" (Young, 1975: 304). In the game-theoretical ver-
nacular, the manipulative perspective focuses on bargaining tactics designed to
change the adversary's expected payoffs. Change in a negotiation is the result of
successful manipulation of the opponent's calculation of utilities and probabili-
ties.
The cybernetic perspective regards bargaining as a "self-stabilizing (Le.,
outcome-reaching) process of output and feedback" and the bargaining actors as
"a pair of linked servomechanisms" (Zartman, 1976: 37). Trial-and-error search,
information processing, and uncertainty control are basic elements of the cyber-
netic understanding of bargaining. Uncertainty is assumed to be of even more
fundamental importance than in the "manipulative" conception. Negotiators
normally experience structural uncertainty; that is, "the nature of the possible
outcomes and not just the probability associated with different outcomes is unk-
nown" (Winham, 1977: 101). The cybernetic understanding of the bargaining
process, in short, "is more akin to fitting the pieces into a puzzle than to conver-
gence along a continuum" (Winham, 1977: 101).
In contrast to the game-theoretical rationality assumption, according to
which each actor performs a comprehensive search and a detailed evaluation of
all available alternatives, the cybernetic perspective suggests that "the central
focus of the decision process is the business of eliminating the variety inherent in
any significant decision problem" (Steinbrunner, 1974: 56). In a bargaining con-
text, this implies searching for a formula, "a shared perception or definition of
the conflict that establishes terms of trade" (Zartman and Berman, 1982: 95).
One implication of viewing negotiation as a process for eliminating variety and
reducing uncertainty is that "the development of common perceptions becomes
more important than the exchange of concessions" (Winham, 1977: 97). Change
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in negotiation, according to the cybernetic understanding, is produced by finding
a common formula rather than by successfully applying manipulative tactics.
The cognitive perspective, finally, focuses on the belief systems of the nego-
tiating actors.
It is often impouible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to
the decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others. That is to
say, these cognitions are part of the proximate cause of the relevant behavior and
other levels of analysis cannot immediately tell us what they will be (Jervis, 1976:
28).
Each actor comes to the negotiations with a set of beliefs and expectations
about himself, the adversary, and the bargaining issues, based on previous
experiences. As soon as negotiations begin, each actor is in a position to test and
either validate or adjust his initial expectations. To understand the ensuing
negotiation process, we need to explore the belief systems of the actor.
Since each party to a conflict reacts not to the situation as perceived by the other
but rather to the situation as seen from his own perspective, the nations are not
reacting directly to each other. Under these conditions it is necessary to under-
stand the perspectives guiding each national unit's activity, and thus how these
perspectives differ, in order to grasp the actual Bow of strategic interaction (Lock-
hart, 1979: 38).
In comparison with the manipulative and cybernetic conceptions, the cogni-
tive perspective emphasizes the obstacles to change in negotiations. First,
incompatibltl btllitl/s frequently complicate and aggravate international negotia-
tions. Second, belief systems tend to be rt18istant to changtl (see Jervis, 1976:
291-296). Change is seen to occur when the negotiating actors modify "peri-
pheral" beliefs; "central" beliefs are considered stable and unaffected by persua-
sion attempts in negotiations.
As this brief outline indicates, the three perspectives offer different explana-
tions of change in international negotiations - successful manipulation of
expected payoffs according to the manipulative perspective, reduced uncertainty
through a common formula according to the cybernetic perspective, and modified
belief systems according to the cognitive perspective. The different perspectives
will be applied to the Paris Peace Conference in an attempt to assess their use-
fulness and degree of compatibility.
23.6. Cognitive Mapping
The cognitive mapping technique was developed in the early 19708 by a group of
researchers at Berkeley, including Robert Axelrod, Michael Shapiro, and
Matthew Bonham. It is a method of reconstructing the beliefs of actors on a
specific issue, coded in terms of concepts and causal links between concepts.
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Drawing on graph theory, maps are constructed on which concepts are
represented by points and causal links by arrows. An arrow with a plus sign
indicates a positive causal link ("leads to" I "contributes to", "increases", etc.),
and an arrow with a minus sign a negative causal link ("prevents", "aggravates",
"diminishes", etc.). All the causal chains, or "cognitive paths", of the studied
actor are combined into maps. This map of the actor's belief structure allows us
to assess the "centrality" of various concepts in terms of the number of arrows
leading into it and out of it [for descriptions of the cognitive mapping technique,
see Axelrod (1976), Bonham et al. (1979), Shapiro and Bonham (1982)].
Our research project includes a collaborative effort with Michael Shapiro
and Matthew Bonham to modify the cognitive mapping technique to make it
applicable to international negotiations (see Bonham et al., 1987). This
represents a continuation of work begun earlier on developing a cognitive map-
ping approach to collective decision-making. It is based on two shifts in the
structure of previous theoretical thinking. First, the emphasis is on discursive
rather than psychological imagery. Second, the idea chain or "path" is favored
over the person or "actor" for purposes of elaborating the dynamics of the sur-
vival of alternative understandings of the bargaining issues. The cognitive map
is thus conceived less as a psychological template than as a discursive space -
an integrated set of categories, descriptions, explanations, and evaluations that
direct not only identifiable settlements but, more generally, the "reality" per-
spective within which the possibilities and conditions of settlements emerge.
Rather than conceiving of persons having positions that they bring to deci-
sions and then hold to them or alter them in confrontation with other positions,
we conceive of positions as having persons. As a process of negotiation unfolds,
its degree of success, within our conception, is to be related to the degree to
which the parties can construct a shared discursive space, which amounts to
their building of a shared "reality".
23.6.1. Example: Dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union
A preliminary study using cognitive mapping in its traditional actor-oriented
variety may serve as an illustration of the direction of our recent thinking. The
study concerned the negotiations on the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian
union in 1905. Cognitive maps were constructed for the majority group in the
internal Swedish deliberations (Figure 23.1) and for the General Staff of the
Swedish military (Figure 23.2) as well as for the Swedish and Norwegian negotia-
tors (Figures 23.3 and 23.-1).
A first observation concerns the marked differences between the internal
and external cognitive maps for the Swedish side. Whereas the military-security
aspects of the Norwegian border fortifications were peripheral in the internal
deliberations and were downgraded by the General Staff, they were centrally
located in the argumentation of the Swedish negotiators. This illustrates, first of
all, the need to take internal bargaining into account in studies of international
270
Unilateral dismantling
of Norwegian border
fortifications
Fortification-free zone
+
C. }onuOfl
Correspondence with
Swedish public opinion +
Sweden's possibilities to fortify~~
the border to Norway _ ~ ..
- Swedish + Swedish
Norway's possibilities to rebuild - security --- interest
border fortifications +
Swedish redress ~.-------:/
Sweden's possibilities to induce~ + /
Norway to reallocate resources
to the border to Russia
Future relations between ~ Norway's defense
Sweden and Norway against third party
+
+ positive causal relationship, for instance increases
- negative causal relationship, for instance decreases
o will not hurt, does not prevent, is not harmful to
o will not help, does not promote, is of no benefit to
o does not matter for, has no effect on, has nor relation to
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Figure tS.t. The Swedish General Staff.
negotiations. But it also points to other strands of our recent concern with "dis-
cursive space" .
It seems plausible to conclude that the external Swedish posture was tacti-
cally motivated. The Swedes did not consider it tactically sound to emphasize
national honor or prestige concerns, which were central in the internal discus-
sions, since that would make it impossible for Norway to accept the Swedish
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Figure f9.9. The Swedish negotiators.
demands without humiliation or loss of prestige. Moreover, there is reason to
assume that similar considerations were behind the Norwegian posture in the
Swedish-Norwegian negotiations. In other words, both sides chose a military-
security discourse in their bilateral negotiations, while engaging in a prestige-
status discourse at home (note the residue of "Swedish humiliation" and
"Norwegian humiliation" in the maps of the negotiations). The similarities in
the external discourse extended to individual concepts and paths. Witness, for
instance, the prominence of the concept "peaceful relations between Sweden and
Norway" in both cognitive maps. Also, concern about what effect dismantling or
preservation of the border fortifications might have vis-a-vis third parties is
reOected in both maps.
The discursive space of the Swedish-Norwegian negotiations of 1905 sug-
gests that an agreement would require a formula that took into account the bila-
teral security concerns as well as defense against third parties, while avoiding
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humiliation of either of the negotiating nations. The concept of a "neutral zone" ,
which was introduced by the Norwegians and had figured marginally in the
internal Swedish debate (Vedung, 1971: 332), constituted such a formula.
23.6.2. Example: Paris Peace Conference of 1919
Another example is taken from the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. In a meeting
between President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Clemenceau in Paris on
March 27, 1919 (Mantoux, 1964), Wilson's discursive chain begins with the
category "excessive demands" and is linked to other categories by implication
connections (which can be represented by signed arrows - see Figure e9.5).
According to Wilson's discursive chain, excessive demands create the
impression of injustice, thus providing Germany with reasons for seeking revenge
and creating discontent among the German people. Discontent leads to conflict
and sows the seeds of future war. According to Wilson, these consequences can
be avoided by "negotiations with moderation and equity", a category that
reduces the impression of injustice.
M. Clemenceau's reply produces a reality that differs from that of Wilson's
by using a national character discourse to explain the behavior of Germany (Fig-
ure e9.6). The "German spirit" creates the desire to impose force on others and
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I+ Negotiation witht ",,----moderation and equity
ImpreSS!: of injustice
Re.sonsi~ seeking revenge
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Conflicts
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Figure £9.5. Cognitive map fragment for Wilson: March 27, 1919, 11:00 a.m.
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Figure £9.6. Cognitive map fragment for Clemenceau: March 27, 1919, 11:00 a.m.
leads to aggression. This can be avoided, according to Clemenceau, by imposing
sanctions on Germany to assure the fruits of victory.
Clemenceau reminded the other negotiators quite explicitly that the inter-
pretive practice of France differed from those of the United States and Great
Britain.
I beg you to understand my state of mind, just as I am trying to understand yours.
America is far away, and protected by the ocean. England could not be reached
by Napoleon himself. You are sheltered, both of you; we are not.
When Wilson proposed his idea of justice as the avoidance of "excessive
demands" on Germany, Clemenceau proposed instead multiple interpretations of
justice. He argued that "What we regard as just here in this room will not
necessarily be accepted as such by the Germans", and he offered some evidence
for differentiating the term: "Note that no one in Germany draws a distinction
between just and unjust demands of the Allies". Later, in an attempt to build
support for his position, he proposed another concept of justice:
274 G. JOnA60n
There is a sense of justice as between allies which must be satisfied. If this feeling
were violently thwarted, either in France or in England, grave danger might fol-
low. Clemency toward the conquered is good; but let us not lose sight of the vic-
tors.
By introducing a new notion of justice and playing on the fears of "grave
danger" (i.e., revolutionary movements), Clemenceau attempted to evoke a dis-
cursive space he shared with Lloyd George.
It should be evident from this example that much of what was at stake in
the interaction between Wilson and Clemenceau involved not just differences in
beliefs or other individual cognitive elements, but differences in the discursive
spaces within which options were to be understood and valued. Hence, what we
will attempt to recover, working within the bounds of our theoretical model, are
the discursive spaces within which the Paris Peace Conference negotiations took
place.
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CHAPTER 24:
The System of International Negotiations
and Its Impact on the Processes of
Negotiation
Victor A. Kremenyuk
USA and Canada Studies Institute,
USSR Academy of Sciences
Moscow
USSR
24:.1. Introduction
International negotiation is subject to many influences. As a situation in which
sovereign partners meet to find a joint and mutual acceptable solution to a
disputable problem, international negotiation attracts the attention of many
interested parties both at home and abroad; and the more important the prob-
lem negotiated, the larger the scope of that attention, which is a significant fac-
tor in the conduct and outcome of international negotiations. This factor
interacts with the dynamics of the process in a specific way; sometimes it works
to achieve its stable and desirable outcome, but sometimes it interferes with and
destabilizes the successful conduct of international negotiation.
In assessing the role of this factor and its impact on the processes of inter-
national negotiations it is important to understand the nature of its influence
and the different ways in which it can be brought to bear. There are purely
domestic factors that may and indeed do have crucial impact on the processes of
international negotiations, among which are: directives from the government
that regards the international negotiation as a continuation of its foreign policy
and tends to adjust it to the interests of that policy; and the concern of
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interested political groups, such as legislative bodies, political parties, major cor-
porations, mass media, and the public. All of these sources of influence do not
necessarily work in the same direction. More than that, in countries with multi-
or bipartisan political systems these sources may produce so controversial an
impact on international negotiation that it becomes a real challenge for the nego-
tiators of those countries to convey a consistent and logical behavior, which, in
turn, complicates the process and may cause its deadlock or failure.
There are purely international factors that also have a great impact on the
international negotiation. Allies of the negotiating parties, third countries, inter-
national organizations, world press - all of them may interfere, both positively
and negatively, in the normal sequence of events in the negotiating forum and
contribute to its success or failure.
Those engaged in negotiations, practitioners, are fully aware of this impact.
While they sometimes actively use it in their own interests, gradually a common
understanding has emerged that, for the sake of the stability of the process, it is
necessary to find ways to make international negotiations more independent of
this impact and to reduce, to the extent possible, its interference in the way the
sides in the negotiation handle their affairs. At least in some important cases,
such as Soviet-US disarmament talks, the sides agreed from the very beginning
to reduce as much as possible the interference of the external factors in the pro-
cess of the negotiation.
Of course, it is absolutely impossible to reduce to nil the external influences
on the process of international negotiations. In the contemporary world, every
international negotiation is a part of a much broader network of negotiations
and, explicitly or implicitly, it interacts with the network of which it is a part.
Inherent ties among international negotiations have become a new phenomenon
of the world of negotiations and, though many practitioners and researchers are
aware of this, until recently it was not studied in depth, with all the possible con-
clusions that can be derived thereby.
24.2. The Problem
The problem here is as old as international negotiations. It is the problem of
managing the negotiations to achieve two different though overlapping goals: to
fulfill one's own purposes in the international negotiation and, at the same time,
to contribute to the stability of the process and its successful outcomes (which is
sometimes close to the former). The traditional way of achieving these goals
and, hence, of managing the processes of international negotiations is to mobilize
all possible factors to build up so-called "bargaining power" and to use it to ela-
borate an efficient negotiating strategy and appropriate tactics. Essentially, this
way is still relevant in most cases. So, what then is the problem?
The problem is that international negotiations, as an object of manage-
ment, has become much more complex and elaborate, and to cope with its grow-
ing complexity a successful negotiator has to take into account not only what
was traditionally regarded as an essence of "bargaining power", but also the fact
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that his options and constraints are limited by the changing nature of contem-
porary international negotiations. In other words, the correlation of the manage-
ment procedures and of the subject of management has to be reassessed to strike
the desirable balance between what is managed and how it can be managed.
For this purpose it would be insufficient just to change the tactics or to find
new ways to outwit the partner. The situation is much more sophisticated: the
international negotiation is in the process of acquiring new and important func-
tions and without a proper assessment of that it is impossible even to speak of a
genuinely new approach to managing international negotiation. Sometimes these
new functions are self-evident, as in the case of UN LOS Conference; sometimes
they are not that visible, but this does not change much the necessity to treat
the whole problem of international negotiations as a new and important feature
of the international environment that demands the restructuring and rethinking
of the traditional approach.
24.3. The Analytical Approach
International negotiations grow in number and diversity. Not only the tradi-
tional issues, such as national security, borders, trade, communications, etc., but
various subjects from the sphere of scientific and cultural exchange, humani-
tarian problems, environment, outer space and oceans are being negotiated.
The growing number of international negotiations is an indicator of a much
more significant process that is taking place underneath - the process of forma.-
tion of a certain sl/stem 0/ international negotiations. So far, this is not a
comprehensive institutionalized system of international negotiations that incor-
porates talks between/among countries on all disputable and controversial
issues. Many of these issues still are waiting to become the subject of talks. But,
nevertheless, one can speak with full evidence of an emerging system, which has
already become an integral part of international reality and thus far has not yet
been assessed in all aspects, as it deserves.
First of all, it is not the mere number of separate international negotiations
that makes one draw a conclusion that there is a system, although the rapidly
and even dramatically growing number of international negotiations has already
drawn the attention of many analysts. There are attempts to make inventories
on a country-by-country basis [e.g., USSR-USA, as B. Blechman (1985) did in
the area of prevention of the risk of nuclear war]. Others try to make such
inventories for different problems: negotiations on arms control, trade, environ-
ment, etc.
It is the growing interaction among international negotiation fora that
deserves attention and leads one to suggest that the growing number of interna.-
tional negotiations definitely is not developing sporadically (although sometimes
it may seem so), but in some systematic way that reflects such crucial processes
as the growing interdependence of nations and of disputable issues among them,
the increasing impotence of traditional ways of resolving conflicts (such as mili-
tary threats), and the increasing need to turn negotiation into the only possible
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institutionalized and codified way to resolve international disputes in the absence
of a real alternative. In other words, the changing international environment has
resulted in the emerging importance of international negotiations. International
negotiations have been transformed from a forum of sporadic international
interaction to the sometimes only thinkable way of conflict resolution under con-
ditions of growing interdependence, which has contributed to the formation of a
certain system (or subsystem, if it is regarded as a part of much broader system
of international relations).
This means that any international negotiation now should be regarded not
only within the framework of the foreign policy of the nations engaged in the
negotiations, but also within the framework of a certain system of international
negotiations to which it belongs. In this case some new factors of the negotiation
appear which greatly affect the processes and the management of international
negotiations.
24.4. The Conceptual Approach
This conclusion is based on a solid foundation of analysis made in different coun-
tries of the main features of the contemporary international system. Taken
together, the major findings in this sphere are summarized in the following sub-
sections.
24.4.1. Structural and functional features of the
international system
The whole world system is in a transitional stage. Structurally, it is shifting
from the bipolar world of the 1950s to a much more diversified (sometimes called
multipolar, although this may not be correct, since it bears no accurate descrip-
tion) world structure. The process is far from being completed. Decolonization
turned huge and rather loose political entities called colonial empires into an
array of newly independent states. The different results of economic develop-
ment brought into play new political forces and centers of power and influence.
New alignments and groupings appeared both in the political and economic
areas, such as the nonaligned movement, European Economic Community,
OPEC, and so on.
On the functional side, this process is accompanied by the changing nature
of the traditional means of interaction among states: the value of military power
has diminished because of the impossibility of nuclear war and the constraints
produced by the rough parity between the two major military blocks. The value
of economic power has also changed, since the emphasis on it is shifting from the
mere production of goods and commodities and finance, to technological innova-
tion. The rising importance of humanitarian issues brings a new dimension to
traditional power alignments and interactions.
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Those processes overlap and interact with another important element of the
emerging international system - the growing interdependence of nations in all
spheres. This notion is much broader than the one used in 19708 (especially
after the oil crisis of 1973-1974). The interdependence of nations, which has
become an objective reality of the 1980s, has several dimensions, the most impor-
tant and prominent being interdependence in matters of security: the national
security of any country in the present situation is inalienable from the security of
others - there can be no security for one country if it threatens the others' secu-
rity. The only possible solution of the security problem is common security,
which can be attained only through a comprehensive and logical system of inter-
national negotiation. Another dimension is economic. The economic growth and
development of nations has long ago ceased to be only their own concern. It is
impossible to imagine now any country, large or small, which could cope with its
development problems without cooperation with and from the outside world.
The next dimension is the environment, which emphasizes to a large extent that
all the nations of the world are interdependent and can only survive together.
The process of growing interdependence develops not only extensively
(including new spheres in which nations become dependent on each other), but
also intensively. This means that the spheres in which the countries find them-
selves dependent on each other also become interdependent. For example, the
interdependence between security and economy, or the arms race and develop-
ment, which is a subject for numerous discussions at international conferences,
and the interdependence between the economy and environment (or to be more
exact, industry and environment).
24.4.3. Complexity
A number of controversial issues have appeared at the cross-section of these two
spheres of interdependence. Sometimes these issues have a very traditional char-
acter: controversies and conflicts in security, trade, finance, environment, etc.
But if we look at them from the perspective of the environment in which they
exist and of the complex network of interdependencies that produce them, it
becomes clear that these controversial issues form some interconnected and
mutually dependent network of conflicts. Such conflicts then have, as one of
their main features, the ability to spill over to other spheres or to escalate, thus
producing a "multi-layered" form of conflicts in which the issues of an ideologi-
cal, confessional/ethnic, or other nature are interconnected. The growing com-
plexity of the international system in this way produces no less complex types of
controversies and conflicts, which should be adequately treated.
Now, what relation has all this to the processes of international negotia-
tions? This is the subject of this chapter, with some suggestions that may be of
interest to those engaged both in the theory and practice of negotiations.
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In the above-mentioned context international negotiation is regarded as the main
means of conflict resolution, which, together with the unilateral actions of
nations, can contribute in a significant manner to keeping the international sys-
tem stable and predictable. What are the main features that appear in interna-
tional negotiations due to the process mentioned above?
First, the emerging system of international negotiations tends to reflect
both in its structure and essence the existing system of conflicts and disputes.
Hence, it becomes more and more universal, incorporating the formal negotia-
tions and consultations, informal talks and meetings of government officials,
experts, public figures and others engaged in the activities of exchanging views
and ideas on the possible ways to find a resolution to disputable problems. The
mere existence of this huge international structure should be regarded as a kind
of specific environment within which some specific "rules of conduct" exist:
non-violence, adherence to joint problem-solving, cooperation, etc. This does not
mean that even here there do not exist political and diplomatic struggle, coer-
cion, threats and the like. But, nevertheless, this environment gives a maximum
advantage to those who adhere to the "rules of conduct" and is rather unfriendly
to those who try to break them.
Second, this system tends to become more and more autonomous. It is
self-evident that a negotiation may be created, as a situation, only due to the
sovereign will of the parties, but once in existence, it becomes to an extent
estranged from that will, since it becomes a part of the system and is plugged
into it through the information flows, interplay of interests, influence of the
observing parties and so on. Within the system a negotiation acquires a second
dimension (the first is that it is a continuation of a foreign policy) and becomes a
part of an international network, which has its own rules and its own laws of
dynamics.
Third, once it is a part of a system, a negotiation has to respond to the
needs and elements of that system. The main demand is that it should contrib-
ute to the stability and growth (optimization) of the system. The entropy or
disorder of the system can be prevented not through stagnation of an individual
cell (part), but through its efficient operation, which means a successful and
timely resolution of a conflict. Thus, the system and its basic parts have an
interdependent relationship: the more efficient the functioning of each interna-
tional negotiation, the more stable and durable is the whole system of interna-
tional relations.
Fourth, the above factors place an additional burden on the process of
international negotiation. Thus far, its main function was to serve the interests
of the parties engaged. It was their interest and their will that primarily dic-
tated the whole process, while the accepted rules served a secondary role in
establishing the procedure. Now, with the emergence of the system of negotia-
tions, parties to any international negotiation have to take into consideration not
only their interests at the given negotiation, but also the whole array of their
interests and positions at other negotiations and even the state of affairs at other
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negotiation fora. The decision-making process becomes magnified and compli-
cated by several orders.
24:.6. The Changing Structure of the Process
Since international negotiation acquires a dual capability - as a function of a
foreign policy and a basic part of the stability of the international system - it
cannot but experience some changes in its nature and process. As to changes in
nature, partly they have already been. described: the burden of conflict resolu-
tion gradually shifts from unilateral actions and decisions to joint problem-
solving and agreed solutions. At this particular moment this statement may
sound premature, but the trend is evident. Even in the sphere of national secu-
rity, there is no way to achieve durable solutions without taking into considera-
tion the necessity to secure the legitimate interests of the other parties.
As to the process, the change is not that evident but gradually it is becom-
ing more and more elucidated.
Professor R. Fisher (1986) of the Harvard Law School summarized the
changes of the structure of negotiations in two models - Model "T" (for "tradi-
tional") and Model "A" (for "alternative"). This gist of his conclusions is that
gradually the structure of the process of international negotiation has changed
from strictly formal, diplomats-to-diplomats "one-shot" conferences to a combi-
nation of governmental and nongovernmental experts' talks, which become an
indefinite, ongoing process working as a production line for producing a series of
jointly agreed recommendations to governments on possible solutions of disput-
able problems.
To continue this trend, one can suggest that in time these international
negotiations will become a kind of permanent, continuous diplomatic activity,
which would then suggest to the appropriate governments either to sign an
agreement with the other side or to take unilateral decisions within an agreed
framework to solve a dispute without having an agreement. In any case, the role
of international negotiations is changing from a mere form of government-to-
government activity to a separate international function (thus institutionalizing
its autonomy), producing a conceptual framework of possible agreements for
governmental deliberation and decision.
But, meanwhile, recognition of the fact of the changing nature of the pro-
cess poses several problems both for practice and research. In practice, this
brings up several tasks:
1. To make an inventory of all contemporary negotiations with some definite
and practicable classification along the following criteria:
Bilateral and multilateral (with some additional criteria, such as
whether or not they are institutionalized, Le., within the framework of
existing international organizations, or noninstitutionalized) .
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Formal (official) and informal (nongovernmental).
By subject of negotiation (political, security, economic, environmental
issues, etc.), which will permit developing an adequate database,
which could be used both by the government agencies and researchers
to have at least an idea of the scope and nature of the contemporary
network of international negotiations.
2. To compare the existing network of international negotiations with the
scope of the issues to be solved in international relations. It is understand-
able that this task will demand the introduction of stricter approaches to
the evaluation of the issues. But each side concerned may unilaterally
decide whether or not the existing network of international negotiations
matches the scope of the issues and whether it forms an international joint
problem-solving system. It is very possible that such a tremendous job will
produce another problem - that of "negotiation on negotiation", how to
rearrange the contemporary network of international negotiations to bring
it close to the needs of the international problem-solving process.
3. The solution of these practical aspects of the problem will demand at least
two types of research. One of them is relatively simple - a program for a
computerized database on international negotiations, which would permit
the collection of all the existing information on negotiations in some orderly
manner, useable by negotiators of any country and international agency:
when, where, who, what is negotiated, and what was the result (or absence
of result). The only necessary condition for such a program is that it
should be universal and distributed freely through the existing interna-
tional information services. This would avoid some misunderstandings in
assessing the number of negotiations and other parameters.
The other direction of research is much more complicated and will demand
much more time. It includes:
The assessment of the type and nature of systemic changes that have
already happened and will happen in the conduct of negotiation,
because of the existence of the system.
The elaboration of the necessary modifications that should be intro-
duced into the conduct of negotiations to bring it closer to the needs
of the contemporary system.
As a final aim, the elaboration of the new code for negotiation, which
can be undertaken only on genuinely international basis.
One of the major consequences of the emergence of the system of interna-
tional negotiations is that the negotiation process that is largely organized along
traditional lines is becoming less and less effective. The process of negotiations,
at least the most important among them, takes more and more time and is lag-
ging behind the evolution of the international environment. The most evident
examples are issues concerning security, trade and finance, and technology. The
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agreements achieved are very often regarded as inadequate and unjust, which
makes them vulnerable to criticism and permits their opponents to insist on their
abrogation.
In sum, the state of affairs in the area of international negotiation is not
satisfactory, and needs substantive innovation. One of the most promising ways
to do this on the international level is to treat international negotiations in terms
of systems analysis and apply the systemic approach to devise the appropriate
remedy.
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25.1. Introduction
First of all, I would not avoid one double question about paradigms in interna-
tional negotiation: is such a study possible; if so, is such a study useful? My
answers are definitely positive.
Using the word in its original, Greek and philosophical meaning, may I
remind readers that paradigma is neither deigma, nor dogma. A paradigmatic
approach implies a prudent quest for references, choice of models, selection of
problems whose study governs the research, definition of methods suitable to the
research and explanation of all the relations between these archetypes.
More precisely, debating, arguing and bargaining make large use of this
kind of process, among nations even more than between individuals or firms.
States live in contact, and often are in rivalry with one another. None of
them can be an exclusive model of civilization, of political, economic or cultural
organization. In any state, power, interests and culture cannot be considered as
abstract data; the environment into which their effects extend, and particularly
the needs, ambitions and interests of other people must be taken into considera-
tion.
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International negotiation is an art of social relationship. Every diplomatic
conference, every international organization, is a place where influences ori-
ginate, where interactions operate between different models. If it is to succeed,
every diplomatic dialogue must respect the pluralism of the participants, their
cultural identities, their proper political views and wishes, the disparity of their
strengths and weaknesses, the opposition of their ambitions and interests. In
this sense, a good paradigmatic approach appears to be one of the basic condi-
tions of international negotiations.
26.2. Paradigms in International Negotiations
In a changing world, seeking paradigms is a difficult task. Certainly, different
approaches are possible and can be compared. Mine is a pragmatic one, as a
result of personal meditations based upon years of diplomatic practice. There-
fore, I would like to suggest three themes of discussion: the power of the state,
national interest and cultural identity.
Power
Force, compulsion and violence are permanent and basic data of physical and
social life. They unavoidably extend their effects in political relations among
states: the perpetual recurrence of wars is sufficient to make this evident.
Nevertheless, in the field of international negotiations, the paradigm of force
requires a keener analysis.
Power is strength ordered by will, placed at the disposition of a strategic
concept. The power of a state is not everlasting, neither is it absolute. It is rela-
tive, in accordance with the environment, depending on armaments, money,
technology, culture and always limited by the power of other states. Alliances
make it evident that strength is always relative and can be counterbalanced by
other strength. International negotiation is the best means to moderate the
effects of power and to create the beginning of security among nations.
National interest
It is generally admitted that national interest is one of the principal paradigms of
international negotiation. Some authors and many politicians find in the doc-
trine of "Realpolitik" the basis of diplomacy. No doubt states are free when
making their fundamental choices, and there is no international control of this
sovereign capacity. However, national interest has no absolute character at all:
its perception depends on personalities, periods, public opinion, environment and
many other elements.
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In every international negotiation, interest changes according to the needs,
utilities, ambitions and tactics of each participant. The evolution of interest is
the aim of a bargaining process. Good faith and trust are the conditions of its
results and have a kind of policing effect in the international system. Therefore,
the relativity of national interest adds to the relativity of power among the
states.
Cultural identity
The same observation can be made about the third paradigm of international
negotiation, even if in many cases cultural identity is a much stronger element
than the two others. As the expression of the individuality of a people, cultural
identity is a datum of civilization, a legacy of the past that marks off one state
from the others and maintains its personality, its independence and its ability to
negotiate. The strength of this paradigm is often subconscious, but often so
active that it compels governments to initiatives, reactions, refusals or conces-
sions. All cultural motives are not rational: ideologies and passions rarely give
way to reason; their intransigence does not favor the process of bargaining. If
international negotiation wants to remove these obstacles, it must use the plural-
ism of cultures to reconcile the dignity of all nations with mutual enrichment.
Contacts help to influence this: as forms of communication between different
cultures, international negotiations and organizations help to create new univer-
sal values that the world is looking for. The paradigm of cultural identity is also
changing, but this evolution will be slow and deep.
International negotiation has to take into account, in its practical exercise,
these three paradigms together. Each of them influences the other two: power is
mobilized by national interests and cultures; interests are measured according to
power; culture is an element of power. The study of diplomacy begins with the
study of these concomitant paradigms, their evolution and their connections.
But these problems must be approached with caution. Power, interests and cul-
ture cannot be precisely measured and their interactions or reactions are always
contingent. This can explain one of the major difficulties of anticipating and
forecasting in international relations.
25.3. A Systemic Concept of International Negotiations
Distances are today very different from what they were during many previous
centuries. Science, technology and organization have transformed social
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communication, particularly in the field of international relations. There are no
more impervious frontiers between states. In spite of strong national identities,
the world is going forward in a growing movement of globalization.
As a result of progress in mathematics, electronics, telematics, methods and
research in the fields of organizations and networks, great importance is now
attached to the problems and the theory of systems. That means, in our field,
the concept of an international society whose organized, integrated and dynamic
totality is greater than the simple addition or juxtaposition of its elements -
states, nations, and cultures.
This macroscopic approach of an integrated world gives a new strength to
the systemic concept of international negotiation and to the hope of self-
regulation in national politics by means of international negotiations or foreign
policy. International organization can therefore be analyzed in the perspective of
a whole set of networks.
Topics of scientific studies can be identified, to investigate and deepen the
evaluation of the different paradigms in international negotiation and the rela-
tions between them: research on objective indicators for military, financial,
economic, technological power; detailed and comparative approaches of national
interests, with the analysis of their complex factors and of their interactions;
regional or global studies in the field of connections, interdependences, solidari-
ties and alliances among states.
Dynamic perspectives can also be displayed, thanks to the progress in gath-
ering and handling data; for instance, the preparation and forecasting of the suc-
cessive steps in commercial or military negotiation; the building of scenarios or
models to make precise priorities, trends, threats, risks; and aiding development
of alternatives or proposals before and during negotiation.
International organizations, nongovernmental institutions, transnational
groups, financial networks, telecommunications, freedom of information, space
observation and detection - all of these contribute to this global and systemic
approach for our changing world, increasing the tasks of negotiators and adding
to the number of elements to take into account in policy making.
It is clear than an increasing need for complete, exact and large amounts of
information will stimulate the study of all the paradigms in international rela-
tions. Information is power, even in negotiation; it provides the ability to com-
municate, to bargain, to dominate. But it has to be organized information,
classified with a method, according to a structural conception of reality and serv-
ing a strategic will.
Of course, the human world is not logical; passion often leads to action.
Among nations, there is no regulating power; unexpected crises are always
threatening peace and international harmony. But the analysis of international
systems, with their proper paradigms, regulation mechanism and interactions,
can be a useful approach to the knowledge and limitation of the risks in foreign
policy. The search for and evaluation of information have always been one part
of the diplomatic art. Today, negotiation for information has become a major
part of international negotiations.
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Empirical means for preparing and conducting international bargaining are mov-
ing progressively to elaborate methods of communication and mutual informa-
tion exchange between states, taking into account the growing role of conferences
and organizations. However, the need still remains for rules, discipline and
confidence in international relations: in a changing world, good faith is, more
than ever, a real paradigm in politics among nations.
Between states, fear and mistrust are natural, strong and lasting feelings,
even if they are hidden and vague. Each state, in its external relations, is wait-
ing for a certain, concrete and equivalent answer to proposals or concessions it
offers. The diplomacy of immediate reciprocity appears among individuals or
people who do not know each other, whose civilizations are different. It increases
in its effects when doubt is possible concerning the sincerity, solvency or liability
of partners in international negotiation.
No cooperation can be expected between nations without "credit" - a
complex concept of trust, in which reciprocity is not required as soon as an
agreement is concluded. If it means to be useful, the balance of interests must
result from a process of action and reaction, with a view to a more or less distant
future where each partner hopes to realize its purpose and to maximize its gains.
Thus, international negotiation can be stimulated and contribute to a better
world environment.
Credit has a double meaning: it is trust you convey and trust you obtain;
it guarantees your offer and the assurances you receive as a counterpart.
Diplomacy cannot create any stability, any process of stabilization, if states are
not able and prepared to develop their relationships within a broad framework of
fairness and mutual good faith. States have to increase confidence, to merit trust
and to show their own trust. This is a difficult task in a large world, where
ambitions and powers are in rivalry, where interests and needs are diverging,
where cultures and ideologies are heterogeneous.
Despite these difficulties, no state that wishes to play its part in the inter-
national system can limit its hopes and actions by the consideration only of
immediate profit. But work for the future compels the acceptance of risks. The
role of international negotiation is also to reduce these risks through an intelli-
gent approach to the issues, through a large amount of information on countries
and leaders, and through good evaluation of what is desirable and what is possi-
ble. Diplomats work often without any shelter, in "terra incognita".
In such a difficult context, good faith is neither a legal principle, nor a
purely moral rule. It is a discipline of behavior, with respect to a relational util-
ity and even a political necessity. It is possible to engage in a negotiation without
any trust in the partner, for instance, to lose time, to await better circumstances
or to hide other intentions. But no negotiation can achieve a good and lasting
conclusion if a general feeling of trust and satisfaction is not created.
In this sense, one can assert that good faith is a paradigm in international
negotiation. But this paradigm is not an absolute one. It is not independent of
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the numerous and various facts and forms of civilization. The concept of good
faith, in its international meaning, is complex and difficult to analyze for the
basic reason that its content is relative to the culture, the history and the char-
acter of each nation. In every state, ethics have their own bases, rules and
expressions. Good faith is a moral and social paradigm, not only in its meaning,
but also in its expression. For instance, according to habits and traditions,
"maybe" can be either a polite refusal or the way to an agreement. The real
meaning has to be found through a good analysis of the context.
Thus, good faith must always be related and interpreted with respect to the
cultural data of all the partners in the negotiation. And each partner has to
develop an awareness and understanding on the part of the others - i.e., to
create and to maintain the feeling, probability, or certitude - that its attitude is
in accordance with the principles of good faith. International negotiations con-
demns expeditious processes, scornful superiority or arrogance and inattentive
behavior that makes others anxious, suspicious or offended. This is not only a
problem for implementing international agreements or treaties, but also for mak-
ing them possible, desirable and credible.
It is the task and the privilege of the diplomat to make up for political
misunderstanding, cultural ignorance, economic unequality in order to create the
conditions of dignity, fairness, mutual understanding, sometimes even con-
nivance, which are urgently needed between people of different cultures, races or
continents. International good faith requires permanent information and
reflection on others and also a patient and constant effort to give a good impres-
sion of one's own attitude, in order to be credible and to put others at ease.
In a world in which a growing economic, technical and cultural integration
has to be developed, responsible leaders and public opinion will no longer accept
negligence, delusion, disloyalty, irresponsibility and incoherence in diplomacy.
Of course, fair play is not silliness or lack of foresight; transparency (glasnost)
and sincerity are neither levity nor imprudence; treaties do not exempt states
from precautions, guarantees and adaptation. Herein lies the art of diplomacy.
Good faith, a paradigm in international negotiation, must be studied and
improved as a basic condition of peace.
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26.1. The US-PIN Program
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), in coordina-
tion with its 15 National Member organizations (NMOs), initiated in 1986 a
coordinated research and information collection and dissemination program on
better understanding and improving the processes of international negotiations.
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the NMO of the USA for IIASA, is
coordinating the PIN program activities in the United States. Funding of the
US-PIN Program has been provided by the Carnegie Corporation and the Bur-
roughs (now UNISYS) Corporation.
The US-PIN Program is one of several programs established to participate
in the activities of the international PIN network. The international network is
composed of the PIN project at IIASA and the PIN projects and programs in
each of the national member organizations. The IIASA-PIN project has a cen-
tral role in coordinating the activities of the national efforts and maintaining direct
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communication with each one, but there are also linkages being formed directly
between individual national programs.
This chapter is, in part, a progress report of some of the activities of the
US-PIN program. We very much welcome closer collaboration with the
nASA-PIN Project and with other NMO-PIN networks.
The US-PIN program has, from its inception, been guided by the "Propo-
sal for an International Research Program on the Processes of International
Negotiations", dated 25 July 1985, nASA.
26.2. Organizational Structure of US-PIN
Under the American Academy Committee for nASA a small Research Coordi-
nating Committee (RCC) under the chairmanship of Harvey Brooks officially
administers the program. Acting in coordination with the RCC for PIN is the
Planning and Synthesis Panel, chaired by James K. Sebenius, which oversees
the intellectual content of the program. The chairpersons of the five projects
under the Planning and Synthesis Panel are represented in that Panel. An
Advisory Panel interacts both with the RCC and with Planning and Synthesis
Panel. The overall executive coordinator of the Program is Lance Antrim.
Funding is tight for such an ambitious program, and the question arises:
why such an elaborate superstructure? Our funding enables us to invite
researchers and practitioners to the American Academy to jointly devise and
suggest research activities and directions. We do not have as yet adequate cen-
tral funding for the execution of research, but we can approach and have
approached various funding sources to finance specific research tasks. The
present structure is designed to facilitate this necessary entrepreneurial activity.
The US-PIN program collaborates closely with three other programs: the Pro-
gram on Negotiation, centered at Harvard Law School, the Negotiation Round-
table, centered at Harvard Business School, and the Computer-Aided Negotia-
tion (CAN) Project centered at MIT. Several doctoral students (both at Har-
vard and MIT) writing dissertations on topics of relevance to PIN are being
jointly supported by US-PIN and its Harvard and MIT affiliates.
We, the authors of this chapter, both members of the Planning and Syn-
thesis Panel, have participated and have perused the minutes of the meetings of
the five working task forces, and have identified 13 recurrent themes that we
hope will help to concentrate and integrate the loosely joined efforts of many
researchers and practitioners with quite diverse disciplinary roots and contextual
orientations. Perhaps some of these may be adopted by other NMO-PIN net-
works or by PIN-nASA as synthesizing themes. We are still at a formative
stage of development and we would welcome being influenced by others in
redirecting our efforts: stressing some themes over others and adding or subtract-
ing from our still-tentative list.
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26.3. Synthesizing Themes
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Theme 1: Tension between creating and claiming: Need for a paradigmatic
shift in approach from a win-lose to a win-win mentality.
Complex negotiations are rarely zero-sum. Hard positional bargaining may lead
to poor agreements, impasses, and conflict spirals. All too often disputants fail
to bake a large enough pie for all to share; they leave potential joint gains on the
table because they fail to engage effectively in joint problem solving. Yet if one
side is open, forthcoming, and inventive, that side may be exploited by a hard-
bargaining opponent. Knowing this, sides may seek to protect themselves "by
taking tough stances", to the detriment of all. This theme seeks to untangle the
cooperative and competitive aspects of negotiation, looking for ways - whether
individual, institutional, or procedural - to enhance outcomes for all disputants.
The artful negotiator must balance a tension between two tactics: those
employed to ereate positive gains for all to share and those employed to claim a
favorable share of those gains.
Theme 2: Linkage of issues
How flexible should we be in linking issues? Linkages can be used as carrots as
well as sticks. In theory, and in the laboratory, it is often possible to join two
intractable negotiations into one grand negotiation with an apparent zone of
agreement. By combining separate negotiations a richer set of tradeoffs is
thereby created that might lead to more maneuverability for compromise -
especially if the disputants give differential weights to the importance of the
separate components of the linked negotiation. But what are the limits? In the
Camp David negotiations, it would not have made sense to link the powerfully
divisive negotiations over the status of Jerusalem with the Sinai question. How
far should we go before possible disadvantages of linkages (of divisiveness,
increased complexity, etc.) override the benefits?
Theme 3: Repetitive negotiations: Temporal linkages and the need to build
better relationships
Our next theme looks at the effects of repetition on bargaining behavior and out-
come. In repetitive negotiations the outcome of one set of negotiations sets the
stage for the next round. It is often important for the disputants not only to
bargain over substance, but to be mindful of building better relationships and
trust that could help future negotiations. In this sense successive negotiations -
even over different matters of substance - become linked. At first blush,
repeated (rather than one-shot) negotiations might be thought to induce modera-
tion. Yet, a bad experience, intentional or not, in an early encounter may
impact through the interactive system and negatively affect later negotiations.
Some bargainers may seek opportunistically to build trust in unimportant rounds
and take advantage of counterparts in encounters with a great deal at stake.
PIN researchers are trying to understand the conditions under which repetition
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improves outcomes over time, when it is harmful, and ways to foster or preclude
it as appropriate.
Theme 4: On cultural styles: Differences within and between cultures
How do various cultures respond to the expressed willingness to negotiate, to
compromise, to the use of third-party intermediaries? What are the differences
in cultural styles that impede fruitful negotiations? Why would country A want
negotiators from country B to know about the sensitivities of country A? Could
a primer for Soviet trade negotiators be written by Western businessmen that
would help negotiations - and vice versa! Differences exist between cultures,
but there may be a great deal of variation within a given culture across different
contexts. For example, the Soviets, the Japanese and Western European coun-
tries may each resolve disputes about family issues, commercial contracts, and
community matters in quite different ways. Are there important differences in
the ways that countries negotiate about security matters versus international
commercial enterprises versus environmental matters? When disagreements per-
sist, it is all too easy to blame "cultural differences" rather than incompatible
differences about substance or poor negotiating skills. PIN researchers are focus-
ing on the role and effects of culture on negotiations among and within various
societies.
Theme 5: Synchronization of internal and external negotiations
Our next theme concerning the structure of most international negotiations has
been pithily articulated by John Dunlop: not only are there negotiations across
the table, but on each side of the table as well. In the simplest form we observe
agents negotiating with each other on behalf of principals in their respective
home countries, in a structure analogous to two lawyers negotiating for their
clients. But this abstraction misses an important complexity: each agent-
negotiator represents not a single principal, but a set of principals who often
disagree among themselves. These principals, all from one country, represent
factions with opposing internal interests. Indeed, we believe that one of the
weakest links in international negotiations is our inability to synchronize internal
and external negotiations. Discord about internal negotiations may inhibit the
ability of our external negotiators to search for creative compromises. And the
interaction between internal and external bargains can become extraordinarily
complex. The agent often plays a dual role: as external negotiator and as inter-
nal mediator.
Theme 6: Creative compensation of internal losers by internal winners
Our previous theme notes that negotiating "sides" are often nonmonolithic.
Even with a superb compromise across the table, there will be losers as well as
winners on each side of the table. For example, think what happens in trade
talks that tear down tariff barriers. Many people (e.g., consumers, importers)
are better off, but a few (e.g., domestic producers) suffer grievously. Economic
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theory says persuasively that internal winners should compensate internal losers
- especially if the internal losers can be blocking minority - in order that
broadly beneficial action (e.g., tariff reduction) be taken. But countries are
rarely skilled in the art of this kind of internal compensation. Just reflect how
badly we do on a purely internal manner of locating noxious facilities: waste-
disposal sites, prisons, etc. "Yes it should be done; it would clearly be of
immense general benefit; but don't put it in my backyard!" And the facilities go
unbuilt. It is often not at all obvious how internal winners can compensate
internal losers in a politically palatable manner. One often overlooked opportun-
ity explores our second theme: use of linked internal negotiations to forge an
acceptable internal compromise.
Theme 7: Coalition dynamics
N-person game theory examines the behavior of players as they jockey for entry
and for power within a set of shifting coalitions. The theory is not tidy even for
the relatively simple case of rational players who use monetary payoffs. The nor-
mative theory has little predictive power nor does it provide prescriptive gui-
dance. In complex negotiations with many issues (e.g., the Law of Sea) a given
country might simultaneously belong to several different coalitions that focus on
different sets of issues (e.g., economic, security, rights of passage). What is
needed are insights, bolstered by a bit of theory and by empirical observations
from real negotiations and laboratory experiments, about how players should
negotiate, within and between coalitions, when several issues with incommen-
surate payoffs are at stake. Researchers are looking both at situations with a few
players (e.g., 3 to 5) and with many players (on the order of 1(0). Surprisingly,
the negotiations with many players often seem to exhibit simpler dynamics than
those with many fewer participants.
Theme 8: The roles of intermediaries or intervenors in international negotia-
tions
For purely domestic disputes there is an array of helpful interventions by third-
party "helpers": facilitators, counselors, fact-finders, ombudsmen, mediators,
"Med-arbitrators", and arbitrators, to mention only the most prominent
"helpers". Intermediaries play key roles in family disputes (in divorce, in settling
estates), in labor management disputes, in community disputes, in environmen-
tal disputes and in other areas. There are a host of alternate dispute resolution
interventions to help ease the burden on the courts and generate better outcomes
for the participants. In the international arena, there are examples where inter-
mediaries have played a helpful role (for example, President Carter at Camp
David or the Pope in the Beagle Channel Dispute between Argentina and Chile).
But there is a paucity of suitable institutions to play comparable roles. In inter-
national disputes questions arise such as: Should an intermediary be invited to
join the negotiations? IT so, by whom? To play what role (e.g., mediator or arbi-
trator)? At what time in the evolution of the dispute? And lastly, who should
that intermediary be? We need to assess how useful third-party involvement can
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be stimulated; what institutional channels are available; how they operate; how
they can be improved; what training would help; what new institutions and
processes should be created.
Theme 9: Role of "neutrals" for fact-finding and for modeling for analysis
One particularly important manifestation of the general problem addressed in
the previous theme involves scientific disputes. How do we get good, fair, impar-
tial analysis for international scientific disputes? Who should be building the
models of atmospheric chemistry, of meteorology and of soil and water chemistry
that could be used in negotiations about acid rain, about ozone depletion, about
CO2 accumulations, about radiation from Chernobyl? To facilitate the neces-
sary learning in a negotiation setting, we need international counterparts of such
US institutions as the Rand Corporation, Resources for the Future, Brookings
Institution, the NRC/NAS committees. Of course, other countries have their
own prestigious scientific institutions playing similar roles. But what interna-
tional institutions can play such roles? Unfortunately UN agencies are often too
politically charged to provide neutral analytical assistance to disputants,
although there are notable exceptions (e.g., the IAEA, WHO, WMO). Can an
intermediary to a dispute help provide analytical support or help to seek rela-
tively "impartial or neutral" analytical support? Can intermediaries help the
disputants to negotiate around a model (as was the case in the Law of the Sea
negotiations)? Can IIASA playa role, or can IIASA spawn an institution that
can playa role?
Theme 10: Knowledge and negotiation: The value of information under
conflict
The issues in many international negotiations are technically complex and the
real interests of the participants unclear. Think of negotiations over fisheries
conservation, transborder pollution such as acid rain, the CO2 buildup, ozone
depletion, renegotiation of foreign debt, arms control, and the like. There is a
particularly acute need in such cases for the parties to learn about the nature of
the problem and about their real interests as well as to bargain to advance their
positions. Often these commingled adversarial and collaborative processes can
become so entangled that neither is carried out very effectively.
In the eloquent words of our joint doctoral student, Arthur Appelbaum:
Negotiators learn and negotiators bargain. Faced with ignorance, they learn with
and from others about the choices that serve their purposes. Faced with conflict,
they bargain over choices with others who pursue different purposes. But because
a negotiator's partner-in-ignorance and adversaries-in-conflict commonly are one
and the same, the two tasks of learning and bargaining tightly interweave. You
often must learn what you want to do as you bargain to get something done.
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The twin tasks of learning and bargaining usually are at odds. Players who hold
information that can help you decide which choices serve your purposes may have
reason to withhold, mislead, or exact a price for their knowledge. And when you
engage in attempts to shape the beliefs of others, you often distort or deflect your
own search for knowledge. But if you fail to learn when you bargain under condi-
tions of uncertainty, you might find in the end that you don't really want what
you bargained for. In this counterpoint of learning and bargaining lies a dilemma:
Horn 1.
Horn 2.
To learn which outcomes serve your interests, you often must jeopard-
ize the chances of attaining those outcomes.
To bargain effectively for specific outcomes, you often must act before
knowing how well thoee outcomes serve your interests.
The configurations of knowledge and interest that propel the learning and bargain-
ing dilemma appear again and again in common and central managerial tasks.
When they budget and invest, develop policies and shape institutional strategies,
organizational players learn under conflict and bargain under uncertainty - and
so, might gore or be gored with one of the dilemma's horns.
Theme 11: Prenegotiations, or negotiating about processes before negotiating
about substance
Before the bell "officially" sounds the start of the negotiations, an intense process
has usually taken place that exerts enormous influence over the final negotiated
results. This process involves working out a formal agenda, which issues will be
joined in which working group, in what order, and by what processes (voting
rules, interim and final deadlines, etc.). These initial choices must be negotiated
and in this sense, prenegotiations are indeed bona fide negotiations. So too, are
many postnegotiation procedures. US-PIN researchers are writing papers on
pre- and post-negotiations, qua negotiations, and examining, in particular, two
upcoming multilateral negotiations: the next round of GATT negotiations and
the Antarctic Treaty.
Theme 12: Negotiation analysis without negotiators: Use of surrogate dispu-
tants
Some disputes are "too hot" to negotiate. Some disputants believe they are
better off not negotiating - not because the alternative to negotiation is so
desirable, but because the outcome of negotiations may be even worse. There
may be an asymmetry of power that negates, in the minds of one or more dispu-
tants, the advantages of negotiations. There may be a perceived weakness in
starting negotiations. But perceptions may be wrong. Can an analyst help?
How can recalcitrant disputants be lured to the formal negotiating table to deal
constructively with their differences? One possibility is to do external analyses,
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sometimes with "surrogate disputants", which may vividly demonstrate the
existence of an array of potential agreements that would be better than the no-
agreement state for each party. Surrogates can be used to help the analyst (1)
capture the essence of dispute, (2) articulate the interests of the disputants and
assess their tradeoff's between conflicting objectives, (3) devise creative options,
(4) formulate starting single-negotiating texts. And lastly, the analyst may be
able to generate attractive alternatives that simultaneously beat the status quo
for all disputants. Finally, real disputants could monitor the psuedo-negotiation
and claim partial ownership of ideas if the process is productive.
Theme 13: Securing insecure contracts through linkages
Our last theme examines the fragility or insecurity of international agreements.
In purely domestic matters, we have a host of institutional arrangements backed
by our judicial and penal systems for ensuring compliance with contracts and for
securing negotiated agreements. There are also international mechanisms for
"securing insecure contracts", but these tend to be weak. The problems of
foreign debt renegotiation - in which past agreements no longer govern rela-
tions between debtors and banks - underscore the importance of an intricate
network of past, ongoing, and future negotiations. Parenthetically, it might well
be easier to get compliance in US-Soviet agreements if our societies were more
intricately interwoven so that any given agreement would be implicitly linked to
many other interactions.
PART V
Theoretical Foundations and
Methods of Analysis - 2
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27.1. Introduction
This chapter is concerned with effectiveness in formation of multilateral coopera-
tion for international conflict solving. We present a game theoretic approach
based on risk assessment.
In the present world, many complex problems involve conflicting national
interests and, for solving them, the processes of international negotiation and
formation of international agreements at some levels are required. These prob-
lems are international nuclear disarmament, international environmental protec-
tion, international opening of economic markets, etc., which include not only
mutual'conflicts among national interests, but also risk in a particular sense for
people in every country. Thus, a hierarchical systems analysis in two levels is
used: national and international. At the national level, a multidimensional risk
function for each country is constructed, which independently reflects national
interests in conflict with each other. At the international level, formation of an
international concord for compromising the national interests is considered. An
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n-person cooperative game in the characteristic function form is used to examine
the effectiveness of an alternative formation of international concord for solving
conflict. Based on the multidimensional risk function, the characteristic function
for the game is derived. The nucleolus as a solution concept is used in its alter-
native function forms.
In the following, Section 27.2 introduces the concept of the multidimen-
sional risk function and presents a multidimensional risk analysis. In Sections
27.3 and 27.4, the nucleolus concept of the cooperative game and its extensions
to the results of the risk analysis are discussed. In Section 27.5, a device to meas-
ure these incomparable solutions with the Pareto or quasi-Pareto optimal pro-
perty in a comparable term is presented. In Section 27.6, a numerical example is
discussed.
27.2. Construction of a Multiattribute Risk Function
2'1.2.1. Multiattribute risk function for a risky event
Multiattribute risk analysis involves a construction of a multidimensional (mul-
tiattribute) risk function (MRF) and its assessment. MRF is constructed as a
result of evaluation with the probability for possible consequences of an event.
Consider an event A that has multiple impacts. Possible consequences of
the event are uncertain and assessed in terms of multiple attributes that are
selected as the measure for consideration of the multiple impacts and treated as
uncertain quantities. Denote a set of m attributes as X ~ {X1, ••• ,Xm } and a
set of their quantities as x ~ {xl""'xm}. A probability function
p~x~, 1= 1,.",m, is assessed subjectively for each attribute x,, A set of probabil-
ity functions P ~ {Pl""'Pm } defines a risk profile of an event A.
The multidimensional risk function (MRF) of the event A is defined on the
risk profile P and represented as
(27.1)
Properties of MRF are as follows:
(i) MRF represents a multidimensional adverse utility (aversion) function
representing negative human preference. That is, a higher order of magni-
tude of the MRF-value indicates a higher degree of aversion for an event A.
(ii) Assessment for MRF is subjectively performed on each element P, in the
n
risk profile P, whose value varies between 0 and I, PI; > 0, and E PI; = 1.
;=1
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(iii) Assessment for MRF includes the value trade-offs between the attributes in
terms of their probability.
Now we must consider representation theorems of MRF.
Assumptions:
(i) Occurrences of attributes for possible consequences of an event A are
independent of each other in the technological and political sense.
(ii) Preference for (aversion to) an attribute is independent of preference for
(aversion to) the other attributes.
(iii) A trade-off between a pair of attributes is assessed independently of trade-
offs of the other pairs of attributes.
Theorem 1 (Representation of MRF)
Under the three assumptions, the multidimensional (multiattribute) risk function
for a state Ej is represented in additive form
m m
R(P1""'Pm) = E k,r,(p,), when E k, = I,
'=1 '=1
or, in multiplicative form,
1 m m
R(P1""'Pm) = K [IT (Kk,r,(p,)+l) - 1], when E k,l= I,
'=1 '=1
(27.2)
(27.3)
m
where 0 < k, < 1. K is a solution of I+K = IT (I+Kk,), where K 1= 0 and
'=1K>-1. O:S: r,:s: 1 and O:s: R :s: 1.
r,(p,) is a unidimensional risk function for a state E j and assessed on the
probability function p~z,), and 8r,j8p, > O.
Proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward on the same line as that for the mul-
tiattribute utility function (MUF) by Keeney and Raiffa (1976). Therefore it will
be omitted here.
Assessment of scaling constants k" 1=I,... ,m, can be performed as the
result of trade-off experiments between probabilities of attributes. The trade-off
experiment is performed on the following questions.
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Consider two probability functions. pr(xr) and p,(x,). for unwanted attributes.
xr and x,. where x, is the most important attribute to be taken into considera-
tion. Suppose that a probability Pr for an occurrence of an unwanted attribute
xr will rise from 0 (the best situation) to 1 (the worst situation). Then. how
much can the decision-maker (DM) admit degradation of the present situation
for the most important attribute x, in terms of its probability?
Question II
Consider a probability function P, for the most important attribute x,. On the
one hand. consider a certain consequence in which the probability P, takes the
value 1 (the worst level). and all the other probabilities Pro r = 1•...• m. r t= 8.
take the value 0 (the best level). On the other hand. consider an uncertain
consequence (lottery) in which all the probabilities P, take the value 1 with a
probability 71" or all the probabilities P, take the value 0 with a probability 1- 71".
How much is the 7I"-value which makes those two consequences (certain and un-
certain) indifferent for the DM?
These experiments correspond to the trade-off experiments for deriving
lert Ie, of MRF and basic Ie,-value estimation. respectively.
2'1.2.2. Multiattribute risk analysis for national interest
The construction of MRF is performed at the national level in a hierarchical sys-
tems analysis for international affairs. A national action results in an event that
has various international influences and over which national interests are in
conflict with each other. Possible consequences of this event are first assessed in
terms of MRF from the point of view of the national interest for each country.
In this process. diversification of risk assessment by collective choice should
be taken into account and thus the degree of national consensus for the assess-
ment of MRF should be examined. We have already presented a fuzzy multiat-
tribute utility analysis for collective choice (Seo and Sakawa. 1985). where a
fuzzification device for the multiattribute utility function (MUF) is introduced
for treating diversification of evaluation by multiple decision-makers (MDM).
For the time being, we will discuss an extension of this device to the assessment
ofMRF.
A device for fuzzy multiattribute risk analysis is as follows.
(i) The unidimensional risk function r, (p~ can be assessed as a fuzzy function
that takes on a fuzzy number. The fuzzy number represents some disper-
sion of evaluation by MDM.
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(ii) A fuzzy preference (aversion) order among the attributes is constructed as
a result of collective choice. A non-fuzzy preference (aversion) order for the
attributes. X, ~Xr ~ ... ~Xt. is obtained, via the defuzzification process
based on Zadeh's proposition (1971). from the fuzzy preferences (aversion)
order. A degree of agreement for the derived preference order is calculated
in a quantitative term. Corresponding to the derived non-fuzzy preference
order of the attributes. a numerical order of the scaling constants 11:, for
rio 1== 1..... m. is determined. The trade-off experiment between probabili-
ties. Pr and P,. is performed on this numerical order of the scaling con-
stants. This experiment derives relative values of the scaling constants
1I:r • r == 1..... m. r :f: 8. in terms of a scaling constant 11:, that is placed for
the most regarded attribute.
(iii) The value of the scaling constant 11:, is also assessed as a fuzzy number such
as the L-R type (Dubois and Prade, 1978). which represents a diver-
sification of evaluation for 11:, due to the collective choice.
(iv) The representation form for MRF. additive or multiplicative. is checked in
terms of fuzzy comparison between the fuzzy numbers (Dubois and Prade.
1980). The question for the fuzzy comparison follows.
Question ill
What is the truth value of the assertion
til _
• E Ie, is greater (or smaller) than 1•
1=1
The separation theorem with a threshold level 9 for two bounded and convex
fuzzy sets (Zadeh. 1965) is used to answer this question.
(v) A fuzzy multidimensional risk function (FMRF) is derived via (i)-(iv).
(vi) By assigning alternative values to the attributes. alternative values of
FMRF can be obtained.
Consider that a national event with some risky properties will occur in a
country. Then risk assessment can be done with FMRF from the point of view
of national interest. The alternative FMRF-values can be calculated for both the
predicted or estimated values and the current values of risk assessment for politi-
cal. economic. and technological consequences that possesses international multi-
ple effects.
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21.3. Nucleolus and Its Extensions for an N-person
Cooperative Game for International Conflict Solving
The FMRF is evaluated for each country confronted with international conflicts
of national interest. For solving international conflicts, international concords
are constructed as the results of multilateral negotiations. We treat this process
as a formation of a coalition and evaluate its efficiency in terms of an n-person
cooperative game. Each Country i is treated as a player who is a member of a
coalition 8. A characteristic function v(8) for a coalition 8 is defined on a total
of decremental values of FMRF due to the formation of a coalition 8:
(27.4)
where 8t;N, N ~ {l, ...,n}. Ri and Rs are FMRFs for Country i and coalition
8, respectively; Pi and Ps are the risk profiles of a state in an event for them.
The v(8) in (27.4) is a coalition value, which indicates a decrease of the degree of
international risk that occurs from a national event.
Define a payoff vector as z ~ {Zl....Zn}, whose elements are decremental
values of FMRF for a player (country) i, i == 1,... ,n, due to the formation of a
coalition.
In terms of an n-person cooperative game in the characteristic function
form, the excess of a value of the game for a coalition 8 over the total payoff
value is defined:
e(8, z) ~ v(8) - z(8), 8eN, (27.5)
where N ~ {l, ... ,n} is a set of n-players (countries), and z(8) ~ E zi' The
iES
excess is regarded as a measure of dissatisfaction with an international coalition
8 at the payoff z. The core is defined as a set of all payoff vectors that cannot be
improved by any coalition, and is shown by
e(8, z) $ 0 (coalition rationality) (27.6)
n
along with zeN) - v(N) = 0, where zeN) ~ E zi'
i=l
The existence and uniqueness of the core are not necessarily assured in all
cases. Thus, by relaxing the definition of the core (27.6), the concept that
defines the quasi-core is introduced [Shapley and Shubik (1966), Schmeidler
(1969), Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley (1979)1.
Define the (strong) f-core as a quasi-core concept relaxed with a parameter
fas
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e(S,z) ~ v(S) - z(S) :$ f, for all S:j: 4>, N,
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along with v(N) = zeN). It means that the payoff vector cannot be improved by
any coalition S, when a relaxing parameter f is imposed on the payoff z(S). The
meaning of f is interpreted as a tax transfer or a subsidy by an international
mediator and represents an international adjustment factor. Based on this con-
cept, the smallest f-core that maximizes the excess is constructed, which is
defined as
f O (z) = min max e(S,z)
zEX SI.,N
(27.8)
where X is a set of preimputations that satisfies the collective rationality,
zeN) = v(N). fo(Z) shows the payoff vector that minimizes the maximum dissa-
tisfaction of the coalition S, and is called the least core, which provides the
nucleolus N (z) of the game feN, v) via lexicographic ordering of the excess.
The lexicographic ordering is defined as follows. Let
8(z) ~ [81 (z), 8 2 (z), ... ,8 2"(z)]
be the 2"-vector whose elements are the number 8 1 ~ e(Sl' z), k = 1,... ,2", on
SeN arranged in a nonincreasing order. The lexicographic order is given by the
relation 8(z):$ L 8(11), which holds when 8 i (z) = 8 i (lI) for all i < j and
8 i (z) < 8 i (II). This means that, if there exists equality between the maximal
values of the excess 8 i (z) and 8 i (II), i = 1,2,... , that are arranged in a nonin-
creasing order, then the next greatest values of the excess, 8 i (z) and 8 i (II), are
compared with each other, and so on. The comparison is continued sequentially
until the inequality is found. Then, the nucleolus of a game is defined as the set
of payoff vectors such that
N(z) ~ {z E X I 8(z) :$ L 8(11) for all II E :d (27.9)
Naturally, the payoff vector z is more acceptable than II. In other words, the
nucleolus is defined as the payoff vector that minimizes the maximum excess.
The nucleolus as the solution concept for the quasi-core is obtained by solv-
ing at most n-1 liner programming problems [Kopelowitz (1967), LittIechild
(1974), Owen (1974)].
As an extension of the nucleolus, define the concept of augmented f-core
that is enlarged with a parameter IJ as
e,,(S,z) ~ v(S) - z(S) :$ IJf (27.10)
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along with v(N) = z(N). The nucleolus )/(JL) is redefined on the augmented f-
core, and an augmented nucleolus is obtained as a solution by running repeti-
tively a linear program. Consider the Q-normalization that is defined with
v({i}) =0 for all iEN. The augmented nucleolus )/(JL) is obtained by solving the
following linear program, and the fo(z)-value (27.8) is found.
(P)
minimize f
subject to
z, ~ 0 for i EN
v(S) - (z(S) + JL f) ~ 0 for all SeN
v(N) - z(N) = 0
(27.11)
The interpretation of the primal problem (27.11) with the augmenting
parameter JL is clear. When JL = 1, the solution to (P) provides the nucleolus.
When JL = s, the weak nucleolus is obtained, where s denotes the number of
players in a coalition S (Shapley and Shubik, 1966). When JL = v(S), the pro-
portional nucleolus is obtained (Young, Okada, and Hashimoto, 1982). Sakawa
and others (1983) proposed the concession nucleolus when JL = E~, where ~,
'ES I
is the Shapley value. The Shapley value is defined as
E (s-I)!(,n-s)! [v(S) - v(S - {i})]·
SeN n.
S3'
(27.12)
The second term of the Shapley value represents the marginal amount of contri-
bution of a player i to the value of coalition S. The first term represents a total
of the relative frequency for a player i to appear in every coalition S. Thus the
value E ~, shows a total of the marginal contribution by each player to every
iES
coalition S weighted by the relative frequency of appearance of each player. The
concept of the concession nucleolus defined in terms of (27.10) shows that the
excess or the dissatisfaction of a coalition S should be divided by the sum of the
marginal contributions of each player in the coalition S. In this concept, some
kind of externality or "opportunity cost" for the participation of each player i is
taken into account for every coalition S. Alternatively, when
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p. = v(N) - v(N - S), the contribution nucleolus is found for a coalition S, as
we call it here. These concepts enlarge the quasi-core concept in alternative
ways.
21.4:. Evaluation of an International Concord
At the international level in the hierarchical systems analysis, in which the game
theoretic approach is used, the obtained FMRF-value for a country i is shown as
wt = R· - zt i E NI I I , (27.13)
where Wj E Wj = RN , represents an international allocation of total risk gen-
• JEN
erated from a national policy with international effects among each country i
after the construction of an international concord among n countries.
Alternative solutions zt ~ {zI ,... ,z,t} of the augmented nucleolus provide
alternative payoff values for each player (country). These solutions depend on
alternative criteria and are not unique for the final decision.
For choosing the preferred solutions z* from among the alternative solu-
tions zt, we can examine the dual optimal solutions 111 and liN generated from
alternative programming formulations for the augmented nucleoli.
The interpretation of the dual variables is derived from the Lagrangian
function of the primal problem (27.11):
L ~ E+ E lis {v(S) - [z(S) + P.E]} + flN[v(N) - z(N)j (27.14)
S~N
Then, according to the sensitivity theorem of mathematical programming,
considering that all variables E, Zj, fls and fiN are all functions of
v(S) and v(N), from the Kuhn-Tucher conditions, one derives
8E8v(S) = fls for lis > 0, SeN,
at optimum. It is known, from the first-order optimality conditions, that
(27.15)
(27.16)
- E fls = liN and
SeN
S3i
E lisP. = 1.
SeN
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The dual variable lis represents a trade-off between the "tax transfer" variable f
and the coalition value v(8) for every coalition 8. This property is also held for
the grand coalition N. In other words, the evaluation prices lis, 8 c N, for each
coalition 8 and liN for the grand coalition are imputed inversely corresponding to
the marginal changes of the coalition values v(8) and v(N), that are made com-
mensurable in terms of a marginal increment of the "tax transfer" variable f.
The lis and liN indicate inversely the shadow prices or opportunity costs of the
coalition values measured commonly in marginal terms of the "tax transfer"
variable f. Larger values of lis and liN show relative inefficiency of v(S) and
v(N), because a smaller value of maximum f is more desirable in this case.
These values lis and liN can be used as the measure of satisfaction with the coali-
tions (concords) 8 and N. The augmenting parameter IJ denotes a discount fac-
tor that indicates a deviation from the balance game. When IJ = 1, the nucleolus
implies that the game is balanced. Figure f!7.1 represents a summary of these
results.
cases 115 for v(S) 7IN for v(N) equilibrium conditions
nucleolus a£ a£
- E 715= 7INav(S) =715 av(N) =7IN SeN
53;
715> 0 E 715= 1, 715 ~ 0
SeN
a£ a£
- E 715 = 7INav(S) =715 av(N) 7IN
augmented SeN
nucleolus
53;
715> 0 E 115 P. = 1, 715 ~ 0
SeN
a, ( a,
-(1+r) E 715 = 7INav(S) = 1+')715 av(N) =7IN
disruption SeN
nucleolus·
53;
715> 0 - E 7IS(v(S)-z(S)) = 1,
SeN
715> 0
Note. IJ =1: nucleolus. IJ =,: weak nucleolus. p. = II(S): propertional nucleolus. IJ = ~ ~i:
ieS
concession nucleolus. IJ = II(N) - II(N - S): contribution nucleolus.
Figure £1.1. Evaluation for nucleolus.
27.5. The Role of the Mediator in International
Conflict Solving
The alternative solution concepts of the augmented nucleolus provide alternative
payoff values and construct alternative risk allocation plans for each country.
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National interests in these alternative plans are in conflict with each other. Gen-
erally, any selection rule among the alternatives has not so far existed. In this
chapter, the dual optimal solutions of mathematical programming formulated for
the game provide an analytical measure for comparative consideration of the
alternative plans. However, in the next stage at the international level of the
hierarchical systems analysis, the role of the mediator as an international coordi-
nator should be introduced for resolving more complex problems of international
politics.
In this stage, political decisions at a higher level should be made for reach-
ing a more acceptable agreement among countries. The role of international
organizations will be crucial at this stage. Although scientific and quantitative
analysis for international conflict solving, which has been presented in the
preceding sections, provides some reference material for decision support, there
is still some room for international mediator to make a final decision.
21.6. Example
For simplicity, we will treat here an event A as a result of a national policy of a
country B. Suppose that the country intends to promote an industrial develop-
ment program on a coastal area of the upper stream of a large international
river. This development program will have multiple adverse effects, which are
economic, environmental and aesthetic, via emission and discharge of various
pollutants in several countries. Thus, the national event A has a property of an
international affair.
For coping with adverse effects for many countries, the two-level approach
is used. First, at the national level, an MRF for each country is evaluated for
multiple attributes such as decrease of income from fishing, forestry, agriculture
and tourism, and damage to human health, etc. The degree of belief for the
occurrence of these effects is still under uncertainty. Thus, these effects are
evaluated in terms of MRF for each country independently of the others. The
fuzzification due to collective choice in a country can lead to a constant FMRF
for each country. Second, at the international level, affected countries will parti-
cipate in negotiation with country B to mitigate the adverse effects. Alternative
coalitions can be formed among these countries. Thus, game theory is applied.
Suppose that five countries are affected by B. Suppose that, at the
national level, the evaluation of FMRF Rj(pj), i = 1,...,5, has already been done
for each country i. For simplicity, we will use a "mean" value of the fuzzy
number as the FMRF-value. These values are shown in Figure 27.2. Then, at
the international level, the characteristic function v(S) of the five-player coopera-
tive game is defined as
(27.17)
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v(S) ~ 100( E lRi(Pi) - RS(p,)) S ~ N
iES 8
N ~ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
v j11 = 0,2
v 3 = 0,
v 4 = 0,
v 5 = 0,
v 1, 2} = 70 - 60 = 10
v 1,3 = 78 - 65 = 13
v 1,4 = 83 - 68 = 15
v 1, 5} = 68 - 55 = 13
v 2, 3 = 73 - 59 =14
v 2, 4 = 78 - 59 = 19
v(2, 5) = 63 - 55 = 8
v(3, 4) = 85 - 70 = 15
v(3, 5) = 70 - 58 = 12
v(4, 5) = 75 - 55 =20
v(l, 2, 3) = 73 - 55 = 18
v(l, 2, 4) =77 - 50 = 27
v(l, 2, 5) = 67 - 50 = 17
R 1 = 0.75
R 2 = 0.65
R 3 = 0.80
R4 = 0.90
R 6 = 0.60
v(1,3,4) = 82 - 50 = 32
v(1,3,5) = 72 - 53 = 19
VI1,4,5) = 75 - 50 = 25
v 2,3,4} = 78 - 48 = 30
v 2,3,5 =68 - 50 = 18
v(2,4,5 = 72 - 48 = 24
v(3,4,5) = 77 - 45 =32
v(1,2,3,4) : 78 - 38: 40
v(1,2,3,5) - 70 - 37 - 33
v(1,2,4,5) = 73 - 35 =38
v(l,3,4,5) = 76 - 34 =42
v(2,3,4,5) = 74 - 33 =41
v(1,2,3,4,5) = 74 - 20 = 54
Figure 11.1. Estimated values of the characteristic function.
where S~N, N ~ {1,... ,5}, and evaluated as shown in Figure 21.2. In this
evaluation (27.17), national equity is considered. The payoff values generated
from alternative concepts of the nucleolus are shown in Figure e1.9. The
obtained risk values (27.13) are also calculated there. As a result, the payoff
values show that the most benefit will be brought to Player (Country) 4, the
largest risk taker. However, among the alternative augmented nucleolus con-
cepts, there are small conflicts of national interest. For Countries 3 and 4, the
proportional nucleolus is most beneficial but, for the other countries, the
nucleolus, weak nucleolus and contribution nucleolus are most beneficial. As a
reference for choosing the preferred policy, the dual optimal vectors are gen-
erated and examined for the alternative nucleolus concepts. The results are
shown in Figure 21.•. It is known that, for the grand coalition, the nucleolus is
the most preferable and the weak nucleolus is second and so on. Efficiency is
decreasing in order, toward the right. However, the final decision can be made
by the international mediator based on these evaluations, but without any
rigorous restraint by the above analytical results.
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Player: i 1 2 3 4 5
Individual risk: Ri 0.75 0.65 0.80 0.90 0.60
Payoff'vector: zi (x 100)
Nucleolus: IJ == 1 8.60 7.60 11.60 16.60 9.60
Weak nucleolus: IJ == • 8.60 7.60 11.60 16.60 9.60
Proportional nucleolus:
IJ == II(S) 8.35 7.24 11.69 17.26 9.46
Concession nucleolus:
IJ == E~i 8.44 7.38 11.64 17.07 9.46
ie.
Contribution nucleolus:
IJ == II(N) - II(N-S) 8.60 7.60 11.60 16.60 9.60
Obtained risk value:
Wi (x 100)
Nucleolus: IJ == 1 66.40 57.40 68.40 73.40 50.40
Weak nucleolus: IJ == • 66.40 57.40 68.40 73.40 50.40
Proportional nucleolus:
IJ == II(S) 66.65 57.76 68.31 72.74 50.54
Concession nucleolus:
IJ == E~i 66.56 57.62 68.36 72.93 50.54
ie.
Contribution nucleolus:
IJ == II(N) - ~(N-S) 66.40 57.40 68.40 73.40 50.40
Figure 17.9. Numerical results for nucleolus.
Nucleolus Weak Propor- Concession Contri-
nucleolus tional nucleolus bution
nucleolus nucleolus
115 for II(S):
vi1,2,3,4)
v 1,2,3,5)
v(l,2,4,5) 0.20 0.05 0.00515 0.00463 0.0037
vi 1,3,4,5)
v 2,3,4,5)
1IN for II(N):
v(1,2,3,4,5) -0.80 -0.20 - 0.02062 - 0.01852 - 0.01481
maximum
f-value - 4.4 -1.1 - 0.1134 - 0.10185 - 0.08148
Figure 17..1- The dual vectors for coalitions and maximal f-value.
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Checking representation fo~ using
fuzzy-number comparison
Comparison of FMRF
Deriving fuzzy multiattribute
ris~ functions (FMRF)
R(Pl' PZ.···. Pili)
Assessing a basic scaling constant
as a fuzzy member ks
Assessing scaling constants with
relative value trade-offs experiments
k l /ks ' kz/ks ••••• km/ks
Determining preference ordering among
the attributes Xs 'r Xt (" ••• t x"
Deriving single-attribute risk functions
~ . [ RZ(P2) I . . . IR.(PIII) I
Figure tn.S. The operational method for deriving the FMRF.
Fuzzifi-
cation
T
Fuzzifi-
cation
--L
2nd
level
1st
level
1
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28.1. Introduction
There is a vast multiplicity of examples demonstrating that international nego-
tiations often extend over rather long periods (e.g., several years) and end with
no agreement at all, although an immediate agreement would be mutually
beneficial. The most drastic and tragic examples are obviously international
wars, where failing to reach an agreement usually implies heavy casualties and
costly damages each day. But as we know from the theory of international
trade, a delay in reaching an agreement on international trade or an interna-
tional commitment to reduce the pollution of air and international rivers and
lakes might also imply serious welfare losses. Thus it is an important task to
explain why we observe long international negotiations and why they often fail to
reach an agreement although international cooperation would be mutually
beneficial. Only through understanding the causes of these phenomena can one
hope to improve international cooperation, e.g., by changing the conditions and
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rules of international negotiations. Related to this is the problem that long
processes of international negotiations often yield no agreement at all, although
mutually profitable possibilities for cooperation exist.
Of course, it would be naive to expect that one can explain the time aspect
of the results of all international negotiations by one theoretical approach. So
the simple fact that many international negotiations take place at rather attrac-
tive places - for instance, Vienna in spring - naturally implies that the nego-
tiators will want to stay at least for some days. Another reason for longer inter-
national negotiations might be that the negotiating individuals have to demon-
strate to their own constituencies how important they are. The last phenomenon
is more thoroughly discussed in the context of collective wage bargaining, where
trade union leaders have to prove to their members how effective they are in
improving working conditions.
Here we do not want to rely on such arguments referring to selfish motiva-
tions of the negotiators. A more important reason, in our view, for long and
sometimes unsuccessful international negotiations is that national delegations are
often not completely informed about the possible moves, the information condi-
tions and the final goals of other countries. Thus, national delegations need time
to find out the types of others and/or to demonstrate their own style and priori-
ties. Usually this happens in the form of proving that certain proposals are by
no means acceptable, Le., one strictly refuses one possible agreement, although
this can imply that one cannot reach an agreement at all. Thus our approach to
explaining the time aspect of international negotiations as well as their results
views long international negotiations as a process where bargainers try strategi-
cally to conceal or reveal their types depending on the perceived profitability of
such measures. We show that a type-differentiating solution necessarily requires
more than just one bargaining round and involves a positive risk of conflict in
the case where no mutually profitable agreement is reached. Thus, there is a
rational explanation for long international negotiations even if they do not
always end with a mutually beneficial agreement.
Our analysis will assume that all negotiating parties know at least their
own type. This means that they have a complete preference ordering over all
possible negotiation results. In other words, we will assume rational negotiators,
as is usually done in game theoretic studies. Of course, most of the phenomena
discussed below (e.g., to prove their own type by risking conflict) will be present
even in the case of negotiators with limited rationality. But if the negotiating
parties are not completely rational, the negotiation process as such can serve
other purposes than in the case of rational decision-makers. Most importantly, a
limited rationality approach to international negotiations would view long inter-
national negotiations as a way by which the negotiating countries find out how
the conceivable negotiation results should be evaluated. During long negotiation
processes, limited rational negotiators will often try to learn why other parties
argue for special results and whether these results will support or endanger their
own positions. Our study, like any other game theoretic study, neglects the fact
that international negotiations often have to last for longer time periods, since
the negotiating parties do not know from the very beginning how the possible
results should be evaluated.
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In Section 28.2 we briefly introduce bargaining (games) with incomplete
information. Section 28.3 provides some examples showing that international
bargaining with incomplete information can extend over several negotiation
rounds, and the probability of reaching no agreement at all is positive. Our final
remarks discuss how our theoretical approach can be used to explain the results
of ongoing international negotiations and how their prospects for yielding an
agreement could be improved.
28.2. On Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
To avoid the impression that our approach is restricted to bilateral negotiations,
we assume n (> 1) countries trying to reach an international agreement. Infor-
mation about other countries is incomplete if one does not know their possible
moves, the information conditions at all possible stages of the negotiation process
and how other countries evaluate the possible negotiation results. It can be
shown (Harsanyi, 1967-1968) that all these information deficits can be reflected
by not knowing the evaluation of the negotiation results by others.
Imagine, for instance, country i, which does not know whether another
country i can really afford the cost of an international agreement reducing its
pollution of air and water. This is remodeled by assuming that country j can
reduce its pollution in any case, but that one possible "type of country i" , would
evaluate such a measure as extremely costly, making sure that in equilibrium
this type will refrain from signing an agreement imposing such a measure on
country j. Thus the expectations of country i concerning country i are ade-
quately reflected by assuming that country i expects two types of country j, of
which one will never sign the contract reducing pollution of air and water.
To define more precisely the possible types of the various negotiating coun-
tries 1,... ,n, assume that there is a given set A (I tP) of possible bargaining agree-
ments including the status quo e when no agreement is reached. Here a poten-
tial agreement a in A with ale has to be seen as a complete description of all
possible details of an international contract, e.g., an international customs agree-
ment or the foundation of a common market such as the European Economic
Community (EEC). A possible type t j of country i can then be described as one
possible evaluation of all agreements a in A by country j, i.e., t j is mapping.
(28.1)
Here tj(a) is the utility/welfare which alternative a yields for type t j of country
j.
Let Tj(1 tP) denote the set of possible types tj of country i (including the
true type) as expected by any other country. The main trick of modeling bar-
gaining (games) with incomplete information (Harsanyi, 1967-1968) is to extend
the bargaining analysis to all possible type constellations
(28.2)
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Thus. in analyzing the situation. country j not only considers what it will
do given its true type. but also what it would do for any other possible evalua-
tions t j expected in other countries. In the terminology of game theory. this can
be expressed by saying that we do not solve the game with players 1•...•n. but
with all possible types of all countries 1.....n as players.
The game with types as players results by introducing a fictitious initial
chance move determining the vector t = (tl .....t") of types tj E Tj of the nego-
tiating countries j = 1.....n. The result of this chance move is assumed to be
only partially revealed to individual countries so as to capture the information
deficits concerning other countries. So country i will be informed about its own
type. but not necessarily about the types t j of other countries j(fi). By the con-
ditional probabilities assigned to the different outcomes tE T. given one's own
type. one can. furthermore. reflect all subjective beliefs concerning the types of
others [as shown by Selten (1982). one does not have to impose any restrictions
on subjective beliefs; for an application of Selten's idea to international politics.
see Giith (1985)1. Thus one solves an informationally closed game where incom-
plete information about types of others is transformed into strategically
equivalent stochastic uncertainty resulting from unobservable chance moves.
In Figure 28.1. we have graphically visualized a bargaining game with
incomplete information where n = 2. A contains two possible results - namely.
the only possible agreement a and the conflict (no agreement) point c. Player 1
is of one possible type. which evaluates a by al and c by cl' Player 2 has two
possible types t2 and t2 evaluating a and c by t2(a). t2(c) and t2(a). t2(c).
respectively. Player 1 expects type t 2 with probability p and t2 with probability
1 - p what is known by player 2. After the chance move determining player 2's
type, player 1 has to choose between accepting the only possible agreement a
(decision Ill) or not (decision nl)' Then depending on his type player 2 must
decide between acceptance of a (decision 1/2 and Y2) or not (decision n2 and N2).
The only possible agreement a is reached if both players have accepted it.
The obvious solution concept for bargaining games with incomplete infor-
mation is the (perfect) equilibrium point \Cournot (1838), Nash (1951). Selten
(1975)\. For our purposes we can define a (perfect) equilibrium point as a stra-
tegy vector for the game with types as players where every player loses by devi-
ating unilaterally. To give an example. consider the game illustrated in Figure
28.1 where
(28.3)
Since both player 1 and type t 2 of player 2 prefer a over c. they both will
accept the only possible agreement a. Type t2 of player 2. however. prefers c to
a and therefore chooses N 2• Thus the only (perfect) equilibrium point under the
parameter restriction (28.3) is the strategy vector
(28.4)
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Figure lS.1. A tw~person bargaining game with asymmetric incomplete information
and one poll8ible agreement a (first chance chooses the type t 2 or £2 of player 2 with
probability p and 1 - p, respectively; then player 1 decides between VI and "1
without knowing player 2's typej finally, player 2 chooses between A V2 and "2 or
y 2 and N2 depending on his typej payoffs are given in the order 1, t 2, t2 at each end-
point)
324 W. GiltJa and R. SelUn
If t2 is present, agreement a is reached, whereas in the case of £2 conflict c
results. It should be mentioned that the probability p of reaching the agreement
a reflects only the expectations of player 1. Player 2 knows his own true type
and can therefore conclude from the solution (28.4) whether bargaining will yield
agreement a or conflict c.
28.3. Type-Revealing and -Concealing Negotiation Processes
Let us first discuss the extreme cases of type-revealing and -concealing negotia-
tions processes where countries either immediately reveal their types or conceal
them forever. To demonstrate this, consider that the game of Figure ea.l is
played not once, but successively for infinitely many periods. Thus, to have an
ongoing cooperation, agreement a, which is valid only for the period ahead, has
to be periodically renewed [see Selten and Giith (1982), for another example of
such a situation].
For the parameter restrictions (28.3) it is clear that neither t2 nor £2 will
want to conceal his type. Since t2 prefers agreement a and £2 the non-agreement
c, they both will immediately reveal their type so that player 1 will know
immediately (after the first period) the true type of player 2. The reason is that
no type of player 2 can gain by imitating the other and thereby concealing his
own type.
To demonstrate that it can pay to conceal the true type of 2 forever,
assume that 1 and 2 are the only countries in the world producing a certain com-
modity, e.g., a natural resource. Whereas 1 and t2 are assumed to have the same
constant cost c (~ 0) per unit, the constant cost c per unit of £2 is considerably
higher. There are no capacity restrictions and in case of competition countries
have to choose their sales prices independently of each other, Le., they are
engaged in a Bertrand-duopoly game [Bertrand (1883); for a more recent survey
see Allen and Hellwig (1986)1.
Now, given our assumptions, competition of 1 and t2 implies that both set
prices equal to c and therefore earn 0 profits. If type £2 is present, price com-
petition will obviously result in a price marginally below c or at the monopoly
price, Le., only country 1 will sell a positive amount and earn a positive profit.
The only possible periodic agreement a can be seen as an attempt to avoid
the disastrous consequences of price competition for 1 and t 1 by arranging that
both set their prices equal to the monopoly price and sell an equal share of the
monopoly sales amount. Let us assume that the monopoly price is only slightly
higher than c and that country 1 competes with £2' In this case country 1 will
earn the monopoly profit even without the cooperative agreement a. Country 1
must therefore compare the expected gain from cooperating with t2 with the
expected loss from transferring part of its higher competitive profit to type £2'
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Provided the market parameters are such that country 1 prefers agreement
a to competition e. type £2 of country 2 will obviously never want to reveal him-
self. If country 1 learned that country 2 is of type £2' it would immediately stop
renewing the agreement periodically and improve upon its result by setting its
price marginally below e. Knowing this. type £2 will always want to copy type
t 2• Even if country 1 would not accept a for one period in order to learn about
country 2's true type. type £2 would set his price equal to e in order to convince
country 1 that he is not of type £2. Here it is. of course. implicitly assumed that
£2's discount rate is not too high. If in equilibrium country 1 knows this. it will
not invest in such a costly experiment so that £2's costly threat to set his price
equal to e will never have to be executed. We therefore have an equilibrium of
the infinitely often repeated game of Figure eS.l according to which all three
players. country 1 and both types of country 2. will always renew the agreement
a. and according to which country 1 will never learn whether type t 2 or type £2
of country 2 is present.
We now want to describe in a non-technical way how negotiation processes
with type-differentiating results. i.e.• how different types of the same players
reach agreements with differing profitability. require a certain duration of the
negotiation process and how more profitable results can be obtained only by fac-
ing a higher risk of conflict.
As a theoretical background. we could use the model of sequential bargain-
ing under incomplete information theoretically analyzed by Rubinstein (1985).
According to this model one of the two players makes a proposal tit (E A) in
each round t = 1.2.3•...• which the other can either accept or reject. Whereas. in
the case of acceptance. bargaining ends with the corresponding agreement tit.
rejection implies that now the other player can select a proposal tIt+l(EA) in the
next round t + 1. etc. Rubinstein. who assumes positive time costs of bargain-
ing. determines all relevant negotiation results by refining the concept of
subgame perfect equilibrium points in an intuitive way. On the other hand, it is
not straightforward how this analysis can be extended to cover bargaining with
more than two players.
An interesting alternative of the model analyzed by Rubinstein is the model
of Harsanyi and Selten (1972). who assume that all players i = 1•...•n simultane-
ously can make a periodic proposal ai and that all previous proposals are bind-
ing. i.e.• an agreement a in A is reached if now or before all players have
accepted it. That is. for all players i=l •...•n there must exist some T:5 t such
that a = a~ . .Bargaining ends with conflict e if in one period t no player i makes
a proposal a: which he has not made before. i.e.• conflict results from the first
negotiation round t without a concession. If A is finite. bargaining will therefore
have to end after finitely many rounds of bargaining.
The disadvantage of the Harsanyi-Selten model is that it may have many
(perfect) equilibria if the set A contains many agreements that are mutually
profitable irrespective of type vector t = (tl•...•tn ). But as shown by Harsanyi
and Selten (1972). one can select one of these equilibria as the solution by impos-
ing some reasonable solution requirements. Here we will use the Harsanyi-Selten
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model. But instead of describing their solution concept in detail, we will simply
rely on properties that any type differentiating equilibrium point has to satisfy.
Type-differentating equilibrium negotiation processes are time-consuming,
since a type tj of player i who reaches a better agreement than another type t/
of player i must give a risk proof of his superior bargaining power. By a risk
proof we mean that tj is willing to fight for the better result, although this
implies a higher risk of conflict. During the negotiation process a risk proof of tj
is typically of the form that, at a certain stage of the process, type t j repeats an
old proposal, Le., makes no concession, whereas t/ proposes some new agreement
in order to avoid the possible deadlock where no player makes a concession and
where conflict I: therefore results.
Consider the situation where two bargaining parties 1 and 2 have to divide
an amount of 100, Le., the set A is the set of all possible allocations a = (ai' 02)
with a1 + a2 = 100 and a1 ~ 0, a2 ~ 0. Let all possible types tj E T j of party
i = 1,2 evaluate all agreements a in A with a f: I: by the amount allocated to
party i, Le.,
for all a E A, a f: 1:. Thus, types tj E Tj of player i can only differ with respect
to the evaluation tj ( 1:) of conflict I: EA. An an obvious interpretation of such a
situation is that one does not know the opportunity costs that an agreement
a(f: 1:) implies for the others, Le., how much others can earn in case of no agree-
ment.
In Figure 28.2 we have illustrated a type-differentiating solution for a situa-
tion with n = 2 where tj ( 1:) = I:j is the amount which type t j of player i receives
in case of conflict c. The entries of the matrix are either the amount a1 allocated
to party 1 (if a f: 1:) or conflict 1:. Since in the case of an agreement a in A
with a f: I: the payoffs a1 and a2 add up to 100, one can use a1 to describe an
agreement a(f: 1:). In Figure 28.2 we have determined a1 by distributing equally
the surplus 100 -1:1 -1:2' Le.,
a1 = 1:1 + (100 - 1: 1 - 1:2)/2·
Conflict I: is imposed whenever it was impossible to give more than c to
both parties.
The time-consuming aspect of type-differentiating solutions can now be
illustrated very easily with the help of Figure 28.2. Assume that in the first
round of bargaining for i = 1,2 all types tj E T j of player i propose the agree-
ment a with a1 = 90, Le., both party 1 and party 2 demand 90 out of 100. Since
no agreement a is reached, bargaining has to continue with the second round. IT
player i is of type t j with tj ( 1:) = 80, he will repeat his proposal in the second
round. Now, if both players i = 1 and i = 2 are of type tj ( 1:) = 80, this leads to
conflict I: in the second round of bargaining, since no party has made a conces-
sion. On the other hand, a type tj(l:) with tj(l:) < 80 will concede by making a
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c2
0 20 40 60 80
cl
0 50 40 30 20 10
20 60 50 40 30 C
40 70 60 50 C C
60 80 70 C C C
80 90 C C C C
Figure fB.f. A type-differentiating solution for n = 2 in the special situation where for
i = 1,2 type8 t j E T j differ only with respect to the evaluation tj(c) = C of conflict C i
the entry of the matrix is either the agreement payoff al of player 1 or C in the case of
conllict.
new proposal, e.g., the one by which he demands only 80 for himself. Thus, bar-
gaining can continue although no agreement has been reached in round 2.
Let us mention some possible negotiation processes yielding the results
described by Figure f!8.f!. For cl = 90 and c2 = 0, the bargaining process could
be described as in Table f!8.1.
Ta6le fB.l. A negotiation proceBII yielding the agreement /I = (90, 10) with a risk proof
for type tl(e) = 90 in round t = 2 to t = 9 where the agreement is reached.
Round Proposal by tl(c) = 80 Proposal by t2(c) = 0
1 (90, 10) (10,90)
2 (90, 10) (20,80)
3 (90,10) (30,70)
4 (90,10) (40,60)
5 (90,10) (50,50)
6 (90,10) (60,40)
7 (90,10) (70,30)
8 (90,10) (80,20)
9 (90,10) (90,10)
The assumption behind Table f!8.1 is that types tj( c) concede step by step
by allocating 10 more to their opponent as long as their own agreement level aj
according to Table f!8.1 has not been reached. In the special case of Table f!8.1
this means that player 2 gives in step by step until the agreement a = (90, 10) is
reached.
In Tables f!8.f! and f!8.9 we have described negotiating processes where first
both players concede and where one player continues to concede until an agree-
ment is reached (Table f!8.f!) or until he also stops to give in (Table f!8.9).
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To6le t8.t. A negotiation process yielding the agreement 0 = (50, 40) where first both
players concede, then only player 2 until the agreement is reached.
Round Proposal by t1(c) = 40 Proposal by t2(c) = 20
1 (90,10) (10,90)
2 (80,20) (20,80)
3 (70,30) (30,70)
4 (60,40) (60,40)
5 (60,40) (SO, SO)
6 (60,40) (60,40)
To6le t8.9. A negotiation process yielding conflict c in the sixth round o( bargaining
where (or the first time no player makes a concession.
Round Proposal by t 1( c) = 40 Proposal by t2 ( c) = 60
1 (90,10) (10,90)
2 (80,20) (20,80)
3 (70,30) (20,80)
4 (60,40) (20,80)
5 (50,50) (20,80)
6 (50,50) (20,80)
These examples should help to illustrate how time-consuming negotiation
processes can yield type-differentiating results involving a considerable risk of
facing conflict. What still has to be explained is why players do not reach an
agreement immediately, e.g., by proposing immediately the agreement a(c)
prescribed by Figure e8.e. One reason is, of course, that players do not know
their opponent's type. But even if he knew t2( c), player 1's type, t 1(c) = 0
would never get 90, according to Figure e8.e, although he first demands 90 for
himself, then 80, etc. The reason for this is that the step-by-step concessions
imply a risk proof of those players who do not make a concession.
As an example, consider the second round of bargaining in Table e8.1.
Here player 1 does not concede, although this would imply c if player 2 were of
type t 2lc) = 80. Similarly, player 1 does not concede in the third round,
although (; would result in the case of t2(c) = 60, if t2(c) = 60 would repeat his
demand of 80. Here it is, of course, essential that the type t j with bargaining
power superior to that of t' j in the sense of tiec) > t' i( c) is willing to accept the
higher risk of conflict whereas the type t' j will prefer to avoid it. In other words,
the higher risk of conflict involved by the attempt to reach a more profitable
agreement ensures that the superior type tj will not be imitated by the weaker
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type t'i of player i. That is why we say that a type-differentiating solution has
to rely on risk proofs of superior bargaining strength.
Of course, for the examples of type-differentiating negotiation processes
described in Figure !!a.!! and Tables !!a.1-9, one would have to show that a supe-
rior type will actually prefer to face the higher risk of conflict c whereas a weaker
type prefers to concede. Selten (1975) has analyzed a specific example with
n = 2 and two possible types for each player in detail and shown that the solu-
tion can be a type-differentiating equilibrium point relying on a time-consuming
negotiation process.
For an example where t1(c) = 80 is willing to accept a risk proof that
t 1(c) = 60 does not accept, consider again Figure !!a.!!. Since t 1(c) = 80 can
either maintain his demand of 90 or decrease his demand to 80, he clearly will
prefer not to concede. On the other hand, type t2( c) = 60 can earn 90 only if he
meets a player 2 of types t2( c) = 0 whereas the next best result of 80 can be
reached in the case of types t2( c) = 0 and t2( c) = 20.
Let F2(t2( c) = (2) denote the probability by which type t1(c) = 60 of
player 1 expects player 2 to be of type t2(c) = c2. Type t1(c) = 60 has to com-
pare the expected dividend 30 F2( t2 ( c) = 0) for not conceding in the second
round with the expected dividend 10{F2(t2(c) = 0) + F2(t2(c) = 20)} implied
by maintaining a demand of 70 starting in the third round. One can easily see
that for
type t1(c) = 60 of player 1 will prefer to concede a = (70,30) instead of main-
taining his demand for a = (90, 10) by imitating the superior type t 1(c) = 80 of
player 1. Since the type t'l(c) with t'l(c) < t1(c) will lose more in the case of
conflict than t 1(c), he will be less eager than t 1(c) to fight for more ambitious
results. Owing to these different incentives of the different types, risk proofs of
superior types can support a type-differentiating equilibrium negotiation process.
28.4. Final Remarks
The main conclusion of the above analysis is that often type-differentiating
solutions have to rely on risk proofs of types and that such risk proofs require
several negotiation rounds and a positive risk of conflict even in the case when
mutually profitable agreements exist. In our view many international agree-
ments reveal type-differentiating solutions, since countries that do not care about
certain international problems (e.g., pollution of international waters) usually
contribute little or nothing to overcome the problem.
Consider, for instance, an international agreement to stop the pollution of
the Rhine. Obviously, the tremendous costs of such an endeavor can be covered
only if those countries using the Rhine as a water reservoir have a strong interest
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in improving the quality of their drinking water. One can easily imagine situa-
tions where an agreement to stop the pollution of the Rhine can be achieved only
if at least some of the countries reveal their strong interests in improving the
quality of Rhine water and thereby their willingness to cover a considerable part
of the necessary costs. IT many countries are engaged, one country will often try
to hide its own strong interests in order to make the other countries pay more.
Such international negotiations will be a process during which countries strategi-
cally hide and reveal their types as illustrated by our analysis above.
Clearly, measures that improve the information about other countries' poli-
cies will reduce the need to prove one's type and thereby the risk of conflict, if a
mutually profitable agreement exists. It is in this sense that intelligence services
and international espionage can be useful, since they might build up trust that
other countries keep their promises and do not misrepresent their interests.
Furthermore, if the same countries are engaged in several international
negotiations, the possibilities to misrepresent strategically their own type are far
more limited, since the a posteriori beliefs of earlier negotiations will become the
a priori beliefs of later ones. This might explain why in reality we observe many
international negotiations on rather specific projects instead of more comprehen-
sive ones.
Naturally, incomplete information about other countries will be reduced if
there is much international trade, cultural exchange, joint ventures, etc. This
indicates that, when beginning international cooperation, negotiations will be
more time-consuming and more likely to end in conflict. But after long-
established forms of cooperation are in place, international negotiations should
almost surely yield early agreements that take into account the true interests of
the participating countries.
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29.1. Introduction
Investigations of international negotiations both by Soviet and Western research-
ers are characterized by two main approaches: the historical-descriptive and the
theoretical-methodological. The gap between these two approaches seems to be
increasing. From our point of view the role of the latter is increasing steadily
because it aims at reaching forecasting results, which is, in principle, not charac-
teristic of the first approach. Within the framework of the second approach,
modeling (using computers) has lately begun to play an important role, as it has
unique qualifications for verifying hypotheses.
Modeling of social processes (including international negotiations) demands
the solution of many theoretical and methodological problems, without which
fruitful results will be hard to attain. The key methodological problem is to pro-
vide a normative model that guarantees the fulfillment of general scientific
requirements such as well-grounded necessity, completeness or sufficiency and, in
the final account, the adequacy of any model. Strictly speaking, there can be no
absolutely non-normative models, because the scientific consciousness of each
researcher or practitioner is based on some sort of theoretical system that is
reflected in his education. But when he uses a model intuitively, it may be
classified as empirical (created on the basis of experience or "common sense"). It
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is impossible to prove scientifically the necessity, completeness or sufficiency of
such a model.
Generally speaking, all historical-descriptive investigations may be
classified as empirical models (very relatively, of course). In this respect their
value is primarily factual, but can also be conceptual.
29.2. Levels and Stages of Analysis
Normativeness has three levels: the methodological, the specific-theoretical and
the mathematical or technological. This division is based on the well-known phi-
losophical triad: universal, specific and unique.
The methodological level provides normativeness on the basis of some gen-
eral laws of the development and functioning of social systems. But being very
abstract these laws cannot be applied directly to concrete processes and
phenomena. The way from the universal to the particular extends across the
specific theory, for only with its help can the transition be accomplished from
general theoretical conceptions to operational ones suitable for quantitative
measurement and experimental verification, the latter requirement being most
important.
The modern period of the development of science is characterized by the
obvious tendency of the creation of many intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary
special theories (the so-called "middle-level" theories), which have now formed a
rather complicated system of several dozens of scientific disciplines.
The abstract model is created on a special theoretical level, for its transfor-
mation into the concrete model it is necessary to introduce information about the
modeled object. This information, as a rule, consists of some peculiarities about
the unique features of the object, which playa very important role in modeling
social processes. If they are not taken into account, it is difficult to guarantee a
high degree of model adequacy.
The transformation of the abstract model into a concrete one by "filling" it
with relevant information can be realized normatively (by scientific technology)
or empirically (based on "common sense", experience, traditions, etc.). In prac-
tice the existing scientific methods (especially, the formalized ones) cannot sub-
stitute for the traditional logical-intuitional analysis.
Normativeness is involved not only in the above-mentioned levels, but also
in the various stages of modeling. In general, there are three such stages: sub-
stantive, formalizing and quantifying, and consequently three types of models.
The starting point of modeling social processes is the creation of a substan-
tive model, which, as stated above, may be empirical or normative and some-
times combined (empirical-normative). The transition from the substantive
model to the formalized one is possible only if the former is normative. The for-
malization of the empirical and combined models has to overcome enormous
difficulties. To avoid any misunderstanding, we wish to stress that under for-
malization we mean the formal-logical organization of the substantive mod~l in
its now-mathematical form. This requirement seems to be very important, as
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the application of mathematical methods often becomes some sort of end in
itself.
By unifying the two groups of conceptions in one matrix and filling it with
the corresponding information about t.he object under investigation - interna-
tional negotiations - a methodological picture results as shown in Table 29.1.
T46le 19.1. Stages and levels of analysis.
StOoge
Su6stOontilJe
LelJel OonOoI,sis FormOotion QuOontificOotion
Methodological Philosophy Social communi- Metamathematics
cation theory
Specific- Foreign policy Systems analysis ?
theoretical theory
Technological Traditional Content and Factor and
information event correlation
analysis analysis, etc. analysis, etc.
Further, we shall focus our attention on the two upper levels, especially on
the second stage (formalization), for it does not have sufficient definition. The
effective use of computers as investigative instruments becomes possible only
after the problem of adequate formalization has been solved. It is not by chance
that we singled out the theory of social communication on the methodological
level of the second stage, but this does not imply its universality. This only
signifies that formalization will be conducted on this and on no other basis.
However, on the strength of the multiple aspects of international negotiations,
the formalized basis may change and, instead of social communication theory,
social psychology or decision-making theory may be used. Correspondingly, a
change will occur on the specific-theoretical level.
At the same time, the multiple-aspect nature of international negotiations
(as with any social process) may be described with the help of a limited number
of such scientific disciplines. Naturally, in creating a complete model of interna-
tional negotiations the use of all these disciplines is necessary to various degrees,
but it does not mean they are equivalent in providing model adequacy. Some of
them, never having claim to completeness, can guarantee sufficiency; others can-
not. It seems to us that social communications theory can guarantee the neces-
sary sufficiency of the model, because it is based on the understanding of interna-
tional negotiations as a method of finding compromise solutions for disputes
among states with the help of social communication (direct, as a rule).
29.3. Key Elements of an International Negotiations Model
Within the framework of this definition, three key elements can be distinguished:
contradiction, compromise, and communication.
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Contradictions
M.A. Khrou6tDlefl
In general the problems of social contradictions are investigated on the phil-
osophical level, while foreign policy theory studies interstate contradictions, as a
special type of social contradictions. IT social contradictions are contradictions of
social interests, interstate contradictions are contradictions of state interest,
which, according to our understanding, constitute a synthesis of social, political
and economic interests.
In this connection it must be stressed that the widespread English term
"national interest" , which has many meanings, is used here in its direct meaning.
Its inconsistent use creates some logical confusions, which is absolutely imper-
missible in the process of formalization.
Social contradictions or disputes are qualified as relations between opposing
interests. Depending on the character of these relations, contradictions are
divided into antagonistic and non-antagonistic. This division is automatically
applied to interstate contradictions. Since antagonistic contradictions cannot be
solved by compromise, they naturally cannot be included in the scope of action
of negotiations. Such a narrowed scope seems unfounded, as in this case antag-
onism is regarded as something undiversified and integral. This is not the case
with interstate contradictions.
Formalization on the basis of systems analysis within the framework of the
proposed matrix ("horizontal" formalization) permits a more correct solution for
this problem, building upon and supplementing the substantive model in a cer-
tain sense.
Since the nature of the relations between opposed interests depends on
their importance for each state or social entity, their systemic grouping will make
possible different variants of those relations. The importance of any interest is
determined by whether or not it leads to lowering the levels of the social entity's
external and internal stability by hindering its functioning and development.
The above-mentioned considerations, may be summed up in terms of three
groups or levels of interests: vital, basic and secondary. The proposed grouping
is of a very generalized nature, determined by the subject matter of this work,
and may easily be decomposed.
1. Vital interests are those that, if not realized, cause the social entity (sys-
tem) to malfunction and/or hinder its development, which unavoidably
leads to lesser (internal) stability and/or (external) security.
2. Rasie interests are those that, if not realized, produce a malfunctioning and
hindered development, which may (with greater or lesser probability) pro-
duce lesser stability and/or security.
3. Seeondary interests are those that, if not satisfied, lead to malfunctioning
and hindered development, which are not accompanied by lesser stability
and/or security.
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In short, viability is threatened with certainty, if vital interests are not
satisfied; it is (with greater or lesser probability) threatened if basic interests are
not satisfied; and it is not affected if secondary interests are not satisfied.
The above classification provides an opportunity to study a spectrum of
probable pair-type conjunctions of interests of various levels that produce con-
tradiction or conflict of interests. The matrix form of representation is given in
Figure t9.1.
Among the nine elements of the matrix, three are identical by the rule of
logic (A I /B2 = A2/B li AI/Ba = Aa/BIj A2/Ba = Aa/B 2). Excluding logical
redundancy, six pairs and therefore six types of contradictions or potential
conflicts, remain:
1. Vital - vital
2. Vital - basic
3. Vital - secondary
4. Basic - basic
5 Basic - secondary
6. Secondary - secondary
~ BI B2 Ba
Al AdBI A I /B2 AdBa
A 2 A 2/B I A2/B2 A2/Ba
Aa Aa/BI Aa/B2 Aa/Ba
Figure 19.1. A and B = social subjects (systems) that pose mutually incompatible in-
terests: 1 - vital interests, 2 - basic interests, 3 - secondary interests.
These types of contradiction may be further classified into two groups
depending upon whether or not a vital interest is present in a pair. The first
three pairs represent antagonistic contradictions, the second three represent
non-antagonistic ones. Within the first group, pair 1 (vital - vital) may be
described as strictly antagonistic, while pairs 2 and 3 may be characterized as
loosely antagonistic.
It is a matter of principle to specify the notion of loose antagonism because
contradiction of that type may be solve on the basis of compromise, this possibil-
ity widening ( at least, in theory) "the sphere" of negotiations.
Of considerable importance is the study of the second (vital - basic) and
fourth (basic - basic) pairs, since the well-known psychological phenomenon of
overstating one's interest and understating that of one's partner produces a
situation in which one or both sides may find a strict antagonism where none
exists.
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Compromise
M.A. Khrowtalell
Having briefly considered the problems of contradiction, let us examine the
second basic element of the above-mentioned definition, compromise, which
implies a voluntary or forced exchange of concessions. Concession, in turn, is
based upon consent by one of the sides having mutually incompatible interests to
the settlement of a contradiction not in its favor - that is, with some interest
not being satisfied. The parameter of a concession is determined by the
significance of the unsatisfied interest. Vital interests are never subject to volun-
tary concessions and only in extreme cases may be ceded as a result of a forced
concession. That is the case when the other party resorts to dictating a settle-
ment, its extreme form being the ultimatum of unconditional surrender.
However, the compromise based on such a forced concession will always be
entirely unstable, since the party that has been forced into the concession will
continuously seek to depart from it - in other words, to render meaningless the
agreement on which the compromise rests. Such is also the behavior of a party
which is being forced to concede a great deal of its basic interests.
In general, any unequal and therefore forced compromise may be described
as incapable in principle of resolving contradictions, but rather as postponing the
solution, or at best, temporarily solving contradictions.
H an equal (voluntary) compromise is reached, both sides satisfy their vital
interests. Their basic interests are satisfied either on an equal basis, or in favor
of one of the sides. In the first case the compromise is mutually advantageous; in
the second, it is one-sided.
Communication
As a rule, compromise is achieved in the process of negotiations, which are of
form of social communication and can be subdivided into the representational
and instrumental. Negotiations may further be divided into genuine ones (based
upon representational communication) or pseudo- or mock negotiations (based
upon instrumental communication).
Negotiations in the sense of representational social communication
correspond to the idea of a voluntary compromise (mutually beneficial or one-
sided), while the sense of instrumental communication is that they embrace the
notion of a fictitious compromise (agreement), or "negotiations for the sake of
negotiations". Employing the tactics of mock negotiations, one side or even both
(taking the simplest case of a bilateral negotiating) aim at solving some problems
other than those that are the subject of the negotiations. As a rule, these tactics
are resorted to in order to save time, to start propaganda campaigns, to gain
new allies, etc.
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Summing up the above: A probable variety of negotiations approaches and
objectives is given by the representation in Figure eO.e.
A: Process of negotiation
B: Compromise approach
C: Simulation approach
1: Mutually-beneficial compromise
2: One-sided compromise
3: Fictitious compromise
4: Procrastination of negotiations 4
Figure e9.e. Negotiation approaches and objectives.
During the process of negotiations, particularly if they are prolonged owing
to the character of the problems involved, either or both sides may change its
approach. This may occur, e.g., because of some domestic developments, such as
a cabinet change, forthcoming elections etc., or as a result of some changes on
the international scene.
As a result, a situation may arise in which, while one side is prepared to
offer a mutually beneficial compromise, the other seeks to prolong the negotia-
tions. The various combinations of the sides' approaches in bilateral negotia-
tions amount to six. It is also necessary to take into account the strategy aimed
at dictating a settlement.
If the lifespan of an approach is to be taken into account, the number of
combinations is even greater. For example, one side may just be starting the
process of adopting an approach for a mutually beneficial compromise, while the
other is already departing from it. In this case the first side's modified approach
may have no impact on the position of the partner, Le., the short duration of the
favorable combination of approaches may render them useless.
Bilateral negotiations provide quite a number of probable combinations of
various approaches by the two sides, and this number increases sharply in mul-
tilateral negotiations. A purely statistical study of a probable situation, where
all the sides in multilateral negotiations adopt a mutually beneficial compromise
approach, reveals that such a probability is much less than that of bilateral
negotiations. Consequently, multilateral negotiations in general require more
time than bilateral ones.
The above idea should not be perceived in a simplified way, because the
laws of statistics by their very nature may not directly apply to any given nego-
tiation. However, when CSCE negotiations are considered from this point of
view, they provide sufficient grounds for the observation that, in practice, they
have become tripartite negotiations. While two groups or "sides" - namely, the
NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries - participated in the CSCE process as
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"already formed" entities from the very start, the third group or side (the neu-
tral and non-aligned countries, or N+N) emerged during the negotiations. Thus,
in this case the process of negotiations produced a new political reality, and this
phenomenon is no doubt to be explained by some serious political considerations.
We thus do not propose to account for it by rationalizing the negotiation pro-
cess, but one possible manner in which to study such negotiations may be to try
to deal with them minus these political components.
CHAPTER 30
Frameworks for Rational Decisions and
Conflict Coefficients
Andrzej P. Wierzbicki
Institute 0/ Automatic Control
Warsaw UniversitJl 0/ TechnologJl
Warsaw
Poland
30.1. Introduction
A better understanding of the evolution of cooperative behavior [see, e.g., Axel-
rod (1985)] as well as of the reasons and dynamics of processes that lead to
conflict escalation [Wierzbicki (1983)] is today essential, for many known rea-
sons. This understanding is typically hampered by the fact that the concept of
rationality is not uniquely defined and is strongly culturally dependent. Thus, in
cross-cultural relations, it is easy to misread the intentions of the opposite side
and adopt strategies that lead to conflict escalation. The prerequisite for avoid-
ing such traps is the readiness to learn about the other sides' concerns with
open-minded tolerance and respect for cultural differences; such learning is one
of principal aims of international negotiations.
Among many methods that can contribute to such learning, one group of
methods is related to computerized games that simulate certain conflict situa-
tions - say, in economics or environmental problems - where playing these
games by representatives of various cultures can contribute to a better under-
standing. Experiments with such games show, however, that mediation in
conflicts is an indispensable tool, even in simulated games, if the outcome of such
a game should be learning not only about a seeming inevitability of conflict
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escalation but also about ways of overcoming conflicts. To support such media-
tion, methods for decision and mediation support must be extended for situa-
tions of plural rationality; the concept of quasisatisficing decisions and rational-
ity is used for this purpose. As one of the positive extensions of the Raiffa con-
cept of a fair compromise solution [see Raiffa (1953), Kalai and Smorodinsky
(1975), Thompson (1980)], the concept of conflict coefficients is adopted and pro-
posed as a tool of supporting fair mediation in plural rationality situations.
In previous chapters of the author related to this subject, it was shown
[Wierzbicki (1983)1 that the nonuniqueness of noncooperative equilibria of games
is a frequent phenomenon that, together with the incompatibility of aspirations
of players, can result either in stabilizing disequilibria conflict outcomes or even
in conflict escalation processes in repetitive games, with outcomes much worse
for everybody than even noncooperative equilibria. Moreover, it was shown
[Wierzbicki (1984)1 that the perceptions of the concept of rational behavior are
culturally dependent and thus pluralistic. Therefore, it is difficult to recognize
the incompatibility of aspirations of players and to distinguish a disequilibrium
conflict outcome from a noncooperative equilibrium outcome. As a way of over-
coming these difficulties, the concept of quasisatisficing rationality and the use of
conflict coefficients were proposed. This chapter further develops these themes
by classifying more thoroughly various frameworks for rational decisions as well
as by analyzing the concept of conflict coefficients, their relation to cooperative
solutions of games and to order-consistent achievement functions used in
quasisatisficing decision analysis.
30.2. Plural Perceptions of Rationality
The impact of cultural background on the perception of what is rational might
be best illustrated by an episode (actually witnessed by the author) in which a
professor from a highly individualistic culture constructed a simulated game that
involved the social trap of the tragedy of common - the overutilization of a
common environment. A high degree of sophistication, displayed by certain spe-
cialists in game theory, was needed to avoid this trap; most representatives of
this culture could not avoid it. However, when played by representatives of a
quite different, collectivist culture, the game was soon made pointless: they pro-
posed jointly to abandon the winning cards that corresponded to environment
overutilization and, when one disagreed, the remaining players abandoned the
privacy of their moves, which made the game trivial.
The hierarchies of values that are historically established in different cul-
tures do considerably influence the corresponding concept of rationality.
Another ~xample [see Zsolnay and Kiss (1985)1 is the differences between the
rationality of the industrialized, individualistic, environment-exploiting West
with moderate population congestion and that of the rural, Buddhist (which does
not mean collectivist but certainly is not individualistic), environment-immersed
East with large population congestion. Differences of basic hierarchies of values
cannot, moreover, be described as simple differences of tastes or preferences; if
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we tried, for example, to follow utility theory when describing differences of
hierarchies of values, we should have then to use discontinuous utility functions,
which would make this theory inoperational.
A modern critical approach to decision theory proposes to replace the cal-
culative or analytic rationality (of utility maximization or similar approaches) by
deliberative or holistic rationality, the "hard" approach by the "soft" approach.
The most logically consistent argument for the "soft" or holistic approach was
given by Dreyfus (1985). Dreyfus argues - and supports this argument with
experimental evidence - that a decision-maker is a learning individual whose
way of making decisions depends on the level of expertise attained through learn-
ing. A novice needs calculative rationality; an experienced decision-maker uses
calculative rationality in the background, while concentrating his attention on
novel aspects of a decision situation. An expert does not need calculative
rationality: in a known decision situation, he arrives at best decisions immedi-
ately, by absorbing (and intuitively processing, presumably in a parallel, still
unknown way) all pertinent information. A master expert, while subconsciously
making best decisions, continuously searches for "new angles" - for new aspects
or perspectives, motivated by the disturbing feeling that not everything is under-
stood, the feeling that culminates and ends in the "aha" or '"eureka" effed of
perceiving a new perspective. Thus, the holistic approach can be understood as
the rationality of the culture of experts.
While accepting these arguments, we cannot use the holistic rationality
prescriptions directly for dealing with cross-cultural con8icts; for who is a master
expert on the hierarchies of values in various cultures? The history of diplomacy
is full of blunders that resulted from insufficient cross-cultural experience. How-
ever, there is one element of paradigm shift that can be extracted from the holis-
tic rationality perspective: the value of learning in decision-making is
paramount, and the main purpose of analytical approaches should not be to pro-
pose optimal decisions but to support learning.
There are several frameworks for analytic rationality; most of these, after
deeper analysis, turn out to be culturally dependent. The utility maximization
framework has been long considered as expressing an universal rationality, as the
basis of decision analysis; every other framework would be termed "not quite
rational". The abstract aspects of this framework are the most developed and a
monograph of several volumes would be needed to summarize them. Without
attempting to do so, three points should be stressed here. First, the utility max-
imization framework is not universal, it is culturally dependent. Second, its
descriptive powers are rather limited. Third, it is difficult to account for and to
support learning within this framework.
As to the first point, consider the continuity assumptions made in the
expected utility theory. A cornerstone assumption in this theory is that, given
three ordered probability distributions of decision outcomes, no matter how
disastrous the worst of them might be, there exist always probabilistic mixtures
(lotteries) of the best and the worst outcomes such that these mixtures can dom-
inate and be dominated by the middle alternative. Accordingly, the following
question is admissible in this theory: "What should be a non-zero probability z
such that you would bet 10 dollars on the lottery of 1-z chances of winning a
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billion dollars and z chances of nuclear war?" Many cultures would deny the
validity of such a question on the grounds that this probability should be zero,
that we cannot compare values that should be hierarchically ordered. Thus, util-
ity theory represents a cultural background where everything, if not forbidden by
law or ethics (which aspects are placed outside of the theory following the tradi-
tion of neopositivistic philosophy), can be measured on a common evaluating
scale - say, by money. This is the culture of classical economics, of an
entrepreneur facing an infinite market and supported by its "invisible hand" -
provided he abides by law and religion and does not encounter disastrous alter-
natives that lead to new moral dilemmas. But what about political situations
that might involve changing laws? What about cross-cultural situations where
laws and religions are diverse?
As to the second point, there were many attempts by utility theorists to
accommodate the paradox of Allois (1953). Consider four alternative lotteries:
the first consisting of winning $1 million with probability 1.00; the second con-
sisting of winning nothing with probability 0.01, winning $1 million with proba-
bility 0.89 and winning $5 million with probability 0.10; the third consisting of
winning nothing with probability 0.90 and winning $5 million with probability
0.10; and the fourth of winning nothing with probability 0.89 and winning $1
million with probability 0.11. Consider two choices: one between the first and
the second lottery and the second between the third and the fourth lottery.
Most people asked about such choices would prefer the first to the second lottery
and the third to the fourth lottery. But there does not exist any utility function
consistent with both such choices.
Of many attempts to explain such a paradox, the most consistent with
other experimental evidence is abandoning the basic assumption of indepen-
dence. Let us assume, as supported by numerous empirical studies, that people
do develop adaptively aspiration levels that might depend on the alternatives
presented to them and that they use these aspiration levels when evaluating
alternatives. Thus, their utility functions are nonstationary and change from
case to case. Suppose, moreover, that people feel strong "regret" [see, e.g.,
Kahneman et al. (1982)1 when the actual outcomes fall below their aspirations.
Then a nonstationary, aspiration-dependent form of utility function might be as
follows:
{
(y - fi)1 Ay, if y~ fi
u(y,fi) = 100(y-fi)1 Ay, if y< fi (30.1)
where fi is the adaptable aspiration level, y the actual outcome, and Ay a range
of outcomes (included in order to obtain an independence of affine transforma-
tions of variables in this function), say, Ay = $5 million in this example. If we
take reasonable aspiration levels to be determined by minimal expected values,
that is, ;r = $1 million for the first choice between the lotteries one and two and
fT' = $0.11 million for the second choice between the lotteries three and four,
the expected values of the nonclassical utility function (30.1) perfectly explain
the typical preferences in these choices. If we assume that aspiration levels
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might depend on other experiences of the decision-maker - say, his accumulated
wealth - we can explain also why a small number of people might actually
prefer the second to the first lottery.
The third point is actually related to the above explanation of the Allois
paradox: when trying to account for learning, we cannot assume utility function
forms that are independent of available alternatives. The right of a decision-
maker to change his mind when he has learned a new fact implies that his utility
function might change from case to case and he might be inconsistent. Thus, the
basic requirement of consistency of rational decisions, typical for utility theory, is
inconsistent itself with the requirement that analytical frameworks for rational
decisions should first support learning. A contemporary challenge for utility
theory is to develop such modifications of this theory that would incorporate the
processes and effects of learning. One of the ways of doing so might be a con-
sistent study of the effects of aspiration levels on preferences.
This challenge is, actually, not quite new: it was raised over 20 years ago
by the satisficing rationality framework, proposed by Simon (1958) and by many
others that followed the behavioral criticism of the normative decision theory
based on utility maximization [see also Simon (1958) for a review of the main
points of this criticism]. This framework started with the empirical observation
that people do form adaptive aspiration levels by learning and use these aspira-
tions to guide their decisions. Very often, they cease to optimize upon reaching
outcomes consistent with aspirations and thus make satisficing decisions. How-
ever, when building a rationale for such observed behavior, this framework pos-
tulated that people cannot maximize for three reasons: the cost of computing
optimal solutions in complex situations; the uncertainty of decision outcomes
that makes most complex optimizations too difficult; and the complexity of deci-
sion situations in large industrial and administrative organizations that induces
the decision-makers to follow some well-established decision rules that can be
behaviorally observed and often coincide with satisficing decision-making. This
discussion on whether and in what circumstances people could optimize substan-
tiated the term bounded rationality (which implies misleadingly that this is some-
what less than full rationality) applied to satisficing behavior and drew attention
away from the essential points of learning and forming aspiration levels.
Meanwhile, two of the reasons for not optimizing quoted above have lost
their relevance. The development of computers and computational methods of
optimization, including stochastic optimization techniques, has considerably
decreased the cost and increased the possibilities of calculative optimization.
Moreover, the empirical results of holistic rationality indicate that expert
decision-makers can easily determine best solutions in very complex situations
even if they do not use calculative optimization. The third reason, supported by
empirical observations, remains valid: satisficing rationality is typical for the cul-
ture of big industrial and administrative organizations (see also Galbraith, 1967).
However, today it can be differently interpreted: the appropriate question seems
to be not whether people could, but whether they should maximize.
Any intelligent man, after some quarrels with his wife, learns that maximi-
zation is not always the best norm of behavior; children learn best from conflicts
among themselves that cooperative behavior is socially desirable and that they
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must restrict natural tendencies to maximization in certain situations. In any
nontrivial game with the number of p~ticipants less than infinity, a cooperative
outcome is typically much better for all participants than an outcome resulting
from individual maximization. This situation is called a soeial trap and
motivated much research that recently gave results of paradigm-shifting impor-
tance.
There are several basic types of social trap situation; among these, the
most important seem to be the tragedy 0/ eommOnB and a similar, though more
exacerbated prisoner's dilemma, in both of which an "individually rational"
(read: resulting from individual maximization) solution gives much worse out-
comes than a cooperative solution. Further exacerbation of these prototype
situations leads to a qualitative change of their structure, typical for the game 0/
ehielten or battle 0/ the sexes situation, where the individually maximizing solu-
tion ceases to be unique; this is the prototype of conflict escalation situations,
discussed further in some detail. Rapoport (1985) gives a much more thorough
classification of various social trap situations that have been studied both empiri-
cally and abstractly; however, he concentrates on strategies for playing games of
the repetitive prisoner's dilemma type.
A finite number repetition of a prisoner's dilemma game does not change
its properties; an infinite number of repetitions would change the qualitative
character of the game. An essential change of the qualitative character, how-
ever, occurs when a repetitive prisoner's dilemma game is played in an evolution-
ary sense, that is, if various strategies for playing such a game, if successful, can
multiply. This changes also the concept of an equilibrium of such a game; an
equilibrium is not an assembly of individually maximizing strategies, but a stra-
tegy that remains successful in the evolutionary sense [see Maynard-Smith
(1982)1. It turns out that evolutionary stable strategies include some strategies
of a cooperative type. To analyze such strategies empirically, Axelrod (1985)
organized several computer-simulated tournaments of evolutionary-type stra-
tegies for repetitive prisoner's dilemma games; a consistent winner in these tour-
naments was a cooperative-type strategy proposed by Rapoport and called tit-
for-tat. This strategy assumes cooperation at the first encounter and, if the
other side also cooperates, continuing cooperation; if the other side defects
(cheats), it is punished in the tit-for-tat strategy by defection at the next
encounter, but only once: the tit-for-tat strategy is forgiving and attempts to
cooperate anew after punishment. This evolutionary stable strategy can be
characterized as non-naive cooperativeness or altruism.
These remarkable results indicate a major paradigm shift. Neither short-
term nor long-term maximization can rationally resolve the repetitive prisoner's
dilemma. The introduction of a different type of evolutionary rationality gives a
resolution to this dilemma. Moreover, evolutionary rationality is not based on
maximization. In fact, it relaces maximization by some evolutionally successful
decision rule - a norm of cooperative behavior that is placed hierarchically
higher than the tendency to maximize and plays a role of a moral principle. In
the century of neopositivism, it is the first case when principles of an ethical type
have been derived rationally by applying mathematical methods. By extrapolat-
ing these results, we arrive at the conclusion that in many more complex multi-
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actor decision situations, it might be rational - in the evolutionary sense - to
forego maximization for the good reasons of avoiding a social trap or conflict
escalation. Hence, the importance of the question of whether we should maxim-
ize, where "should" is understood in a normative evolutionary sense.
The importance of this question has been recognized by another analytical,
culturally determined framework for rational decision making - that of goal-
and program-oriented planning [see Glushkov (1972), Pospelov and Irikov
(1976)], which represents the culture of collective economic or engineering plan-
ning. This framework is not restricted to planned economy countries; in fact, it
had been independently developed - with some differences - as the goals pro-
gramming technique [see Charnes and Cooper (1975), among many others], or
later rediscovered in a different context [see Umpleby (1983)1. The goal- and
program- oriented planning approach specifies two hierarchial levels of objec-
tives: the upper-level objectives, called goals - for which desired values are
specified, in a sense similar to aspiration levels, only less adaptable; and the
lower-level objectives, called means - which are, in a sense, equivalent to deci-
sions, but the actual decisions correspond typically to the allocation of means.
Given means are then allocated - either holistically, by experts, or by using an
optimization technique - to come as close as possibly to the given goals, which
are typically not attainable. H the goals cannot be attained, modifications of
means are considered until either the goals can be reached, or there are no
further reserves in means. H the goals can be attained, no further optimization
is performed; in this aspect, goal- and program-oriented planning is similar to
satisficing decision-making. However, it differs from satisficing decision-making
by the deliberate use of optimization techniques. There is no doubt in this
approach that optimization techniques can be used; the question is whether they
should be used upon attaining goals. This difference from the satisficing
approach is particularly visible in the goal-programming technique, which has
been sometimes classified as a type of satisficing decision-making. However, this
technique is, in fact, an optimization method; thus, it contradicts one of the basic
assumptions of satisficing.
When trying to incorporate the lessons from the perspective of evolutionary
rationality, however, another question must be raised: why should we stop max-
imizing upon reaching goals? We should stop maximizing for good reasons, such
as avoiding social traps or conflict escalation, but reaching given goals is not
necessarily a good reason - perhaps the goals have been inadequately specified.
When following the lessons from the perspective of holistic rationality - that
the most important function of calculative rationality is as a support in learning
- we should rather present to the learning decision-maker some alternative solu-
tions, at least one efficient solution corresponding to a consistent maximization
above given goals and another solution corresponding to just reaching goals.
The decision-maker himself should decide whether there are good reasons for
stopping maximization.
To support decisions that might be either maximizing or not, depending on
a conscious choice by a decision-maker who might adhere to either a maximizing,
or satisficing, or goal- and program-oriented perception of rationality, a general-
ized framework of analytical rationality has been proposed by the author [see,
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e.g., Wierzbicki (1984)] and called quasisatisficing decision-making. This frame-
work also incorporates the conclusions derived from the holistic perspective: it
assumes that the main purpose of analytical decision support is learning; hence,
any approximations to utility functions must be nonstationary. From the
satisficing framework, it takes the basic concept of aspiration levels and uses
them in a similar way as in the goal programming technique - with the distinc-
tion that the maximization is not necessarily stopped when the aspiration levels
are reached and, thus, efficient solutions can be always computed and proposed
to the decision-maker.
We say that a decision-maker behaves in a quasisatisficing way if, aware of
his objectives or decision attributes (with a possible distinction between primary
and secondary objectives, such as in the goal- and program-oriented decision
making), aware of scales of attainability of these objectives, aware of his aspira-
tions (together with possible distinctions between various types of aspiration lev-
els, such as reservation levels or goal levels), he tries to reach the aspiration lev-
els by maximizing when the outcomes of admissible decisions fall below these lev-
els; but, when the aspiration levels are attained, he can choose either to further
maximize or to stop maximization for additional good reasons. Moreover, the
quasisatisficing decision-maker is learning: he can change the specifications of
his objectives, collect the information about their scales of attainability, and
modify his aspiration levels. In this learning process, he might be supported by a
computerized system that constructs simple nonstationary approximations to his
changing utility function, based mostly on the information about his aspiration
levels, and calculates either efficient decisions resulting from the maximization of
these approximations, or just satisficing decisions.
Such approximations to changing utility functions are called order-
consistent achievement functions [see, e.g., Wierzbicki (1986)1. Among many
possible forms of achievement functions, a useful form is based on the informa-
tion about four points on the scale of every objective or attribute: two of these
points represent some (not necessarily tight) bounds on the range of attainability
IIi min' IIi max' and two other points are a reservation level iii and an aspiration
(g~al) I~vel ii/', where IIi min < ii/ < 11/'<IIi max for each of p attributes,
i = 1,...p. The achievement' function is then co~structedwhile accepting the fol-
lowing assumptions:
(a) The decision-maker prefers outcomes that satisfy all his reservation levels
to any outcome that does not satisfy at least one of his reservation levels;
similarly for aspiration levels.
(b) The satisfaction of the decision-maker at reaching (all, or the last of) his
reservation levels can be measured by 0, while his satisfaction at reaching
(all, or the last of) his aspiration levels can be measured by 1.
(c) The satisfaction of the decision-maker at reaching the maximum of the
range of all outcomes can be measured by 1 + ,where a > 0 is a parameter
(if a = 0, then the decision-maker behaves in a strict satisficing way); the
dissatisfaction of the decision-maker at reaching the minimum of the range
of at least one of the outcomes can be measured by -6, where 6 >- 0 is
another parameter.
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(d) IT an attribute shows underachievement when compared to its reservation
(or aspiration) level, and other attributes show overachievements, the
decision-maker is willing to accept a compensation of the underachievement
by the average overachievement in other attributes (all measured relative
to the scales implied by points (IIi min' V/' ;(',IIi max) with a weighting
coefficient e, where 0 < e < p.' ,
(e) Since all available information for the construction of this special utility
function has been already used, the simplest form of this function that
would satisfy (a), (b), (c), (d), obtained through linear interpolation, is pos-
tulated. Such a function has the following form:
b((IIi- IIi,min)/(V/- t1i,min)-l),
ui(IIi)= (t1i- V/)/(U/' - V/),
a(IIi - V/')/(IIi,max- V/')+1,
while the aggregation is defined by:
if t1i min $ t1i $ V/,
if V/ < IIi < U/'
if V/' $ t1i $ t1i,max
(30.2)
8(71,;(;(') = U(II) = (min ui(IIi) + (e/p) Eui(IIi)) / (1 + e)
l$i$p i=l
(30.3)
This achievement function can be interpreted as a cardinal utility function,
since it is independent of affine transformations of the scales of attributes. Its
maxima are not only efficient, but also properly efficient [with trade-off
coefficients bounded a priori by e and 1/ej see Wierzbicki (1986)]. Its level sets
approximate from outside the shifted positive cone R~. Functions of similar
types have been extensively used in so-called DIDAS, decision support systems,
[see, e.g., Grauer, Lewandowski, and Wierzbicki (1982)J, as well as in the SCDAS
decision support system [see, Lewandowski, Johnson, and Wierzbicki (1986)].
30.3. Conflict Coefficients for Mediation Support
In simulated games used for illustration of social traps and related phenomena, it
occurs quite often that Nash equilibria resulting from unilateral maximizations of
utility of all players are not unique (as in the prototype cases of "the game of
chicken" or "battle of the sexes" , where there is a small, finite number of equili-
bria; in more complicated examples, there might even be infinite numbers of
equilibria). Each player can then select a strategy corresponding to an equili-
brium that appears rational to him.
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Typically, however, these selections do not correspond to one equilibrium
(for example, because of incompatibility of aspirations of players) and the result-
ing multistrategy does not result in an equilibrium. Typically, its results are
much worse than expected by all players. In a repetitive game. this can lead to a
process of eonftiet esealation, that is, going away from equilibrium outcomes
with worsening of results [see Wierzbicki (1984)]. Playing such a game is quite
instructive for the players; but we must also show them ways of overcoming this
trap of conflict escalation. For this purpose, a negotiating or mediating pro-
cedure must be introduced. To support such a procedure, the concept of conflict
coefficients [see Wierzbicki (1986)] is useful. These conflict coefficients generalize
- for the case of nonconvex sets of attainable objectives, for the case of multiple
objectives of each player, as well for the case of various decision situations,
including noncooperative equilibria and conflict escalation cases - the concept
of the Raiffa cooperative solution [see Raiffa (1953), Kalai and Smorodinsky
(1975), Thompson (1980)].
Consider an assembly of p objectives of m players, and suppose all objec-
tives are maximized. We shall first analyze the case when m = p and each
player has just one objective that can be interpreted as his utility function; later,
we will analyze a more general case. Let YCRP denote the set of attainable
objectives under admissible multidecisions, that is, the assemblies of decisions of
all players. Typically, this set is given implicitly by a set of admissible multide-
cisions X and an outcome mapping !:X->RP where Y = !(X), but we need for
this discussion only the relations in the objective or outcome space. Let fiE Y
denote a status quo outcome - called also disagreement outcome [see Roth
(1979)]. For each fiE Y and fiE Y, define the following coefficient of deviation
from ideal (or utopia) outcomes:
(30.4)
(30.5)
where:
fli, max (fi) = max fli; Y(fi) = {y E Y: fli~fii' i = 1,...p}
l/EY(ul
are the components of the ideal or utopia point flmax (fi) =
(fll,max (fi), ... fli,max (fi), ... flp,max (fi)) relative to the status quo point fi. If these
components would be jointly attainable, flmax(fi) E Y(fi) , then by choosing
fI = flmax(fi) we could make the deviation coefficient d(fI, fi) = 0 and there would
be no conflict between the objectives of the players. Typically, however,
flmax (fi) ¢. Y(fi), the utopia point is not attainable. The drawback of the devia-
tion coefficient d(fI,fi) is that it depends on the dimension p of the space of objec-
tives. To correct for this dependence, we can follow the suggestion of Kreglewski
(1984) and use the following transformation to define the eurrent eonftiet
eoeffieient (more precisely, the conflict coefficient measured at the current out-
come fI relative to the status quo outcome fi):
e(fI,fi) = 2d(fI,fi) + (p(p-2)/(p-l))d(fI,fi)(d(fI,fi) - 1) (30.6)
Framcworb for Rational DeMOfil and Conflict CoeJMientl 351
This transformation is needed because we would like to have I: (If,U) = 1 if
Ifi - Ui = (1/p) f (lfi max (U)-Ifi) for all i = 1,...p
i=l •
(30.7)
which corresponds to a good intuitive interpretation of measuring the conflict by
1 if the players have to accept the simplest compromise between objectives;
whereas d(lf, fi) = (p-l)/p in this case; by postulating I: (If, U) = 0 if If = IfmaxJU)
and d(lf, U) = 0, I: (If, U) = 2 if If = Uand d(lf, U) = 1, and by assuming the sim-
plest quadratic transformation that meets all these three requirements, we obtain
the formula (30.6).
The interpretation of the current conflict coefficient is as follows. The com-
ponents Ifi _(U) of the utopia point relative to status quo point measure the
maximal aitainable improvement for the ith player, provided all players coopera-
tively concentrate on this improvement, but all other players do not accept
results worse than their status quo components. The current conflict coefficient
measures, in relative units, the distance of a current outcome If from this partic-
ular utopia point. Values such that 0:5 I: (If, U) :5 1 indicate that the current
point If gives to every player improvements at least as good as the simplest
compromise (30.7); values 1 < I: (If, U) < 2 indicate that there is some improve-
ment over the current status quo point, but worse than the simplest compromise
(30.7); finally, values I: (If, U) > 2 indicate that If is worse than the status quo
point, possibly as a result of conflict escalation. Thus, the current conflict
coefficient can be used when simulating games to indicate to all players the
intensity of the current conflict situation.
For further applications in mediation and negotiation processes, we can
define the minimal cooperative conflict coefficient (more precisely, the minimum
of the conflict coefficient, which in this case is always attained at a cooperative,
weakly efficient solution):
I:c(fi) = min 1:(If,U)
,E Y(U)
(30.8)
which can be interpreted as an indicator of the cooperative decision and outcome
that minimizes conflict, given the status quo outcome U. The minimal coopera-
tive conflict coefficient has the following properties [see Wierzbicki (1984), Bron-
isz and Krus (1986), Bronisz, Krus, Wierzbicki (1987)1:
Theorem 1
IT Y is convex compact and m = p, then the minimum in (30.8) is attained at
the Raiffa cooperative solution and is thus (at least weakly) efficient. IT Y is
compact, then 0 :5 I:c (U) :5 1; if Y convex, I:c (U) = 1, if the part of the efficient
boundary of Y dominating U is a linear manifold, and I:c(U) :5 2 for nonconvex
Y.
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when each player has Pi objectives, that is,
- say, because of cultural differences between
Recall that the Raiffa cooperative solution can be also characterized by the
axioms of invariance under positive affine transformations of utility, of sym-
metry, of weak Pareto optimality (weak efficiency), and of individual monotoni-
city - see Thompson (19S0) and Bronisz, Krus, Wierzbicki (19S7). The use of
conflict coefficients generalizes the Raiffa solution for nonconvex Y. The weak
efficiency property can be considered a drawback of the Raiffa solution; when
using the concept of conflict coefficients, we can propose two specifications of the
Raiffa solution that are always efficient (Pareto optimal, not weakly Pareto
optimal). The first specification consists in supplementing the max term in
(30.4) by a linear term with a small coefficient, such as in (30.3); observe that
the deviation coefficient (30.4) can be interpreted as a special case (with changed
sign) of the achievement function (30.3). After such modification, all minima of
the corresponding conflict coefficient c(II, il) are not only efficient, but also prop-
erlyefficient (with bounded trade-off coefficients). The second specification con-
sists in using the conflict coefficient without modifications as defined by (30.4)
and (30.6), but supplementing its minimization over Y(il) by a lexicographic
maximin principle - see Rawls (1971); Bronisz, Krus, Lopuch, (19S7).
Another possible generalization is the use of the conflict coefficients in
preventing conflict escalation even if there is no possibility of cooperative action
and only noncooperative Nash equilibria must be considered as possible final out-
comes. Suppose there are many such equilibria; thus, conflict escalation can
occur. Let YN C Y denote the set of all outcomes corresponding to nonunique
Nash noncooperative equilibria in the game. Since a conflict escalation process
can lead to a status quo outcome il that is dominated by points in YN' a relevant
question might be how to support negotiation and mediation that would lead
even to jointly acceptable noncooperative equilibrium. We can use then a suit-
able modification of the definition of the conflict coefficient: Y should be
replaced by YN in the formulae (30.5) to (30.S) to define the minimal non-
cooperative conflict coefficient cn(il). Most of the properties of ce(il) can be suit-
ably modified for this case.
30.4. Conflict Coefficient for Multi-Objective Games
Situations and Interactive Mediation Processes
We consider here a case
m
p = ~ Pi> m, and assume
i=1
players - that the objectives of a player cannot be consistently aggregated into
a utility function. If the players have multiple objectives, they could try to
manipulate the outcomes of a mediation process by aggregating or disaggregat-
ing their objectives - that is, by changing the number of them. The results of
Bronisz and Krus (19S6) on the generalizations of the Raiffa solution for this
case indicate that a manipulation-free mediation process can be organized by
asking each player to define an aspiration point in the space of their objectives
and defining a conflict coefficient relative to aspirations, in the following way;
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Let 11 = (1Ii, •..1Ii, •.•1Im ) E RP denote the joint outcome for all players,
1Ii E R Pi denoting the outcome vectors and 1Ii,i single outcomes for individual
players. Let the attainable outcome set Y c RP and a status quo point fl E Y be
given. Suppose a player defines his aspiration point Yi E R Pi. By maximizing-
over 11 E Y(fl) defined similarly as in (30.5) - the following achievement func-
tion:
where
s· '(11' y. fl·) = (11' . - y. ·)j(Y· . - fl .)
',' ., '" ," ," '" '"
(30.9)
(30.10)
with some smalll > 0, a decision support system can compute an attainable and
efficient outcome:
(30.11)
This outcome is, in a sense [see Wierzbicki (1986)1 the best attainable
response to the aspirations of the player (if the player does not like this response,
he can modify it by changing his aspirations - although he clearly cannot obtain
unattainable outcomes just by increasing aspirations) under the assumption,
however, that the moves of all other players contribute to attaining this outcome
as long as other players' outcomes are not worse than the corresponding com-
ponents of the status quo point fl. Therefore, the outcome 1Ii
,
muJy, fl) is not a
reasonable outcome of the bargaining process; a vector 1Imax (y, fl) =(111 max(y, fl),· ..1Ii max(y, fl), .. ·1Im max(y, fl)) composed of these outcomes is typi-
caliy not attainable and thus will be called an utopia point relative to aspirations;
the subvectors 1Ii,max(y, fl) are called here individual utopia point components.
Observe that the differences 1Ii
,
muJy, fl) - fli between the individual utopia
point components and the corresponding status quo components constitute direc-
tions of improvement desirable for the ith player. Observe also that, if the set Y
is convex, the simple compromise point:
(30.12)
belongs to this set and is attainable.
Thus, we can assume that each player can agree to a joint outcome moving
in the direction 1Imax(y, fl) - fl if the stepsize coefficient in this direction does not
exceed a scalar value a = min (al, ..ai, ..a m) where ai are confidence coefficients
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specified by players. This prineiple 0/ limited eonfidenee [see Fandel and
Wierzbicki (1985), Bronisz, Krus, Wierzbicki (1987)] can be interpreted as the
fact that, in many practical applications, the players do not have full confidence
in their ability to describe and predict precisely the consequences of their deci-
sions and possible outcomes; thus they prefer to proceed cautiously in negotia-
tions and try to limit the improvements of outcomes of other players. The use of
the minimal confidence coefficient follows from the fact that a unanimous agree-
ment is needed for any cooperative improvement of the status quo point. Rea-
sonable values of the confidence coefficient for this multicriteria game in the con-
vex case are at best between 0 and 11m ; while admitting a more general case and
a technical adjustment of the confidence coefficients, however, we can consider
all confidence coefficient values between 0 and 1.
For this purpose, we define first the coefficient of deviation from the utopia
point relative to aspirations:
d(lI, ii, y)= max max (lIi.j,m&X(ii, y) - IIi) ! (lIi,j.max(ii, y) - Vi)
l~i~m l~j~Pi
(30.13)
and observe that, if we move along the direction lIm&X(ii,y) - ii, the minimal
value of this deviation coefficient and the maximal step-size for attainable out-
comes in this direction sum up to 1. Thus, we can define:
Qm&X = 1 - min d(lI, ii, y)
rEY(~
(30.14)
and admit any confidence coefficients that are not larger than Qmax. Moreover,
we can as well generalize the concept of the conflict coefficient to the multiobjec-
tive case, relative to the aspiration levels of the players:
e(,.i.i} = 2d(',i.i} + (m(m-2)}/(m-l}d(,.i.i)(d(,.i.i) - I} (30.15)
This conflict coefficient has properties similar to those specified in Theorem
1; its minimal value can be determined together with Qmax:
ec(ii, y) = min e(lI' ii, y)
rEY(~
= 2(1-~ax) - (m(m-2)!(m-1))Omax(I-Qmax)
and the following theorem holds:
(30.16)
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IT Y(il) is compact, then the minimum in (30.15) is attained at a weakly efficient
solution, generalizing the Raiffa cooperative solution. Moreover, 0 ~ cAy, il) ~ 1
if Y is convex, cc(y, il) = 1 if the part of the efficient boundary of Y dominating
il is a linear manifold, and cc(y, il) ~ 2 for nonconvex Y.
While using the principle of limited confidence supplemented by the con-
cept of the minimal conflict coefficient or the maximal confidence coefficient, we
can construct an interactive process of negotiations (supported by a mediator or
a mediating decision support system). Each round of negotiations, t, starts from
the current status quo point if. Each negotiator (player) specifies, in confidence
to the mediator, his current aspiration point in the space of his objectives, yf,
and his current confidence coefficient, at. The mediator - either by holistic,
deliberating reasoning, or using a decision support system with the model of the
game - determines the individual utopia components relative to aspirations
(which he communicates confidentially to individual negotiators). The maximal
confidence coefficient a:nax' the resulting confidence coefficient at = min
(al, ...ai, ...am,a~ax) as well as the minimal conflict coefficient cc(yt, if) and the
increase of the conflict coefficient corresponding to the resulting decrease of the
confidence - these coefficients he can communicate to all negotiators. Along
with these coefficients, he can compute and communicate to all negotiators the
proposed result of this round of negotiations, yt = if + at(y:nax - if); if all
negotiators agree to this result, it is accepted as the status quo point if+l for
the next round. Axiomatic properties of such a process have been investigated
by Bronisz, Krus, Wierzbicki (1987).
30.6. Conclusions
Most analytical frameworks of rational behavior, even when aimed at universal-
ity, are culturally dependent. The lessons from the holistic framework of deli-
berative rationality show that the main purpose of using an analytical framework
is that of learning. Thus, even when starting from the utility maximization
framework, we should not assume consistency of a decision-maker and must
admit nonstationary approximations to his utility function.
This leads to the quasisatisficing framework of rational behavior that takes
into account the learning and changing aspirations of a decision-maker. This
framework incorporates most of the properties of other analytical frameworks,
based on other culturally dependent perceptions of rationality. Therefore, it can
be used for supporting decisions in cross-cultural contexts. For multi-actor deci-
sion situations of this type, including the cases of social traps or conflict escala-
tion in simulated games, the concept of a conflict coefficient generalizes the
Raiffa cooperative solution and helps to measure conflict intensity as well as to
support mediation and negotiation.
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CHAPTER 31
Aspirations and Aspiration Adjustment
in Location Games
Wulf Albers
Universittit Bielefeld
Bielefeld
Federal Republic of Germany
31.1. Introduction
This chapter gives a first outline of some central ideas of aspiration approaches
for location games. The theories have been developed by observing more than
400 experimental location games, mainly involving free face-to-face communica-
tion.
Section 31.2 introduces the paradigm of location games, which are a gen-
eralization of the situation of n players with ideal points %1"",%n in R n having to
agree on a solution point % E R n by simple majority rule, where each player
tries to obtain a result that is as near as possible to his ideal position. It seems
that - for instance, by using factor analysis methods - the paradigm can be
applied to a wide class of political decision problems.
In Section 31.3 aspirations and the aspiration equilibrium are introduced as
a rational solution concept. Aspirations are assumed to develop parallel to the
bargaining process; they are supposed to be such that within a coalition a
player only agrees to an alternative if its utility fulfills his aspiration. In the
aspiration approach the aspirations of all players are considered simultane-
ously. Equilibrium conditions for such aspiration profiles (al"" ,an) are intro-
duced. The result can be interpreted as an extension of the quota concept or of
the generalized quota concept [Albers (1974)\ to location games.
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In Section 31.4 aspiration adjustment processes are modeled from a
rational point of view. Aspiration adjustment paths are introduced as limits of
stepwise aspiration adjustment. The end points of maximal paths have in some
respect the character of E-equilibria. Related to the observed behavior, a path
section rule is given, which, under reasonable conditions, seems to reduce the
number of paths in a way such that all paths have the same end points. So, by
applying some principles of observed behavior, the rational theory could be
refined in a way such that a unique aspiration profile can be predicted.
However, these predictions essentially differ from observed bargaining
results. The reason for that seems to be the difference between bargaining
processes and aspiration adjwtment processes. Aspiration adjustment
processes, as modeled here, are based on the assumption that each player max-
imizes his aspiration. In bargaining processes this aim is confounded with a
necessity to stop the bargaining process at a point, when one is himself in the
formed coalition. From this point of view, it can become reasonable to reduce
one's demands essentially below one's adequate aspiration.
Section 31.5 gives a more behavioral approach. It is assumed that players
can deviate from their aspiration as long as the condition "a stronger player
should not get more than a weaker player" is fulfilled (where the strength is
given by the theoretical value of the aspiration of Section 31.4). This principle
selects a certain set of alternatives for each coalition. In addition, two condi-
tions are introduced, namely: (a) within a coalition a player i has to justify high
outcomes by outcomes in other coalitions, including i, with at least the same
utility to himself, and (b) the others have to justify low outcomes of i by out-
comes with at most the same utility for i in other coalitions, including i. Apply-
ing this principle repeatedly, one obtains for each coalition a set of alternatives
as predicted outcomes. This approach can be interpreted as a consequent exten-
sion of the equal share analysis of Selten (1972). At present, the predictions of
Section 31.5 seem to give the best descriptive solution concepts for location
games.
Section 31.6 introduces the formation of blocs. Blocs are not-winning coali-
tions of similar players, who bargain with one vote and with a joint utility func-
tion (which is obtained from the utility functions of the bloc members by a rule
of fairness). Blocs are formed only if thereby the aspirations of all players of the
bloc increase. So the formation of blocs does not make sense by its immediate
outcome, but through the related transformation of the game.
31.2. Basic Tools
31.2.1. The space of alternatives
The task of economic, social, or political decision-making is to select one out of
many alternatives. Here the space of alternatives is denoted by X. It is modeled
as an m-dimensional Euclidean space. The coordinates of the space can be·, for
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instance, amounts of different budgets or outlays within parts of budgets,
depending on the degree of aggregation of the decision or the analysis.
The coordinates can also be obtained by factor analysis. Empirical experi-
ences with factor analysis indicate that for most applied problems the extension
to a space with more than six or seven dimensions does not give significant addi-
tional insights. In fact, in many cases only the three or four most significant fac-
tors really have explanatory character.
In the examples below the space is restricted to two dimensions to allow
the situation to be presented graphically.
31.2.2. Utility functions
It is assumed that the preferences of the players can be modeled as quasicon-
cave utility functions, Le., the utility functions induce iso-utility contours that
are borders of convex sets (ef. Figure 91.1).
Figure 91.1. Examples of utility functions illustrated by the corresponding iso-utility
contours.
31.2.3. Paret~optimality
In n-person decision making it is rational to select Pareto-optimal alternatives:
DEFINITION: An alternative z E X is Pareto-optimal for a set S of
decision-makers, if there is no other alternative II E X that is strictly pre-
ferred to z by all decision-makers in S (Le., ui(lI) > ui(z) for no
IIEX,iES).
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By this condition the set of reasonable outcomes is essentially restricted, as
the examples of Figure 91.e show. Figure 91.e(a) shows the Pareto-line between
two individuals connecting the ideal points of the players. Figure 91.e(6) shows
the "triangle" of ideal points for three players. The boundary of the triangle
consists of the Pareto-lines corresponding to the two-person subcoalitions.
(a)
(2)
Figure 91.2. Examples of sets of Pareto-optimal points.
Generally the following theorem holds.
THEOREM: Given a space of alternatives X = R m:
(1) If the utility functions of the players are continuous (not necessarily
quasiconcave), then for each coalition 5 ~ N, the mapping from the
set U of possible utility functions to the corresponding sets of
Pareto-optimal points of 5 is continuous (using the Hausdorff topol-
ogy).
If the utility functions of the players are quasiconcave, then for all
utility levels u" = (u;, ... ,u:) ERn for each coalition 5 ~ N the
corresponding sets
X(5,u): {x E X I u.(x) ~ u: for all i E s}
are convex.
(3) If the utility functions of the players are strictly quasiconcave and
their maxima are obtained on X, and 151 denotes the number of
players in 5, then there is a continuous mapping of an (I N 1-1)-
dimensional simplex (with vertices s., ... ,sn) to X such that:
(a) The set of Pareto-optimal points of N is the image of the sim-
plex.
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(b) For each subcoalition S of N the set of Pareto-optimal points is
the image of the facet spanned by the vertices (si liE S).
(c) For each player i E N the ideal point %i (which maximizes his
utility) is the image of si'
(d) For each two-person coalition {i,i} the set of Pareto-optimal
points is a path connecting their ideal points 2i, xi' [Note that
(a), (c), (d) follow from (b).]
Difficulties that may arise when the utility functions are only continuous
and not quasiconcave are shown by the example of Figure 91.9. The Pareto-sets
of two-person coalitions need no longer define paths between the ideal points of
the players.
Figure 91.9. Example showing that for utility functions which are not quasiconcave the
set of Pareto-optimal points of two players need not define a path between their ideal
positions %1' %2'
The example of Figure 91.,4 shows that the set of Pareto-optimal points of
three players does not generally need to be isomorphic to a two-dimensional sim-
plex.
The example of Figure 91.9 indicates that the quasiconcavity of the utility
functions avoids discontinuities and thereby simplifies the bargaining problem.
31.2.4. Location games
DEFINITION: A location game r = (N, X, u, W, d) is given by
A set of n players, N = {1,2,... ,n}, the subsets of N being called coal-
itions
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Figure S1 ../. Example showing that even for strictly quasiconcave utility functions, the
set of Pareto-optimal points of three players does not need to be isomorphic to a trian-
gle.
A space X of alternatives
Utility functions ui : X -+ R of the players on X
A set W of coalitions (Le., of subsets of N), called winning coalitions
A default outcome d ERN, which is the outcome if no winning coali-
tion is formed.
The idea of the game is that the players of a winning coalition can deter-
mine an alternative x E X as the outcome of the game. So that the problem of
the location game is: which winning coalition is formed and which alternative is
selected by the coalition. [A m~re general approach is given in Laing et al.
(1983).]
It is assumed that the space X of alternatives is an m-dimensional
Euclidean space R m, that the utility functions of the players are quasiconcave
and obtain their maxima on X, and that there are no two winning coalitions
with empty intersection. [Complements of winning coalitions - coalitions which
are neither winning nor losing - are called blocking. In the following, the out-
come of blocking coalitions (the default outcome) is supposed to be sufficiently
unattractive that blocking coalitions can be ignored.]
The examples given in this chapter and the experiments performed only
involve three-, four-, and five-person games with X = R 2• The utility functions
are given via ideal points xl>". ,xn (or via ideal lines '1'''' ,'n) by the respective
(negative) Euclidean distances from the ideal points (or lines). The winning
coalitions are given by simple majority rule.
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In this framework it is the aim of a player to arrange a coalition and
thereby verify an alternative x that is as near as possible to his ideal position
Xi (or his ideal line 'i)' Of course, the interests of the players are usually con-
trary, so that it is a matter of bargaining as to which coalition is formed and
which alternative is selected.
31.2.5. Interpersonal comparison of utility
In Section 31.5 we assume that there is a strength ordering on the players with
the consequence that, if possible, a stronger player should not get less than a
weaker player. This implies a common agreement on the interpersonal com-
parison of outcomes, or, more precisely, a common agreement on scales
ul, ... ,un by which the outcomes of the players 1,... ,n can be measured, where
each scale ui is a mapping from X to R. These scales have the character of
utility functions, and it seems reasonable to assume that they can be obtained
from the individual utility functions ui of the players by stricly monotonic
transformations.
Under this assumption we can replace the individual utility functions
ul" .. ,un by the scales ul"'" un as long as the analysis only refers to the ordinal
character of the utility functions. Moreover, ul' ... ,un give the additional pro-
perty that interpersonal comparisons of outcomes are possible.
In this chapter the results of Section 31.4 make sense for utility functions of
both types Ui and ui' However, from a behavioral point of view, the path selec-
tion rule in Subsection 31.4.5 implicitly requires the interpersonal comparison,
since otherwise a behavioral selection of "most symmetric aspiration profiles" is
difficult to motivate. Section 31.5 should be based on functions of type ui'
In our experiments the monetary incentives ii (x): = ci - Q Ix-xii were
multiples of the (negative) Euclidean distances of X from the respective ideal
positions xi ERn, with additive constants ci' which were different for different
players and not known in advance. (The constants depended on the success of
other players in the same position as player i.) In this setup the distances from
the ideal positions suggest themselves as evaluation functions ui' It seems
reasonable to assume that also in other situations the Euclidean distances from
the ideal positions can be spontaneously selected as scales to perform the com-
parison of outcomes.
This means that the outcomes of the players are implicitly compared with
their maximal possible outcomes. It is interesting to remark that in characteris-
tic function games (with payoff 0 in all one-player coalitions) the players directly
compare their numerical outcomes. So in this situation each player compares his
outcome with the worst outcome he can get. In both cases canonical reference
points have been selected to obtain interpersonal comparability, but in wholly
different ways.
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31.3. Aspirations
31.3.1. Aspiration profiles
W. Al6en
In this approach aspirations are modeled as minimal demands of utility, so that
a player i with an aspiration ai will agree to an alternative % EX, only if
ui(%) ~ ai'
It is assumed that in each state of the bargaining process each player has
an aspiration ai' which may be adjusted at the next stage. The aspirations of
the players define an aspiration profile a = (ai, ... ,a") E R".
NOTATIONS: For an aspiration profile a E R" let
X(8, a) : = {% E X 1% Pareto-optimalfor 8 and ui(%) ~ ai(%) for all i E 8}
coa (a): = {8 E WI X(8, a) 10}
coai(a): = {8 E WI X(8,a) 10, i E 8}
X(8,a) is the set of those Pareto-optimal alternatives of S that fulfill the aspira-
tions of all players of 8. coa(a) are those winning coalitions that can fulfill the
aspirations of all of their members by an adequate alternative. So the coalitions
of coa (a) may be denoted as "feasible coalitions" i coat (a) are the feasible coal-
itions containing player i. Correspondingly, we introduce feasibility of players:
NOTATION: A player is called feasible (with respect to a) if coa.(a) 10.
31.3.2. Aspiration adjustment process and bargaining process
Analyzing people who are bargaining in a location game, one has to distinguish
the development of aspirations in an aspiration adJustment process, (which can
be modeled by the aspiration profiles at at different points of time t E T), and
the bargaining process, which may be given by a sequence of proposals (at
different points of time) and by the information as to which player agreed to
which proposal (at which point of time), where a proposal (%,8) is a pair
%E X, 8 E W. The idea behind a proposal (%,8) is that the players of S might,
should (or already have) agree(d) to the alternative %. If the players of Shave
agreed to %, then (%,8) can have the character of an interim agreement or a final
agreement.
The problem of empirical observation is that the bargaining process can be
observed directly, while the aspiration adjustment process can only be observed
indirectly by its influences on the bargaining process.
Relations between these two processes can be formulated by introducing
revealed aspirations, which have to fulfill assumptions such as:
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Figure 91.5. Examples of feasible points X(S,a) and feasible coalitions for different as-
pirations in a three-person location game.
(1) A player i will agree to a proposal (x,8) only if it fulfills his revealed
aspiration (Le., if Uj(x) ~ aj).
(2) A player i E 8 who agrees to a proposal (x,8) thereby indicates that his
revealed aspiration aj is not higher than Uj(x), which follows from (1).
(3) A player who actively changes from (x, 8) to (y, T) (with i E Tn 8) has a
revealed aspiration aj > Uj(x).
In Albers (1986) the relations of the aspiration adjustment process and the
bargaining process are worked out in detail for apex games. In that paper the
bargaining process is analyzed and the aspiration adjustment process behind the
bargaining process is modeled implicitly. Here the aspiration adjustment process
is modeled directly, and the bargaining process is not modeled. (It should be
remarked that the approach here can be easily transferred to one-step charac-
teristic function games.)
31.3.3. Dependence of players
Let a = (al,a2'· .. ,an) be an aspiration profile. Then we say that a player i
depends on player j if every feasible coalition of i contains player j, while player
j has a feasible coalition without player i:
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DEFINITION: i depends on j at a if c0l1t(a) ~ coa;(a).
W. Alber.
In such a situation it can be reasonable that player j asks player i to
reduce his aspiration and j himself increases his aspiration in such a way that
afterward still coai(a) ~ coa;(a). In fact, if i gets less than his aspiration in an
alternative coalition of player j without player i, then player j can even force i
to reduce his aspiration by threatening to form a coalition without i.
If, on the other hand, for all coalitions in coaj(a) \ coai(a), the
corresponding proposals (x,8) fulfill the aspirations of player i, then the propos-
als (x, (8 U {j}) U {ill are also feasible under simple majority rule, and coai(a)
cannot be a subset of coaj(a). So, under simple majority rule, the argument that
a dependent player can be forced to reduce his aspiration always holds.
Figure 91.6. Aspiration adjustment in a three-person game.
The definition of dependence may be explained by the example of Figure
91.6. Consider the situation with aspirations as given in (a). Here players 2 and
3 depend on 1. Player 1 can force player 2 to reduce his aspiration and 1 can
increase his aspiration by the same amount [see (b)]. Now player 3 has to reduce
his aspiration, if he wants to find a coalition partner [see (c)l. Steps (b) and (c)
can be repeated unless players 2 and 3 form an alternative coalition and
thereby lose their dependence on 1. The corresponding result, where all players
are independent, is given in [d].
In the following we shall use the
NOTATION: dePi (a): = {j E Nli depends on j (with respect to an
A",erationa and A,piration Adjuriment jn Location Game,
31.3.4. Aspiration equilibrium
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Figure 91.6 (d) gives a very acceptable solution for this specific game. In order
to generalize this to arbitrary location games we give three properties that are
met by the example:
- Each player is feasible, i.e.,
(AI) c:oaj(a) f °for all i E N
- IT all players of a set S ~ N increase their aspirations, then at
least one of them is infeasible or dependent afterward, Le.,
(A2) iij > aj(all i E S), iij; = aj; (alllr. E N \ S),
=> either c:oa(ii) = 0, or there are i E S, j EN such that
c:oaj(ii) ¥c:oa (ii).
- No player depends on another, i.e.,
(A3) c:oaj(a) ¥c:oa;(a) for no pair i, j E N
Property (AI) is obvious; (A3) has been discussed above. (A2) can be
explained by Figure 91.7, which shows situations where players can increase
their aspirations (see the dotted lines) and can afterward still verify their aspira-
tions without becoming dependent.
Using these axioms we define
DEFINITION: The aspiration equilibrium is the set of aspiration profiles
that meet (AI), (A2), and (A3).
In the following we shall replace (A2) by the condition
- IT all players of a set S ~ N increase their aspirations, then afterwards
either there is no feasible coalition, or for one player of S the set of
players on whom he depends increases, i.e.,
(A2) aj > aj (all i E S), iij; = aj; (aillr. E N \ S)
=> either c:oa(a) = 0, or there is i E S, such that
depj(ii) ~ dePi(a).
It is easy to prove that condition (A2) can replace (A2) if (AI) and (A3)
hold:
REMARK: The aspiration equilibrium is the set of aspiration profiles
that meet (AI), (A2), (A3).
The advantage of formulation (A2) is, however, that it makes sense to
apply it, even if (A3) does not hold. Since (A2) is a condition that reduces the
slack (cr. the examples of Figure 91.7), condition (A2) will enable us to con-
sider aspiration profiles that meet (AI) and (A2) when condition (A3) is not yet
met, and we can define a movement of such profiles in a way that attempts to
fulfill condition (A3) in the end.
According to conditions (AI)-(A3), the following behavioral rules can be
introduced:
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Figure 31.7. Aspirations in a three-person game with ideal points that do not meet con-
dition (A2).
(i) A player reduces aj if coaj(a) = 0
(ii) All players i of a set S ~ N increase their aspirations from aj to aj if
coaj(a) =I- 0 and depj(a) ~ depj(a) for all i E S
(iii) A player reduces aj if he depends on another player.
LEMMA: An aspiration profile is an aspiration equilibrium if it is stable
with respect to (i)-(iii).
Figure 91.8 gives some examples of aspiration equilibria in different loca-
tion games.
31.3.5. Predictions related to the aspiration equilibrium
The prediction of the aspiration equilibrium theory is that the aspiration adjust-
ment process stops in an aspiration equilibrium profile a and that the
corresponding bargaining results are all proposals (x, S) with S E coa(a) and
x E X(S,a).
EXAMPLE: For the three-person game with ideal points of Figure 91.9,
there is only one aspiration equilibrium. The corresponding feasible coali-
tions are {l,2}, {1,3}, and {2,3}; and the corresponding alternatives are
xl,2', and xl,3' and x2,3' respectively.
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Figure 31.8. Aspiration equilibria of different location games.
Figure 31.9. Predicted results of a three-person game.
31.3.6. Modification of the aspiration equilibrium
The definition of Subsection 31.3.3 is a first approach to a reasonable definition
of an aspiration equilibrium. One problem of the definition may be illustrated by
an example (see Figure 91.10).
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(A2')
Figure 91.10. Example motivating a modification of the aspiration equilibrium
definition.
In this example, for the given aspirations, player 1 depends on player 2
(and symmetrically player 4 depends on player 3). However, if player 1 reduces
his aspiration, player 2 cannot in return increase his aspiration (neither in coali-
tion {1,2,5} nor in {1,2,3}). From this point of view there is no motivation for
player 2 to press player 1 to reduce his aspiration, since he cannot achieve an
(immediate) advantage from that.
This consideration motivates us to modify condition (A2) in the following
way:
eoai(a) ~ eoa;(a) only if j. becomes infeasible or dependent for all
aspiration profiles ii with iii < ai' ii; > a; and ak = ak for all
It :/ i, It:/ j.
This means that it is impossible for player i to reduce his aspiration and player j
to increase his in a way that permits a feasible coalition to j.
This modification, so to speak, restricts the pressure of player j on player i
to such cases where something similar to side payments from i to j are possible.
In this context it should be remarked that, in a similar way as here, aspiration
equilibria can be defined for characteristic function games (where side pay-
ments are always possible). For these games, however, conditions (A2) and
(A2') are equivalent. It must, however, be remarked that the new definition
does not solve all problems. In fact, it does not even solve all problems
imposed by the example.
Assume players {3,4,5} form a preliminary coalition and agree upon the
point x34S' What will players 1,2 do? They will propose a coalition {1,2,3}
with an outcome %123' which is nearer to the ideal position of player 3 than x123
(and therefore also nearer than x34S). Player 3 can, of course, accept this offer,
since the new proposal cannot be dominated by any coalition that does not
include player 3 (except in the case that one of the players essentially reduces his
aspirations). So, implicitly, player 3 can force player 1 (or 1 and 5) to reduce
their aspirations.
The dependence of player 1 on player 2 therefore works against player 1,
because player 2 clearly prefers x123 to x12S' so that, under certain pre-histories
of the bargaining process, player 1 cannot use x12S as a counter-argument.
Thereby he becomes dependent (on player 3).
373
The threat described here works differently from that given when we intro-
duced the definition of dependence. There we argued that, if i depends on j,
then j can threaten player i to reduce his aspiration and otherwise form a coali-
tion with somebody else. Here he threatens player i to form a specific coalition
with player j. Restricting player i to this alternative, he may become dependent
on somebody else, and thereby he can be forced to reduce his aspiration.
This argument again results in the conclusion that the dependent player
must reduce his aspiration. However, we are not sure whether in every situation
where one player depends on another, there are forces working in such a way
that the dependent player has to reduce his demands.
31.4. Modeling the Aspiration Adjustment Process
The aim of this section is to model the aspiration adjustment process in a nor-
mative way with continuous time as an aspiration adjustment path. Such a path
is defined as a limit of aspiration adjustment sequences with discrete points of
time. Maximal paths are selected, paths are normalized by assuming "a con-
stant speed of change" and, by applying the observations of experiments, a path
selection condition is introduced.
31.4.1. Aspiration adjustment chains
DEFINITION: An aspiration adjustment chain is a sequence
ii = (a 1,a2 ,... ,) of aspiration profiles such that for all r E N, i E N one of
the following conditions holds:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(*)
a r+1 < a r and coa·(ar ) = a, , ,
a[+l > a r and coaj(ar) n coaj(ar+l) f= a and
depj(ar+l) ~ depj(ar)
a[+l < a[ and i depends on some player j in coa(ar), and there is no
player Ie who depends on i in coa(ar)
a r+1 = a r, ,
Moreover, it is assumed that for a given r
• case (2) is not applied, if there are i E N, (i"+l E R N fulfilling
condition (1)
• case (3) is not applied, if there are i E N, iir+l ERN fulfilling
condition (1) or (2).
EXPLANATION: Conditions (1)-(3) refer to the corresponding condi-
tions of the aspiration equilibrium and to conditions (i)-(iii). These condi-
tions are ordered by (*) in a hierarchical way, i.e., (1) is applied before (2)
and (2) is applied before (3). Examples are given in Figures 91.11 and
91.11.
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Figure 91.11. An aspiration adjustment sequence in a three-person game.
) I
Figure 91.1£. An aspiration adjustment sequence in a five-person game.
In these examples the single steps of aspiration adjustment have been per-
formed in a special way so that players in symmetric positions have been treated
equally I and that all players who reduced their aspirations from one step to the
next reduced them by the same amount.
Of course, it would have been possible to subdivide the processes into
finer processes with finer steps of aspiration adjustment. In the limit, paths of
aspiration adjustment are obtained. The definition of paths requires us to define
the fineness of aspiration adjustment sequences:
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DEFINITION: An aspiration adjustment sequence ii has fineness
fER, f > 0, if Ia[+l - a[l < f for all i E N, r EN.
31.4.2. Aspiration adjustment paths
Let T: [0, tJ or [0, tJ (Le., the set of real numbers between 0 and t including 0,
but not necessarily including t).
DEFINITION: a: T -+ R N is an aspiration adjustment path, if
(1)
(2)
There is a sequence of aspiration adjustment sequences lii,2ii,3ii, ... ,
and
There are monotonically increasing mappings iT: N -+ T (i = 1,2,... )
such that
(a) ((ir(r), ia") IrE N} converges to {(t,a(t)) I t E T} (Haus-
dorff topology) .
(b) the finenes~ of the sequence Iii converges to 0 (for all i)
(c) maxr E N (ir(r+1) - Ir(r)) converges to 0 (for all i).
there is a maximal
initial point (Le.,
From this definition follows
LEMMA: Every aspiration adjustment path a: T -+ R N is continuous.
Moreover, I presume that every aspiration adjustment path is piecewise
differentiable.
For the examples of Figures 91.11 and 91.12 aspiration adjustment paths
can be obtained by refining the drawn process. Then each figure just shows the
vertices of the path, and the path is obtained by connecting these vertices by
straight lines of aspiration adjustment in R N .
31.4.3. Maximal aspiration adjustment paths
DEFINITION: An aspiration adjustment path a: T -+ R N is maximal if
there is no aspiration adjustment path {J: U -+ RN such that T ~ U and
a(t) = {J(t) for all t E T.
This maximality condition refers to the tails of the paths:
LEMMA: For each aspiration path a: T -+ R N
aspiration path {J: U -+ R N with the same
a(O) = {J(O)) which extends a (Le., a(T) ~ {J( U)).
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Maximal aspiration adjustment paths can lead to aspiration equilibria
and, obviously, each aspiration equilibrium can be presented as the end point of
a maximal aspiration adjustment path.
An aspiration adjustment path can be interpreted as a permanent effort
to fulfill conditions (Al)-(A3) of the aspiration equilibrium. From the hierarchy
of the aspiration modification conditions for aspiration adjustment chains, it
follows that aspiration adjustment chains permanently have to reach aspirations
that meet (AI) and (A2) before a new effort can be made to fulfill (A3). From
this follows
THEOREM: For each aspiration adjustment path a: T -t R there are
points t 1 < t2 in T such that
(1) a(t) meets (AI) if t ~ t 1
(2) a(t) meets (AI) and (A2) if t ~ t2•
Of course, the only point t3 for which a(t3) meets (A3) can be the end
point of the interval T. However, it need not be that the path really meets an
aspiration equilibrium. To characterize properties of the end point we introduce
a meets (AI) and (A2), and
For no pair i,j E N with coai(a) ~ coaj(a) is there an aspiration
profile ii such that ii<ai-f. iij > aj + f, irj; = aj; for It =I i,j, and
coai( ii) ~ coaj(ii).
DEFINITION: An aspiration profile a E R N is an aspiration f-equilibn'um
if
(1)
(2)
So an aspiration f-equilibrium can be interpreted as a point in which con-
dition (A3) is insofar fulfilled that the dependence of player i on j cannot justify
a change of the aspirations by more than f. Now we can formulate
THEOREM: The end point a(t *) of a maximal aspiration adjustment
path is a limit point of aspiration f-equilibria (Le., for each f > 0 there is
an aspiration f-equilibrium a£ such that Ia£ - a(t *) I < f).
31.4.4. The speed normalization
The following remark says that a monotonic transformation of the time scale
T of a path defines a new path:
REMARK: If a: T -t RN is an aspiration adjustment path and
I: R -t R is a continuous strictly monotonic increasing function with
1(0) = 0, then "1: = a 0 r 1 : I(T) -t R N is an aspiration adjustment path.
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The only difference of the two paths a and fJ are the "speeds" da/ dt and
d"Y/ dt at different points of the path. Since we are not interested in the speed
of the aspiration adjustment, we normalize it:
SPEED NORMALIZATION: An aspiration adjustment path a: T -+ X is
speed normalized, if for all t E T:
The following theorem says that "every aspiration adjustment path can be
speed normalized":
THEOREM: For every aspiration adjustment path a: T -+ X there is a
strictly monotonically increasing function f: R -+ R such that
"Y : = a 0 r 1: f( T) -+ R N is speed normalized.
So we can restrict our considerations to speed normalized aspiration
adjustment paths without loss of generality. In the following we shall only con-
sider speed normalized aspiration adjustment paths.
31.4.5. Path selection rule and open start condition
Experimental observations indicate that subjects select paths that are, so to say,
"most egalitarian". To define this we introduce the
NOTATION: For each aspiration profile a E R N let lex(a) be the vector
obtained from a by reordering the components of a decreasingly.
Now we can formulate the
PATH SELECTION RULE (PSR): Let a: T -+ R N , fJ: U -+ R N be two
speed normalized aspiration adjustment paths, and let t - E T be maximal
subject to a(t) = fJ(t) for all t < t-. Then fJ is preferred to a, if there is an
f - > 0 so that for all f with 0 < f < f - lexfJ(t - + f) is lexicographically
smaller than lex a( t - + f). A speed normalized path a fulfills PSR, if there
is no speed normalized path fJ which is preferred to a.
In addition, we define the
OPEN START CONDITION (OSC): A speed normalized path
a :T -+ R N, which meets the path selection rule, meets the open start
condition if fJ( U) ;2 a( U) for every path fJ: U -+ R N with fJ;(O) $ a;(O) for
all i E N (i.e., a path that meets the path selection rule meets the open
start condition, if it can be continued at the starting side to arbitrary
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aspiration profiles below the initial aspiration profile a(O) of the path).
In the following we will restrict our considerations to "regular" paths:
DEFINITION: An aspiration adjustment path is regular, if it is maximal,
speed normalized, and it fulfills PSR and OSC.
Now we can formulate the
CONJECTURE: For each location game, there is at least one regular
aspiration adjustment path.
The idea is that for a given game r all regular aspiration adjustment paths
should lead to the same end point. One step in this direction is made by
LEMMA: For every location game r there is a unique aspiration profile
a2 (Ij such that for every regular aspiration path a: T -+ X either there is
t 2 E T such that a (t 2 ) = a2 (Ij, and [a(t) meets (AI) and
(A2)] <=> [t ~ t2]; or there is a regular aspiration path fJ: U -+ X such that
a( T) ~ fJ( U) and a2(r E fJ( U)).
More generally we define
DEFINITION: A location game is regular, if all of its regular aspiration
adjustment paths end in the same aspiration profile. We denote this
profile by a -(Ij, and call it the regular aspiration profile of r.
Of course, if a location game r has a unique aspiration equilibrium, then
this is the regular aspiration profile of the game. However, for more compli-
cated games, the regularity principle can serve to select a specific aspiration
profile.
It seems that "almost all" location games are regular:
CONJECTURE: let r = (N, X, u W, d), and for any (x 1,x2 , .•• ,x") E X N
let u:l:: X -+ R N, d:l: ERN such that
u:l:(z): = u(z-x) for all z E X
df: = di + maxi,iE Nlxi-xil, and let
r:l:: (N, X, u:l:, W, d:l:)
then for any z E X and any f-ball Uf(x) round z the set {x E Uf(x) Ir:l: not
regular} has Borel measure zero.
The idea is that by the (suggested) theorem a unique solution profile can
be assigned to almost all location games. But even if the theorem is wrong, the
set of possible end points of aspiration adjustment paths that meets the aspira-
tion adjustment rule and the open start condition essentially restricts the set of
predicted results of the aspiration adjustment process.
EXAMPLES: The aspirations shown in Figures Sl.ll and S1.1e give the
vertices of the respective regular aspiration adjustment paths. In both
examples the end points a -(Ij are unique. Both paths are started with
aspirations given by the ideal positions of the players.
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31.4.6. Strategic behavior
The preceding subsection describes in which way aspiration adjustment
processes develop. It seems reasonable that rational players can foresee the
further development of the process and the question arises if this might cause
them to change their behavior
For instance, if a player i depends on another player j, then player j can
refuse to ask player i to reduce his aspiration and to increase his own aspiration.
Thereby the aspiration adjustment process can stop at an early point of the
aspiration adjustment procedure. The consequence of this is that in many
three-person games only the coalition {1,2} is formed.
The main difference between the aspiration adjustment process and the
bargaining process is that the aspiration adjustment process is modeled in a way
that assumes that it is in the interest of every player to maximize his aspiration
value. However, the aspiration has to be verified as an outcome! And since usu-
ally a player is not contained in all feasible coalitions, he cannot be sure to ver-
ify his aspiration.
From this point of view it may even be reasonable to demand essentially
less than one's adequate aspiration. It might perhaps even happen that all
players are willing to reduce their aspirations below the aspirations reached in
the aspiration adjustment path. But there is a limit to such aspiration reduc-
tions. Aspirations are not at the free disposal of the players; they must be
regarded by the others as adequate demands. The question arises: which devia-
tions of aspirations from those of the aspiration adjustment process are
accepted by the players? Experimental results suggest that players accept devia-
tions from reasonable aspiration profiles as long as players with higher aspiration
values get higher outcomes than plallers with lower aspiration values. These con-
ditions reduce the purpose of the aspiration adjustment process to finding an
order of strength on the set of players, with the implication that - if possible -
a stronger player should get more than a weaker player. This idea will be
modeled in Section 31.5.
31.4.'1. Relation to the competitive solution
Although defined in a very different way, the concept here is closely related to
the "competitive solution" of McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer (1978); the fol-
lowing definition is given according to Forman, Laing (1982):
DEFINITION: A set C of proposals is called a competitive solution if
(0)
(I)
(finiteness) for each coalition 8 ~ N there is at most one alternative
%E X such that (%,8) E C
(internal stability) (x, 8), (II, T) E C => (II, T) does not dominate
(%,8)
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(2) (external stability) for each (%,8) 3 C which dominates a proposal in
C there is a proposal (II, T) E C such that (II, T) dominates (%, 8)
where: (II, T) dominates (%,8) if T is winning and Uj(II) > Uj(%) for all
i E Tn 8
For many games the competitive solutions are given by the sets
U{X(a,8) I 8 ~ N} = U{X(a,8) 18 E eoa(a)} of the aspiration equilibria
a.
Figure 91.19 (a) gives an example of a location game that has a unique
aspiration equilibrium (given by the radii drawn in the figure). But the sets
related to the aspiration equilibrium do not form a competitive solution, since
(%235' {2,3,5}) is dominated by (%145' {1,4,5}). However, {(%123' {1,2,3}),
(%145' {1,4,5}), (%234' {2,3,4})} form a competitive solution.
(b)
Figure 91.19. Two examples of location games and corresponding aspiration equilibria
given by the drawn radii. Game (6) has no competitive solution.
The situation in this game can be characterized as one where player 5 has
the only function to support the proposal {%145' {l,4,5}} if coalition {1,4} is
formed. This consideration reduces the essential part of the game to the active
interest groups {I}, {4}, and {2,3}, where the coalitions {1,2,3}, {4,2,3}, and
{1,4} are possible, of which {1,4} is necessarily supported by player 5.
A slight modification of the example [see Figure 91.19 (6)], generates the
game for which for each aspiration equilibrium the corresponding set of propo-
sals neither fulfills the internal nor the external stability condition. In this exam-
ple omitting the dominated proposal (%235' {2,3,5}) still leaves the external
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stability violated. I strongly suggest that this game has no eompetitive solution.
The role of player 5 is similar to that in example (a); however, the idea of the
aspiration equilibrium can no longer be presented in the framework of the com-
petitive solution approach.
31.6. Order of Strength and Generalized Equal
Share Analysis
31.5.1. The order of strength
The following concept is based on a strength ordering on the set of players:
DEFINITION: t is a strength ordering on N, if it is
transitive (Le., i t j, j t k => i t k)
reflexive (i.e., i t i for all i E N)
complete (i.e., i t j or j t i for all i,j E N).
We write i > j if it j and not j t i.
Within this section it is not important where the strength ordering comes
from. Observing experimental games, it seems that it is one of the subjects'
questions in the game to find out their bargaining strengths, i.e., to find out who
is stronger and who is weaker than oneself. It seems that the answer is obtained
during the bargaining process, sometimes by hypothetical bargaining.
According to the aspiration approach, it may be suggested that the
strength ordering is induced by the aspiration values of the unique joint final
aspiration profile of all maximal aspiration adjustment paths that follow ASR
and ose. And, in fact, this seems to be the most reasonable candidate to induce
a strength ordering.
But it may also happen that players follow the aspiration adjustment path
only in the beginning of their considerations and then switch to another cri-
terion, which explains the strength ordering obtained at that state. Albers and
Brunwinkel (1987) consider such a criterion, which says that a player i is
stronger than another, if there are more players whose ideal positions are
nearer to the ideal position of i than players whose ideal positions are nearer
to that of the other. Another criterion may be the distance from the gravicenter
of the set of ideal points: a player is stronger, if he is nearer to the gravicenter.
However, it now seems to the author that these alternatives are only pseudo-
criteria, which are used to confirm the players' feelings of strength that they
developed during the bargaining process.
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31.5.2. Predictions related to the order of strength
W. Alber'
The idea related to the strength ordering is that within a coalition a stronger
player must not agree to get "less" than a weaker player. This is made precise
by the following definition of dominance:
DEFINITION: Let t be a strength ordering on N,S a winning coalition,
and X,1I two alternatives. Then 11 dominotes x with rCBpcct to S and t, if for
each i E S one of the following conditions holds true:
(1) ui(,I) > ui(x)
(2) ui(1I):$ ui(x) and there is a player it i with u;(x) < ui(x) and
u;(,I) > u;(x).
It is reasonable that a player will agree to a change from x to 11 if his utility
increases (condition (1)). Moreover, we assume that a player can be forced to
accept a point 11 with a lower utility than x if there is a player j who is not
weaker than i Uti) so that i has the right not to accept the alternative x (in
which he gets less than i), and to suggest an alternative proposal instead, which
increases his utility (u;(1I) > u;(x)).
The arguments that are stable with respect to this dominance for a given
coalition S are:
DEFINITION: If S is a winning coalition, then X(S, t ) is the set of all
alternatives that are not dominated with respect to S and t. If S is not
winning, then X(S,t) is defined to be empty. X(S,t) is denoted as the Bet
of Btablc altcrnotitJCB of S with rCBpcct to t.
From the definition of dominance follows immediately
REMARK: For all S ~ N a,nd all strength orderings on N, all alternatives
X(S,t) are Paretcroptimal for S.
Examples for sets X(S,t) are given in FigurcB 91.1-4 and 91.15. The exam-
ples show that a player can get more than another player, although he is not
stronger than the other.
31.6. The Adjustment Process of Solution Sets X(S, t)
It seems reasonable to assume that the solution sets X(S, t) induce strategic
considerations of the players by arguing with possible outcomes in other coali-
tions. Specifically, if a coalition S is formed, a player i can argue that he should
not get less than in his worst alternative proposal that does not involve the other
players of S, and partners of i can argue that he should not get more than his
maximal outcome in an alternative coalition that does not involve them.. Of
course, in this context it is important to know the outcomes of which coalitions
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Figure 91.15. Examples of sets X(S,t) of three-person coalitions with different orders
of strength.
can serve as arguments; here we assume that the set fl of these coalitions is
given. The argument of player i will be extended to arguments of subsets of S.
Moreover, the alternatives involved in the arguments of a player i must be res-
tricted to such proposals (y, T) that involve player i as an essential decision-
maker, i.e., those that are not Pareto-optimal for T\{i}.
Applying this idea induces a reduction of the solution sets X(S, t) to
X'(S, t). Then the same procedure can be applied to the new sets, etc., 50 that
a stepwise adjustment process is obtained.
384 W. Allie,..
Correspondingly we define the following set adjustment procedure:
SET ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE:
Let l! ~ W. We define the sets X~(S) ~ X by induction over r for all
S E l!, r E N:
Btep 1: X;(S): = X(S,~) for all S E l!
step r: let X~ (S) be given for all S E l!. Then Z E X;+1 (S) if
(1)
(2)
(3)
Z E X~(S)
There is no I ~ S such that for all TEl! with I ~ T and
for ally E X~(T) and ui(Y) > ui(z) for all i E Tn S
There is a subset S· C S such that
(a) x is Pareto-opti;'al for S·, and
(b) For every i E S· there is TEl! with i E T, T =/ S and
Y E X,(T) such that Uj(Y) ~ Uj(z) for all i E Tn S
Here (2) can be interpreted in the sense that no subcoalition I of S must
accept a proposal when it can be sure to get more in any other coalition that
contains 1. Condition (3) first reduces S· to S by omitting some players who
are not needed to make the compromise on X tight; for the set of remaining
players, S·, it is assumed that each of them should not get more than in his best
alternative in another coalition.
It must be remarked that from experimental observations we are not sure
whether to include condition (3) in the reduction procedure or not. And, in fact,
there are good reasons not to apply condition (3), if one assumes that players
only check if a proposal gives high enough amounts to the others, since danger
comes from players who get too low amounts and therefore change the coalition.
REMARK and DEFINITION: Applying the procedure of the preceding
definition repeatedly,one obtains for each coalition S E l! a sequence
Xi(S), X~(S)" .. which,' in finitely many steps, leads to a set
X~(S) : = r ~NX~(S),
Figure 91.16 gives an example showing the development of the sets
X(S, ~). It should be mentioned that strength ordering ~ and the set l! cannot
be arbitrarily selected. For a given strength ordering the set l! of "reasonable
coalitions" should be at least such that X~(S,~) =/0 for all S E l! (since other-
wise coalitions serve as arguments during the set adjustment procedure, which
in the end are not entered because they do not give stable results). On the
other hand, the strength ordering should be such that it permits at least one set
l!.
DEFINITION: Let r be a location game, l! ~ W and ~ a strength order-
ing on N.
l! is eonsistent for ~ ,if X~ (S) =/ 0 for all S E l!
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Figure 91.16. An example explaining the set adjustment process: location game with
ideal points and strength 1>-2>-3, according to 0 '(1'), I! = {{1,2}, {1,3}, { 2,3}}
= coo(o').
::: is consistent for r, if there is e ~ W which is consistent for :::.
Moreover, one should require that within the sets e each player is feasible
(Le., l!j f: 0) and no player is dependent (Le., ej ~ e.for no pair i, i EN). [Note
that ej : = {S E eli E S}.] ,
In the following section we show that aspiration profiles that are end
points of aspiration adjustment paths induce strength orderings (by i :::
i {:> aj ~ aj) and sets of coalitions e: = coa(a), which are consistent.
31.6.1. The set adjustment process starting with X(S, :::), S ~ N
Now we assume that the strength ordering is obtained by an aspiration profile,
which is the end point of a maximal aspiration adjustment path:
THEOREM: Let a be the end point of a maximal aspiration adjustment
path, let to be the strength ordering induced by a (Le., i :::0 i {:> aj ~ aj),
let e:= coa(a), and let X~ (S) := X(S, :::0) for all S E l!. Then for all
SEl!
(1) X(a,S) n X(S, :::0) ~ X~(S, :::0) for all r EN, and therefore
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So::;a is consistent for the game, and (l is consistent for ::;a.
Generally, one can say that for an end point of a maximal aspiration
adjustment path the definitions of this section have the following character: the
solution sets X(S, ::;a) are extensions of the sets X(a, S) and the set adjustment
procedure reduces these sets back into the direction of the sets X(a, S).
As we remarked, it is not clear whether one should exclude condition (3) of
the set adjustment procedure. If it is excluded, then the obtained sets are larger
and the theorem holds as well. Specifically - and this was the aim of Section
31.5 - this theorem can be applied to the unique regular aspiraton profile a - of
a regular game. In this case the aspiration adjustment procedure extends the
predicted areas X(S,a-) to X~ (s,::;a') (with (l = coa(a-)).
Accordingly, we obtain the
PREDICTION: Let r be a regular location game and a the corresponding
regular aspiration profile. Then we predict
(1) A coalition S E coa(a) will be formed, and
(2) The corresponding outcome in S will be in X(S, ::;), where::; is the
strength ordering induced by a.
It must be remarked that, from the present state of experimental observa-
tion, it cannot be definitely decided if the sets X1(S, ::;a), X 2(S, ::;a) or
XOO(S, ::;a) are the best predictors of experimental outcomes. This may also
depend on knowing to what extent social phenomena can influence the result and
thereby on the experimental presentation of the game.
The examples of Figures 91.17 and 91.18 show that this extension of the
predicted areas is essential and necessary to explain experimental results. More-
over, the pure aspiration adjustment path concept (with maximality, PSR, and
OSC) leads to point predictions, which are usually not met by experimental
results. Overall, the procedures of Section 31.5 extend the predicted regions in
a way that fits the experimental results quite well.
31.6.2. Links to equal share analysis and equal division bounds
The procedure described here is related to the equal share analysis [Selten
(1978, 1972)] and the equal division bounds concept [Selten (1982, 1985)]. Both
concepts have been developed for characteristic function games. The latter
concept is only defined for three-person games; however, Selten only considers
sets similar to X 2(S, ::;a) in the equal share analysis and similar to X 3(S, ::;a) in
the equal division bounds concept.
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Figure 91.17. Solution sets X1(S,mO ') and experimental results of a location game
with ideal points. Players within a coalition are marked by a circle. The numbers x/y
refer to correct/incorrect predictions (including E-neighborhoods).
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Figure 91.18. Solution sets Xl(S,8uccapG ') and experimental results of a location game
with ideal points. Players within a coalition are marked by a circle. The numbers x/y
refer to correct/incorrect predictions (including f-neighborhoods).
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31.7. Formation of Blocs
Albers (1978) described phenomena in characteristic function games that can
also be detected in location games - namely, the formation of blocs. We intro-
duce this idea with an example (see Figure 91.19).
(a) (b)
)C"'\t.'\=~l"~
~ It'\''~. It'u~ ..
result if all players
behave as individuals
(e)
result if players 3.4
form a bloc
result if {l.2} and (3.4}
form a bloc. respectively
Figure 31.19. Example describing the formation of blocs in a four-person location game
with ideal points.
In the original game the aspiration equilibrium is given by the intersection
point of the diagonals 2' 4" and r 3; all aspirations are fulfilled within points (the
point is the core point of the game) [see Figure 91.19 (a)].
Now, players 3 and 4 might have the idea to form a subcoalition. Although
this does not not give them an additional outcome immediately (since 3,4 is not
winning), this improves their barga.ining situation, if they form then replace
their different ideal points %3 and %4 by a joint ideal point - for instance, the
mid-point %34 of %3 and %4 - and if they from then on try to verify a result that
is as near as possible to %34' In this case the result of the modified game is %34
[ef. Figure 91.19 (b)].
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Of course, players 1 and 2 will answer by forming a subcoalition {1,2} with
a joint proposal %12' which may be the mid-point of %1 and %2' Then the result
of the aspiration adjustment process will be the mid-point of %12 and %34 [see
Figure 91.19 (e)l. This result shows that the formation of the subcoalition {3,4}
improves the overall result of players 3 and 4.
Generally we define
DEFINITION: A bloc is the formation of a non-winning coalition 8, which
replaces the utility function of its members by a joint utility function
and from then on behaves as one player (with the aggregated number of
votes).
Here we only consider the case where the joint utility function is obtained
by subsuming the individual utility functions in selecting a new ideal point.
Now we cannot generally say by which principle this new ideal point is
selected. One might think of the center of the smallest circle containing all posi-
tions of the bloc members, or of the gravicenter of their ideal points, or of a pro-
portional reduction (or an equal-amount reduction) of the aspirations of the ori-
ginal game until a point in the Pareto-surface of the bloc coalition is obtained.
At present it seems reasonable to predict the convex closure of these alterna-
tives as reasonable agreement points of the bloc players for a joint ideal posi-
tion.
The question arises: under which circumstances will players form a bloc?
One point is that the conditions of communication must permit them to agree on
a joint utility function. The central idea, however, is the
BLOC FORMING PRINCIPLE: A bloc 8 ~ N is formed if thereby the
aspirations given by the end points a -(1') of the aspiration paths increase
for all players of the bloc.
In our example this principle leads to bloc {3,4} in a first step and to bloc {1,2}
in a second step.
However, we also observed formations of blocs that did not increase the
aspirations of its members. These did not refer to the aspirations or the aspira-
tion adjustment process, but to specific proposals of the bargaining process:
If a certain proposal (8,%) is regarded as the final state of the bargaining
process by all members of 8, then the players outside 8 will definitely not con-
sider their aspirations as possible outcomes but (usually) less than that. It can
then be that these players (or a part of them) by forming a bloc (Le., a sub-
coalition with a new joint utility function) change the game in such a way that
the new aspiration values permit new coalitions including the bloc, and that all
bloc members afterward have adequate aspirations that are higher than their
outcomes in (8,%).
The central question of such a situation is whether the bloc will hold after-
ward or if this coalition is only used as a tool to extend the bargaining process
beyond a point that is unfavorable for the players of the bloc.
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Albers (1978) could show that there are situations where blocs do hold,
even if breaking the bloc would increase the aspirations of all of its members;
however, these aspirations could not be verified in a coalition including the whole
bloc. It seems that the reason that such blocs do not break up can be modeled
by loyalty potentials [see Albers (1986a and 1986bl], which are built up among
"similar" players in "similar" positions, and which influence the decision
behavior in a similar way as additional outcomes of the bloc players. The
corresponding examples are characteristic function games.
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CHAPTER 32
Tools for Cooperative Negotiation
between Two Departments of a
Large Corporation:
Cultural and Strategic Aspects
Albert David
Laboratoire d'Analllse et Modilisation de SlIstimes
pour l'Aide II la Dicision (LAMSADE)
Universiti de Paris-Dauphine
Paris
France
32.1. Introduction
Introducing negotiation support systems inside a large organization raises
specific problems that result not only from modeling difficulties. When several
actors or groups of actors decide to work together, they go beyond the tradi-
tional sequential procedures. New problems arise that were previously not
clearly formulated. The decision frontiers widen; different - and potentially
conflicting - strategies and cultures appear. Cooperative, nonsequential
decision-making may involve organizational changes: the evolutionary design of
appropriate tools can help build a common representation of the problem and
lead to more effective decisions.
This discussion will be based on the example of new product design in the
automobile industry, at the level of negotiations between the Marketing Depa.rt-
ment and the Engineering Department.
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32.2. Joint Decision-Making within the Organization:
A Complex Cooperative Negotiation
32.2.1. General formulation of the problem: The meeting of
three actors
A. David
The term "negotiation" can be understood in many different ways. When we try
to support negotiations inside an organization, it is important to define well
which type of situation is referred to.
Imagine a large industrial corporation, composed of various departments
(Finance, Marketing, Production, etc.), each subdivided into a certain number of
teams. Our discussion may be represented by the following general formulation:
two divisions X and Y, belonging to distinct departments, coexist within the
organization. Both are involved in the decision processes, but have no direct
contacts. Now suppose they wish to cooperate, to improve the quality and the
effectiveness of their decisions.
~__D_i_v~_.s_i_o_n__1( ? )1 D_iv_~_'5_i_o_n__
Figure 91.1. What does "cooperation" mean?
As Figure St.1 suggests, what occurs when two groups of actors decide to
work together can be analyzed from various points of view. We will put the
stress on the two main factors that structure this interaction: the culture and the
strategies of each group.
Moreover, if a "mediator" (from outside the organization) is called by divi-
sion X to design and to introduce tools (computer-aided or not) to support the
cooperation, a complex relation is created between three actors (Figure St.H) -
divisions X and Y and the mediator with his negotiations support system - each
of them representing a culture, a rationality, a strategy.
32.2.2. Consequences of traditional sequential procedures for
conflict solving
The organization chart in Figure SH.S - taken from the automobile industry -
does not pretend to describe the complexity of real decision processes: it only
illustrates our discussion.
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Figure al,l. X, Y, and the negotiation support system: a complex interaction.
1
1
negotiations
no direct
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Figure al.a. A traditional organization chart.
This simplified organization chart shows a traditional Taylorian type of
organization: each department - the Marketing Department and the Engineer-
ing Department - is composed of several subdivisions, each subdivision or team
being in charge of a particular aspect of product design or management (market-
ing design, style, doors, engine, etc.). At the upper level, the head managers
meet and negotiate, supported by recommendations from their respective staffs.
From the upper level to the lower level: arbitrations; from the lower level to the
upper level: recommendations that will "rationally" support intuitions and
orientations. But at the lower level, discussion remain within a department.
There are generally no direct contacts between teams from distinct departments:
each division has its reserved field of competence, and the project (the future
product) circulates sequentially from one department to another (Figure 91q).
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Figure St.i. A sequential decision process.
In this type of organization, conflicts are solved in three different ways:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Arbitrations and competitive negotiation (upper level: formal, planned
meetings).
Sequential problem-solving and functional division of work. To face com-
plexity, it is often easier to treat the various aspects of a problem
separately or sequentially. This corresponds to the traditional, still
widespread belief that a complex problem can always be subdivided into a
set of simple subproblems, each giving birth to a specific partial decision,
all decisions being easily aggregated afterward to form a coherent and
efficient whole
"Avoidance" strategies, reinforced by the well-known "organizational
slack" [Cyert and March (1963)] of large corporations. The definition of a
problem depends on the composition of the group in charge of managing it.
The quality of decisions would probably be higher if the various actors
involved in the decision process at the lower level could work together. But
the individual and organizational cost of such changes may be heavy.
Different and potentially conflicting cultures, strategies, work, analyses,
and information sources appear, making the former situation more secure
and comfortable. The "organizational slack" allows, up to a certain point,
the parallel development of work and the coexistence of objectives that
would turn out to be competitive in a more "transparent" system.
32.2.3. A cooperative negotiation
When two groups of actors (in our example, division X of the Marketing Depart-
ment and division Y of the Engineering Department) decide to work together,
they go beyond the traditional procedures and hierarchical relations: they create
a very particular type of cooperative negotiation. New problems arise that were
previously not clearly formulated. A common language and a common problem
representation must be found to ensure both a correct translation of Marketing
objectives into their technical meaning and an effective synergy between techni-
cal research and its marketing consequences.
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32.3. Building a Common Problem Representation:
Cultures and Strategies
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The design of a new car results from a very long and complex decision process
that involves several hundreds of persons. In our example, even a relatively
"small" problem (fixing objectives in terms of comfort or noise level of the future
car) is complex enough to make impossible any global modeling: no "optimal" or
"true" solution can be found. Moreover, the various tools that can be used and
the procedures that can be introduced represent a certain culture and reveal -
sometimes in a very subtle manner - a certain conception of management [Pas-
cale and Athos (1981)]. They constitute a "new deal" with respect to the stra-
tegies and the culture of the actors concerned; they may even give birth to
conflicts and incompatibilities, eventually leading to a return to the former tradi-
tional procedures. A few examples will illustrate these ideas.
32.3.1. Strategies
When the various tools and models that could help describe or analyze a prob-
lem are implemented, the necessary data are too often supposed to be "given"
("data" is the Latin word for "given") or already collected. When the data col-
lection difficulties (cost, time, low precision, nonmeasurability, etc.) are taken
into account, a second aspect is generally neglected: information has a strategic
dimension. This dimension, well known to professional negotiators or in more
competitive contexts, is surprisingly ignored in the type of situation we are
describing. Cooperation supposes information exchange. Building a common
problem representation requires that each division communicates at least a part
of the information that supports its point of view. The strategic consequences of
the cooperation must be carefully analyzed as the negotiation procedures are
elaborated, because the strategies involved may constitute a major obstacle to
reaching the minimum level of "transparency" and "honesty" required for an
effective negotiation.
Let us give a short example, Engineers of the Engineering Department are
judged, among other criteria, on their creativity, which leads them to develop
systematically new solutions. A few months ago, one of the engineers elaborated
a very elegant and original - but expensive - technical solution. Of course, he
hoped that his solution would be selected for the future product. Consequently,
he was logically led to under-evaluate intentionally the other products of the
brand on that particular criterion so that his hierarchy, alarmed by such a bad
score, would adopt his project. Though this example is a bit caricatured, it
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clearly appears that a database including this type of information does not have
the reliability required for a real negotiation support system.
32.3.2. Cultures
When people from different continents meet - for instance, North Americans
with Japanese or Koreans with French - they may discover cultural differences
that go far beyond the way to say "Good morning!" or to shake hands. Percep-
tions of time and space, definitions of what are "a good compromise" or "a fair
negotiation" are different [Hall (1969 and 1973), Hofstede (1984)J.
A negotiation between two departments within a corporation raises the
same kind of problems. Of course, national values are not involved here: more
specific variables appear, mainly professional values, which can explain a part of
each department's point of view, behavior and strategy within the organization.
Three examples will illustrate the importance of cultural variables.
First, engineers are experts. Their behavior is therefore different from the
behavior of a nonspecialist. The expert will, for instance, notice very detailed
imperfections and under-evaluate a product whose global characteristics are
quite acceptable or to over-appreciate a car if its designers have solved a certain
technical problem in a particularly elegant or original way. What is for the aver-
age consumer - therefore for the Marketing Department - an almost invisible
imperfection could not be ignored by the engineer: in that case, he would
appear, in his colleagues' opinion, as a bad expert.
A second cultural variable is linked to how each department sees the truth.
For the Marketing Department, the "truth" is mainly statistical: it comes from
the analysis of large surveys of representative samples of the population. More-
over, the analysis of consumer behavior includes psychological, highly subjective
considerations: we are close to social sciences, where imprecision, ambiguity and
subjectivity play an important part. The technical culture of the Engineering
Department is closer to the traditional epistemology of experimental sciences:
"truth" exists and can be measured; the first attitude of the engineer to explain a
phenomenon will be to determine and measure its various components. This
explains, for instance, our difficulties in introducing some elements of multiattri-
bute utility theory [Keeney and Raiffa (1976)] or the multicriteria decision-aid
methodology [Roy (1985)]: "Our measures are objective: why associate a utility
function to a variable or build a criterion?" was the first response. Conflicts
between the Marketing Department and the Engineering Department can there-
fore come from the way the experts, because of the instruments they use to col-
lect and manage information, will treat problems - according to their scientific
attractiveness and their measurability, and not with regard to the average
consumer's opinion.
The third example is slightly different. It shows how a very simple graphic
representation can lead to very important changes in the way a problem is
identified and solved. In the Marketing Department, the statisticians tradition-
ally represented a variable by a scaled vertical axis, on which the various -cars
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were placed according to their score on that variable. Several criteria were
represented with as many vertical scales (Figure 99.S).
Suppose that the statistician now uses the graphic possibilities of a spread
sheet to plot this type of graph. The standard graph of Lotus 123, for instance,
is not a monodimensional vertical graph: it is a two-dimensional X Y plot (Fig-
ure ge.6).
a
b
criterion X
Figure 9f.5. A traditional sequential representation.
criterion Y
+-----....:::..""'r----JlY•• I
b
a
criterion Y
I----b
I---+--a
technolo8ical or financial
frontier
criterion X
Figure 9f.6. Widening the problem: a two-dimensional XY plot.
This new graphic representation is not only different graphically, it leads
the decision-maker to consider the interaction between X and Y. The ideal point
(XYmax) is probably infeasible (for instance, a car with a very high maximum
speed and a very low fuel consumption) or strongly depends on a technological or
financial frontier. This is a good example of how the logic of a very simple model
can generate important changes in the way problems are analyzed - toward less
sequential, more global decision processes.
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32.4:. A Decision Support System for Cooperative
Negotiation
32.4.1. Modeling: A complex environment
A.DaWl
The traditional normative description of problem-solving consists of four succes-
sive steps:
(1) Identify and analyze the problem.
(2) If the problem is too complex, subdivide it into more simple subproblems.
(3) Generate solutions and analyze consequences.
(4) Choose the best solution.
The environment in which we have to work is very far from this idealized
view; it can be characterized by five points:
The whole decision process (from general marketing objectives to product
launch on the market) lasts about five years. This means that the set of
possible actions is only partially defined as the project grows.
The various subproblems are not mutually independent. For instance, no
decision concerning the maximum speed level should be made without con-
sidering the fuel consumption level. Even the design of the seats can have
indirect but important consequences on another part of the car.
The complexity of the product, the high interdependence between subprob-
lems, the relative uncertainty concerning the internal (research results) or
external (consumer behavior or strategy of competitors) environment make
consequences of decisions difficult to estimate.
The history of a project is a succession of fights, supported by studies rein-
forcing the various points of view; it is not the result of "rational"
cost-benefit analysis.
The Marketing Department manipulates large amounts of statistical data,
but at a rather aggregated level, whereas the Engineering Department
manages very precise technical information, but not systematically col-
lected, which makes more difficult the building up of a common database.
In such a context, how can we introduce a negotiation support system and
of what could it be made?
32.4.2. Methodology: An evolutionary design
It is now widely accepted that decision support systems - and this is even more
accurate for negotiation support systems - should be designed in an evolution-
ary way. Their implementation requires a careful methodology to ensure a suc-
cessful interaction between an "ethnographic" analysis of decision and
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negotiation processes (in terms of cultures, strategies, learning possibilities of the
various actors) and the design of relevant tools.
At least three different aspects should be taken into account:
Relevance concerning the complexity of the problem (the model must nei-
ther be too simplistic nor constitute an uncontrollable black box).
Relevance concerning modes of cooperation desired by the two groups of
actors.
Relevance concerning the way each division or department has to justify its
orientations, recommendations or decisions within the organization, and
particularly toward its own hierarchy.
32.4.3. Which tools to support the cooperation?
Many tools exist, simple or sophisticated, that could help the two groups to work
together. The more important needs were expressed at three levels:
Quick data management (sorting, listing, and simple mathematical opera-
tions such as means, standard deviations or medians).
Quick and easy data graphic representations (profiles, two-dimensional XY
plots, etc.), for immediate use during work sessions.
More sophisticated tools for interactive preference modeling and multi-
variate data analysis and description.
This explains our intensive use of:
A spreadsheet with graphic possibilities for data management and visuali-
zation.
Regression analysis to bring out relations between the consumer's satisfac-
tion and the technical characteristics of the product (which is a way to
build an analytical bridge between the Marketing Department and the
Engineering Department).
PREFCALC [Jacquet-Lagreze (1982)] for interactive preference modeling,
this preference being either the consumer's opinion or the individual per-
ception of an expert who wants to "understand" better his own point of
view.
32.6. Concluding Remarks
As they tried to build a common representation, to define a common language, to
ban meaningless words (Le., to create a common culture), the two groups of
actors started a fruitful process of thinking over their own way of working, past
and present. IT this cooperation lasts, the decision frontiers will have to be made
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precise: what would the problem become if the Financial Department or the
Quality Department (which also make recommendations concerning future pro-
ducts) were progressively included? Which kind of culture and which conflicting
strategies would appear? And what would this "horizontal" cooperation become
if members of the hierarchy participated? Experience seems to show that the
expert in charge of the design and implementation of negotiation support tools
(let us call him a mediator) should mention this dimension, but let the actors
concerned decide whether or not to enlarge the group to members of other parts
of the organization.
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CHAPTER 33
A Computer Network-Based
Teleconferencing System
to Enhance the Effectiveness of
Multilateral Negotiations Fora
Vladimir F. pryakhin
USSR MinistrJl 0/ Foreign Affairs
Moscow
USSR
33.1. Introduction
Normally both multilateral and bilateral disarmament negotiations, with rare
exceptions, come under the category of political negotiations. Hence, their
specific features such as
Dependence on the overall world political situation.
Special, stricter rules of procedure (consensus).
Extreme irregularity in attaining practical results.
The complexity of disarmament negotiations and the particular importance
that the problems discussed there have for the national security of states deter-
mine these talks' special status and specific rules of procedure. At no other
negotiations is the rule of consensus so strictly observed.
The extreme irregularity of such negotiations brought about the use of the
term "breakthrough", which vividly describes progress reached at the talks after
many months or sometimes years of seemingly fruitless exchanges. It is not the
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purpose of this chapter to review the process of forming political will for conclud-
ing treaties in the field of disarmament. Political will is undoubtedly a major
precondition for the success of disarmament negotiations. It is shaped by a
number of factors inherent in the international situation.
This chapter, instead, will study the possibility of enhancing the
effectiveness of negotiations, given that all participants without exception display
political will for their successful completion.
We believe that such an approach, although a priori and somewhat one-
sided, is quite valid, since an effective negotiating mechanism is in itself an
important factor that helps to shape political will for the success of the negotia-
tions.
The negotiating mechanism cannot of itself dismantle the political barriers
that divide the participants, but it can help to identify and distinguish between
obstacles to agreements. Expert analysis and discussion may well reveal that
many problems dividing the participants in the negotiations are technical rather
than political, while technical problems previously thought to be insurmountable
may prove to lend themselves to solution.
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that international negotiations are
becoming increasingly complicated, technical and loaded with important
scientific, technical and legal details.
All this makes it quite relevant to examine the problem of enhancing the
effectiveness of international negotiations, including disarmament talks, assum-
ing the existence of political will. In our view the negotiations to ban chemical
weapons held within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are significant in this
respect. Technically and legally, the subject matter of these negotiations is so
complex that, even when an overwhelming majority of participants seek to
achieve practical results, there are quite a few technical difficulties that objec-
tively impede an early elaboration of agreements.
What then are the ways to enhance the effectiveness of such multilateral
negotiations? Some traditional ways to enhance the effectiveness of multilateral
negotiating fora long employed by the international community have probably
not yet been exhausted. These include, in particular, increasing participation,
extending the negotiating time frame, increasing the number of experts on vari-
ous subjects in some delegations, improving the quality of interpretation at nego-
tiations, as well as providing negotiators with skilled interpretation for longer
hours, increasing the number of auxiliary working bodies and making it possible
for negotiators to go, if necessary, on extended official missions away from the
venue of the talks, thus making them more mobile.
The Geneva negotiating fora serve as a concrete example illustrating the
application of all these methods to enhance their effectiveness. In the framework
of this Conference it seems to be appropriate to raise the question of reviewing a
broad application of technical facilities and aids for conducting negotiations on
political issues, including disarmament negotiations.
We believe that a certain technological basis to that end already exists.
Organizational and scientific information systems for automated dialogue, which
are in fact sophisticated teleconferencing systems based on computer netwerks,
are particularly promising aids for multilateral negotiating fora.
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The application of such systems fully corresponds to the intensified life
style of contemporary society at large, with the role of communications being
constantly on the rise. It is well known that the costs involved in providing peo-
ple with information during the process of their activities are continuously rising.
Soviet experts estimate that communications costs including cable, telex and
telephone expenses are several times higher than those involved in the technical
processing of information. Losses resulting from inadequate or untimely deci-
sions because of incomplete information are high.
33.2. Potential Benefits of ADOSIS (automated dialogue
organizational and scientific information systems)
Network-based computers, which exchange information upon the users' request,
produce a new, effective communication environment both for political negotia-
tors and technical experts. Such a communication environment is characterized
by low cost and easier accessibility, user-friendliness and developed "intellect",
high speed of information transmission, a powerful means of information display
and the potential for documenting textual and graphic information.
Automated dialogue information systems used within the structure of nego-
tiations could make it possible, by means of automated information exchanges
with major data banks available to the international community, to provide
negotiators with more modern and effective means of communication between
groups of people whose traditional forms include conferences, meetings, etc. It is
for this reason that such systems are called computer network-based telecon-
ferencing systems, thus distinguishing them from fundamentally simpler elec-
tronic mail systems.
The following example can be cited by way of illustration. The joint
Soviet-US document on the prohibition of radiological weapons took 49 meetings
to be finalized, including meetings of the drafting group that worked hard during
several rounds a year. Only 34 meetings were held to discuss that issue during
the initial two years at the Geneva disarmament negotiating forum, while there
was an actual need for a continuous examination of that particular question with
a view to finalizing numerous technical details. Organizational and scientific
information sl/stems for automated dialogue are capable of making the negotiating
process a continuous one and could enable a qualitative breakthrough in expand-
ing chronological frameworks for conducting negotiations. Thus, the negotiators
are actually provided with continuous contact, regardless of whether they are
physically present at the venue of negotiations - for instance, in Geneva - or
remain at their permanent place of work.
In this context a substantive remark seems to be in order. Participation
per se in international negotiations held in major world centers designed for that
purpose is becoming a symbol of the modern way of life, and participating in
such negotiations is regarded as a matter of prestige. In this connection, the
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wide application of computer network-based teleconferencing systems to the pro-
cess of international negotiations has been opposed because of fears that such
systems could phase out negotiations as a form of international communication.
Such fears are totally groundless. Direct communication between political
negotiators can never be supplanted. The introduction of ADOSIS has a
different purpose - namely, to set the stage for political negotiations as such,
relieve them from technical details, reconcile to the utmost those issues and
details on which agreement can be reached at the expert level, and ensure a
higher level of expertise in technical and political matters.
At one point there was a legitimate question raised in the framework of the
Geneva disarmament negotiating forum to the effect that work at this forum did
not take place more than 12 weeks a year, the balance of time being spent on
vacations, leaves and discussions of procedural matters. The introduction of
automated dialogue systems could make it possible to expand considerably these
time limitations on negotiations.
As for the fears that contacts between computers will replace contacts
between people, we believe that with the application of ADOSIS the interna-
tional community will be able to enlarge quantitatively the agenda of negotia-
tions, incorporate more issues and technical categories, and increase the number
of negotiating fora and eventually the number of political contacts between nego-
tiators.
One of the functions of ADOSIS, which can be easily applied within the
framework of a multilateral negotiating forum, is to make available to negotia-
tors advanced means of electronic mail which include:
Printing out newly arrived or as yet unread personal messages addressed to
a given user or groups that include a given user.
Reviewing newly arrived messages.
Retrieving messages from key fields, contexts or associative relationships.
Readdressing messages.
Generating new messages. .
Interrelating messages to generate strings of messages.
Forwarding messages to individual users, groups of users or to all users.
Automatically acknowledging message receipt by the addressee.
Storing messages in the system's archives or user's personal archives.
It is easy to see that the above functions of electronic mail encompass most of
the functional machinery of multilateral negotiations.
Besides performing the electronic mail functions, ADOSIS can provide
negotiators with a capability to engage in simultaneous exchanges of information
at both the political and expert levels. To that end, the following functions may
be envisaged:
Compilation of the list of currently active system users.
Establishment of bilateral interactive links between two users or a multila-
terallink among a group of users.
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Exchange of information among those users who have established the
interactive link.
It should be noted in passing that the simultaneous address subsystem
could include the possibility of an active involvement in negotiations of non-
governmental organizations, as well as of organizations representing various seg-
ments of public opinion and the scientific community, whose recommendations to
the negotiators could then be more competent. Therefore, the computerization
of negotiations would promote their globalization both in terms of the number of
issues discussed and the number of participants. In our view, this is fully con-
sistent with the scope of the political goals of negotiations, which is to ensure
international peace and security.
33.3. Possible Roles of ADOSIS in the Various
Stages of Negotiations
It is not difficult to see that each subsystem of ADOSIS has its analogue in a
time- and space-related structure of bilateral and multilateral negotiations,
including political negotiations. The stages leading to multilateral negotiations
can include the following:
(1) At the beginning of a negotiation one or several future participants formu-
lates the subject matter of the negotiations. Teleconferencing systems
could enable any state to formulate an initiative in accurate and well-
defined terms or to sponsor international negotiations on any technically
complex subject, if its political interests so require.
(2) At the second, preparatory stage, the sponsoring state seeks to enlist sup-
port for the subject of negotiations among other members of the interna-
tional community and form an action group for the purpose of, e.g., adopt-
ing relevant documents of the international community, such as United
Nations General Assembly resolutions, joint statements by the groups at
the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, etc.
An example of such a document is the joint document CD/200 submit-
ted by the group of Socialist countries at the Geneva Conference on Disar-
mament and issued in 1981; it contained proposals to enhance the
effectiveness of the machinery of the Conference (then called the Commit-
tee on Disarmament).
As a rule, documents of that kind are drafted, negotiated and issued by
the negotiators whose political positions are close. All the more significant
is the indisputable fact that in this case, too, computer network-based
teleconferencing equipment can help provide a better rationale for the pro-
posals made by cosponsors to initiate negotiations. In principle, no one can
rule out the possibility that like-minded cosponsors, after careful discussion
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through the teleconferencing system, will come to the conclusion that it is
objectively impossible to propose the initiative in question. In that case,
the participants of the action group (cosponsors) would take a well-founded
decision to refrain from proposing a joint initiative. This must also be seen
as a useful result of the application of teleconferencing.
(3) As soon as the display of the chairman of the multilateral negotiating body
has reproduced the specific proposal by the sponsor or the cosponsors to
initiate negotiations on the subject, the third, and politically most impor-
tant, stage of the preparation of negotiations will start - namely, drawing
up the agenda for the negotiating body's session.
There have been periods in the history of the Conference on Disarma-
ment where negotiation of the agenda for a current session took four, five
or even more months out of the year's total of four to five months of work.
This was due, of course, to political differences in the positions of the nego-
tiating states. Computer systems alone will not eliminate such differences;
however, they may be used to take account of all the proposals available,
which may facilitate the search for possible solutions and accelerate nego-
tiation of the agenda.
(4) The next negotiating stage is no longer preparatory, but rather substantive.
That is, after the agenda and the work program have been adopted, the
multilateral negotiating forum enters the stage where delegations of the
participating countries present their political positions on the individual
agenda items.
Records show that this stage in the negotiations requires computeriza-
tion least of all. By this time, political positions will already have been
prepared and agreed upon among the groups of like-minded states. Often-
times, the main task before the delegations at this stage is to present those
positions with maximum effect not so much for the benefit of their negotiat-
ing partners as for the press. At this stage, the negotiations usually serve
as the platform from which .political statements are made by the Secretary
General of the United Nations, heads of state, foreign ministers and other
political leaders.
In substantive terms, the main point at this stage in the negotiations
will usually be whether or not there is a consensus on the establishment of
subsidiary bodies to conduct specific negotiations on a particular issue on
the basis of an agreed mandate.
(5) This stage of the negotiations consists in negotiating the mandate of any
subsidiary working body that has been formed. A political comparison of
the positions is also essential at this stage. The teleconferencing techniques
might be used here on a somewhat larger scale, because work proceeds on
the texts of draft mandates in open-ended subsidiary groups of all kinds.
The discussions within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disar-
mament on the mandate of the subsidiary working body on the agenda item
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entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" during its 1984 ses-
sion demonstrated that, along with three formal draft mandates, up to a
dozen or even more papers can be discussed informally. It is much easier
and more efficient to compare and negotiate such drafts on a teleconferenc-
ing display than on paper.
(6) The use of computers by subsidiary working bodies:
(a) As soon as negotiations start in a subsidiary working body on the
basis of an agreed mandate, which usually provides for the prepara-
tion of legally binding papers in a particular area, a new stage begins
where the use of computers is in our view highly desirable today and
absolutely imperative in the future. As a rule, negotiations in a subsi-
diary working body start with a review of all the existing agreements
and documents in this area. The computer memory is an excellent
working instrument for such a review.
(b) The work on a text of a document on the basis of submitted proposals
and drafts, as well as the discussion and negotiation of provisions of a
future agreement (or convention) in a subsidiary working body. con-
stitute the most important stage of negotiations. At this stage, we
perceive the possible use of computer network-based teleconferencing
techniques as involving some of the data that characterize results of
the work of specially formed groups, e.g., the Ad Hoc Committee on
Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), set up
by the CD for the period of the 1985 session [1]. This example, in our
view, is a most appropriate illustration for improving the effectiveness
of international negotiations, because there is an increasingly clear-cut
consensus emerging in the world community on the question of ban-
ning chemical weapons - a development that is propitious for the
success of the negotiations.
Nevertheless, even in these relatively favorable circumstances, the efficiency
of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its subsidiary
working bodies was rather low as far as the technical aspects are concerned.
Between February 27 and August 19, 1985, there were 12 meetings of the Ad
Hoc Committee [2], Le., one meeting every week and a half of the session's work.
At the same time, there were 17 meetings held by working group A [31, 12 by
working group B [41, and 14 by working group C [5] of the Ad Hoc Committee.
In addition, there were numerous open-ended consultations held by the Chair-
man.
These seemingly humble figures look quite different if seen by the negotia-
tors themselves, Le., members of the delegations and experts. In fact, out of 286
persons on the consolidated list of participants in the 1985 session, only two or
three dozen experts could fully concentrate on the extremely difficult matter of
the negotiations. A number of delegations - namely, half of those represented
at the Conference - did not even have any experts on some of the priority items
of the agenda.
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For that matter, it should be noted that in spite of the heavy schedule,
experts spend much time on problems such as checking and comparing docu-
ments, searching for necessary documentation and moving about Geneva and the
Palais des Nations. To this should be added the large translation workload done
by both the Conference secretariat and national delegations.
A rough analysis of the work performed by the Ad Hoc Committee on
Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament during the 1985 session
shows that in our opinion, it could have been done at least twice as fast and at a
significantly higher level of expertise, if effective computer-based systems to aid
negotiations had been available.
33.4. Potential Benefits of Problem Information Subsystems
of ADOSIS
In this connection, the future introduction into the negotiating practice of a
problem information subsystem is promising. This subsystem is an integral part
of the automated dialogue organizational and scientific information systems that
are being currently developed by specialists in a number of countries [6, 7].
This subsystem offers the following possibilities, which are directly con-
sonant with operations carried out during the meetings of subsidiary working
bodies of a multilateral negotiating forum or conference (e.g., the CD):
Printing out a list of conferences available to a given user, hooking up to a
selected conference, and obtaining the list of its participants.
Retrieving conference-related data (reports, documents, materials, deci-
sions, opinions, resolutions, etc.) from key fields, contexts or associative
links.
Reviewing titles of sections of working documents, and, if necessary,
reviewing the content of the 'sections selected.
Formulating a new section (with no specific format or patterned after one
of the formats used for a given problem), identifying key fields of a newly
formulated section, establishing a fixed link between the newly formulated
section and one of the previous sections (fixed association or continuation
of a previous section), establishing a substantive link between the new sec-
tion and one or several previous sections (substantive association for organ-
izing section "strings" on a given problem).
Submitting a problem under discussion as a whole, its section, a block of
sections or an associated string of sections for coordination or for a vote, as
well as taking note of the fact and results of such coordination (uncondi-
tional with an associated "dissenting opinion", "objection", etc.) or voting.
Obtaining information on the results of such a coordination or vote on a
given problem.
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Storing in a participant's personal archives the sections of the conference
documents sponsored by him; arranging a new section out of several old
ones in any sequence; documenting the section, a sequence of sections or
strings of associated sections; and removing sections.
As a re8ection of the negotiating experience accumulated in international
practice, the conference subsystem practically replicates the (model of) negotia-
tions. One of the participants in the teleconferencing may be appointed as
presiding officer (chairman) and in such a case he alone can perform a number of
functions. Of the functions listed above, this may include submitting sections for
coordination or for the vote, removing sections, and establishing document for-
mats that have been adopted for the subject at hand. The presiding officer may
also admit or dismiss participants, or determine a participant's status out of one
of the following:
Observer without the right to vote or coordinate, or the right to codify old
sections and introduce new ones.
Nonvoting technical officer without the right to vote or coordinate.
Participant without the right to coordinate.
Full-8edged participant enjoying all possible rights of a delegate.
Senior participant partially endowed with a leader's rights.
In addition to its other merits, this kind of system enables new partici-
pants, at both the expert and political levels, to join the negotiating process
promptly.
A number of the subsystem's functions is performed automatically. Upon
joining the conference, a new user is automaticallY provided with information on
the total number of sections, the number of new sections (with which the user is
not yet familiar) and the number of sections to be coordinated or voted upon.
When drawing up a new section within one of the document formats adopted by
a given conference, the formating is carried out automatically. H a deadline or a
phased schedule is set for solving a problem, the message subsystem is then used
to issue regular reminders to all delegates involved about the approaching dead-
lines.
A major advantage of computer network-based teleconferencing systems is
that they make it possible to overcome language barriers between negotiators.
By and large, the existing mechanism of multilateral negotiations already per-
mits dealing with the language problem both through the use of highly skilled
interpretation and translation and through the continuous upgrading by the
negotiators of their proficiency in foreign languages. The requirements for the
emerging "globalization" of negotiations, however, present the language problem
in a new light, because of a sharp increase in the number of "topics" (specific
subjects) of international negotiations as well as in the number of direct and
indirect negotiators, especially at the expert level. To overcome the language
barrier, computer teleconferencing systems may be employed to help the users
independently to formulate (unless an adequate standard version is available) the
texts of all inquiries and messages within the system. This is achieved by
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arranging all textual information contained in the external interface in special
files (one per each version of the interface). With this structural pattern, the
teleconferencing mechanism can be changed to a "new" language simply by
preparing yet another version of the text stored in the service file of the external
interface. In a similar fashion, the system can be adapted to the terminal equip-
ment employed by the user.
33.6. Concluding Remarks
A large-scale introduction of teleconferencing may raise a possible problem: that
the "globalization" of negotiations will result in a loss of their structure or usual
hierarchy. We feel that this would not be the case, since the teleconferencing
system itself provides for a certain hierarchy among the negotiators as well as
selecting out information known in advance to be useless to a given negotiator or
expert.
At the same time, the introduction of teleconferencing systems makes it
possible to achieve its main objective, namely a possibility of taking into account
and of incorporating in the final documents of negotiations any constructive
opinion, conclusion or judgment, wherever and at whatever level they may be
expressed.
As noted above, teleconferencing and computerizing the multilateral or
international negotiating process cannot substitute or make up for a lack of polit-
ical will to conclude the agreements under negotiation. We are strongly con-
vinced that political will to achieve agreements is a specific state of political
thinking of negotiators and others involved in the processes of negotiations,
which evolves as a result of a number of factors in international affairs. Compu-
terized aids for the negotiating process and the use of the most advanced infor-
mation technology are intended to promote political will for productive negotia-
tions.
Listed below are some of the possible effects of computerization on the pol-
itical will of negotiators:
Computerization can provide an opportunity to separate political and
technical issues in the course of negotiations.
It can raise the level of expertise.
As a result of using the computer network-based teleconferencing mechan-
ism, the negotiating process can acquire a global dimension, viz:
• The number of negotiators can become larger.
• The number of problems under discussion can increase.
• A longer period of time can be allocated for dealing with problems.
In the long run, the introduction of computer network-based teleconferenc-
ing into the negotiating mechanism could aid in the development of approx-
imate computer models of international negotiations, which could enhance
the effectiveness of negotiations to promote international cooperation and
security.
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CHAPTER 34
The Mediator as a Third Negotiator
Guy-Olivier Faure
UnitJersitl de Paris-Sorbonne
Paris
France
From the strategic analysis of a mediator's actions one can construct a model
that portrays the relations between the different parties involved in a mediated
negotiation. Identifying and studying the motivations of all the actors enables
one to develop new concepts. These concepts will explain, first, the position of
the mediator in relation to the parties and, second, his contribution that modifies
the entire negotiating framework. Both of these conditions govern the process
and the outcome of the negotiation. The various strategic positions that may be
adopted by the mediator, combining partiality and non-neutrality, are analyzed
in this chapter.
The methodology applied to this work consists of an integration of real-
world observations made from the perspective of different fields: sociology,
anthropology, social psychology. It aims at proposing a conceptual framework
able to give an accurate account of the rationale at work in a mediation interven-
tion.
34.1. Introduction
Mediation is a social process that occurs in the case of very particular situations,
for the most part highly conflictual negotiations that result in a deadlock. None
of the parties involved in the conflict wishes to make any or any more conces-
sions, but the stalemate is in itself very costly for both sides. This is the case in
an open conflict, such as a war, or in a mere refusal of any economic cooperation
between two neighboring countries.
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Mediation is defined by Touval and Zartman (1985) as a "form of third-
party intervention in conflict for the purpose of abating or resolving that conflict
through negotiations" .
It can be radically distinguished from other forms of third-party interven-
tions, such as arbitration, because a mediator never takes a decision instead of
the parties, as an arbitrator would. He interferes in a complex process in order
to direct this process toward a potential agreement between the parties. the ulti-
mate decision belonging to these parties. However, the mediator is not power-
less, contrary to well-accepted theories.
Although such an activity has not yet been thoroughly studied nor ade-
quately conceptualized, mediation has a broad field of application including fam-
ily disputes, labor relations conflicts and international disputes.
Mediation has traditionally been part of international conflicts. There is a
very old and on-going tradition of mediation in international conflicts. A quite
exhaustive study [Holsti (1983)] takes a census of 94 conflicts since 1919 and
shows that 42 among them have been mediated. In most of the cases, the
conflict stemmed from a territorial dispute. The USA, the UN, the Pope, the
Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States, the Interna-
tional Red Cross, and Algeria have been among the most active mediators in the
last two decades.
34.2. The Rationale of Mediation
In the first theoretical works on negotiation, mediation appears to be either just
ignored, as in the case of Walton and McKersie (1965), or portrayed in a quite
idealistic conception that becomes totally unrealistic as soon as applied to inter-
national situations. Such an approach has been illustrated by Peters (1952) and
Simkin (1971). Being themselves professional mediators, they offer a strongly
idealized self-reconstruction of their own experiences. Their research tends to
represent the mediator as a powerless judge. To be efficient, the mediator must
have a high status and must not have or show personal preferences. His only
purpose is to implement justice and work for the common good.
From a Lewinian approach, McGrath (1966) suggests a broader model able
to integrate more dimensions and forces operating during the mediation process.
Meanwhile, his concept of a mediator still belongs to the former category,
because he postulates that the mediator represents the whole social system in
which both conflicting parties interact. By experimenting with the McGrath
model, Touzard (1977) points out that such a model is more suited to formal
than to informal negotiation. As most international negotiations are of an infor-
mal nature, this model is difficult to apply.
Looking at mediation in international conflicts, one may emphasize several
points. The mediator's intervention has a structural influence on the negotiation
system itself. It changes a dyadic relation into a triadic system, thus changing
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the logic of equilibrium. The mediator introduces new values into the game. He
has his own representations, goals, strategies and tactics. By intervening in the
interaction, he increases the number of issues at stake. A mediator involved in
an international dispute has his own conception of what international order
should be and what an acceptable attitude within a relationship should be.
A triadic interaction may elicit complex strategies. Each party strives to
create a favorable unbalanced situation. Such an attitude has rather narrow lim-
its because, for instance, if the intervention of a mediator leads to an obvious loss
for one party, the victim may merely break the triadic relation. However, the
efficiency of a mediation is not necessarily related to a strictly balanced interven-
tion with regard to the two parties. The efficiency depends more on the expecta-
tions of the parties, it being understood that they can get more than what they
would get without the intervention of a mediator. The usefulness of the media-
tion must not be evaluated based on what each party obtains compared to the
other, but regarding what each party estimates he would have received within
the dyadic relationship.
34.3. The General Model
As sketched in Figure 9.4.1, the general model includes a number of actors far
beyond the basic triadic relationship: the negotiator's and mediator's consti-
tuencies and environments.
The negotiator's constituencies, such as governments, may sometimes bring
enough weight by themselves into the general system to cause the mediator to
adopt specific strategies toward them. For instance, if a negotiator sticks to an
excessively rigid attitude, the mediator may threaten to bring this excessive rigi-
dity to the attention of his constituency.
Environments are of different types: public opinion; the system of interna-
tional relations; and other states. They may have a strong influence on the
negotiator's strategies and may be viewed as levers that could be used by the
mediator. For instance, in case of a protracted deadlock he could make both
parties understand that he is going to inform the media concerning his recom-
mendations. Environmental influences may concern the mediator as well
because he may care about his reputation. If he considers that he will be in
some ways evaluated according to his capability to get both disputants to reach
an agreement, he may take this as a strong incentive. By the same token, his
constituents may strongly influence his behavior, if they have power to affect his
career. These constituents may be a government or an international organiza-
tion.
The mediator is involved in a complex network within which operate
conflicting rationales. He has to determine his action, define strategies, and
modify equilibria in order to achieve his own goals as well as to help the parties
in reaching some kind of agreement.
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Figure 9./.1. The mediation model.
34.4. The Mediator: His Position and His Contribution
34.4.1. Impartiality
The mediator is usually described as impartial and neutral in his intervention
[Peters (1952), Simkin (1971), Muench (1963), Young (1967), Northedge and
Donelan (1971)].
To be impartial can be defined as being careful not to favor any side, not to
show any preference for one disputant or the other. Recent international media-
tions however, show a different reality. Partial mediators may be able to carry
on their project and manage an agreement between strongly opposed positions.
For instance, this was the case of the Algerian mediation between the USA and
Iran on the US hostages.
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The most important thing for the two parties concerning the mediator is
that each will have a more positive outcome through his intervention. The fact
that the mediator is impartial or partial is less important for them. On the con-
trary, partiality may be advantageous for the party in disfavor if the mediator
wields some power over the other party.
Partiality exercised within certain limits may be the initial device that
leads a negotiation process to some agreement. In such a case, impartiality
appears more as an openly stated value than as an operating variable.
H negotiators are strongly committed to conflicting ideologies, it is very
unlikely for a mediator to adopt a position half way between the two sets of
values. There is no way to establish a kind of arithmetical mean of the different
values at stake. The mediator, then, will just favor the solution closer to his own
values.
The mediator, by manipulating the information, by influencing the parties,
by putting pressure on them on occasion, directs the process of mediated nego-
tiation toward a new equilibrium that does not correspond to what could have
been reached if the negotiation had been left to its own dynamics.
34.4.2. Neutrality
There is a general confusion between the concepts of impartiality and neutrality.
Researchers tend to use them as synonyms, but they refer to different types of
action. Impartiality means not favoring either party. To be neutral means not
intervening in the situation, not influencing the result of the negotiation.
It is rather an exception for a mediator dealing with international matters
not to express any judgment, not to suggest any solution, but to work only as a
facilitator or a go-between. In most cases, the mediator introduces into the pro-
cess elements such as pressure, arguments, threats or rewards that will affect the
outcome in some way. For instance, concerning the Camp David agreements,
the US mediator involved himself in modifying the issues at stake and the global
value of the game by offering economic aid to Egypt and the construction of a
strategic air base to Israel.
The very principle of an intervention goes against the idea of neutrality
because, by getting involved in the initial dyadic relationship, the mediator
modifies the structure of the conflict. Moreover, non-neutrality increases the
likelihood of reaching an agreement, because it provides new means of action and
incentives in the shape of rewards or threats of punishment such as a withdraw-
ing of support.
34.6. The Mediator's Intervention: The Model
H one considers that a fair solution should be the settlement point that could be
reached through the dynamics of the dyadic relationship without any interven-
tion of a third party, partiality could be defined 811 the modification of the
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outcomes introduced with the action of the mediator (Figure 9-1.2). The position
of the mediator is described by axis (Nl N2). The two ends correspond to the
positions of the negotiators. Axis (Nl N2) concerns only the distribution of the
existing resources.
Nl <--------~._-------->N2
i
impartiality point
Figure 94.f. The position of the mediator regarding partiality.
Non-neutrality is shown in Figure 9-1.9 by an orthogonal axis (Gl G2),
whose length and orientation correspond to the intervention of the mediator on
the joint outcome. Non-neutrality may directly affect the system as a whole or
just one party.
IT the mediator brings into the system a personal contribution, it will be
shown by a certain length of the two vertical vectors (Gl G2). IT he brings some
reward only for the benefit of one party, it will be shown through one vector. IT
he does not bring anything into the mediation system (Gl G2) will not appear.
This will correspond to the neutral position.
Gl
N1~--- ---=O~>-- 4 N2
G2
Figure 94.9. The position of the mediator in regard to partiality and non-neutrality.
34.5.1. The mediator's position
The different positions that may be taken by the mediator during his interven-
tion can. be shown with respect to the two variables partiality and non-
neutrality.
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The top left and bottom right quarters of Figure 9,4.,4 correspond to areas
where partiality and non-neutrality are both involved. The mediator manages
in such a way that the party he favors gets a larger part of the outcome than he
would without the mediator's intervention. In this case, the mediator also gives
an additional gain to his favored party.
r-------
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I partial plus
I additional gains
I
I
I M8
I
I
I part ial but
I compensate
I
I M71 _
o partial ity
M6
- - - - -
M3 1
I
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Figure 9,4.,4. Two-dimensional plot of the mediator's positions with respect to partiality
and non-neutrality.
The top right and bottom left quarters correspond to situations in which
the mediator behaves in a partial way and as a consequence gives some advan-
tage to one of the parties, but compensates the other party by adding to his
gains:
• M1 corresponds to the position of a mediator who is totally partial toward
negotiator N1 and who, moreover, gives to N1 a supplementary contribu-
tion in comparison with the product of the system. The US mediation dur-
ing the negotiation of Nankin (1945-1947) between the Kuomintang and
the Chinese Communists is an example of such an attitude, N1 being in
that case the Kuomintang.
• M2 shows the position of an impartial mediator who would evenly split the
gains resulting from the initial negotiation. This mediator would, however,
give any additional gains to Nl.
• Segment M2 M6 represents the new resources brought by the mediator or
made available from the negotiation system through the action of optimiza-
tion by the mediator. The US mediation of Camp David is an illustration
of such a practice. President Carter maintained a fair impartiality toward
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both parties, but raised their gains by bringing more benefits into the deal:
economic aid for Egypt and a new air base for Israel.
• M3 corresponds to a mediator who strongly favors one party in the share of
the existing resources within the system and who adds, as a counterpart, a
personal compensation for the other party. This was the case in the
Trieste conflict. The US helped Italy to get the town of Trieste, but com-
pensated by giving Yugoslavia financial aid.
• M4 indicates a mediator who does not enlarge the scope of the possible
benefits, but who gives an advantage to negotiator N2 in the share of the
gains. Algeria used such a strategy during the US-Iran negotiations con-
cerning the US hostages in Teheran by adding nothing more than what was
already available and favoring Iran over the USA.
• M5 strictly corresponds to a situation similar to the one described in Ml.
• M6 corresponds to the one described in M2.
• M7 corresponds to the one described in M3.
• M8 corresponds to the one described in M4.
• M9 corresponds to the positions of a mediator who does not favor any
party and does not broaden the potential gains of the negotiation. He has
in such a case a neutral and impartial attitude. He can be a passive facili-
tator or a mere presence who keeps the negotiators' behavior within accept-
able limits. In the field of international relations, such a role may be
played by an international organization that attempts to solve a conflict
between two of its members.
One can see that there are many positions the mediator may take. M9 is
the case corresponding to the first conception of mediation, built up from obser-
vations made in the field of industrial relations.
The nine positions analyzed here are extreme cases. In fact, there is an
infinite number of positioning possibilities for the mediator. All of them can be
situated into the area illustrated by Figure 94.4.
34.5.2. The outcome of a mediation
The different positioning possibilities of the mediator can also be shown on the
area of possible agreements. The type of area chosen corresponds to the
hypothesis of a highly conflicting negotiation, as presented in Luce and Raiffa
(1957, p. 93).
The concave curve in Figure 94.5 refers to a situation in which mediation is
a real necessity. The shaded area shows the set of possible agreements between
the two negotiators with reference to their respective utilities. The area within
the dotted line corresponds to the new set of possible agreements resulting from
the intervention of the mediator. Furthermore,
• Ml represents the maximization of Nt's utility. The maximum that could
be previously reached before the intervention of the mediator is M8.
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Figure 9,/.5. The mediator's positioning within the area of po88ible agreements.
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• M2 corresponds to a payoff for N2 that could be one possible equity point
(M9) to which a personal contribution from the mediator is added.
• M3 represents a maximization of N2's utility. The corresponding utility for
NI is raised with the contribution of the mediator.
• M4 corresponds to the maximized utility obtainable by N2 without any
specific contribution from the mediator.
• M5, M6, M7, M8 correspond symmetrically to the positions MI, M2, M3,
M4.
• M9 represents an equilibrium showing the "fair" solution with an impartial
and neutral mediator careful not to bring into the game any personal
resources to increase the global outcome.
• S should be the Nash solution, corresponding to the strategy of an impar-
tial mediator who brings into the game a bilateral contribution. It
describes an equivalent situation to the one snown before with the segment
M2 and M6.
34.6. The Mediator's Motivations
The concept of a partial and non-neutral mediator is quite adapted to real-world
situations and particularly to relations between states. The mediator is a nego-
tiator who introduces new goals and extra resources into a deadlocked game and
is able to start it up again. Figure 9-1.5 shows that the strategy of a neutral and
impartial negotiator is one strategy among many, but, moreover, that such a
strategy does not lead to the best outcome for either party.
The intervention of the mediator can be justified by several types of rea-
sons, which fall into two main categories: external and internal. Reasons that
are external to the will of the mediator are institutional. International
424 G.-O. Faure
organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity or the Arab League,
foresee generally a possibility of mediation in case of a conflict between two of
their members.
The mediator in such cases does not intervene on his own, but because he
has been appointed by his institution. Such a situation does not exclude other
personal motivations on the part of the mediator: reputation, career, power, etc.
H there are several possible solutions for settling the dispute, the mediator
will be inclined to favor the one that is the most advantageous for himself or for
his organization. The mediator may also intervene for personal reasons. His
motivation may be to gain something or to avoid a loss. During the two years
the French hostages have been kept by the Moslem Shiites in Lebanon, seven
different mediators have attempted to enter into the negotiating process. What
is at stake for the mediator in such a negotiation is that in the case of a success-
ful intervention the two parties will be indebted to him. He is in a position to
ask for something in return.
The case of the border conflict between Algeria and Morocco in 1963 also
shows the potential gains (political prestige, power) that are expected by the
mediator if he leads the parties to an agreement. Tunisia, the Arab League,
Ghana, Iraq, Ethiopia and eventually Mali tried within two weeks to bring the
disputants to a compromise. The mediator may act in order to prevent a loss for
himself. This was the purpose of the USA at the time of its mediation in the
Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus in 1964. Both countries are members of
NATO and any conflict between them would have weakened the position of the
alliance and, consequently, of the USA. The USA acted in order to minimize its
losses.
The mediator may act in order to prevent one of his allies from losing face.
This was the case of the US mediation between the Netherlands and Indonesia
concerning the future of West Iran. The Netherlands could no longer counter
the guerrilla movement initiated by Indonesia. It was necessary for the USA to
find a solution that would make the inevitable withdrawal of the Netherlands, its
ally, not appear to be a defeat. The mediation of Ellsworth Bunker led both par-
ties to agree on a formula that included a temporary administration of the con-
tested territory by a third party,·the UN, then the transfer of the administration
to Indonesia, which would organize a referendum on self-determination. In this
way, the change of sovereignty did not appear as a surrender of the Netherlands
to the conditions put forward by Indonesia, but as compliance with the sugges-
tions of an ally.
Another motivation of a mediator may be avoiding a possible loss in
influence resulting from the successful intervention of another country. In that
case, those competing for the role of mediator see their own prestige highly
raised. This is a reason why the superpowers for years vied to help India and
Pakistan settle their chronic dispute. This was especially true of the Soviet
intervention of Tashkent, which followed the 1965 war.
A mediator, whether it be an individual, an organization or a country, may
also act for ethical reasons, aiming to fulfill moral obligations. The Quakers'
international action is quite relevant, if referred to such goals.
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Negotiators themselves may be highly motivated to reach an agreement.
Thus, managing a compromise may become an essential value for them to carry
out. Such a motivation incites them to internalize the goals or the constraints of
the other side and to develop a personal concept of a fair solution. The negotia-
tor changes his role and becomes a mediator, as IkJe (1964) underlines, while
analyzing the behavior of some Western negotiators in front of Soviet diplomats.
In fact, performing the functions of a mediator, the negotiator acting in a dyadic
relation remains a negotiator and only modifies his goals and constraints. The
changing variable throughout the whole process of negotiating is the propensity
to reach an agreement.
34.1. Concluding Remarks
Mediation is an activity that does not require impartiality and neutrality as con-
ditions for success. The mediator has the characteristics of a negotiator. He
intervenes in the dyadic relation with his own set of goals and constraints and
may only use a limited number of strategies and tactics.
Through his intervention the whole structure of the game is modified and
becomes a triadic interaction. But if the mediator can be defined as a negotiator
involved in a relationship with two parties, this three-player game cannot be
analyzed as a mere coalition game. Such an approach would bring the mediator
beyond the limit of what could be accepted and would result in the very negation
of the mediation process.
A mediator who appears to connect his interests exclusively with those of
one party would lead the whole system to collapse.
It is within these two limits - Le., no longer a dyadic relation, but not yet
a coalition game - that the particular rationale of the mediator may be
specified.
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CHAPTER 35
On Getting Simulation Models
Used in International Negotiations:
A Debriefing Exercise
Laurent Mermet and Leen Hordijk
International Institute for Applied Sf/stems AnalJ/sis (IIASA)
Lazenburg
Austria
35.1. Introduction
Problems approached through international negotiation - especially multilateral
negotiation - tend to be large-scale and long-term. They involve complex
phenomena and issues that can only be grasped with the help of scientific
research. Furthermore, since their complexity and rather global nature usually
makes these problems cross the boundaries of single scientific disciplines, results
from various fields have to be synthesized in a way that:
Represents adequately the global functioning of the phenomena involved at
the biophysical level.
Adapt to the way members of the international community formulate the
problem when engaging in negotiation.
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Such synthesis of existing data and understanding to assist decision-making
is one of the main objectives of systems analysis in general, and of simulation
modeling in particular.
The matter is notoriously difficult to grasp in the abstract, and involves
skill and experience. Therefore, to formulate an answer to the question of how to
get a model used, we have chosen an approach where one of us (L.M., who is a
management science researcher) "debriefed" the other (L.H., who is an experi-
enced practitioner in building models and getting them used).
The material presented here is based mainly on the current experience of
Leen Hordijk as leader of the Acid Rain project at IIASA. This project's RAINS
model can be used to simulate the emission of acidic pollutants in Europe, their
transport and deposition, and their effects on the environment. The purpose of
the simulation work is to provide a technical reference basis for current negotia-
tions to curb acid rain in Europe, especially in the framework of the Convention
on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, located in the United Nations'
Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva. In the course of building the model,
much effort has been devoted to try and ensure its actual use. The skill in these
efforts stemmed from L. Hordijk's previous experience with similar "modeling-
for-use" projects, especially in the Netherlands. In the course of the exercise, we
also discussed these cases when necessary to complement the example of the
RAINS model [1]. Although mainly based on experience with RAINS, this
chapter is by no means an account about getting that particular model used in
international negotiations.
The aim of debriefing is to tap expertise acquired "on the job". It consists
of making explicit, through systematic questioning, the more or less implicit
understanding of a certain problem that a practitioner has acquired over time.
It is an attempt to put skill acquired through experience into a form more acces-
sible to analysis and teaching.
But debriefing raises methodological problems: how should the information
"extracted" be structured, and how should the questioning be organized accord-
ingly?
We approached this question in a novel way, so that the study presented
here really had two goals: .
To contribute to a better understanding of the skills involved in getting
models used in international negotiations.
To experiment with a relatively new method for debriefing practitioners in
matters of strategies and negotiations.
We first briefly present the methodological guidelines we adopted for the
exercise. We then present in more detail that part of the material produced by
the debriefing results which is relevant to the issue of the use of models.
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35.2. Debriefing "in Terms of Games": The Methodological
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Even a bulky piece of analysis can include only a limited amount of information.
By comparison with any article or a book, the amount of understanding involved
in a practitioner's skill is overwhelming. To capture such extensive understand-
ing in the narrow limits of analysis causes serious problems, be it in terms of the
total amount of information involved, of the variety of themes or fields to be
covered, or of the number of details that are unconnected in practical thinking,
but cannot be left that way in analysis. The debriefing concept is intuitively
appealing, but raises challenging methodological problems [21.
The most traditional solutions are akin to surveys and memoirs. In a
debriefing conducted like a survey, one will ask the practitioner a predetermined
set of questions, very much like what is familiar from magazine polls. This
approach provides precise and comparable answers covering the questions con-
sidered to be important by the interviewer. But knowing what questions to ask
is half of the issue. The approach requires in particular that a good understand-
ing of the problem's structures be available beforehand.
Memoirs, or totally free-wheeling interviews, represent the opposite
extreme. The choice of issues and the structuring of the problem are chosen
entirely by the practitioner. The result is usually lively and informative, but
loosely structured. Typically, a practitioner will not structure the problems he
has faced and solved in a systematic mannerj he will rather underline, and com-
ment on, those aspects of the matter which to him are novel, interesting, chal-
lenging, or which he thinks are usually overlooked. The core of his know-how,
the basics and reflexes on which his skill is based, will thus often escape formula-
tion because he is unaware of some, considers others to be too trivial or lacks
proper formulation.
Our objective in this exercise was mainly to identify the most basic, most
general structures and dynamics of the strategies and tactics involved in building
a model for use by policy-makers in a negotiation context. We considered that
only on this basis could details, refinements, and the advanced understanding of
good practitioners be integrated into a coherent, transferable whole. We had to
find a debriefing formula focusing on the structuring of the problem, rather than
on the solutions to all the various difficulties associated with it, and which vary
so much from one particular case to the next. A survey-type formula could not
be retained because it produces much content, but is not very effective in explor-
ing the structure of problems.
To unravel the particular structures of the subject of the debriefing - get-
ting models used in our case - can only be left to the "debriefed" practitioner,
as the exercise goes along. But the practitioner cannot formulate the way he
implicitly structures his approach of situations unless he receives help, especially
questions and hints on what kind of structures can be looked for. This help, and
the tools allowing it, have to be the contribution of the "debriefer".
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In parallel with the present study, extensive work is under development on
the potential of various analytical frameworks and methodological tools to help
bridge the gap between practitioners and researchers in strategies and negotia-
tions in natural resources management. Our methodological thinking relied
largely on results of this work [31.
Analytical frameworks used to help to structure a problem, or to make the
structuring of a problem explicit (as in the present debriefing) have to pursue
several objectives at the same time. They must be consistent with the way peo-
ple spontaneously structure their understanding of problems in practical think-
ing. They must be suitable for use and in particular allow simultaneous descrip-
tion of a problem, and prescriptive and normative approaches to it. They must
have a clear connection and consistency with the analytical theories in the area
involved.
This last condition suggests that the structures that can be proposed for
practical problems should inevitably rely on one or several of the few paradigms
that are used to structure thinking in research.
In view of the complexity involved in institutional tactics and strategies,
the system paradigm would currently be most likely considered to underlie
debriefing. One could, in effect, conduct a debriefing in terms of systems, involv-
ing, for instance, the mapping of systems boundaries, its elements and their
interactions, the identification of feedback loops, of internal and external factors
influencing the emerging evolution of the state of the system, and so on [4].
However, the system paradigm poses serious problems hindering its use in
the preparation of strategic action, such as intervention in a negotiation, or insti-
tutional tactics associated with scientific work. Suffice it to mention one major
impasse associated with analysis of practice in terms of systems. Either the
decision-maker or negotiator is considered as part of the system, or he is viewed
as being outside of the system. In the first case, the following dilemma occurs:
If the system is well understood, the actor's choices are determined and
predictable, this places him in a very bad situation for action, and makes
analysis of the problem a futile attempt on his part.
If the actor exercises some degree of freedom in action and is strategically
astute, he will try to remain as unpredictable as he can. Then the possible
understanding of the system will remain very limited.
In the second case, if the actor is considered as being outside of the system, no
understanding of the latter can give indications on the rationales for his actions.
It follows that the system paradigm is suitable to understand complex
problems on which actors are negotiating or deciding, but cannot at the same
time integrate the subjective logic of action in the analysis and be of practical
use to prepare action.
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The research effort mentioned above suggests that the game paradigm pro-
vides a sound analytical framework to bridge the practice-research gap 1:41. In
particular, it structures situations in a way that supports both an analysis by the
observer and the preparation of action by the player in the game, as the example
of any familiar game will show; This choice of the game paradigm seems to find
support:
In the extensive use that practitioners in all fields make of game metaphors,
such as rules of the game, winner, loser, move, points, to be put in check,
and so on.
In the empirically acknowledged usefulness of simulation games to promote
understanding of complex issues involving tactical and strategical interac-
tion.
In the use in theoretical research of approaches that are based on analysis
of some aspects of games, for instance, in game theory and decision
analysis.
Since the game paradigm fulfills the conditions we have mentioned earlier
in a way the other currently used analytical frameworks do not, we have selected
an analysis in terms of games as the guideline for the exercise. To avoid
misunderstandings, it should be made clear that the game concept used here is
quite different from the one found in game theory. What we have in mind is a
much broader framework suggested by the more complex forms of games, in par-
ticular simulation games, which involve not only scores, choices and strategies,
but also many other aspects, including such intangibles as role-playing, excite-
ment or reluctance, and intuition \51.
On this basis, the guideline for the whole exercise, which covered seven
two-hour interviews over a period of one year, was a two-part question, con-
stantly repeated in various forms: If "Building Models for actual Use in an inter-
national negotiation" is the name of a game (we will call it the BMU game); and
if you are a player in this game whose assigned objective is to get the model built
and used:
What best description can you give of the most important features and
structures in the game?
What should a beginner in the game learn first as he starts playing the
same role you presently have?
We started without any further detailed conception of what the general ele-
ments and structures of a game are. Exploring these was also one of the aims of
the exercise. We just let ourselves be guided by the manifold "natural concepts"
associated in everyday thinking with the word game, and by constant analogies
with various popular games. Gradually, a fairly clear image of the real-life game
of "Building a Model for actual Use in international negotiation" emerged.
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35.3. Getting a Simulation Model Used in an
International Negotiation
35.3.1. General framework of the game
L. MCmKt and L. Hordijk
When confronted for the first time with a new game, one will first see the board
or game space, the other players and the various elements of the paraphernalia:
dice, fake (or real) money, chips, and so on. One will also very soon learn the
principles and the crux of the game: "Monopoly", for instance, is about real
estate speculation, and the crux of the game is to put everyone else out of busi-
ness. What are the equivalent basic structures in our BMU game?
The basic structure of the game is presented in Figure 95.1, which shows
that playing BMU is actually playing simultaneously four quite distinct games:
(1) Each member of the research team is involved as an active participant in
one or another scientific field, the results of which are to be synthesized in
the model. Each scientific field is more or less clearly bounded, with a rela-
tively stable set of players, whose interactions follow the rules of the
scientific game. In BMU, there are as many such games as required by the
scope of the model and the composition of the team; we have called them
Scientific Field Games (FG).
(2) A modeling effort is often pursued within a certain institutional framework.
It can be, for example, a project of a consultancy firm, or a program of an
institute. This framework is a distinct game with its specific bureaucratic
or economic rules, stakes and tricks: we refer to it as the Parent Institution
Game (PG). Part of the effort of any modeling team is spent on surviving
or prospering in this element. How the players do it and how they succeed
has a strong bearing on whether and how the model gets completed, and
eventually used.
(3) Use of the model occurs in a specific decision-making environment, such as
an international conference or an international organization. This consti-
tutes yet another distinct game, with its players, its own rules and out-
comes: we call this the Use Game (UG).
(4) Finally, building the model is a distinct game in its own right, obviously of
central importance here. We will call it the Modeling Game (MG). Its
players are the members of the research team, and its desired outcome is
the completion of the model.
The crucial principle in BMU is active creation and successful maintenance
of a kind of constructive coherence between such disparate semi-closed scenes as
a set of scientific fields, an international policy debate, a research bureaucracy
and its financial supporters: an easy statement, but a difficult achievement!
In the following analysis, we will be primarily concerned with the Use
Game, and with those aspects of the Modeling Game that are relevant for getting
Use
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Figure 95.1. General structure of the BMU Game.
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the model used. The general description of these games as provided here is
meant to help model practitioners, their financial supporters and their evalua-
tors, in organizing their thinking about the issue of getting the model used.
They can use this material to identify and structure relevant information when
preparing a model for use.
However, it is not enough to identify what information is needed, and to
structure it once it is obtained: obtaining it is a challenge in itself. Our first
recommendation will be that one needs to identify in each country - and more
generally in each subgame one will have to enter - an experienced person who is
willing to provide such information as deemed necessary. We have named such
persons grey-haired experts in the scientific subgames and grey-haired advisors
in the bureaucratic and political subgames. It is hard to overemphasize the
importance of taking the time and effort to identify such persons and cultivate
steady relations with them.
35.3.2. Basics of the Modeling Game
The basics of the Modeling Game are represented in Figure 95.2. The triangle
represents the boundaries of the game. The various shapes around the large cir-
cle indicate the players. These are designated in terms of the roles they play, not
of the persons playing these roles: the same person can be a player in several
games, and also play several roles in the same game.
The large circle contains the major issues and the corresponding rules and
interaction structures:
The project plan sets the basic rules on which the game relies: aims, attri-
bution of roles, means available, time available, etc.; these basic rules are
changed if the plans are modified during the game.
Much of the model quality will rely on good integration of various submo-
dels and on the scientific coherence of the whole; this subgame is a major
responsibility of the leader..
Each participating scientist is a specialist; he is thus "chasing two hares at
the same time": excellence within his scientific field, and integration of
knowledge from this field into the model. It is rare that these two objec-
tives totally coincide, so that there is constant negotiation to assure that
both concerns get addressed satisfactorily.
The use and allocation of available logistics and secretarial help is also a
subgame of its own right.
Finally, simulation models run on computers. Access to the hardware, pro-
gramming the different parts of the model, and assuring that, when they
are assembled, the composite model functions satisfactorily and is reason-
ably user-friendly, is a complex and absorbing game, the results of which
have a crucial bearing on the quality of the model for users.
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35.3.3. Phases in the Modeling Game
L. Mermet and L. Hordi,-1c
Many games, if not most, go through successive stages, setting different contexts
for the interactions of the players. They can be procedural stages written into
the rules - for example, when a deadline is set in the research contract for the
various steps in the completion of the project. They can also be more informal
phases appearing when the progression of the effort modifies its environment and
its agenda. The evolution of BMU can be represented by seven successive
periods, which are represented in Figure 95.9.
The first three phases correspond to a stage in which the project can be
considered as preliminary:
Phase 1 is the original idea of starting such a project: "it would be interest-
ing - and maybe useful - to build a model of this or that phenomenon";
this is a short, totally informal, often overlooked phase.
Phase 2 is the transformation of the original idea into an actual proposal to
start the effort; the main issues are clarifying and formulating the project,
overcoming skepticism, identifying the necessary means and potential
financial supporters.
Phase 3 is the exploratory start of the project: some seed money has been
gathered, small-scale work is done to demonstrate feasibility and useful-
ness, a conference may be organized to secure a network of collaborators;
in brief, financial supporters, researchers and the parent institution are
"giving it a try" .
If the project successfully proceeds beyond these preliminary phases, it will
acquire a full-size configuration, a firm institutional status and more reliable
funding. Appetizers are history, and the time has come for the main course: the
major work now is to build the full model. As in the previous one, this stage can
also be divided into three phases:
Phase 4 is the project's development: major decisions have to be made on
computer hardware, model· structure, composition of the research team,
and relations with potential users. The promises made are bigger and
bigger, the products to show remain meager.
Phase 5 is the project's implementation: everything is available to actually
do the work, gather the data, write the computer programs, etc.
Phase 6 is the end of model construction and the time of fullest use of the
model: the results have to be published in various forms, the model has to
be finalized, debugged and documented.
Basically, the work is done. The team can dissolve and its members seek
other scientific adventures. But the model is still there. Especially if it is used,
it will need maintenance, upgrading, instructions to users, etc. This is phase 7:
follow-up and clearinghouse.
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35.3.4. Model-building with use in sight: Issues and phases
Of the various subgames in the Modeling Game, project planning, model coher-
ence and computer negotiations are directly relevant for the ultimate use of the
model. Usability should be a major concern in these activities, starting right at
the onset of the model-building effort. How, specifically, can this goal be met?
A second look at the phases we just described will help answer the ques-
tion. The issue of use presents itself quite differently at the various stages of the
game as we just described them. We have sketched this in Figure 95.9.
During the three phases of the preliminary or planning stage, the issue is to
evaluate the chances that the model will be used. From the use point of view, is
it worth pursuing, funding, institutionalizing? This question presents itself
differently in each phase of the planning:
In phase 1, the issue is to clarify the place of use in the original idea. Is it
central, so that use is the main aim of engaging in the exercise; is it
planned as the natural outcome of producing new and useful information;
or is it a facade prompted by the financial or institutional pressures toward
immediately usable products of research?
In phase 2, one should be able to ascertain whether the idea of use is pre-
cise and realistic. At this stage, an operational definition of use should be
provided, and not only a definition in principle. For the latter, it would
suffice to state that the model is for use by practitioners in negotiations
about the topics covered by the model. For an operational definition of
use, it will be necessary to specify the particular practitioners, the negotia-
tion forum, and how precisely the model would be used.
In phase 3, one can start finding out if the envisaged users are really
interested in the idea. At this stage potential users should be contacted, at
least at an informal level. Their reaction will be important: are potential
users politely skeptical, interested in principle, or already giving signs of an
operational intention of use?
At the second stage, when research is done at a full-scale level, the priority
for the partners in the modeling effort is to get the model build and used. This
involves the following issues:
In phase 4, the model should be made known to the users' forum or fora, so
that the involved parties can start considering it as a resource for negotia-
tion or decision making This involves surmounting inevitable opposition,
and receiving or creating opportunities to present the effort to all parties
concerned. In this phase, it is also important to provide the users with an
opportunity to get involved in the project - for instance, by participating
in review meetings, by providing data, etc. Finally, it is at this time that
rather irreversible decisions are made about the structure of the model.
Needless to say, the envisaged use has to be one of the bases for this design;
for this, user feedback is essential.
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In phase 5, the project should maintain users' attention and keep the users
involved. In this phase, everyone in the modeling team is very absorbed in
getting the model done and running. At the same time, the users have
many subjects of interest other than a model that has not yet delivered
anything. Also, competition is likely to emerge. One may be tempted to
feel that what has been acquired in the previous phases may be taken for
granted, but one should not. Especially since the technical task of building
the model becomes so absorbing at this stage, it will take a special effort to
keep users informed and involved, and to make sure that the model itself
does not, for technical reasons, stray away from its potential intended use.
In~~~~~~~~~~d~~~~~~
a form suitable for use. This winding-up phase of projects is delicate,
because it puts the team in a paradoxical situation: if the research work is
nearly finished, all resources will tend to be attracted to other projects that
are in more challenging phases. H the team continues to work, it will
always be tempted to go a little farther in research, rather than just docu-
menting what has been achieved. In this phase, actual use of the model
should also start: there should be intense activity of the modelers in the
Use Game.
H the model has not made its way to actual use in phase 6, it is unlikely to
make it later on, because the indispensable resources, energy and momentum will
no longer be available. H the model does start to get used, then it is important
to provide users with good service, because most of the use will happen after the
core research is over. This follow-up phase is largely a matter of logistics for
maintenance and adaptation of the model. It is also at this stage that the effort
should be evaluated by the users, not by the proponents of the model!
35.4. Basics of the Use Game
35.4.1. Board and players
We just discussed what "use" looks like from the point of view of those financing,
supervising and building the model. We sketched an image of this as a specific
environment, which we have called the Modeling Game. Seen from there, the
"users" have a strong tendency to be viewed, even if only implicitly, as a rather
abstract, mistakenly unified entity. But the term "users" covers a whole set of
people and organizations with different interests, who operate in a specific and
diverse environment, which we have called the Use Game. To get users
involved, to obtain their support, it is necessary to understand to a certain
extent the games they are playing. In fact, a certain amount of involvement in
the Use Game will usually be necessary to remove barriers and build enough sup-
port for actual use.
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AIl above, let us start with an overview of the board of the Use Game, as
sketched in Figure 95.~. In international negotiation, model use will, more often
than not, be conducted in the framework of some organization, convention, or
other set of procedural mechanics. This is a game in its own right. Main players
are the delegates, chairperson, and other negotiators. In the game set, there will
usually be a secretariat to facilitate the procedure and assist with technical
matters. Secretariat members are also players; they will play their own marbles
in the game, somewhat like the banker in a casino game. Also, ad hoc technical
working groups are likely to be formed to face those issues that are both complex
in content, and politically sensitive. Each one is a subgame of a sort.
Furthermore, no delegation is a transparent and monolithic reflection of a
country. In each country that is a party to the negotiations, there are likely to
be debates about the interests to promote at the international forum, and about
the best strategy for doing so. The latter can include the use of a simulation
model. This is yet another game in which national administrative organizations
(agencies, ministries, etc.) are the parties, and in which individual players are
leading scientists (collaborators, competitors, friends, or supporters of the model
we are trying to get used) and officials (each of whom also has a certain potential
as ally or opponent). In each country, the interplay between science, policies and
politics seems to follow specific patterns and rules with which experienced
nationals in the field have learned to play.
35.4.2. Getting it used: Targets and moves
Given this general background, which strategies should the model-builder follow
to get his product used? To answer this question, it is necessary first to get an
idea of the possible winning or losing outcomes - that is, of the possible types
and levels of use.
The notion of the use of models in international negotiation oscillates
between two extreme concepts of the role of complex applied studies and
decision-support systems in controversial decision-making. A somewhat carica-
tured account will help to describe the debate.
At one extreme is a vision that is part of the current folklore of decision-
support systems. Underlying many proposals and - mostly preliminary -
developments, is a fantasy of negotiators gathered around a colorful screen
displaying a "negotiator-friendly" computer program. It answers their questions
swiftly, thanks to a large database and to simulation models based on the result
of state-of-the-art, impartial scientific studies. At last confronted with objective
and understandable information, following long stages of groping in the dark, the
negotiators can play with the program and explore the many facets of the issue.
Before they are even aware of it, they have abandoned their entrenched posi-
tions, hammered out joint gains, and they all wind up as winners. If this utopia
were true, international negotiations could be considered just another type of
video-game [61.
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At the other extreme is a more acid concept of simulation models - and of
any applied studies - as just another play in the tactics of decision-making
processes. In this view, negotiation is so dominated by politics that, if a model is
used at all, it will be by a party that finds its position supported by its results.
IT another party holds a different position, it will always find an alternative
model to support it, or interpret the existing data differently. IT it does not find
such an alternative model, it will fund its development. In the end, the negotia-
tors, armed with competing models, will shoot divergent results at each other [71.
There is some truth in both of these concepts, and a lot of room for inter-
mediate positions. We propose to organize this range of potential use situations
in the following two dimensions. The first rests on the distinction between use
by all negotiators collectively, or by only one or some of the negotiating parties.
The second dimension is based on a distinction between the simulation model
seen as the active ingredient pushing the negotiation process along, and a model
seen as a more neutral scientific reference for discussions in a negotiation process
that itself remains fundamentally based on politics. To these situations of use,
we would like to add situations of nonuse, by one (or a few) or by all partici-
pants, at a level of indifference to the model, or of actively fighting it. The
resulting scope of possible use or nonuse situations is sketched in Table 35.1.
Table 95.1. Types and levels of use of a simulation model in the negotiation process.
U8er level
Role of model
Model as a motor of
the process
Model as source of
information
Model indifferent
because marginal or
useless
Model undesirable
Individual
A party promotes the
model as an active basis
for its position
A party uses the model to
complement the argumen-
tation of its position
A party is reluctant to
move from the political to
a more technical ground
A party disagrees on the
science or fights the model
as a tactic in the negotia-
tions politics
Collective
(joint U8e by all partie8)
All parties agree to use
the model as reference
framework for the process
The model is considered
by all parties as one
source of information used
in the process
The negotiation is so ad-
versarial that "rational"
analysis of the problem
plays little role
Prospects for the use of
the models are terrible
At the most ambitious level of use, the model is a moving force in the pro-
cess. It can be used as such by one or a few delegations. This is particularly the
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case when a party wants something done about a problem, but faces strong
reluctance supported by scientific uncertainty on the exact nature, extent, or ori-
gin of the problem. A model is a powerful way for such parties to mobilize what
scientific evidence there is, and if possible, force consideration of the issue. A
model can also be used as a key activating factor of the process by all parties
jointly. This is in particular the case when there is agreement to use the model
as a common framework allowing proposed solutions to be tested, possible joint
benefits to be explored, etc. This concept of the model as a mediator seems to
dominate, so to speak, the emerging efforts in computer-aided negotiations.
This is, however, a very ambitious concept of the use of models, one which
seldom comes true. But the use of models should not be seen as an "all or noth-
ing" situation. It can be conceived, like the use of any applied science, in a more
traditional fashion. In this way, research results provide a source of information
and reference for the rationality of envisaged solutions, which is mobilized as
necessary in the course of the negotiation process, itself moved and dominated by
procedures and politics. Again, the model can be used individually as a rationale
to defend a politically established position, and to work out its technical details.
It can also be used collectively as a yardstick to foster better articulation of posi-
tions, and as a reference for discussion of details.
Nonuse can stem first from indifference to the model. This is likely to be
based on the view that the predominance of politics makes complex and still unc-
ertain scientific results irrelevant. Most of the time, this will be because one
party - or the whole negotiation - is highly politicized. It can also happen
because negotiators are weary of complex models. They can perceive these as
providing results, which, since the negotiations cannot understand their basis,
could as well be arbitrary, and will reduce their degree of control on the outcome
of the negotiation.
Finally, it can happen that one, a few, or many of the parties will fight the
use of the model in the negotiation. H too many of the parties fight the use of
the model, one might want either to reconsider the value of the model, or to con-
sider another decision-making forum for its use. H the opposition just comes
from one or a few parties, it is quite natural. It can stem from a disagreement
about facts or concept of the model, which then has to be dealt with at the
scientific level. This can be the case, for instance, if one country has quite
specific, if marginal, technical problems, and these do not receive adequate atten-
tion in the model because it is based on the general case. But opposition also
often stems from tactics: it can be a way to maintain a level of high uncertainty
about the issue if this is favorable to one's position; it can be a way to delay the
procedures and discussion; it can be a way to deny the existence, the
significance, the cause of a problem, or the possibility of remedying it. In that
case, the difficulty has to be dealt with at the political level.
To this point, what we have done is basically to associate precise and struc-
tured - although very general - descriptions with the notions of "users" and
"use". How do they combine when it comes to action - that is, to getting the
users to use the model?
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35.4.3. Getting it used: The process
L. Mennet arwl L. HonJ;j1
It must first be realized that the modeler is only a quite marginal player in the
Use Game. His possibilities for direct intervention are very limited: an occa-
sional presentation of the modeling work and results, or participation in a tech-
nical working group. We have also seen that the use of the model necessitates
action at the political level to put it on the agenda, to overcome opposition, etc.
Action at this level is necessary, but it can only be indirect, through the inter-
vention of players with influence in the Use Game: active delegates, chair-
persons, influential secretariat members.
Furthermore, we have seen that the initial attitudes of delegates and other
players with regard to the model could be actively supportive (usually on politi-
cal grounds), mildly supportive (usually on technical grounds), reticent or hostile
(on political or technical grounds, or due to ignorance). The crux of action here
is to find ways to make these attitudes evolve favorably. Those changes in
players' positions that are connected to the credibility and relevance of the
model do not require tactics beyond good modeling work and sound presenta-
tions when the opportunity is given (of course, making sure the opportunity is
given is an important point of strategy). But when it comes to influencing posi-
tions at the political level, one will have to leave the initiative to active allies:
those who tend to support the model on political grounds.
These intrinsic limits to the intervention in the Use Game finally make the
strategic concerns of the modeler much simpler than they might have looked at
first sight. These concerns are threefold:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Building a model that is fit for use, Le., scientifically state-of-the-art and
adapted to users' needs.
Acquiring a clear enough picture of the Use Game to know what one is fac-
ing, and identify what strategic and tactical help will be necessary, and its
potential sources.
Making active allies in the Use Game - those who will be the actual pro-
moters of the model, and will be able to overcome opposition.
At first sight, these conclusions seem to pertain entirely to a concept of the
use of the model by one party or coalition in the negotiation, as opposed to its
collective use by all parties to help with the process (in other terms, it would
correspond only to the left column in Table 95.1). This is not so, however. The
following discussion of this issue should permit an integration of these two
extreme concepts of the use of models in negotiation, as well as give a better idea
of the Use Game. What has to be considered here is the dynamic process of get-
ting the model used.
Indeed, the use of a simulation model is still too often seen as a static issue
- as if, at the end of its building, the model would or would not be used, as a
product is or is not sold after production. But one look at the Game Use board
and at Table 95.1 makes it clear that it should rather be understood as a
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dynamic process. Many of the players in the Use Game will have to be
approached separately. They will have varied attitudes toward the model, and
use it - or not - in different ways. It will be a long-lasting effort to neutralize
the hostile and turn the potentially interested into actual users.
In this gradual development, we have seen that the action is basically in
the hands of a limited number of active supporters of the model. If they succeed
in getting the model adopted, it will be through a process of diffusion, gradually
rallying parties to its cause. This diffusion process is narrowly linked with the
negotiation process. The latter consists of each active party trying to rally the
others around a position that it finds acceptable. The model is a means to that
end: it helps rallying positions first around a framework one finds acceptable,
thus laying the table for solutions one finds acceptable. Both processes are
parallel, each one reinforcing the other: progress in the negotiation makes the
model easier to adopt, and vice versa.
This, we hope, gives a clearer view of how the Use Game works in addition
to its basic static structures, as we have proposed. However, it still does not
seem to apply to the concept of collective use of the model, which is strikingly
put forward by the motto: "the computer as mediator". A key to that issue can
be found in the concept of the mediator as a third negotiator, proposed by Faure
in Chapter 34 of this volume. Following his argument, it is rather mistakenly
assumed that the mediator or the chairman is considered to bring into the pro-
cess a type of intervention totally different from that of the negotiators them-
selves - a difference often captured by the term neutrality. Faure shows exam-
ples of non-neutral but very effective mediation interventions, and proposes a
consideration of the mediator as just another negotiator in the process, egoisti-
cally pursuing his own agenda. The difference is that, for a variety of reasons,
the mediator's agenda involves among other things trying to make the other par-
ties reconcile their differences. So it can be that a mediating negotiator actively
promotes a simulation model, leading to a process of diffusion exactly similar to
what we just described when one party promotes the model for its bargaining
ends.
Actually, the most convincing existing example of the "computer as nego-
tiator" confirms this point of view. In his description of the use of an MIT model
of the economics of deep-sea mining in the Law of the Sea (LOS) convention
negotiations, Sibenius shows the chairman of the convention skillfully using the
model to promote his agenda of helping parties reconcile extreme initial posi-
tions. He shows how the model, because it was relevant and scientifically credi-
ble, was instrumental in salvaging a negotiation process that was close to total
deadlock [81.
So the two concepts of the role of a model in negotiation, respectively, as a
support for partial positions and as a means to foster cooperative problem-
solving, are not essentially different. One role can even lead to the other. In all
cases, the actual use of a model results from its promotion by one or a few
players with influence in the negotiation. When successful, this promotion
results in a gradual spreading of the acceptance of the model, in close connection
with the negotiation process.
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36.6. Conclusion
L. MerYMt and L. Hordi.;i
We started the exercise described in this chapter moved by the following motives
and orientations:
We regarded the practical use of simulation models as important both to
help reach better outcomes in negotiations about complex issues, and to
justify the big investments made in building simulation models.
We considered that such practical use of models rests above all on their
scientific credibility, but also depends to a considerable degree on relevant
strategic initiatives on the part of the proponents of the model. The suc-
cess of such initiatives, we thought, relied largely on specific skills acquired
through experience.
To improve the use of models, we were interested in the possibility of facili-
tating the acquisition of such skills by modelers. This could be done, we
thought, by providing them with a relevant analysis of the main issues and
possibilities for action involved in the situation of trying to get a simulation
model used.
In our view, this analysis had to be based mostly on debriefing: an explica-
tion of the practical understanding acquired by a practitioner with several
successful experiences in the process of building models that actually got
used.
Finally, we regarded the prospects of success of such a debriefing as scant if
it were based on a traditional survey-type questionnaire or on free-wheeling
interviews, so we decided to try a new approach of debriefing "in terms of
games".
In the course of the exercise, we have obtained significant results in three
directions: a clarification of the issue of the use of a model in international nego-
tiation, the tentative development of practical methodological tools to improve
effectiveness in getting a model used, and the fruitful testing of a new debriefing
method. We will briefly review each of these three results.
First, the exercise has provided a clarification of the issues involved in
model use. It has helped dispel a rampant vision that somehow, magically,
models will make their way into the negotiation process and do what negotiators
have hitherto been unable to do themselves. The use of a model should not be
viewed as a "yes or no" issue: it has varied modes and degrees. The user(s) of
the model cannot be considered as a monolithic entity or a homogeneous lot, but
as people with various interests and positions with regard to the model and
operating in institutional environments of their own. Use should not be post-
poned to the end of the modeling effort, because it can only be the result of a
gradual dynamic process, in which building the model and getting it used are
closely connected.
Secondly, this clarification of the issue of use has produced tools that can
facilitate the diagnosis of problems associated with the use of a particular model.
These tools provide guidelines on how to identify the relevant elements in a use
situation, how to take into account the issue of use at various stages of model-
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building, how to define what kind of use is a realistic aim, how to identify practi-
cal initiatives that can be taken. We hope that these guidelines have some
degree of general value, so that they can be used both as a practical guide to get-
ting models used, and as a support to facilitate discussions, planning, and
evaluation of the use of a model. Its potential users cover the whole range of
actors involved in the construction of a model: the model builders themselves,
their financial supporters, their collaborators, the supervisors of the effort, etc.
Thirdly, we consider the exercise and those of its results presented here as
one successful test of the method of debriefing in terms of games, which we had
set out to define and test. Some concepts for such use of the game analytical
framework have emerged in the course of the debriefing. They appear in this
presentation of the results; however, it is too early to present them in a sys-
tematic fashion. Going farther in that direction will require further experiment-
ing with debriefing in terms of games, integrating in this practice the results of
the more theoretical work on the game concept (which is being pursued in paral-
lel [9]) and articulating the use of the game approach for debriefing with its use
for training and education on which work is also being developed in parallel with
the effort presented here [10].
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36.1. Introduction
This chapter deals with a two-person bargaining problem given by a set of the
payoff vectors attainable by the players through some joint actions and by a
disagreement point reached if the players fail to agree. Bargaining problems
have been studied by, among others, Nash (1950), Raiffa (1953), Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975), Kalai (1977), Meyerson (1977), who propose some solutions;
but they are confined to one-shot solution concepts that describe only possible
final agreements for the bargaining problem.
The dynamic bargaining process presented here starts from the disagree-
ment point and, through successive agreements of the players, leads to the final
payoffs. The successive agreement points reflect the progress in the bargaining
process. In the chapter, we consider the continuous case of the process,
presented in Bronisz, Krus, and Wierzbicki (1987), in which the successive agree-
ment points form a continuous trajectory. To assure "fairness" in bargaining,
the equal concession axiom is imposed, which says that the Lebesgue measures of
payoffs refused during the process in the regions favorable to particular players
are the same.
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We show that there exists one and only one dynamic solution of the bar-
gaining problem satisfying the axiom. This solution is described by an initial-
value problem, which was also considered in the Raiffa (1953) continuous solu-
tion concept. Therefore, the obtained result can be treated as axiomatization of
the Raiffa continuous solution of two-person bargaining problem. The properties
of the Raiffa continuous solution are shown. Moreover, we compare the solution
to the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.
36.2. Problem Formulation and Definitions
A two-person bargaining game is defined by a pair (S,d), where S (called an
agreement set) is a subset of two-dimensional Euclidean space R 2 and d (called a
disagreement point) is a point in S. The pair (S,d) has the following intuitive
interpretation: every point x = (xl,X2) E S represents the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility levels for players 1 and 2 that can be reached when they act
jointly. If the players fail to agree on an outcome in S then they receive
d = (d1 d2) utility levels.W~ employ a convention that for X,II E R 2, x > II implies xi> IIi' and
x ~ II implies xi ~ IIi for i = 1,2. For (S,d), we say that xES is a strongly
Pareto-optimal point if there is no liES such that II ~ x and II :f x. The boun-
dary as of S is defined by as = (x E S: there is no II E S with II > x). For con-
venience, let R; = (x E R2: x ~ II) and S = (x E S:x ~ II).
We confine our consideration to tte class B of bargaining games (S,d)
satisfying the following conditions:
BL S C RJ
B2. S is compact, convex, and there exists z E S such that z > d.
B3. S is comprehensive, Le., if z E Sand d ~ II ~ z then II E S.
We assume implicitly (S C Rj) that the outcomes that are less favorable
to one of the players than the noncooperative outcome d can be disregarded.
The convexity assumption is made because we assume that randomization on
different outcomes is possible; the comprehensiveness assumption is made
because we assume that the players can freely dispose of utility.
For any game (S,d) E B, a dynamic bargaining process can be described by
a function ,x : [to,t,1 -+ S. We assume that the process satisfies the following
conditions:
CL Continuous, i.e., ,x is a continous function.
C2. Progressive, Le., ,x(f) ~ ,x(t) for any to ~ t ~ t' ~ t,.
C3. Starts at the disagreement point and leads to the boundary of S, i.e"
,x(to) = d, ,x(t,) E as.
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As was mentioned, we confine our consideration to continuous processes
starting from the disagreement point and leading to an efficient payoff vector.
Axiom C2 states that no player will accept an improvement of the payoff of the
other player at the cost of diminshing his own payoff.
In this chapter, a dynamic bargaining process is identified with the course
of the process in the payoff space (independently of possible parameterization
ways). From condition C2, it follows that a trajectory A = {.X(t): to ~ t ~ tl}'
called an agreement trajectorll, describes completely the process in the payoff
space; it starts at the point min ~ A = -X(to )' the successive points on the trajec-
tory x E A reflecting the progress in the process, and it leads to the final payoffs
max~A = -X(tl ).
Let C denote the class of all trajectories in R 2• By a dynamic solution of
the bargaining problem, we mean a map F: B -+ C such that for any game
(S, d) E B the agreement trajectory F(S, d) is generated by a function satisfying
conditions CI-C3.
Observe that the dynamic solution concept differs from the solution con-
cept proposed in the classical literature on the bargaining problem. For any
game (S, d) E B, a dynamic solution gives not only the final payoffs for the
players, but also pictures how they reach them.
We impose on a dynamic solution the following two axioms:
AI. For any game (S,d) E B, if x E F(S,d) and (Sz'x) E B then F(Sz'x) =
F(S,d) n Sx.
A2. For any game (S, d) E B, let R,(S, d) = {x E S: there exists II E F(S, d)
such that x, > II" Xj = IIj for j =I i} for i = 1,2. Then IL[R1(S,d)! =
IL[R 2(S,d)], where IL[ I denotes the Lebesgue measure.
Axiom Al states that if the players reach payoffs x during the bargaining
process, then the payoffs belonging to S\R~ play no role in the further part of
the process. For any game (S, d) E B, the agreement trajectory F(S, d) cuts the
agreement set S on two sets R1(S, d) and R2(S, d) (see Figure 96.1). The set
R,(s, d) , i = 1,2 is the region favorable to the ith player with respect to the tra-
jectory F(S, d) in the sense that the payoffs belonging to R,(S, d) are, roughly
speaking, "better" for the ith player and "worse" for the counter player than the
points belonging to the trajectory F(S,d). We require that the Lebesgue meas-
ure of each region R,(S, d) , i = 1,2 be the same.
It is easy to verify that axioms Al and A2 involve the following axiom:
A3. Equal concession axiom: For any game (S, d) E B, if X,II E F(S, d) and
x ~ II then IL!R 1(Sz' x)\R1(S" II)] = IL!R2(Sz, x)\R2(S" II)].
The dynamic bargaining process can also be considered as a give-and-take
policy in which each player makes concessions from the payoffs in his favorable
region. Axiom A3 says that in passing from x to II, the measure of payoffs
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excluded from consideration in each region favorable to a particular player is the
same (see Figure 56.e).
2
Figure 96.1.
36.3. Results
2
Figure 96.1.
To present the main result of this chapter, let us consider for a game (B,d) E B
the initial-value problem:
dX2/dx1 = (l2(x1) - X2)/(l1(x2) - Xl)
x2(d1)= d2 ,
(36.1)
where ' 1(x2) = max{x1 : (xl' X2) E B}, ' 2(x1) = max{x2: (Xl' X2) E B}.
Intuitively for any (xl' X2) E B, ' 1(x2) and ' 2(x1) are the maximal payoff's
that players 1 and 2, respectively"might hope to receive in the game (B%, x).
From Peano's Existence Theorem and from the Extension Theorem [Hart-
man (1964)] for any game (B, d) E B, there exists one and only one maximal
solution I: (d1, x;) -+ (d2, x;) of the initial-value problem (36.1) (the maximal
solution means the solution defined on a right maximal interval). The point
X- = (x; ,x;) defined by x; = lim ./(x1) belongs to the boundary of B. More-
:1:1-+%1
over, from the continuity of functions 11 and 12, it follows that function I is con-
tinuously differentiable.
This initial-value problem was suggested by Raiffa (1953)as a reasonable
and plausible description of the bargaining process.
Now we can prove the following theorem and corollary [see Bronisz and
Krus (1986)].
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There is a unique dynamic solution F- : B -+ C satisfying the equal concession
axiom. For any game (S, d) E B, the agreement trajectory F-(S, d) is generated
by the maximal solution I: (d1, %;) -+ (d2 , x;) of the initial-value problem
(36.1), Le., F-(S, d) = {(%1' %2) E S : %2 = 1(%1) for d1 ~ %1 < %;, or
%= (%;, x;) where %; = lim./(%l)}'
Zl-+Zl
Corollarfl
F- : B -+ C is a unique dynamic solution satisfying axioms Al and A2.
36.4. Raiffa's Continuous Solution and Its Properties
The Raiffa continuous solution is defined as the result of the dynamic solution
satisfying the equal concession axiom, Le, the Raiffa continuous solution is the
function q,: B -+ R 2 such that for a game (S, d) E B, q,(S, d) = (%;, x;)
( = max ~ F-(S,d) ) where (%;, x;) is the final payoff vector of the dynamic
solution satisfying the equal concession axiom (see Theorem).
We can prove the following properties of the Raiffa continuous solution [see
Bronisz and Krus (1986)1:
PI. Feasibility: q,(S, d) E S.
P2. Uniqueness: q,(S, d) is a unique point in S.
P3. Continuity: Let (Si' d) E B be bargaining problems defined for a sequence
of sets Si such that .lim Si = S (in the Hausdorf topology) and let
)-+00(S, d) E B. Then .lim q,(Si' d) = q,(S, d).
)-+00
P4. Strong individual rationality: q,(S, d) > d.
P5. Strong Pareto optimality: q,(S, d) is a strongly Pareto-optimal point in S.
P6. No dictatorship: IT I(S, d) denotes the ideal point of (S,d), Le., I j(S,d) =
max {%j: %E S, %~ d} for i = 1,2, then either q,(S, d) = I(S, d) or
q,(S, d) < I(S, d). We say that (S, d) is a symmetric problem if d1 = d2
and if for each %= (%1' %2) in S, the point fI = (%2' %1) belongs also to S.
P7. Symmetry: For a symmetric game, q,l(S, d) = q,2(S, d).
P8. Invariance under positive affine transformations of utility: Let A:
R 2 -+ R 2 be a positive affine transformation defined by A% =
(a1%1 + b1, a2%2 + b2), where aI' a2 > O. Then Aq,(S, d) = q,(AS, Ad).
P9. Strict risk sensitivity: IT a game (S, d) E B is transferred into a game
(T, d) E B by replacing player j with a strictly more risk-averse player,
then q,j(T,d) > q,j(S,d) for i ::/: j.
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The next three properties describe the relation between two games (5,d) and
(T, d) belonging to B, which are connected in geometric ways. Quoting Thom-
son and Meyerson (1980):
IT T is obtained from 5 by the addition (or the elimination) of points that are all
located in a region favorable to a particular agent, one might want the solution to
move in his favor (or agaillllt him). Such requirements may be seen from a norm..
tive viewpoint, as fairness conditions, or from a descriptive viewpoint, since no
player could reasonably be expected to accept a solution that would fail to satisfy
them.
The presented properties strengthen those proposed by Thomson and Meyerson
(1980). Let (5, d) E B, (T,d) EB be such that 5:f: T and let j denote the
counter player to player i.
PIa. Strict adding: IT {x: xi:$ Wi (5, d)} n 5 = {x: xi :$ Wi (5,d)} n T,5 c T,
and W(5,d) E aT, then Wi(T,d) > W,(5,d).
PH. Strict cutting: IT {x: ZJ' :$ Wi(5,d)} n 5 = {x: x, :$ Wj(5,d)} n T and
T c 5, then Wj(T,d) > Wj (5,d).
P12. Strict twisting: IT:
(i) w(5, d) EaT,
(ii) x E T\5 implies Xj :$ Wj(5, d),
(iii) x E 5, Xj:$ Wj (5, d) implies x E T, then Wj(T,d) > W,(5,d).
d
Figure 96.9. Figure 96.4. Figure 96.5.
Figures 96.9, 96.-1, and 96.5 illustrate properties PIO-P12 for i = 1. In
each figure, two bargaining games (5, d) and (T, d) are presented (the first game
is drawn with a continuous line and the second one with a broken line). In Fig-
ure 96.9, adding alternatives favoring the first player, by going from 5 to T,
leads to an improvement of his payoff according to PIa. In Figure 96.-1, elim-
inating alternatives favorable to the first player, by going from 5 to T, results in
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a deterioration of his payoff according to Pll. In Figure 96.5, twisting S to T
around Ilf{S, d} in favor of the first player leads to an improvement of his pa.yoff
according to P12.
36.6. Comparison of Raiffa's Continuous Solution to
Nash's and Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution Concepts
The Raiffa continuous solution can be compared to the classical solution con-
cepts: the Nash solution N: B --t R 2 [Nash (1950)] and the Kala.i-Smorodinsky
solution K : B --t R2 [Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)]. Each of them satisfies the
properties of strong Pareto optimality, symmetry and invariance with respect to
affine transformations of utility. These three properties treated as the axioms
and the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives define the Nash solu-
tion; while these three properties and the axiom of individual monotonicity
define the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Moreover, each solution has the proper-
ties of continuity, strong, individual rationality and risk sensitivity [see Roth
(1979)]. However, the two last-mentioned axioms are not fulfilled by the Raiffa
continuous solution. In contradistinction, the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solutions do not satisfy the properties Plo-P12.
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To illustrate these solutions, let us consider examples in Figure 96.6 and
96.7. In each figure, two bargaining games (8, d) and (T, d) are presented (the
first game is drawn with a continuous line and the second one with a broken
line). On the right-hand side of the figures, the values of the solutions for games
(8, d) and (T, d) are given [the values lit (8, d) are calculated approximately].
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PART VI
Training for
International Negotiations

CHAPTER 37
Negotiations for Results:
How to Develop Related Executive Skills
Pier Luigi Bontadini
IFAP
IRI Institute for Management Researeh and Development
Rome
Italy
37.1. Introduction
Negotiation, in organizational terms, is a process in which persons or groups
with their own specific interests exchange knowledge, resources, and information
in order to make and coordinate decisions. It is a process wherein the parties
involved exercise a mutually conditioning influence as they seek positive results
through a critical consideration of differing expectations in order to assume and
redistribute opportunities, requests, and proposals for suitable organizational
behavior patterns. In the final analysis, we can define it as an evolutionary
adaptation process whereby organizations grow by dominating their own internal
and external relations. It is a transverse way of "becoming organized" .
Pursuant to this assumption, IFAP has conducted empirical research in
select Italian management circles. On the basis of the experience acquired by 30
successful managers, a training model on negotiations was drawn up for medium-
and high-level management staff with multimedia aids, which, in addition to the
ordinary teaching tools, also includes a database with 2,000 entries available for
use during actual negotiations. This training model is very flexible and takes
into consideration the participant's level of acquired knowledge, the client's
needs, and the actual time available.
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A fundamental assumption is that there is no universally valid model of
negotiation. Such an exercise involves internal and external factors, which make
the situation very different from case to case. The external factors include the
relative cultural environment or the presence of parties not directly represented
in the negotiations; the internal factors include elements such as the relationship
between the negotiator and his own targets in time, the relationship between
negotiators, the influence of earlier relations and respective future expectations.
These are just a few of the elements that make it difficult to fit negotiations into
an ordinary model structure. In the organizational realm there are also intrinsic
factors rendering negotiations all the more peculiar, owing to the forces at work
within an organization.
However, this complexity should not lead to the pessimistic conclusion that
the situation is impossible to understand. Despite the inherent diversities, it is
possible to identify and analyze the negotiation process as a succession of logical
steps where, in a more or less purposeful way, a series of elements are used and
whose effectiveness depends on a certain number of factors both internal and
external to the process as such.
The researcher's task entails:
Highlighting the structure of the logical steps involved in the negotiation
exercise as it takes place.
Identifying the elements most frequently used in negotiations.
Studying the possible relations between negotiation situations and
effectiveness in the use of the negotiations elements.
37.2. Organizational Dimensions for Negotiation
First of all, however, one should consider the intrinsic reasons behind the special
nature of negotiation in an organization. We can identify three organizational
dimensions where negotiations are required. The "trigger" in all three of them is
a change that is deemed necessary to achieve greater coherence and that involves
the organization to a greater or lesser degree, according to the dimension in
question.
The cultural dimension
The cultural dimension is the area where a series of reference or guideline values
are advanced, defined, and assimilated. These values are destined to condition
at length the environment in which the organization is situated and, at the same
time, represent a sort of justification with respect to the inner workings of the
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organizational system itself. This "cultural" dimension coincides with the birth
of the organization, whether in terms of the whole company or an independent
part thereof. This is a process that sets the borders separating the "inside" from
the "outside" and the criteria for "belonging" to the organization.
The structural-operational dimension
This is the area where operational targets are set, resources are allocated, and
responsibilities are assigned or claimed among the various people within a more
limited time frame, compared with the time element in the cultural sphere. In
this time frame as well we encounter the handling of daily activities in target
pursual.
The regenerative dimension
The regenerative dimension is where efforts are deployed to change a culture or a
well-established organizational structure to realign them with the relative refer-
ence environment and move toward an evolutionary organizational process
whose management determines the company's survival. This process cannot be
left to chance and calls for the full assumption of direct and innovative responsi-
bility on the part of management.
These three dimensions overlap in temporal terms and influence one
another, to differing degrees. While, in the past, interaction took place over
longer periods of time and under rather stable conditions (to the extent of ena-
bling individuals and organizations to "digest" each and every innovation at a
natural pace), nowadays this phenomenon is much faster and often involves
unpredictable changes in direction. This means that evolutionary adaptation is
difficult unless properly managed. The phenomenon is so difficult that only the
more "dynamic" organizations grasp the occasions for change and transform
them into opportunities to alter the relationship with the external environment
to their own advantage and thereby force others to succumb or try to catch up.
It is clear that the negotiation issue assumes a fundamental importance in
each of the three dimensions mentioned above. In all three, in fact, the essential
point is to reconcile interests as well as the ways of looking upon contrasting and
"necessarily" conflicting objectives. Since situations and objectives differ as to
the actors in their mutual relations as well as in their approach to the organiza-
tion and the global environment, the characteristics of the negotiations and the
talents required to manage them in an effective way also differ.
In each of the three dimensions the process of change may be perceived
completely or in part by the actors involved and, in that sense, may receive an
additional thrust. Or else it may not be noticed at all, in which case the actors
continue their work and more or less consciously ignore the innovative stimulus
elements.
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37.3. Organizational Strategies
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A manager involved in situations such as those just described has very serious
responsibilities, since his behavior can sanction an existing situation (change or
the status quo according to what is happening at a given time in an organiza-
tion). Then again, direct action on his part may be considered indispensable
either to block or channel a change, because it may assume negative features, or
else to diffuse an uneasy situation.
There would seem to be two categories of skills necessary for a manager:
(1) The diagnostic skills for interpreting reality and defining the targets that
will serve as the basis for his action.
(2) The ability to lead the organization toward the set targets. With respect to
the organizational dimensions indicated earlier (cultural and stra-
tegic-operational) and by facing a noticed or unnoticed change in the sys-
tem, a manager has three options:
Direct action.
Mere adaptation of the present opportunities.
Acceptance of events without guiding the system to change, i.e., a
passive stance.
By crisscrossing the organizational dimensions and the process of change in
the organization with the options, we have a picture of the organizational stra-
tegies open to a manager. The outcome matrix in Table 97.1 indicates 12 action
possibilities a manager can employ to pursue the targets as defined above in (1).
Table 97.1. A manager's options in the face of change.
Organizational dimension
Options
Change
noticed
Cultural
Change
not noticed
Strategic-operational
Change Change
noticed not noticed
1. Direct action Enhance the
spontaneous
change
phenomena
Create
diversity /
inequalities;
foster subsystem
confrontation
Formalize
targets and
behavior
patterns
Push different
targets
2.0pportu- System Sit back Maintain course Rebalance/review
nistic facelifting and wait without touch- targets and
stance ing targets functions
3. Passive Repress/isolate Eliminate Remove Make the
stance the emerging diversity / roles/functions present targets
situation inequalities from certain coercive
sharpen control targets and
measures vice versa
The negotiation exercise plays an essential yet not exclusive role, but
demands ways and means gauged to each of the possibilities in terms of the
specific target pursued by a manager with his options, with regard to his coun-
terparts' stance in relationship to the specific options, and with respect to the
objective reasons behind each option.
37.4:. The Research Project
In line with the assumptions made, the actual research was conducted in Italy
and involved a series of interviews with 30 "successful" managers (e.g., managers
who had reached the top of the career ladder and stayed there over a long time)
on the basis of the consideration that negotiation abilities in one's own market or
environment constitute one of the factors in success. Also part of the initial pos-
tulate was the conviction that each "environment" is defined by rules of behavior
that a "good negotiator" respects in order to emerge.
The purpose of the research project was to bring out the underlying struc-
tures, if they actually existed.
The managers interviewed came from areas as different as industry, busi-
ness, labor unions, public administration, and sport federations. These inter-
views were followed by others with sociologists, psychologists, and experts in
international negotiations.
The actual interview was conducted with reference to a standard geared to
bringing out for each manager the ways and means ordinarily employed in nego-
tiations, the elements used according to the various situation, and a judgement
on their effectiveness according to the situation. The interview ended with one
or more examples of significant negotiations in which the manager had been
involved.
Each interview lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours and was videotaped.
This provided a substantial amount of material available for repeated review and
analysis. The study of the literature in this area and the material collected made
it possible to identify a large number of variables which, in due modular arrange-
ment, are used in the various negotiation situations.
It is possible to make an hypothesis on the succession of the logical steps
making up the vast majority of negotiations, but the experience of these success-
ful managers confirmed the initial assumption: there are so many negotiation
models that the possibility of reducing them to a few fundamental schemes is
most doubtful. What is most important, however, is that good negotiations
differ from bad ones according to the way in which the constitutent elements are
used: actors, targets, time, pressure, processes, etc.
The research project disclosed in rather clear terms the way in which suc-
cessful negotiators achieve coherence in the use of the elements in each negotia-
tion exercise according to the circumstances.
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37.5. Teaching Target
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The lesson learned from the research project has become the main teaching tar-
get: to help people to understand that negotiation is a process of evolutionary
adaptation whereby the actors involved dominate the objective complexity of the
issue tackled, the related environment, and the contrasting interests at stake by
using the negotiaton elements in a coherent way.
To develop the skills necessary for negotiating, the transfer of the
knowledge acquired through this research takes place through two channels:
(1)
(2)
A clear idea of the negotiation process, its logical phases, and inherent ele-
ments.
The manager's progressive immersion into the complex nature of negotia-
ton in order to train him in the use of the elements according to the objec-
tive nature of the negotiation situation.
The ultimate target is to make the managers able to dominate the negotia-
tion process, to know how to gear the use of the elements according to the vari-
ous situations, and especially to know how to develop their own range of negotia-
tion models in harmony with their own personality and with the situations they
ordinarily experience.
37.6. Teaching Strategy
To achieve the teaching targets it seemed advisable to have the participants fol-
low the same process used in the research project, and this was made possible by
the way the information was collected. This information is summarized in Fig-
ure 97.1.
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The peculiar feature of the methods adopted is that the participant is introduced
into a "cognitive itinerary" where he himself becomes an explorer into the possi-
bilities offered by the information collected during the research phase. With the
instructor's assistance he can go over alternative negotiation models, explore the
usable elements (2,000 entries), mentally position them in his own preexistent
model, and come up with others suited to the situations typical of his daily life.
The material collected was organized for presentation in the form of the follow-
ing multi-media teaching tools and methods:
Films: prepared from the videotapes of the interviews with the successful
managers that contained the most discordant replies; these short films (3-
12 minutes) were prepared taking fully into account each logical step in the
negotiation process.
Lectures: traditional, with the use of transparencies.
Examples: geared to each logical step in the process.
Questionnaires: to stimulate the participant's analysis of each logical
step in the process.
Test8: to check on the progress made by the participants.
Simulation exercise: to stimulate the participants to relive special nego-
tiation situations; these simulations were usually videotaped.
Database: this includes all of the microvariables related to the various
moments in the negotiation process and can be accessed directly by partici-
pants on a personal computer.
The use of the data base is necessary because of the high number of entries
involved. They are expressed in qualitative form, entail a series of instruc-
tions or suggestions, and can be located by using the matrix crisscross
parameters (Figure 97.1) with the definition of a set of conditions freely
selected by the participants by using a very simple personal computer
access program.
Working session: the typical format of a working session is as follows:
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Introduction (by the instructor).
Projection of the film as a stimulus.
Filling in of the questionnaire (around 10 items) where each partici-
pant judges the stimulus effect of the film.
Discussion, in small groups, with summary input by the instructor.
Support exercises.
General discussion.
Each working session is dedicated to one logical step in the negotiation pro-
cess.
The teaching activity ends with the simulation of a complex negotiation
exercise. Ordinarily, it aims at reproducing a full-involvement situation by
using a subject of common interest to all the participants, who rotate in the
roles of negotiator and observer.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
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Negotation session: a typical negotiation session includes:
An introduction by the instructor and the assignment of tasks in
small groups.
Group work to define the negotiation strategy: the database is avail-
able for the determination of strategies to be employed.
Report by the group to the instructor on the strategies selected.
Videotaped negotiation simulation.
Review of the taped simulation and discussion.
Evaluation of negotiation effectiveness through a comparative analysis
of the strategies reported by the groups before the negotiation simula-
tion, and of the actual situation during the exercise.
The instructor can always liven up step (4) by introducing incidents that
compel the participants to reformulate their strategies while the negotiation
process is under way.
Flexibility: the program has been designed with the following flexibility
factors:
(1) Adaptation to the participants' level of knowledge: During the course it
is always possible to adapt the learning process to the needs of the
group of participants. By using performance tests, the instructor can
check the actual level of knowledge and then either concentrate on
elements yet to be grasped in full or leave aside familiar material.
(2) Adaptation to the amount of time available: In practice the optimal
length of the program is 3-5 days for middle-level managers. How-
ever, the program can be shortened or extended without introducing
any substantial changes.
(3) Adaptation to the client's needs: When focusing directly on manage-
ment problems, the program can be adapted to the typical situations
summarized in Table 97.1. In this way exercises and simulations can
be introduced for each of the hypothetical situations a manager may
face when tackling a change in a situation more or less shared by the
organization and according to the options he may wish to pursue.
ST.8. Conclusions
To have a better understanding of this training project, the following aspect
must be considered. Once the problem has been identified and before outlining a
training program, training personnel ordinarily have to draw up a working
hypothesis according to their own model, collect all of the information required,
and then, on this basis, check whether the model is valid or has to be adapted to
the specific situation. Only after this preliminary research work can the training
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activity be designed and delivered in such a way as to respond fully to the rela-
tive requirements.
Therefore, research and training represent two phases of the same job, but
ordinarily they remain distinct, the former handled by the instructors, and the
latter with the participants called upon to interact via a model not designed by
them.
The special feature of this model resides in using research as part of the
training process. IT the participants, and not only the instructors, check the vali-
dity of the initial model, they are provided with a unique opportunity to practice
the aggregation and input of their own concrete experience. However, this does
not suffice. With this method the participants are stimulated to compare their
own negotiation conduct with behavior patterns adopted by others, although in
sometimes different circumstances, which have been studied by the instructors in
drawing up the initial model. In the case in question, the negotiation behavior
patterns considered were those of the successful managers in quite different sec-
tors.
In this way the initial model can be adapted and improved upon at any
time by the participants themselves, according to their own concrete situations.
This means that the structure of the training process is open in the sense that it
can be traveled in any direction desired and used by anyone who wants to delve
into current problems.
All of this takes place in a completely transparent way. From the very
outset, the work to be done is explained to the participants who thereby under-
stand the meaning and usefulness of the training process. In the final analysis,
this training model embodies three special features which are more consonant
with scientific work than with a traditional training model. The features are as
follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Interaetive: it gives each participant an opportunity to contend with
behavior patterns and variables taken into consideration by others and
compare them with his own reference reality.
Simulative: it offers the possibility to simulate all types of operational
situations.
Experimental: it provides for a constant verification of individual behavior
models at each moment of the training process.
Alternative negotiation possibilities emerge if enough time is set aside for
brainstorming between men with company experience along with the counsel of
the instructors. These possibilities can always be checked by the learning group
from the viewpoint of coherence. The instructors involved in the project have
stated that:
A series of learning tests we conducted during the course immediately after the
most important steps in the teaching process confirmed the progressive conver-
gence of the participants on the suggested cognitive itinerary more so than on the
negotiation model presented. This made it possible for them to introduce order
into past experience and reflect on what was being offered in claas.
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The method adopted goes beyond the sphere of negotiations to which it
was applied. In more general terms we can say that when a person advances in
his career, he is not always able to adapt rapidly to the new position of responsi-
bility. With the cognitive itinerary adopted for negotiations, this person is
trained to tackle a problem, define that problem to the degree of constructing an
interpretative model (moving from information collection to the ordering
thereof), defining action in the context of the model, and checking the results. In
effect, this becomes a concrete simulation of a management activity, not con-
ducted explicitly, but actually during an activity used to acquire a management
skill.
This is why, if the training experience is well conducted, it can be most
effective in the development of the participant's capabilities.
CHAPTER 38
Training in International Negotiating:
A Learning Instrument
Willem F. G. Mastenbroek
Holland Consulting Group
Amsterdam
The Netherlands
38.1. Introduction
For ten years workshops on international negotiating have been organized by the
Governmental Training and Conference Institute in the Netherlands. The pro-
gram of the workshops was developed by this author, who devised a learning
instrument with the objective of facilitating effective feedback on negotiating
styles [1].
This chapter describes that learning instrument in the form of four scales,
which express different kinds of negotiating activities: obtaining substantial
results; influencing the balance of power; promoting a constructive climate; and
procedural flexibility.
The scales were developed in close interaction with practitioners. They are
used to provide participants of workshops on international negotiating with
specific feedback on their negotiating styles and tactics. They also proved to be
a good basis for discussing the negotiating process.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold:
(1) To share my experiences in developing these learning tools.
(2) To communicate with consultants and educators in other countries, who
are engaged in developing instruments and workshops aiming at more
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effective international negotiations, with the ultimate goal of developing a
plan for future exchange and collaboration.
38.2. Learning Tools
An important part of the workshop on international negotiating is devoted to the
simulation of real negotiations. For instance, participants negotiate on a treaty
concerning the chemical pollution of the Rhine or international transport prob-
lems. These simulations are videotaped.
The participants are supplied with information on the effects of their nego-
tiating behavior. In the first conferences 12 scales were used to systemize
behavioral feedback. Over the years it became evident that improvements and
adaptations of these scales were necessary. All scales were reformulated and gra-
dually only six remained as the most relevant. The efforts here described were
broadened to other negotiating areas as well. Now the scales are used in
workshops on a wide variety of negotiations.
Four of these scales are described in this chapter. They express different
kinds of negotiating activities:
Obtaining substantial results.
Influencing the balance of power.
Promoting a constructive climate.
Procedural flexibility.
These activities, each of which is dealt with in the following subsections,
contain some dilemmas that sometimes make it difficult for negotiators to make
the right choices. The other two scales, which are still in the stage of develop-
ment, deal with empathy toward other cultures and the handling of constituen-
cies.
The development of these .learning tools started ten years ago with the
selection of three perspectives:
(1) Negotiation as a skill based on handling a number of dilemmas. Material
on this is scattered throughout the literature; see, for example, Karras
(1970).
(2) Negotiation as a process with a structure in time; see Douglas (1962), Him-
melman (1971), Zartman (1978).
(3) Negotiation as a complex of various types of activities. A classic work by
Walton and McKersie (1965) is based on this perspective.
The first perspective was worked out in more detail and combined with the
other twc:, [Mastenbrook (1987)]. Gradually, important and specific negotiating
techniques, which also have found recognition elsewhere [Fisher and Dry (1981),
Dupont (1982)], were integrated. While profiting from the knowledge and
experience of competent negotiators, and challenged by questions and critical
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remarks, it became evident that improvements and adaptations were desirable
and possible. Thus, only four negotiating dilemmas have remained from the ori-
ginal list of twelve, two have been added and all have been drastically reformu-
lated.
38.2.1. Obtaining substantial results
An important category of negotiating activity concentrates on influencing the
content of the outcome. This involves such matters as information, arguments,
facts, agenda, concessions and positions. These activities directly focus on
obtaining tangible results. They proceed from the intention of reaching a solu-
tion by dividing costs and benefits in a favorable way.
The most important activities in this category are:
Exchanging information about aims, expectations and acceptable solutions.
Influencing one another's perceptions of what is attainable.
Working step by step toward compromise with mutual concessions.
These activities are common ground to negotiators. Most negotiators pay a
lot of attention to them (but the experienced negotiator also shows a keen aware-
ness of the other three dimensions).
The tactical choices a negotiator has to make in this area can be under-
stood as the balancing of conceding versus more tenacious or even stubborn
behavior. This dilemma is clarified in Figure 98.1 with some examples.
1 2 3 4 5
lenient, indulgent 4-. -- tenaciou8, testing ---_. hard, stubborn
Information and arguments
are presented as open for
discUS8ion
The interests of the other
side are accepted as they
are deacribed
Generous concessions
facilitate the working
out of compromises
Firm presentation of facts
and arguments but margins
are taken for granted
The interests of the other
party are tested in order
to discover his priorities
Impasses are part of the
game, relatively small
concessions are possible
Information and
arguments are presented
as self-evident and
unassailable
The interests of the
opponent are challenged
or ignored
Tendency to set
ultimatums, provoke
crises and "final
offer, first bid"
Figure 98.1. Conceding versus stubborn behavior along a scale.
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38.2.2. Influencing the balance of power
W.F.G. Ma.stenbroel:
Negotiators show a keen interest in the balance of power among them. They
may find it tempting to establish a more favorable balance of power or to test
the power and resistance of the opponent. There are different ways of
strengthening one's own power position at the negotiating table. Important tac-
tics in this respect are:
Fighting. Such tactics are directly aimed at subjugating the opponent.
Examples include ignoring the other party's information and arguments; feigning
emotions such as anger and impatience.
Manipulating. This is a more indirect attempt to strengthen one's position
at the negotiating table. The most subtle are the manipulations that affect a
person's feeling of self-esteem - for instance, insisting on having one's way as if
it were the only logical thing to do, or displaying a dynamic attitude so that peo-
ple who do not go along get the feeling they are "retarding" progress.
Facts and expertise. Knowledge of the history; background about the nego-
tiating partners; having facts and material at hand that are favorable to one's
own position and being able to present them clearly are all essential for this tac-
tic.
Exploring. This technique, which we will treat in more detail, can
strengthen a person's position for several reasons. Exploring means taking a cer-
tain power of initiative: posing questions, giving information, making proposals,
creating a possible package deal. Exploring also means trying to consider the
interests of the opponent in a sense that a person's attitude is characterized by
"How do we find a solution to this together!" This legitimates a person's perfor-
mance; it lends a person authority.
Intensifying the relation. The relationship with the opponent can be
strengthened by developing acceptance and trust. This strengthens the mutual
dependency.
Power of persuasion. Elements of persuasion are:
A clear, well-structured mariner of explaining one's own opinion.
A reasonably relaxed, but not nonchalant, attitude. Manipulating and
fighting can provide a temporary advantage, but risk escalation and irri-
tated personal relations. The other tactics are more constructive.
Strengthening the starting position. There are several ways to strengthen
and consolidate one's position before the negotiations really get started. Some
important means are:
Having alternatives. Not only alternative solutions for the items on the
agenda, but also different ways of reaching one's own goals, perhaps with
others.
Political access and political intuition. Easy access to the relevant centers
of power is of special importance.
Status. Tangible success, informal authority, hierarchical position, personal
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trustworthiness, and credibility are all matters that contribute to status.
Support 01 others. Having allies during the meeting, being able to obtain
support from other countries not present. Not operating in isolation.
These are "facts" that will show their effectiveness at the negotiating table.
All activities between parties are colored and modeled by the balance of power.
No wonder negotiators are very sensitive to changes in the power and depen-
dency balance. The dilemma here is that power games increase the risk of esca-
lation. At the same time, it is sometimes necessary to test the balance of power.
Not being able to do this or not recognizing that one is being tested or perhaps
even somewhat provoked makes one appear weak and encourages exploitative
behavior. The challenge is to preserve that factual dependence on a firm, unag-
gressive footing. The ways people cope with this dilemma are shown in Figure
98.2.
1 2 3 4 5
minimal resistance _ preserving a certain
balance
_ aggressive, trlling to
dominate
Restrained use of
"favorable facts" ,
pressure is avoided
Little resistance
when challenged
No active interest in
alternatives to the
current relationship
Attempting to influence
the balance by means of
facts and restrained
pressure
When challenged, one
reacts in proportion
Alert to alternatives for
improving one's position
within the current
relationship
Influencing the balance by
means of threats, manipu-
lations, confusion and
arrogance
When challenged, one
attacks
Behaving as if one has many
other attractive alternatives;
acting as though one will break
off the relationship at the
least sign of trouble
Figure 98.t. Bending versus domineering behavior along a scale.
38.2.3. Promoting a constructive climate
Negotiators consider it important to promote a constructive climate and respect-
ful personal relationships. An irritated or very formal atmosphere hampers
effective negotiating. So they try to develop trust, acceptance, and credibility. In
this way they give evidence of their mutual dependence and foster a relationship
based on this dependence.
Examples of tactics in this area are:
Paying attention to each other's opinions.
Promoting informal and open contacts.
Avoiding loss of face.
474 W.F.G. M06tenbroek
Behaving predictably and seriously, not using ploys and strategems or
"pulling a fast one" .
Distinguishing role behavior (e.g., a firm demand) from personal goodwill
and mutual respect.
The dilemma one has to face is that trusting the other without reservation
means running the risk of seriously weakening one's own position and of over-
compromising. So one must develop a kind of calculated trust, while remaining
fully aware of the exploitative possibilities of a very personal and confidential
relationship. Trust and credibility are important. But at the same time, invest-
ing heavily in trust and personal relations may readily be seen as overbearing, or
as weak and silly. This dilemma is illustrated in Figure 98.9.
1 2 3 4 5
jovial, confidential 4-4--- credible, 80lid -----... h08tile, irritated
Reliance on personal
charm, tendency to tell
lots of jokes, likes to
become very close
Dependent: "Your inte-
rest is my interest"
Promoting informal
discussions, shows an
interests in personal
matters, moderate use of
humor, consistent
Interdependent: "What
solution will we find"
Keeping opponent at arm's
length, formal behavior,
sometimes sarcastic,
shows irritation,
unpredictable
Independent: "What can
I get out of this"
Figure 98.9. Jovial versus hostile behavior along a scale.
38.2.4. Procedural flexibility
How explorative is a negotiator?· Some negotiators search persistently for solu-
tions that are relatively satisfying for both parties. This can be done without fal-
ling into the trap of making concessions. For this purpose people need ideas on
how to proceed and they need to be able to use these procedures flexibly. Exam-
ples of such behavior include extensive exchange of information, trying out a
variety of tentative solutions, thinking aloud, and informal questioning. The
integrative potential of the situation will then be fully utilized. Exploring occurs
by searching for common interests: Do the parties share some basic assump-
tions? Are relatively small concessions possible that might mean a lot to the
opposite party and vice versa? Can a combination of mutual advantages be
created in a package deal?
The basic idea behind all this is interdependency. Parties are negotiating
because they are interdependent. Interdependency means common interests. So
try first to make the common good as tangible as possible. The two poles of this
behavior are indicated in Figure 98.4. This also can turn out to be a dilemma.
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Repetitive rigid behavior has to be avoided; on the other hand, too much flexibil-
ity can appear as opportunistic and impulsive behavior.
1 2 3 4 5
fle~61e, searching, ...---
acti"e
calm, patient -----_~ staying one one track,
pusi"e
Taking advantage of
opportunities, impulsive
Coming up with new
ideas, ability to
improvise
Creating alternatives
Taking time to weigh and
analyze possibilities
Trying to keep things
consistent
Open to alternatives
Reliance on fixed
procedures
Sticking to original posi-
tion, supplying more
evidence that this is "right"
Repetitive, rigid
Figure 98.4. Exploring versus avoiding behavior along a scale.
Practitioners as well as researchers stress over and over the great impor.
tance of an active strategic attitude for skillful negotiating.
Negotiations go through a number of phases. The notion of phases as an
approach to the study of negotiations is well established [Douglas (1962), Gul-
liver (1979), Himmelman (1971), Zartman and Berman (1982)], but relatively
unexplored. Here we use a model with three phases as a procedural technique to
improve flexibility.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Start with a diagnosis of mutual premises and interests; investigate where
interests overlap and keep an eye on the priorities on both sides. Scanning
other options and alternatives is also part of this.
Introducing a very broad "platform proposal" is often an effective next step:
the proposal can serve as an outline for
Amendment and alteration until a compromise is reached.
Using these phases can help to prevent the situation from developing into hostile
arguments about positions.
38.3. Conclusion
Providing specific feedback on negotiation styles is the most important purpose
of the four scales. Other learning connected with their scores on the scales
proved important to the participants. Some examples:
Firmly going after your interests does not mean showing the other party
disrespect, irritation and distrust. Separate the relationship from the con-
tent.
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Do not confuse a power struggle with obtaining favorable material results.
Firm negotiating has little to do with scoring points, dominating the discus-
sion, threats and manipulations.
Try to have formal or informal "preliminary talks". where parties can sur-
vey each other's interests and ideas before taking pronounced positions.
Attempt to devise alternatives. Do not respond too quickly with judgments
or counterarguments. Instead look for alternative proposals and solutions.
Enlarge the negotiating field. More issues over a longer period of time
sometimes increase the chance of a package deal that is relatively favorable
to both sides.
Work with "platform proposals". If one disagrees, instead of defending
one's own proposal at all costs, a party simply inquires under what condi-
tions one's proposal would become acceptable, or which modifications
would be needed. Next, one does not start arguing but proposes amend-
ments of one's own. Especially on complicated issues with several parties
involved, this strategy may prove quite effective. Someone states a general
outline of possible agreement. This outline is then specified and amended
in a number of sessions.
Movement when a deadlock is imminent:
• Seek more and different information instead of correcting and nega-
tively judging information.
• Search for the problems that lie at the root of the impasse instead of
convincing and threatening.
• Emphasize equality and mutual dependence (for example, by explor-
ing the negative consequences of a continuing impasse) instead of act-
ing superior or withdrawing.
• Adjourn and create informal contacts instead of going on and on with
meetings.
Most of these examples are effective tactics on the procedural flexibility
scale. They can be summarized in the maxim "Be fte:tible but firm". In evalua-
tions of the workshops, particip"ants often rated highly their learning in this
respect.
Note
[1) The part of the workshop devoted to the handling of cultural differences was
developed in cooperation with Dr. C. Dupont (Professor, University Lille and
CRC/Paris).
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CHAPTER 39
Negotiating a Research Project
on Negotiation: The Fixed Link
(Transchannel) Prenegotiations
Christophe Dupont
Lille-I University (IPA-IAE) and
Researeh Center for Management (CRC)
Jouy-en-JosaB
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39.1. Preliminary Observations
On November 30, 1984, the President of the Republic of France, Mr. Mitterand,
and the Prime Minister of the British Government, Mrs. Thatcher, held a joint
summit meeting. The agenda included a possible revival of the recurring project
of providing a fixed link between the United Kingdom and the Continent.
This transchannel project had been envisaged for almost two centuries; and
agreement to build a tunnel, which led to some preliminary work, had even been
signed in the early 19708 and then cancelled by British request. But November
1984 seemed to mark a new turning point.
Mrs. Thatcher's official statement after meeting the French President made
it clear that the political will was - this time - real. That statement was the
beginning of a long, complex and very particular set of negotiations. On January
20, 1986, the two governments announced at Lille the choice of the design
selected from among rival projects: it would be a tunnel rather than a bridge or
some other alternative (such as a bridge or a combined bridge and tube con-
nected by two artificial small islands). One month later, on February 12, 1986, a
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treaty was signed at Canterbury by the two governments and on March 14,
1986, a quadripartite concession agreement was signed by France, the United
Kingdom, and two private organizations - France Manche (a French consor-
tium) and CTG (Channel Tunnel Group, a British consortium) - which
together became the concessionaires of the project and from that date on merged
into an original unique organization: Eurotunnel (see Figure 99.1).
Public
Sphere
-
The
Intergovernmental
Commission -
EUROTUNNEL
('concessionnaire')
.......
____• (QUADRIPARTITE
AGREEMENT)Private
Sphere
(French industrial
companies, banks)
FRANCE
MANCHE
(British
.........V industrial
companies
The CHANNEL banks)
TUNNEL
GROUP
Independent
consultant
SETEC
ATKINS
(French contractor)
.~
(Subcontracts)
I
TRANSMANCHE
LINK
(Contractor)
I Translink
(British contractor)
Private
contract
•
Figure 99.1. A simplified representation of the institutional set-up of the channel tunnel
project.
As of April 1987, these treaties are in the process of ratification; Eurotunnel
has established headquarters and offices in the United Kingdom and France; con-
tractors have been awarded a construction contract; work is in progress on both
sides of the Channel and some preliminary private financing has been arranged.
Yet the project will be final only after ratification and the exchange of instru-
ments [1]. In the meantime, some uncertainties still remain and complex nego-
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tiations continue unabated, since some issues are not fully resolved and some
others continually crop up as the project gradually takes life and leads to daily
operational problems.
This chapter centers on the prenegotiations, a period here defined as
extending from November 30, 1984 to Jananuary 20, 1986. The chapter is the
result of a research that will cover principally the negotiations from January 20,
1986 to the end of 1986. Therefore, it may be viewed as preliminary background
for that research.
The chapter is mainly descriptive, but an effort has been made to refer
various facts and events to relevant aspects of the theory or practice of interna-
tional negotiations. The title points to a major difficulty facing researchers on
negotiation, that of having access to true and viable sources of information,
including interviews with real actors and sometimes discussing confidential data.
Obviously, the researcher is bound by some rules of the game, and the following
analysis scrupulously abides by such rules as relating to off-the-record comments
of the persons interviewed. Another recognized limitation is that the work is
only beginning, which explains its descriptive orientation without reliance on a
sophisticated methodology.
39.2. Scope and Organization of the Research:
A Brief Overview
The research project was launched as an essentially academic venture as regards
context, structure and orientation. Yet some possible practical applications
might be obtained as a welcome by-product.
The theme of the research was discussed by a university professor in charge
of a graduate class on project management and by the author, whose interests-
academic and practical - include negotiating, especially international negotia-
tion [2). As usual, time allocation and finance proved, at that juncture, to be
obstacles to be surmounted. Yet this was in the end only secondary to what
proved to be the major problems encountered: delineating the scope and purpose
of the study, selecting the most promising angles of attack and - perhaps the
most robust of all the obstacles - seeing to it that a minimal number of
appropriate persons - knowledgeable, open-minded, and having themselves
lived through the negotiating process - could be approached and, subject to not
violating in any way the inevitable confidentiality attached to certain aspects,
interviewed both in the United Kingdom and in France. Such interviews had to
be conducted both in public and in private circles, both at national and regional
levels, not to mention the variety of statuses and professions involved (govern-
ment officials, administrators, high-level managers, legal advisers, bankers, con-
struction professionals, etc.).
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It was decided that the research should in a first (and possibly only) stage
be characterized by the two following major constraints:
(1) Time and resource limitations would make it necessary to concentrate on
some selected issues of particular relevance to the initiators of the project.
Among these were:
(a) To clarify the decision-making process and what place the negotiating
mode had in it.
(b) To look into the prenegotiations and the formal negotiations
thereafter, examining to what extent existing theories of negotiation
help explain the process actually observed.
(c) To clarify transcultural aspects and provide some recommendations in
that respect.
(d) To examine the problems faced by peripheral actors in the decision-
making or negotiation network (this refers notably to small firms
negotiating some form of participation in the carrying out of the pro-
ject).
Time and budget were severe given constraints. Whereas part of the job
could be considered as a normal academic assignment and would not
require special allocations, the extra resources were defined and limited to
about 30 man-days. Needless to say, this would not permit in-depth
research; however, it was deemed adequate (combined with a normal
assignment) to lay the foundation for a future more elaborate work.
(2) From a methodological viewpoint, the approach should be based on the
study of published documentation and literature and on interviews both in
France and in the United Kingdom. Strict observance of confidentiality
should be adhered to. Additionally, regarding more recent developments
and unresolved issues, no attempt should be made to decode strategies pur-
sued by the actors.
The present chapter may be considered as part of item l(b). Although,
with regard to the research project as a whole, the author will cover the four
points mentioned, contributions were made by other researchers for points l(c)
and 1(d)[3].
39.3. Prenegotiations and Background Factors
Most models or studies of negotiations [e.g., Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) or,
more recently, Zartman and Berman (1982) and Touval and Zartman (1985)]
insist on the importance of background factors and their emergence in the pre-
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negotiation phase, Le., the rather loosely defined period up to some marked turn-
ing point setting the stage for the initialization of the formal process.
In the case of the Fixed Link negotiations, prenegotiations may be dated
from the early 1980s to the joint meeting of November 30, 1984.
A simplified chronology of events is instructive. After a standstill of a few
years following the cancellation of an agreement to build a tunnel in the mid-
1970s, some interest in reviving the idea began to develop in several quarters. In
France, the Region Nord-Pas-de-Calais - a local authority recently created as
part of the the effort to deeentralize the historically heavily centralized adminis-
trative decision process - launched a number of initiatives under the impetus of
two prominent (socialist) political leaders [4] in order to revive the issue [51. In
the late 19708, on the other hand, contacts had been established between officials
of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Authority with their counterparts of the county of
Kent [61. In the private sphere, banks and a few industrial companies, especially
in engineering and public works, continued to study certain aspects of an even-
tual project. In the United Kingdom, in 1981, the Select Committee for Tran-
sport of the House of Commons presented a report comparing the ten solutions
that could then be envisaged for a privately financed link [7]. Interestingly, some
form of joint cooperation in the two countries continued, as was evidenced by the
publication of two official reports: one by an Anglo-French Study Group and
one by an Anglo-French Financing Group. In France, the Region Nord-Pas-de-
Calais launched yet another study with the help of the Bechtel consultant group.
As regards prospective private promoters, two loosely structured organiza-
tions comprising bankers and industrial companies were engaged in some form of
activity (e.g., drawing up details of projects; making studies on and searching for
financing; lobbying). One such group was CTG, entirely British, formed in 1984
by seven members; the other was Euroroute, composed of nine banks and com-
panies, both British and French.
Two other events of interest should be noted. First, the purchase in July
1984 of the Sealink ferry company by J. Sherwood (a later prospective candidate
for the project). Second, the development of contacts in the summer and fall of
1984, on the one hand, between officials of the two governments and, on the
other, between prospective promoters and national government officials.
From a methodological viewpoint several elements are of interest. They
include:
- Identification of parties and their characterization.
- Early emergence of key issues and the different values placed on their
associated stakes by the parties involved.
- Factors entering into bargaining power.
This regrouping falls within the framework of simplified models of negotia-
tion, which postulate that the negotiation process is strongly influenced from the
start - relative to the object of negotiation (the issues) - by three main driving
interacting forces: parties, stakes (value of interests; preoccupations; constraints;
the risk factor), and the relative balance of power. The combination of these
forces not only determines to a large extent the type of negotiation (integrative,
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distributive, etc.), but also structures the dynamics of the process (as evidenced
a posteriori by the analysis of strategies and tactics).
39.3.1. Parties
One of the most important features of the Fixed Link prenegotiations is the
development of an intricate network of actors. The structure of the network -
which emerged early in the prenegotiation stage and was later (after January 20,
1986) simplified, but simultaneously complexified - could be represented graphi-
cally by a series of poles connected in a multidimensional way. A brief descrip-
tion of this network is summarized as follows.
Several different dimensions have to be considered: some of these acted as
preconditions or constraints for the other, some were closely linked, others not,
and some overlapping was also present.
Dimension 1 concerns the actors and the corresponding activities relating
to the two national governments. In the prenegotiation stage, bilateral contacts
were organized and conducted by various members of government, essentially
the Office of the President, the Prime Minister, and ministers in charge of tran-
sport, but also the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Finance (for France); and
the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary for Transport
and the Treasury among others in the case of the United Kingdom. Obviously,
key aides as well as the embassies had their part in this process. This dimension
is typically in the realm of classical diplomacy. This group of actors belonging to
the public sphere must be extended to include senior officials of the two (nation-
alized) rail transportation systems (BR and SNCF). These organizations, whose
interests were at stake in the project, played a key role in the whole negotiation
process (prenegotiations and later).
In a sense, each government tried to assess the political will of the counter-
part in that part of the search process. Some events or discussions were also
determinant in framing the future scope of the negotiations. For example, a con-
sensus was reached that the problem was bilateral, not multilateral (as would
have been the case through the intervention of the EC 18]; and there was the
clear indication from the very beginning that, on the British side, the project -
whatever its physical design - would not involve public money [9].
Dimension 2 of the network of parties is closely related to the preceding
one: it can be defined as the involvement of parliamentarians, especially in the
United Kingdom. Members of the parliaments were not only lobbied by their
constituencies (for or against the project) but also by various associations some
of which were national in character, while others - such as the Conseil franco-
britannique - were in fact binational.
One of the specificities of the Fixed Link prenegotiations was network
dimension 3, made up of factors belonging to government bodies and to the peo-
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pie forming the initial private promoters. In the United Kingdom, both CTG
and Euroroute were active in order to obtain appropriate information on the
chances of the project really being supported by the government and under
what conditions, while also undertaking initiatives of many sorts to influence the
decision-making process at the political level. That such prenegotiations were
particularly intricate derives from the fact that the promoters had to fight on
many fronts. Both promoters were allied in so far as the first priority was sim-
ply to influence positively the decision to go ahead; but they had clearly opposite
interests insofar as they were rivals to obtain the contract award. Strategies had
therefore to be extremely subtle since, to make matters still more complicated,
the eventuality of facing pressure by the governments to join forces had also to
be considered.
Dimension 4 represents the process through which the promoters had to
secure a binational basis, that is, comprising both British and French partners.
Euroute did not have to face that problem but, as Nicholas Henderson (1987)
later wrote in a very detailed account of the maneuvering that took place, much
energy and time had to be devoted by CTG to finding an appropriate French
partner (which became France-Manche). Many parties, both private and public,
were involved in this organizational problem. Sub-networks of relationships were
formed and developed negotiating activities. At this stage a key factor - impor-
tant for the theory of negotiation - was the role played by a few key individu-
als, their drive, their motivations and their qualities as negotiators as well as
their ambiguities.
Dimension 5 of the network relates to national versus regional actors. The
problem was that key decisions (to go ahead or not, major guidelines) would be
made by the central governments and the promoter(s), while major impacts
would affect local territories: principally, the County of Kent and the Region
Nord-Pas-de-Calais. In the prenegotiation phase officials and private parties in
both regions were therefore very active in attempting to be included into the
decision-making process. Their negotiating task was also very delicate, as they
not only had to deal with their central governments (not overlooking the pros-
pective attitude of the other government), but also had to consider their own
bilateral regional relationships.
A sixth and final dimension represents the group of private operators intent
on participating in varying degrees and in multiform ways in the prospective
works and services. Some of these operators were national in scope, but many
were small, specialized, potential subcontractors. Obviously, they faced a very
difficult negotiating task, which in the prenegotiation stage consisted mainly in
trying to obtain information and perhaps get ready to act in due time. The
negotiator at the periphery of a network is no doubt in a weak position.
The description of the actor network should also mention public opinion,
evidently not a party as such, yet ever-present through the media and the lob-
bies. This often forgotten and diffuse factor may not be a party; it should how-
ever be included as an invisible actor in the negotiation process.
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39.3.2. Issues and Associated Stakes
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During the prenegotiations the issues that were debated were relatively straight-
forward and global (as opposed to detailed}.
For the governments and associated bodies and officials the problem could
be formulated in a twofold proposition:
(1) Should a fixed link project be revived?
(2) If so, under what preconditions and constraints?
For promoters and the other parties involved the prenegotiation stage con-
sisted mainly in prenegotiating their expected participation and influence in the
undertaking and the design of the project.
Issue analysis at this stage illustrates several basic elements of the theory
and practice of negotiation. As regards governments, an influential factor was
the clear awareness that the two parties had both joint and divergent interests
and priorities (i.e., different stakes), but that an overriding element was their
interdependency: there simply could not be in this matter a unilateral decision.
Joint interests included political and economic aspects, especially as the United
Kingdom was now an active member of the European Community [10]. But
priorities (stakes) were valued quite differently on each side of the Channel. In
the United Kingdom the key priority was - apart from the politically symbolic
gesture of a link to the Continent - the economic benefits that would derive
from a more efficient way to transport goods and passengers. The approach was
that of an overall cost-benefit analysis embracing many aspects, including tran-
sport cost savings, impact on employment, travelers' convenience, security and
preservation of environment. Among these the latter, viewed as constraints, had
a high psychological value.
In France the global picture was not at all ignored, but it would seem that
a high priority, compared with Britain, was the long-term need and the present
opportunity to extend across the Channel a unified efficient rail transport sys-
tem, including high-speed, high-tech trains. Another important stake for France
was the revitalization of the Region Nord-Pas-de-Calais, which had suffered from
the partial destruction of its industrial structure composed of such declining
industries (under European conditions) as coal-mining, textiles and steel. In
contrast, the problem for Kent was more to preserve the "garden of England"
than to restructure the existing industrial base. Finally, a difference in priorities
and constraints was the demand by the United Kingdom for exclusively private
financing whereas this issue was more open in France, where some form of
government financing was not excluded.
Among the recent advances in negotiation theories are the analysis of joint
benefits and the search for linkages between different priorities by parties. As
applied to the Channel prenegotiations, one can sense simultaneously the oppor-
tunities and the difficulties of attempting to link priorities. This is because at
this formula stage ref. Zartman and Berman (1982)1 issues were to a large extent
qualitative and represented principles rather than items tradeable through some
common system of value.
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Another factor that was likely to impede the exchanging of priorities was
the power balance at this stage (see below). Historically, the pressure to build a
fixed link had come from France, and especially from its North region. By let-
ting it be known that the United Kingdom was now in favor of the project, their
negotiators were in a position to structure some of the initial rules of the game:
no new rail system from the coast to London, no public financing, a high priority
on security and health issues ("from terrorism to rabies") and on the environ-
ment. In exchange for these preconditions some commentators have stated
privately that the British negotiators were much more ready to compromise on
technology, especially as French technology enjoys an enviable reputation in this
field [111.
Issue identification and analysis is, in a way, simpler with regard to the
nongovernmental actors. Their problem was desperately clear: influencing the
decision-making process to the best of their abilities (and interests). This meant
negotiating for information (Le., getting qualitatively relevant rather than quan-
titatively abundant data and opinion), locating the right level of decision-makers,
persuading again and again, and, last but not least, positioning in advance for
the next stage of the process.
Again referring to negotiation theory and practice, the importance of good
preparation for the negotiators becomes obvious. Preparing for the future (as
uncertain as it looked) meant a lot of high-level as well as meticulous paperwork.
For if in this prenegotiation stage CTG and Euroroute were allies in the sense
that both had an interest to force the decision, both were also rivals who had to
build their future bargaining power by adjusting their initial plans, sharpening
their arguments and "sowing now to harvest later". These strategies required
much technical competence (preparation) and skill (negotiator's experience and
qualities) [121.
As will be shown briefly in the next section, issues were manifold in number
and complexity: the architecture and design of the project (with such compli-
cated questions as the comparison between rival technical solutions: tunnel
versus bridge? A combination of both? A tube? etc.), the financial and economic
aspects, the necessity to take account of government preoccupations, expecta-
tions, preconditions, constraints and unveiled preferences. Difficulties were com-
pounded by the fact that each party had to deal with its national authorities
while not ignoring the negotiating positions of the other government.
30.3.3. Power
It is difficult at this time to proceed to a detailed analysis of the power balance,
as not enough is known of the true motivations, strategies and role-playing of the
main negotiators.
On a global scale, concerning government positions, the scanning of pub-
lished information and the analysis of the first series of interviews would make it
appear that the United Kingdom had the edge in the initial prenegotiation power
balance for the reasons already mentioned. This is also in conformity with
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recent research on power in negotiations in which the emphasis is put on the
degree of mutual dependency of parties.
Some commentators suggest that the British team of negotiators was able
to get themselves organized in a more rapid and cohesive way than their French
counterparts. The latter apparently had to face a slower, more intricate
decision-making machinery. It may also be that the French, especially the
private sector and banks, were hampered by doubts regarding the real intentions
of the British, because of events in the early 19708.
Another point of interest is the rivalry between the two British groups
vying for the future award of the contract. This may have had the effect of
stimulating initiatives and imagination, which in turn strengthened the British
position in the first prenegotiation encounters. Also, contrary to what is gen-
erally taken as a characteristic of British negotiators in general - who are often
seen as purposely indecisive and pragmatic in the early sequences of negotiations,
while keen and able to move swiftly and play surprise tactics later on - it would
seem, at least from the comments of some interviewees, that the British negotia-
tors came from the start with a tight package of arguments and positions that
helped them structure the dynamics of the process [13]. A third additional point
to consider, although its relevance rather pertains to the subsequent stages, was
the financing issue: as the British made it clear that "not a public penny" would
be available for the project, whatever it might be, the role of the City in future
financing was an element that gave inherent strength.
The time factor has also to be analyzed. The key element in this respect
was the scheduling of elections in both countries. France was the first on the list
as May 1986 was a crucial dateline; whereas for the United Kingdom, barring
advanced elections, the government had more time at its disposal [14].
39.4. The Core of the Process:
November 30, 1984 - January 20, 1986
The 14-month period between the "green light" signal of the two governments
(November 30, 1984) and the announcement of the decision to go ahead with the
tunnel project (CTG and France-Manche merged henceforth into the joint
organization: Eurotunnel on January 20, 1986 constitutes the core sequence of
the negotiations. A turning point was the Invitation to Promoters in April 1985
to submit proposals within certain guidelines "to develop, finance, construct and
operate a fixed link across the Channel" .
As final decision-makers, both governments had now to negotiate a wide
array of issues ranging from the crucial choice of the type of design (selection
among the rival schemes) to writing down binding provisions on manifold issues:
institutional, technical, legal, financial and the like. This represented an enor-
mous task, as documents produced during this period clearly show: dozens of
volumes and thousands of pages. Negotiating activity was practically continuous
throughout the period, involving in one form or another the large number of
actors identified in the preceding section.
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As this chapter is centered on the prenegotiation stage, the analysis of the
core of the process is deferred pending the completion of the research. However,
a few preliminary remarks are made below.
First, the shift from prenegotiations to negotiations proper involved the
gradual institutionalization of the process. As soon as the statement of intention
was made in November 1984, bilateral meetings between British and French
officials were held. Appointments were made of the principal negotiators
(Messrs. Lyall and Rudeau), whose first task was to write down guidelines fram-
ing the terms and conditions that proposals by the interested promoters would
have to meet.
Meanwhile, and in less formalized procedures, promoters had to prepare
their cases for later screening. The negotiating component of this exercise was to
obtain rapid and accurate information while persuading officials in each govern-
ment of the validity of one's own proposal. This task involved drawing up
detailed studies and comparative assessments, initiating contacts and analyzing
expectations, constraints, criteria and intentions of all those involved in the
decision-making process. This meant working through a complex network, as
the decision at the top would result from a combination of personal preferences
and arguments and recommendations from a number of decision-influencing peo-
ple or bodies.
A point of interest for the theory and practice of negotiations (apart from
adequate and relevant preparation) is the need for flexibility. A good illustration
is the early comprehension by the CTG group (which was later to win the
award) that the drive-through issues might tip the balance in favor of the
Euroroute scheme. The response was twofold. The first part was defensive
(demonstrating that the bridge, spiral and tube system raised considerable prob-
lems, technically and financially). Another part was offensive, showing that the
tunnel scheme could be made flexible by inserting provisions to the effect that at
some later stage an addition could be made to the present design which would
permit the drive-through requirements.
Another development deserving careful study is the inevitability of the
coalition issue in multilateral negotiations. Should parties seek alliances, enter
coalitions or play it alone? What is the best strategy in a given situation?
Again the Channel tunnel history provides some material relating to that issue
(in the given circumstances). The problem arose particularly as the deadline for
submissions came closer: the CTG-France-Manche group had to decide whether
to join other promoters (particularly a late-comer, the James Sherwood group),
given the fact that some government pressure was exerted to combine schemes
and resources, a move that was also favored by some potential contractors.
One of the key moments in the negotiation process was the appointment
and the meeting of an Evaluation Committee designed to recommend the favored
scheme. Groups had to submit their proposals before October 31, 1985. The
proposals were examined by a committee of six experts, half British and half
French. This group had to assess the comparative merits of the four proposals
and make a recommendation. Unfortunately, little has filtered out so far from
the work of this committee, but clearly any research on the Channel tunnel pro-
ject will have to probe into this matter [15].
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At the end of this process the decision was taken, on January 20, 1986,
awarding the concession to the future Eurotunnel group. Now the negotiations
became quadripartite: the two governments and the British and French groups
constituting together Eurotunnel. A treaty was signed on February 12, 1986 and
a concession agreement on March 14, 1986. Negotiation of these agreements
involved a great number of institutional, legal and technical matters that are of a
great interest to those studying the process of negotiation. Some of the issues
raised by these agreements are still being negotiated.
Some of the issues raised in the negotiations were, for instance, the way to
combine two very different legal systems; to ensure that parity would be
respected in decision making and in financial matters (a very original solution
was found in this respect with the concept of the unit made up of two parts -
half British, half French); to create a machinery for coordination at the govern-
ment level (an intergovernmental committee), etc. Some of the more intricate or
unsolved issues were studied in some depth at a British-French Colloquium,
organized in April 1987, by the University of Kent at Canterbury, the proceed-
ings of which are to be published.
Notes
[1]
{2)
[3]
[4]
[7]
As of mid-April 1987, the matter was put on the agenda of the spring session of
the French National Assembly. Senate ratification would follow the finalization of
the British procedures. As regards the United Kingdom, the second reading of the
Bill was completed at the House of Commons; it still requires approval by the
Lords and would then come back at the House of Commons for a third and final
reading. Amendments could be possible under these various procedures. In
France as in the United Kingdom, ratification implies the assent of the President
and the Queen, respectively. Then instruments have to be exchanged. It is only
then that the treaties become effective in national as well as international law.
Professor Debourse of Lille-University, who is also the Director of the Regional
Development AgencII, a local authority in charge of research and various activities
at the regional (local) level.
For the former, a small consultant organization specializing in transcultural prob-
lems: I.C.M. (Paris), and for the latter, an academic and consultant: P. Audebert
of Lille University and CRC.
The mayor of Lille, P. Mauroy (later Prime Minister from 1981 to 1983), and one
of his key aides, M. Delebarre, later a minister in the socialist government (until
1986).
The socialists won the elections in May 1981.
Such contacts mainly took the form of joint seminars and colloquia; e.g., in 1977
and 1978.
The reference to private financing was particularly important because one of the
reasons for the cancellation of the project in 1974 was the United Kingdom's finan-
cial difficulties facing the Labour government at that time.
European Community envisaged here in its institutional structure.
These two points are partly interconnected as EC intervention would have
presented a budgetary problem.
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[10]
[11]
[12]
[131
[14]
[15]
From a strategic viewpoint, it may well be that the United Kingdom's favorable
attitude toward a fixed link (in spite of the historical record and the reluctance of
a part of public opinion) was a calculated move to impress on other Community
members its attachment to Europe, at a moment when the United Kingdom posi-
tion was rigid on certain major problems such as the EC budget and the agricul-
tural policy.
As Sir Nicholas Henderson humorously comments in ChGnnels Gnd Tunnels (1987,
p. 46), [the French] "had after all, pioneered both the Suez and Panama Canals".
He adds that "They had by the 19708 become the world expert in transportation
systems" .
See, for instance, the 1987 contribution by Nicholas Henderson (the then chairman
of CTG). His contribution is now one of the sources of public information on
many details and anecdotes in the prenegotiation and (early) negotiation stages.
However, on one important point - the so-called drive-through issue, Le., direct
passage without cross-boarding via a shuttle system - the British position was
left undetermined, as there were both proponents (Euroroute) and adversaries
(CTG) of that alternative.
It is interesting to note that the time factor may now tend to redress the power
balance as the tunnel issue has become a commitment of the Conservative Party
and as ratification has proved a more difficult process in the United Kingdom than
in France. The French government has now taken the position that finalization of
ratification (which is certain in the French Parliament) would be scheduled only
after the British process is itself finalized.
Many other aspects are worth studying. An example is the sub-negotiGtion which
officials of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Region were able to conduct with the Govern-
ment, on the one hand, and the four contenders, one the other, to obtain certain
guarantees as to the benefits for the Region of the carrying out of the Project.
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CHAPTER 4.0
Report of the US Environment and
Natural Resources Task Group·
Program on the Processes of International Negotiations
American Academy 0/ Arts and Sciences
Cambridge, Massachusetts
USA
4.0.1. Special Characteristics of Environmental Disputes
International environmental and natural resource issues raise many questions
that are common to other topics of negotiation. Examples include such ques-
tions as the uses of scientific and technical information, the perception of
national interests, the relationships between internal and external conflicts, and
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Joanne Nichols, Tufts Univertlity, Medford, Mauachusetts
Robert Stein, Environmental Mediation International, Washington, DC
Konrad von Moltke, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire
Michael Wheeler, MIT, Cambridge, MauachuseUs
The Environment and Natural Resources (ENR) Task Group began meeting in October 1986. The group
agreed to focus on international (or what we prefer to call transboundary) disputes involving the manage-
ment of natural resources or problems of environmental quality control.
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others.. At the same time, however, they also raise additional issues that are dis-
tinctly different from other topics of negotiation, many of which are growing in
importance to practitioners as well as interesting to theorists. Examples of these
differences follow.
Nature 0/ the Issue
Several of the most important international environmental issues involve a global
public interest in the outcome that should transcend the more limited national
interests of the negotiating parties. Examples include effects on the global cli-
mate and the uses of oceans and outer space. In such cases, the legitimate
interests of large numbers of potential victims may not be adequately
represented in the negotiations unless new forms of surrogate representation are
instituted.
A second special characteristic of some environmental issues is the possibil-
ity that irreversible adverse changes may result from some outcomes. Examples
include the effects of chlorofluorocarbon emissions (CFCs) on stratospheric
ozone, other climate-related issues such as CO2 and the greenhouse effect, and
extinctions of species (whales, for instance).
Third, a large class of natural resource and environmental issues involves
the over-exploitation of open access resources, such as ocean fisheries and pollu-
tion of common seas and airsheds. These issues are often too simplistically
identified as "tragedies of the commons"; there are in fact many examples of
regimes by which they can be managed, protected, and allocated, but such
regimes require international negotiations to convert them in one way or another
from open access to common property resources. One existing example is the
International Whaling Commission.
Finally, similar problems are evident in many natural resource and
environmental issues on less than a global scale, in cases involving resources that
are regionally shared across international boundaries. Examples include large
international rivers, acid rain, and exports of hazardous chemicals and wastes -
all issues, incidentally, which are already subjects of study at IIASA. All these
issues involve situations in which the existence of national boundaries blocks or
complicates the creation of management regimes that are necessary to protect
beneficial natural systems and processes.
Note that in some cases, such boundaries may even frustrate the implemen-
tation of effective measures within national boundaries: if it is cheaper to send
hazardous wastes to an unsafe dump in a nearby country, costlier but safer tech-
nologies in the country of origin will not be used without either public subsidies,
export restrictions, or international negotiations to assure uniform minimum
safety standards and close such "pollution havens" .
Special questions for negotiators that arise in many of these types of issues
include:
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Imbalances in power between upstream and downstream nations. Such
issues may require identification of negotiable linkages to other issues in
which the power relationships are reversed.
Resources that move: for example, migratory fish that may breed in one
nation's jurisdiction, grow to fishable but prebreeding size in another, and
be safely fishable from a conservation perspective (mature and postbreed-
ing) only in a third. Such resources may require international management
regimes including compensation to the first two types of nation for their
conservation efforts.
Finally, localized issues that happen to involve international borders
present particular problems in that local interests on both sides must be
filtered through national bureaucracies and policies that are often subject
to different priorities and extraneous linkages as well as slower and often
insensitive local needs and concerns.
Scientific and Technical Questions
In addition to the different nature of many natural resource and environmental
issues, such problems often have several other special characteristics. One is the
central role of scientific and technical questions, and perhaps even more, of
scientific and technical uncertainties. Unlike trade and military security negotia-
tions, moreover, these complexities and uncertainties are often in fields new and
unfamiliar to traditional government and business negotiators.
This is stressful, and typically results either in the disbelief or discounting
of the new information, in redefining the issue back into more familiar terms
(such as trade or national interest terms), or in an enlargement of the role and
power of technical experts in the negotiation process - for example, the creation
of negotiation processes among technical representatives that parallel or precede
those of plenipotentiaries, often shaping key assumptions and other terms of
debate. Such expert negotiations deserve careful study in their own right.
Nontraditional Participants
International environmental issues have also been associated with significantly
expanded roles for nontraditional participants other that scientists, as sources
both of information and of influence in the negotiations. This, too, is stressful,
since such groups frequently represent points of view different from those of
traditional government and business elites and even in conflict with traditional
views of the national interest. One result is to complicate greatly both internal
and external aspects of the negotiation process.
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40.2. 'New Issues
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Simply by virtue of being new issues on the agenda for international negotiation,
many natural resource and environmental issues pose both new problems and
new opportunities. On the one hand, they often have low status with traditional
participants, and may accordingly be poorly understood or poorly handled; and
bottlenecks in negotiation may arise because of the small number of individuals
either interested, qualified, or allocated to negotiate them.
On the other hand, they do sometimes present situations where all parties
can be made better off through negotiated solutions; they sometimes do offer
opportunities to focus on questions of mutual and global concern when other
issues are stalemated by more divisive national interests; and the small number
of individuals involved is itself an opportunity to develop new common under-
standings, precedents, and ways of approaching such issues for the future.
For all these reasons, we believe that international resource and environ-
mental issues present important and interesting topics for investigation in their
own right, as well as for the insights they may produce concerning more generic
issues of international negotiation processes. We also hope that such a research
agenda would both complement and add strength to the excellent program of
environmental research already under way at IIASA.
40.3. Formulating a Research Agenda
All of these differences helped to shape the group's attempt to outline priority
issues for further comparative or collaborative (international as well as interdis-
ciplinary) research. The group specified ten important research themes:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
What new international institutions (or what adaptations of existing insti-
tutions) do we need to handle international environmental disputes more
efficiently?
What roles should there be for nontraditional participants (citizens,
nongovernmental organizations, subnational units, etc.) in international
environmental dispute resolution?
What role does technical-scientific data (and technical support systems)
play in international environmental dispute resolution? How are data
verified? How are they transformed into policy or agreements?
What sorts of educational efforts and skill-building are needed to help
resolve transboundary environmental disputes more effectively?
How are national interests perceived and defined in international environ-
mental disputes?
How can linkages across and within issues be exploited in transboundary
environmental dispute resolution?
How should the parties involved determine what is negotiable and what is
not in international environmental disputes?
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(8) What role do the media play in shaping perceptions, stimulating public
concern, and in regulating the participation of various stakeholders in
transboundary environmental disputes?
(9) How does internal group or national conflict affect negotiations in
transboundary environmental disputes?
(10) What are the processes by which informally negotiated settlements of
transboundary environmental disputes are ratified?
Having compiled this list, our next objective was to select three or four of
these themes that might be the focus of preliminary study by members of the
group. Once these themes were selected, we hoped to prepare a series of Work-
ing Papers that we could discuss prior to the IIASA meeting in May 1987. We
also hoped to commission follow-up research efforts jointly with teams in other
PIN-sponsoring countries and to encourage doctoral students in the United
States to focus their dissertation research on the themes outlined and developed
by the group. Finally, several members of the group expressed interest in
developing an extensive prospectus for a book on international transboundary
environmental disputes that might encourage and direct further experimenta-
tion and theory-building.
40.4. Four Themes
The group requested and received proposals from individual members. Four were
selected.:
(1) Dorothy Nelkin, Professor of Science, Technology, and Society at Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York, agreed to prepare a Working Paper on The
Role 0/ the Media in International Environmental Negotiations.
(2) Konrad von Moltke, Senior Fellow at the Conservation Foundation in
Washington, D.C. and Adjunct Professor of Environmental Studies at
Dartmouth College, agreed to prepare a Working Paper on Scientists,
Environmentalists, Local and Regional Officials: Nontraditional Partici-
pants in International Environmental Negotiations.
(3) Christopher Joyner, Senior Research Fellow at the Marine Policy Center,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and Associate Professor of Political
Science at the George Washington University, agreed to prepare a Work-
ing Paper on US National Interests and The Antarctic Mineral Negotia-
tions Process.
(4) Francisco Szekely, Assistant Director for International Environmental
Studies, Energy and Environmental Policy Center, Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University, in conjunction with Scott McCreary, a
doctoral student in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at
MIT, agreed to prepare a Working Paper on Applying the Principles 0/
Environmental Dispute Resolution to International Transboundary
Resource Conflicts: The Case 0/ the US-Mexico Border.
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Drafts of these four papers were reviewed by the group at a meeting in
March 1987. Revisions have been made and the completed versions of the Work-
ing Papers will be available through the Working Paper series of the Program
on the Processes of International Negotiation at the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.
While the views contained in the papers do not necessarily represent the
views of all the Task Group members, the group as a whole has endorsed their
publication in the shared belief that they frame very important questions. In
addition, the ENR Task Group is eager to broker collaborative research efforts
with PIN-sponsored groups in other countries that share our interests.
40.4.1. The influence of the media
Was Three Mile Island an "accident" or an "incident"? Was Chernobyl a
"disaster" or an "event"? Is dioxin a "doomsday chemical" or a "potential
risk"? Are accidents "normal" or are they "aberrant" events? Dorothy Nelkin
points out that "selective use of adjectives can trivialize an event or render it
important; marginalize some groups, empower others, define an issue as a prob-
lem or reduce it to a routine". She points out that "the actual influence of these
judgments on environmental negotiations depends in part on the media's effect
on public attitudes and on policy decisions".
Professor Nelkin has reviewed most of the post-World War II research on
the media's impact. She points out that
the common thread running through most of this research is that the effect of the
media messages depends on the social and cultural context in which they are
received and on the selective interest and experience of the reader or television
viewer. In the case of esoteric environmental problems, people have little direct
information or pre-existing knowledge to guide an independent evaluation. Then
the media, as the major source of information, define the reality of the situation
for them.
Professor Nelkin believes that "the media ... establish a framework of
expectations that can help to set the goals and the agenda of negotiations. Once
covered in the press, isolated events soon take on meaning as public issues". In
addition,
journalists identify pressing issues for negotiation through their selection of
newsworthy events. They help create the judgmental biases that underlie the
positions of negotiators and the relationships that develop during the negotiations
process. They can set up the potential for negotiated agreements, influencing pat-
terns of legitimacy, creating demands for regulation and control, and putting pol-
itical pressures on those involved in international disputes. They stimulate
demands for accountability, forcing negotiators to justify themselves to their
constituencies.
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In addition to analyzing the factors that account for media coverage of
environmental problems in developed Western nations, Professor Nelkin goes on
to sketch a full-fledged study that would examine media coverage of similar
transboundary environmental disputes in different countries and its effect on
international negotiations. She focuses particularly on the ways in which the
media affect the agenda of negotiations, the process of negotiation and the rela-
tionships among the parties; the ways in which the media obtain information
about ongoing negotiations; and the effect the media can have on implementa-
tion of negotiated agreements.
In discussing Professor Nelkin's paper, the members of the Task Group
explored possible models that have been used to portray the mechanisms by
which media messages shape the public's agenda and perceptions and the ways
that these in turn are translated into standards and terms of agreement for up-
coming or on-going negotiations. There was general agreement that the opera-
tions of these mechanisms are terribly unclear at present.
40.4.2. The role of nontraditional participants
Professor von Moltke points out that "the underlying fiction of international
negotiations is that sovereign states can speak for all interests within their jur-
isdiction". He also asserts that "the need for international measures to protect
the environment has created a new problem in terms of participation in interna-
tional affairs by groups which have not traditionally had a role in them".
Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that "sovereign states can probably not speak
for the needs of environmental protection".
Professor von Moltke admits that it is "extremely unlikely that environ-
mental resources will be assigned rights by international law in the foreseeable
future". But he believes that there will be a "further enlargement of the circle of
persons and institutions which are recognized as having legitimate interests, and
consequently a right of participation in international negotiations". Such a right
will require the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure that it can be fully
and effectively exercised. "Among the groups most likely to receive such recogni-
tion are scientists, environmental organizations, and decentralized levels of
government, none of which have a recognized independent role in traditional
diplomacy" .
Professor von Moltke provides a detailed review of the ways in which scien-
tists and scholars participate in environmental policy debates within various
countries. His conclusion is that appropriate environmental decision-making
requires that some means be devised by which independent scientific analysis can
find its way into the resolution of ideological or political disputes. He does not,
however, have a specific suggestion as to how the involvement of independent
scientists in transboundary environmental dispute resolution might be accom-
plished.
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Along somewhat similar lines, Professor von Moltke explores the increasing
role for environmental advocacy groups in policy and site-specific disputes in a
number of Western nations and suggests that environmental interests exist at
the international (and perhaps global) level and that these need to be "articu-
lated effectively for purposes of negotiation" .
International negotiating processes have adjusted slowly to the existence of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In fact, as Professor von Moltke
reports, "the 1972 Stockholm Conference is widely viewed as a watershed event
for NGO participation in general, since this was the first instance in which the
United Nations made a systematic effort to include NGO input in an intergo-
vernmental conference". Under United Nations rules of procedure "a wide range
of organizations by now has ready access to the plenary negotiating sessions,
but the ability to actually influence decisions rests heavily on the ability to
obtain access to national delegations" .
"More than many other issues of international policy, environmental affairs
involve all levels of government: frequently the resources which require protec-
tion are controlled by local or regional authorities". Yet, as Professor von
Moltke indicates, "the issue of ensuring adequate participation of local and
regional authorities in international negotiations is not an issue which can be
solved internationally: it is largely a domestic issue for each country, particu-
larly for countries with federal structures" .
In reviewing Professor von Moltke's paper, the Task Group noted that the
problem of involving nontraditional interests in transboundary dispute resolution
was primarily a problem of structuring simultaneous and interlocking processes
of negotiation. Scientists from many countries might meet before or in parallel
with national delegations, but the dilemma is how to mesh what the two groups
deem to be important. Similarly, environmental or other NGOs might meet
before or during formal negotiations between countries; the question is how the
results of the separate meetings will be merged. While the Task Group did not
have specific recommendations regarding experiments that might be tried to
explore new process options, the members did feel strongly that international
collaboration on this question in the form of joint research efforts might be espe-
cially useful.
40.4.3. Defining national interests
As Professor Joyner defines it, the "national interest may be considered the gen-
eral, persistent, and long-term purpose the people and government of a state see
themselves serving". Thus, "a state's national interest is rooted in the social
consciousness and cultural identity of its people". Through a close look at the
multilateral negotiations that have taken place since 1982 among a select group
of states - the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties - Professor Joyner has
attempted to probe the mechanisms by which national interests have been for-
mulated and integrated into transboundary negotiations.
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Professor Joyner has categorized various subparts of a national interest. He
defines "primary national interests" as "those deemed essential to preserving a
state's physical, cultural and political identity. These can never be compromised
or traded off". Then he goes on to define "secondary", "permanent", "variable" ,
"general" , and "specific" national interests. The importance of each is examined
in the context of the Antarctic minerals negotiations.
The parties to this negotiation are
striving to create an institutional mechanism with a structure capable of efectively
managing mineral activities, promoting scientific cooperation, ensuring economic
priorities and protecting the circumpolar environment - all to be accomplished
without disturbing the geopolitical stability afforded by the pre-existing Antarctic
Treaty System.
The procedures that each country uses to determine its policy preferences (in
line with its national interests) are important. Professor Joyner looks particu-
larly at the internal negotiations process within the United States.
"The process of determining whether some Antarctic minerals policy
squares with the national interest begins with the basic formulation of the US in
an interagency task force". Then a basic formulation is set on paper. This is fol-
lowed by several rounds of internal and external review.
The Task Group spent a great deal of time discussing the points raised in
Professor Joyner's paper. In particular, the group explored the importance of
"unofficial" or "informal diplomacy" in defining the national interest. It also
examined the disproportionate impact that the chairman of the interagency task
force has in such a process. The group asked about the importance of the "deci-
sion rules" by which a final definition of national interests is made prior to enter-
ing into negotiations with other countries. Should "consensus" to be the goal?
The group tried to model the chain of events by which grassroots groups
might express their views to the individuals or party in power and how these
individuals in turn formulate instructions to the country's negotiating team. It
was intrigued with the problem of how best to redefine national interests in light
of the offers and information that arise during the international negotiations.
This was an area that the Task Group felt would lend itself to further (com-
parative) research.
40.4.4. Potential uses of mediation
Dr. Szekely and Mr. McCreary focused on the prospects for using mediation to
resolve transboundary environmental disputes. They concentrated on sewage and
air quality disagreements between the United States and Mexico. They con-
cluded that the full process of mediation currently being used to resolve domestic
environmental disputes is not likely to work in an international context. They
also believe, though, that some elements of environmental mediation -
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particularly the assistance that a nonpartisan facilitator can provide in generat-
ing new options - are applicable in international situations.
Dr. Szekeley and Mr. McCreary summarize the key attributes of conven-
tional bilateral negotiations and compare them with the features of environmen-
tal mediation as practiced within the United States. Conventional negotiations
are handled by formal delegations and constrained by national legislation, bilat-
eral treaties, and the rules of international law. Each delegation usually arrives
with predetermined statements of its position, from which it cannot depart sub-
stantially. Information is generated separately by the parties and often withheld.
Each side has its position and perhaps a fallback. Very few options are gen-
erated jointly. Much of this process would have to be changed if the model of
environmental mediation were adopted.
The negotiations would be conducted informally, almost in a joint
problem-solving style. The interactions would be managed by a "neutral"
acceptable to both (or all) parties. The separate groups would work to develop
information jointly and to invent as many options for mutual gain as they could.
The ground rules for their interaction would be invented on an ad hoc basis by
the parties themselves. The result of the negotiations would be a consensus
document that the countries would then have to transform into a binding agree-
ment through the more traditional treaty-implementing machinery.
Szekely and McCreary explore why such a process might well have been of
value in the case of the US-Mexican negotiation over sewage problems between
San Diego and Tijuana, and conclude that the negotiations were less productive
than they might have been because the parties quickly locked themselves into
stringent negotiating positions that left little room for creative problem-solving
that would have served both sides interests more effectively.
Szekely and McCreary propose a research agenda that they hope will
interest scholars in other countries for exploring the possible uses of mediation in
bilateral environmental negotiations. They suggest that the United States and
Canada as well as Switzerland and Germany explore the prospects for mediating
acid rain disputes. Secondly, they propose collaborative case studies on the
export of hazardous waste involving Belgium, France, and Austria. Finally,
they propose case studies of "transfrontier fisheries exploitation" involving Cana-
dian, Japanese, and Australian counterparts.
40.5. Future Directions
The Environment and Natural Resources Task Group has only scratched the
surface. There is a great deal more to be done in just defining the issues that
ought to be the focus of future research. We believe that we have identified ten
useful themes. Weare also pleased that the first four papers we commissioned
have helped us to develop a clearer sense of how these themes might be explored
further.
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All four themes that became the subjects of the papers we commissioned
could well be looked at by counterpart groups in other countries. We are well
aware that our bias toward the American experience may be leading us in direc-
tions that are not especially interesting or appropriate when looked at from
other vantage points. That is why we feel so strongly that the next step ought to
be to put together, with IIASA's help, international teams of PIN-sponsored
researchers who can take a truly cross-cultural perspective on the important
environmental and natural resource questions that are the focus of our inquiry.

CHAPTER 4:1
The Politics of Ozone:
What Determines National Policies
Toward the Protection of the
Ozone Layer?
Tapani Vaahtoranta
University 0/ Turku
Turku
Finland
4:1.1. Introduction
Man may be changing the distribution and the quantity of the stratospheric
ozone layer to an extent that will have adverse global consequences. Since no
part of the earth is likely to escape the biological and climatic effects of ozone
depletion, protection of stratospheric ozone should be in the interest of all
governments. However, no binding international regulations on potentially
harmful activities have been implemented. Why are sovereign states not acting,
although they are facing a potential global threat? What explains national poli-
cies? Both system-level and domestic factors seem to influence national prefer-
ences.
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41.2. The Global Commons
T. Vaahtoranta
International pollution is a phenomenon where polluting agents emitted by a
source state are transmitted through a medium bringing about detrimental
effects in the territory of another state. The international commons are those
parts of the biosphere that are beyond the national jurisdiction of any country.
They are the property of no state. The atmosphere and the ozone layer are
examples of the global commons. No state can avoid the global consequences of
ozone depletion, nor can it be prevented from emitting pollutants into the atmo-
sphere. If ozone is depleted, all states will be victims, including those emitting
pollutants.
It is sometimes pointed out that, although no state can escape the harmful
effects of pollution of the global commons, every state gains by polluting them.
This is due to the fact that each state gets all the benefits from national pollut-
ing activity, but its harmful effects are shared among all states. Besides, without
international cooperation unilateral measures to reduce emissions would not stop
international pollution. Consequently, no rational state should be willing volun-
tarily to reduce pollution. This pessimistic assumption of the politics of interna-
tional pollution has led to the conclusion that the policy of sovereign states will
end up in the global "tragedy of the commons" [Hardin (1977), Ophuls (1977)1.
The tragedy may, however, be avoided, since in the long run pollution of
the global commons is likely to have adverse impacts on all states. The com-
mons can be polluted freely as long as clean air or water is abundant. Restric-
tions become necessary when pollution is about to produce catastrophic effects.
Since the enclosure of the global commons is impossible, international coopera-
tion is the only peaceful way of avoiding the tragedy [Brown d aI. (1977), Wijk-
man (1982)]. It is currently debated whether rational states are willing and able
to accept behavioral constraints to maximize their own long-term gains, Le., to
avoid the tragedy by forming international regimes [1].
41.3. Ozone Depletion
The ozone depletion theory was first presented in 1974 (Molina and Rowland).
It was claimed that chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) chemicals would be transported to
high altitudes, destroying ozone. Less stratospheric ozone means that more
harmful solar ultraviolet-B (UV-B) radiation is reaching the earth's surface.
UV-B is known to cause human skin cancer. Ozone depletion is also likely to
cause other harmful biological and climatic effects. Despite intense research,
many uncertainties still remain concerning the theory. The amount of likely
ozone depletion and its causes and effects are not known without doubt. Since
the publication of the Molina-Rowland theory, the magnitude of the predicted
ozone depletion has varied between 3% and 20%. And no general agreement
exists on the cause of the observed thinning of ozone over the Antarctic.
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There are four major CFCs that are produced in commercial quantities:
CFC-ll, CFC-12, CFC-22 and CFC-1l3. CFC-ll and CFC-12 are used as aero-
sol propellants. CFC-11 is also used extensively in manufacturing plastic foams.
CFC-12 and CFC-22 are used as coolants in refrigeration and in air conditioning
applications. The use of CFC-1l3 as a solvent in the electronic industry is grow-
ing rapidly. In assessing the significance of each CFC as a potential ozone
depleter, both the amount of production and the lifetime in the stratosphere
must be considered. The major CFCs in this regard are CFC-ll and CFC-12.
Both have high production levels and relative depletion potency. CFC-1l3 is
produced in smaller quantities, but it is thought to be almost as effective a
potential ozone depleter as CFC-ll and CFC-12 [Hammit et aI. (1986), Gibbs
(1986)].
CFCs were first developed in the 19308 [Gibbs (1986)]. During the 1950s
and 19608 CFC-ll and CFC-12 production grew rapidly, more than 10% per
year. The rapid growth came to an end in the 1970s. Because of concern about
the potential effects of CFCs on the ozone layer, several nations unilaterally re-
stricted their use as aerosol propellants. As a result of these national regula-
tions, production of CFC-ll and CFC-12 declined in the 19708, although their
nonaerosol applications continued to grow into the 19808. By now the full effects
of the unilateral restrictions have been seen and aerosol use in countries without
regulations is growing. Production has returned to nearly the same level
achieved before the implementation of national restrictions. Current production
of CFC-ll and CFC-12 accounts for about 80% of all CFC production in the
world. Use of CFC-22 and CFC-1l3 has steadily grown since the 1960s. Conse-
quently, the overall trend in CFC use is upward, both for aerosol and nonaerosol
applications.
41.4. International Negotiations
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) established in 1981 an
Ad Hoc Working Group consisting of legal and technical experts appointed by
governments to elaborate a global framework convention for the protection of the
ozone layer. The Working Group met for the first time in January 1982. It held
a total of four sessions [2]. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer was signed in 1985 by 20 states and the EC. The emphasis of the
convention is on scientific research and information exchange, since governments
could not agree upon specific regulatory measures to protect the ozone layer.
The Vienna conference, however, adopted a resolution requesting UNEP to con-
vene a working group to continue work on a protocol on regulatory measures.
This protocol was signed on 16 September 1987 by 24 states including the EC.
The protocol must be ratified by states representing two-thirds of the world's
consumption of these chemicals, in order to enter into force.
The emphasis of this chapter is on the national preferences expressed dur-
ing the negotiations leading to the Vienna Convention. The following states sent
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experts or observers to attend all four sessions of the Ad Hoc Working Group:
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America. The major western industrial nations strongly
inB.uenced the progress and the outcome of the negotiations. They also produce
most of the world's chloroB.uorocarbons.
The Nordic countries worked actively from the beginning for internation-
ally binding regulations on CFC emissions. Sweden, Norway and Denmark also
implemented unilateral restrictions on aerosol uses of chloroB.uorocarbons [3].
Finland, Norway and Sweden submitted a draft text of the convention at the
first session of the Working Group. The text served as a basis for the work.
Denmark had also participated in preparing the draft text. In the view of the
Nordic governments, despite existing uncertainties, the essential part of the evi-
dence clearly pointed towards worldwide reduction of CFC emissions [4]. Article
1 of the draft contained the basic obligation: "The contracting parties shall
limit, reduce and prevent activities under their jurisdiction or control which have
or are likely to have adverse effects upon the stratospheric ozone-layer". Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden hoped that concrete measures of regulation could be
specified in an annex to be attached to the convention [5].
The Netherlands clearly supported the general obligation of the Nordic
draft. Others considered that the evidence did not point to the need for such
action, and that international cooperation should therefore mainly relate to
improving scientific knowledge of the problem. This view was expressed particu-
larly by Japan, which considered regulatory measures "premature" [6]. The
need for an annex that would be an integral part of the convention was also
questioned. It was considered more appropriate to adopt protocols that would
enable each state to decide whether it wished to join only the convention or also
the regulatory protocol.
Later four alternative texts were proposed for Article 2, now containing the
general obligations. They ranged from urgently imposing specific obligations to
protect the ozone layer to merely exchanging scientific information. Three
groups of countries could be recognized at the second sessions [7]. The Nordic
countries aimed at bringing about an internationally binding instrument to pro-
tect the ozone layer. The Netherlands, Switzerland and, with reservations, Aus-
tralia, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany shared their view. Canada
and the Federal Republic of Germany also had unilaterally reduced use of CFCs
in aerosols, and the Netherlands had introduced warning labels on aerosol con-
tainers stating that CFCs were decreasing the ozone in the stratosphere.
The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan formed the
group clearly opposing the Nordic initiative. The United States, however, was
the first country to impose unilateral restrictions on chloroB.uorocarbons. The
manufacture and distribution of fluorocarbons for nonessential aerosol uses were
banned in 1978 [8]. The United States was agreeable to a protocol concerning
nonessential aerosol uses, but maintained that more research was needed before
other regulations could be implemented [9].
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France, Japan, and the United Kingdom were among the most reluctant
western industrialized nations to agree on Huorocarbon regulations. None had
implemented unilateral restrictions on CFC emissions. France and the United
Kingdom, however, adopted the recommendations made by the European Com-
munity. In 1980, the Council of the European Community required member
states to take appropriate measures not to increase the CFC-11 and CFC-12 pro-
duction capacity and to reduce by at least 30% the aerosol use of these CFCs by
the end of 1981 compared with 1976 levels.
The third group consisted of the developing countries that were mainly
concerned about the costs of the convention. They were particularly interested
in avoiding any stipulations that would endanger the building up of industries in
their countries.
In 1983 Finland, Norway, and Sweden submitted a new draft text of a
regulatory annex where the Huorocarbons and their uses were considered in two
parts. Article 1 contained the measures for ending the used of CFC-11 and
CFC-12 in aerosol cans, except for essential uses. Article 2 referred to measures
to control, limit and reduce emissions of CFCs in the sectors of plastic foam,
refrigeration, solvents and others. The authors later agreed to regard the text as
a proposed protocol [10].
The new Nordic approach had important results. The United States,
Canada and New Zealand supported the general objective of Article 1, although
they considered Article 2 inappropriate at that time. Australia, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Switzerland accepted, with few reservations, the Nordic draft.
In other words, the United States and the Nordic nations together demanded
internationally binding regulations on nonessential aerosol use of CFCs. Bel-
gium and the United Kingdom took a more negative stand by arguing that Arti-
cle 1 went too far. No protocol should, according to them, go further than the
limitations accepted by the European Community. Italy did not want to discuss
any regulations before the signing of the convention, and Japan totally rejected
the Nordic proposal [11]. Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece and the United Kingdom eventually submitted an alternative to the
Nordic draft protocol on binding emission regulations, recommending only more
research [12].
A newly formed coalition, consisting of Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden,
and the United States (the Toronto Group), submitted in 1982 a new draft pro-
tocol, which became the basis of the discussion. Three other states, Austria,
Denmark and Switzerland, supported the draft. The concrete goal of the draft
protocol was a reduction of the use of CFCs in aerosol spray cans [13J. Critics of
the draft saw no need for a protocol dealing with the limitation and reduction of
CFCs emissions. Specifically, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France supported
the implementation of a production capacity cap [14].
The disputes could not be settled before the signing of the Vienna Conven-
tion, and the conference adopted a resolution requesting UNEP to set up a work-
ing group to continue to strive to arrive at a protocol. Japan was the only coun-
try arguing that it was too early to decide on continuing the work [15]. Although
the main difference between the approaches has remained since the conference,
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states seem to be reaching a compromise. The Toronto Group aimed at gradu-
ally reducing use and production of CFC and eventually banning all use. The
EC countries first tentatively agreed to implement a production freeze on some
CFCs and later to reduce production by 20%.
Upon entry into force of the protocol to limit and reduce consumption of
CFCs, production of CFCs would be capped at the 1986 level, reduced by 20%
after three years and then by another 30% after eight years. The protocol is
expected to enter into force by 1991 [16J.
4:1.6. Explaining National Policies
It is commonly assumed in the study of international relations that states are
rationally behaving actors pursuing self-interest. In system-level explanations it
is further assumed that each state calculates the costs and benefits of alternative
courses of action, depending on its position in the structure of the international
system. The system is supposed to determine the behavior of all states, and
domestic characteristics rarely influence the outcomes of national policies at the
system level. This view is well argued in Waltz (1979, pp. 79-101).
If one applies these assumptions to the politics of international pollution,
the primary goal of each state should be to keep its own area free from adverse
effects of pollution. Every state should aim at exporting its own pollutants into
the territories of other states or into the international commons and at reducing
that part of international pollution it is importing. The position of a state in the
import-export structure of international pollution makes it either a net exporter
or net importer of pollutants and their adverse effects. Net importers should
support international regulations on pollution and net exporters should oppose
them.
In the case of the ozone layer, each government would presumably have all
others eliminate their ozone-depleting emissions and make its own contribution
only to the extent that it is a net benefit for its own country. Since each state
gets all the benefits from emitting CFCs and the harmful effects of emissions are
divided among all states, it should not be in the short-term interest of any state
to regulate chlorofluorocarbon emissions. This is the fear of Garett Hardin
(1977): the tragedy of the commons may result, since all states are likely to be
free riders when the pollution of the international commons should be regulated.
But states are not placed in the same way in the structure of CFC pollu-
tion. The positions differ depending on the amount of chlorofluorocarbons states
are emitting, and they may not be equally vulnerable to adverse effects of ozone
depletion. The structural propositions concerning state behavior in the politics
of ozone can be stated as follows:
(1) The more CFCs the state emits into the atmosphere in relation to the
amount of adverse effects likely to be caused in its territory by all
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chlorofluorocarbon emissions, the less likely a state is to engage in interna-
tional cooperation to reduce the emissions.
(2) The more adverse effects the CFCs emissions are likely to cause in the ter-
ritory of a state in relation to the amount of chlorofluorocarbons emitted by
it, the more likely a state is to favor international controls on CFC emis-
sions.
The effects of ozone depletion are not likely to be equally distributed.
Light-skinned populations in the Northern Hemisphere are known to be more
vulnerable to ultraviolet radiation than are darker-skinned populations. It is
assumed that, owing to the low rates of skin cancer in Japan, the Japanese
would be less concerned about potential ozone depletion. Some Britons are said
to believe that they would actually benefit from increased ultraviolet radiation
despite their less-pigmented skin. But it seems unreasonable to explain national
policy on the basis of these assumptions. Too many uncertainties are related to
the potential consequences of ozone depletion. Besides, it is assumed that the
mild temperature increases causes by ozone depletion would aid agriculture in
the Northern Hemisphere, but would have seriously adverse effects in the rest of
the world [17]. No part of the world is likely to avoid all harmful effects of ozone
depletion, nor are consequences known without doubt. It seems more reasonable
to see how much each state is depleting ozone in order to determine its position
in the pollution structure.
Production of CFC-ll and CFC-12 are here used to determine the CFC
pollution structure (Table -11.1), since they are the most important potential
ozone depleters. The table illustrates the situation in 1974, when the
Molina-Rowland theory was published. The US share of total production has
dropped since the middle of the 1970s to about 30% because of its unilateral ban
on aerosol uses of CFCs. A state benefits from CFC production by selling a part
of it and consuming the rest. In either case the CFCs are eventually transported
into the stratosphere. Major producers of fluorocarbons also are their main con-
sumers. Those states producing most CFCs should, according to the structural
proposition, be the most reluctant to accept regulations on this industry.
The pollution structure seems to determine the extreme approaches to the
ozone issue. First, the Nordic countries, Austria and Switzerland produce no
CFC-ll or CFC-12, and all strongly support binding regulations on fluorocarbon
emissions. Second, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom are main pro-
ducers and have opposed the Nordic initiatives. The Soviet position is more
ambiguous. The Soviet Union neither supported the Nordic initiatives, nor
openly joined France, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom. Although the
Soviet Union produced relatively little CFCs in 1974, by the end of this century
its production of CFC-ll and CFC-12 may grow faster than production in any
other country [Quinn et aI. (1986), pp. 41-42].
The preferences of the United States, Canada, the Netherlands and, to a
lesser extent, the Federal Republic of Germany are more problematic. Accord-
ing to the pollution structure, they should have a more negative attitude toward
regulations. Domestic determinants must be considered to explain their policy.
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Table ~1.1. Production of CFC-ll and CFC-12 in 1974 (thousand tons) [18].
Country
USA
Federal Republic of Germany
France
United Kingdom
Japan&
Italy
USSR
Netherlands
Canada
Australia
aproduction In 1973.
Production
376.0
88.3
72.0
72.0
40.3
38.0
32.1
29.0
23.5
16.0
As cited in Enloe (1975, p. 132): "The wealthy worry about car fumes. We
worry about starvation". It is is often assumed that rich nations want environ-
mental protection, since they can afford it. This seems to conform rather well to
the politics of ozone (Table ~1.1!).
Table ~l.e. Gross domestic product per capita in 1974 (US dollars) (Statistical Yearbook).
Country
United States
Canada
Federal Republic of Germany
France
Netherlands
Australia
Japan
United Kingdom
Italy
Soviet Union
GDP per capita
6,640
6,080
5,890
5,190
4,880
4,760
3,800
3,360
2,770
2,300
The United States, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany are
wealthier than those major CFC producers opposing international regulations on
emissions. The low level of economic development of developing countries
explains why they are worried that international protection of the ozone layer
may become too costly by preventing them from developing new industries.
According to a common political explanation of environmental policy,
important bureaucracies in all countries favor economic growth. Only public
pressure can make governments spend on environmental protection. Effective
public pressure has two preconditions. First, concrete incidents of environmen-
tal degradation must take place. Second, the political system must allow raising
environmental issues and pressuring decision-makers. The United Kingdom,
Japan, and the USSR are mentioned as countries where the political system
dampens citizen mobilization IEnioe (1975), Kelley d aI. (1976)]. In Canada, the
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Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States environ-
mental protection has been a highly salient issue. This seems to conform to their
policy toward the protection of the ozone layer. But in another case of air pollu-
tion - acid rain - their preferences differ. The Federal Republic of Germany,
Canada and the Netherlands favor restrictions on sulfur emissions causing acid
rain, but the United States did not join the agreement calling for a 30% reduc-
tion of sulfur emissions. Why? Pollution structure may also explain this
difference.
There are concrete incidents of environmental degradation in the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Canada, since all are net importers of
international pollution. The Federal Republic of Germany and Canada suffer
from acid rain caused beyond their borders. As a downstream country the Neth-
erlands imports the pollutants emitted into the Rhine by the upstream states.
The governments are under strong public pressure to reduce pollution. This
pressure and the position of their countries as net importers of some interna-
tional pollution may explain why they also have a positive attitude toward the
protection of the ozone layer. They may hope that policy in the ozone negotia-
tions could enhance leverage with their main polluters.
In the United States, however, the "high environmental consciousness"
does not seem to determine policy toward all international pollution. Public
pressure does not seem to be enough, if a country is a net exporter of interna-
tional pollution and strong domestic interest groups are against regulations. The
United States exports three times as much acid pollutants to Canada as it
imports from it; and the electric utility industry, high-sulfur coal producers and
the United Mine Workers oppose proposals calling for reduction in sulfur emis-
sions [Wilcher (1986)1. The chlorofluorocarbon issues is different. The costs of
regulating aerosol uses of CFCs were low in the United States. An economic
impact assessment completed in 1977 estimated that restrictions would impose
only modest, short-term costs and that consumers would actually save in the
long run by relying on cheaper substitutes. The 1978 ban of nonessential aerosol
uses of CFCs conformed to this estimate [Stool et al. (1983), p. 58, Cumberland
et ai. (1982), pp. 79-81, 88-92]. Recently, the US CFC industry has had success
in developing new forms of fluorocarbons that do not threaten the ozone layer.
Not surprisingly, the environmentally conscious public got an influential ally
when Du Pont, the largest producer of CFCs in the world, called in 1986 for a
worldwide limit on emissions of the harmful chemicals [191.
41.6. Conclusions
Garret Hardin is afraid of the global tragedy. If all states find it rational to pol-
lute the global commons, ecocatastrophe will occur. Only a radical change in
state behavior could avoid the tragedy. But the experience of the ozone negotia-
tions implies that all states do not behave according to the Hardin's pessimistic
assumption.
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States producing no chlorofluorocarbons want to protect the ozone layer.
Controlling CFC emissions would not cost them much, and the potential damage
to their population and environment caused by ozone depletion would be
reduced. Since these countries have very few means of pressuring the main pro-
ducers, their policy alone is not likely to save the ozone layer.
The group of CFC producers favoring international regulations is more
important in avoiding the tragedy. Also, the policy of these countries seems to
be determined by pollution structure. They all are net importers of other types
of international pollution. In other words, local or regional ecocatastrophes seem
to be needed before main polluters join the international environmental effort.
Domestic economic factors also seem to affect national environmental pol-
icy. The more economic resources a country has and the less costly reducing pol-
lution is, the more likely a country is to support international regulations on pol-
lution.
The analysis of the ozone negotiations suggests that the tragedy of the glo-
bal commons may not be inevitable. A protocol specifying regulatory measures
to reduce CFC emissions was signed in September 1987. States seem to be able
to form regimes to maximize their long-term ecological interests. But one must
remain cautious. The ozone depletion theory was already established in 1974.
The protocol was a compromise, and only a first step towards the original Nordic
goal. Since the phenomenon of ozone depletion is not completely understood, we
do not know if the regulations go far enough.
Notes
[1]
[41
l~l
[8]
9]
l°l1112
For the literature on international regimes, see particularly Axelrod and Keohane
(1985); Brown et al. (1977); Keohane (1983 and 1984); Krasner (1983); Stein
(1983); and Young (1986).
The final report of the Ad Hoc Working Group is UNEP/IG.53/4.
For unilateral regulations on chlorofluorocarbons, see, e.g., Bevington (1986);
Environmental Policy and Law (1983); Stool et al. (1983); and Gladwin et al.
(1982).
Statements of 20 January 1982 by Erik Lykke, Director General, Ministry of
Environment, Norway; and by Dr. Antti Kulmala, Representative of Finland.
UNEP/WG.69/3, p. 1 and UNEP/WG.69/CRP.2, p. 2.
UNEP/WG .69/CRP.1.
Environmental Policy and Law (1983); UNEP/WG.78/8, pp. 2-3, 5; and
UNEP/WG.78/CRP.I0.
Exempted essential uses include some drugs, pesticides, lubricants, and cleaners
for electronic equipment, and articles necessary for safe aircraft operation. These
uses constituted in 1979 only 4.3% of the total use of CFCs in the United States.
UNEP/WG.94/5, p. 3.
Environmental Policy and Law (1983) and UNEP/WG.94/r, p. 3.
UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.l, 2, and 3.
UNEP/WG.94/CRP 34.
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[13]
I~il
[17]
[181
[19]
Introduction of Draft Protocol, Geneva, 22 October 1984. Address delivered by
Canadian delegate, Dr. A.J. Chisholm, on behalf of Canada, Finland, Sweden,
Norway, and the United States.
UNEP/WG.110/4, pp. 9-10.
UNEP/IG.53/5, p. 2.
See World Environment Report, 25.6.1986, pp. 99j International Herald Tribune,
18.12.1986; Helsingin Sanomat 28.2.1987; and International Herald Tribune, 2-
3.5.1987, p. 6.
For the likely impacts of ozone depletion on different parts of the world, see, e.g.,
Cumberland et al. (1982, pp. 32-33, 57) and Stool et al. (1983, p. 69).
The production of the OECD countries is published in Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (1982, p. 39). The Soviet figure is from Fluorocar-
bon Program Panel (1985, p. 14). The countries included in Table 41.1 produce
almost all the world's CFC-11 and CFC-12. Small quantities of these
chlorofluorocarbons are also produced in Argentina, China, Brazil, India, Spain,
and Eastern Europe.
International Herald Tribune, 18.12.1986 and 14.4.1987.
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An Experimental System
Supporting Negotiation on a
Joint Development Program
Piotr Bronisz and Lech Krus
Systems Research Institute
Polish Academy of Sciences
Warsaw
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42.1. Introduction
International cooperation presents many examples of bargaining problems. Let
us consider several countries interested in the development of production of some
kind of goods. Each country can decide to realize its own independent develop-
ment program or they can create a joint program. Undertaking a joint develop-
ment program can result in benefits (due to scale effects) in comparison to pro-
grams developed independently. Thus there is an incentive for cooperation and
negotiation on benefit allocation among countries.
A development program is characterized by volumes of produced goods
and required resources. It is typically considered as a unicriterion problem in
which the cost of resources is minimized under the assumed volumes of
developed production, or the production is maximized under the constraints
resulting from the given limited resources. Such unicriterion models are not suit-
able for real decision-making problems. Decision-makers, especially in non-
market economy countries, have various preferences related to the particular
kind of resources and the volume of developed production. Let us observe that
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prices in nonmarket economies are not necessarily a good way for aggregating
resources into a joint cost. Therefore, we might also consider a multicriteria
model in which particular resources are considered as independent criteria to be
minimized and amounts of the produced goods to be maximized. An experimen-
tal system illustrates a new algorithm of interactive search for a cooperative,
efficient solution in a multicriteria bargaining problem.
42.2. Problem Formulation
Let N = {1,2, ... ,n} be the finite set of players (decision-makers), each player
having m objectives. A multicriteria bargaining problem can be described in the
form (8, 8 1, 82, .•. , 8n), where 8i E R m is a disagreement set of the ith
player, i EN, 8 E Rn*m is an agreement set of all the players.
The bargaining problem has the following intuitive interpretation: every
point x, x = (xl,x2' ...'xn), Xi = (xil,xi2' ... ' xim) E R m , in the agreement set 8
represents payoffs for all the players that can be reached when they cooperate
with each other (Xij denotes the payoff of the jth objective for the ith player).
If the players do not cooperate, each player i E N can reach the payoffs from
his disagreement set 8i . The players are interested in finding an outcome in 8
that will be agreeable to all of them
We say that x E Ri: is a Pareto-optimal point in X if there is no
11 E X such that 1I::f x, 11 ~ x .
For simplicity, we assume that each player tries to maximize each of his
objectives. The proposed interactive process consists of two phases. In the first
phase, each player i ENacts independently of the others on his disagreement
set 8 i to select the most preferable Pareto-optimal point di . In the second
phase, the players bargain over the agreement set 8, assuming that d = (d l ,
d2, • •• , dn) is the status quo of the players.
42.3. First Phase: Multiobjective Decision Problem
To select a Pareto-optimal outcome in 8 i , i E N, we utilize the Rawlsian lex-
min principle [see Rawls (1971); Imai (1983)]. The proposed approach is very
close to the achievement function concept [Wierzbicki (1982)] from the point of
view of the user. Analogously, a special parametric scalarization of the multiob-
jective problem is utilized to influence the selection of Pareto-optimal outcomes
by changing reference points. Under some nonrestrictive assumptions about the
sets 8i , i E N, they can be determined in a simple way (even in a case of com-
plicated nonconvex sets where the problem of maximizing the Tchebyshev norm
can be ill-conditioned). The corresponding algorithm is based on several (at
most m) directional maximizations using, for example, a bisection method that
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works very quickly and effectively. [For a more detailed description, see Bronisz,
Krus, and Lopuch (1987)].
42.4. Second Phase: Cooperation
Let di E Si be the Pareto-optimal outcome in Si determined in the first phase
by the ith player, i EN, and let d = (d1,d2, ... ,dn) be the resulting status quo
point. Now we reduce the problem to the pair (S,d) , where S is the agree-
ment set. If there is a point xES such that x > d, then the cooperation of the
players is profitable.
We are interested in a constructive procedure that is acceptable to all
players, starts at the status quo point and leads to a Pareto-optimal point in
S. The procedure can be described as a sequence, {d t } :=0 , of agreement
points dt such that
dO = d , dt E S , dt 2: dt- 1, for t = 1,2,. ", d t
is a Pareto-optimal point in S. (The assumption dt 2: dt - 1 follows from the
fact that no player will accept improvement of payoffs for other players at the
cost of his concession). At every round t, each player i E N specifies his
improvement direction >..: E R m, >..! > 0 and his confidence coefficient
a! E R , 0 < al $ 1. The improvement direction >..: indicates the ith player's
preferences over his objectives at round t. The confidence coefficient al is
introduced because any player has limited ability to describe precisely his perfor-
mances and to predict all possible outcomes in S.
We propose an interactive negotiation process defined by a sequence [for
justification, see Bronisz, Krus, and Wierzbicki (1987)]:
{dt}~o such that ~=d,
dt = dt- 1 + ft. [u(s,dt-1,>..t) _ dt-1j for t = 1,2, ...
(42.1)
where >..t E Rn*m, >..t = (>..f, >..~, ... ,>..~) is the improvement direction specified
jointly by all players, u(S,dt-1,>..t) E Rn*m is the utopia point relative to the
direction >.. t at round t defined by
u(S,dt-1,>..t) =
(ul(S,dt-1,>..f)), u2(S,dt-l,>..~), ... , un(S,dt-l,>..~)).
(42.2)
ui(S,dt-1,>..h = (42.3)
max {x o E Rm . xES x> dt- 1 x· = d~-l + a>..~ for some a E R }.~I • ,- '11 1
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M t· (t t t t ) R h t· th . Ioreover, f = min aI' a2"'" an,a~ax E , were a max IS e maxima
number a such that dt- l + a[u(S,dt - ,At) - dt-lj belongs to S.
Intuitively, the utopia point u(S,dt-l,An relative to the direction At
reflects the "aspiration levels" of the particular players when the improvement
direction At is specified at round t. The individual outcome ui(S,dt-\An is
the maximal payoff in S for the ith player from dt - l according to improve-
ment direction At, while ft is the minimal confidence coefficient of the
players at round t (we assume that no player can agree on a coefficient greater
than his) such that a new calculated agreement point belongs to S. It can be
shown [Bronisz, Krus, and Lopuch (1987)] that such a procedure is finite and
converges to a Pareto-optimal point in S under a relatively weak assumption.
42.5. Simplified Model of a Joint Development Program
The model relates to two countries (treated as players) that consider implemen-
tation of development programs. A program requires some amount of resources
of various kinds and gives as a result some volume of production. Each country
can realize the project independently, or they can decide on a joint develop-
ment program. A joint program, owing to scale effects, can allow for a
decrease of required resources at a given production volume or an increase of
the production under given resources in comparison to two independent pro-
grams.
In the model, two kinds of resources are considered: labor and capital.
Each player is assumed to maximize the obtained production volume and to
minimize the resources put in the joint program. The problem consists in a
choice of the production scale of the joint program and the sharing of the
required resources and of the production volume - which should be agreeable
and possibly close to the preferences of the players.
To deal with the case of maximization of objectives only, we assume that
each player has given a disposable fund of capital assets Ci E R+, and dispos-
able labor resources Li E R+ i = 1,2, and tries to maximize slack variables
SCi = Ci - ci' and sli = Li - Ii' where ci, Ii are the capital and labor resources,
respectively, which should be put into the joint project by the ith player.
The development program, which can be realized on various scales, is
described by two functions:
where C(p) are capital assets required in the program ofthe scale or production
volume p, and I(p) are labor resources required in the program. Assumed shapes
of the functions are presented in Figure 42.1. A similar shape has been obtained
by Bronisz and Krus (1986) in an example of a joint water resources project. In
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the model, the same forms of the functions are assumed for independently and
jointly realized programs, but even in this case the problem is not trivial.
c
p
Figure .1£.1. The functions c(p) and I(p).
Each player i = 1,2 maximizes three objectives: Pi' sCi' sli . The
disagreement sets are described by: Si C Rt
Si = { (Pi,sci,sli) E R 3 : c(Pi) ::; Gi - SCi'
I(Pi) ::; Li-sli}, i = 1,2.
The agreement set has the form: S C R~ x 3
s = ((PI,scI,sII,P2,8C2,sI2) E R6 : c(PI + P2) ~ 01 + 02 - SCI - SC2'
I(P1 + P2) ::; L 1 + L2 - sll - sI2}'
(42.4)
(42.5)
In this example, the negotiation process proposed above has been incor-
porated into an experimental system of bargaining support.
42.6. Short Program Description
The experimental system of bargaining support with multiple objectives has been
built for a simplified model outlined in the previous section. It can be considered
as an illustration of the theoretical results related to the interactive process in a
multicriteria bargaining problem and its application in support of negotiations.
The program description is illustrated by Figures .If!.!! through ,1f!.IO from an
example session.
The system aids two players, each maximizing three objectives, to find an
acceptable, cooperative, Pareto-optimal solution in an interactive procedure.
This is done in two phases:
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(1) A status quo is derived.
(2) A cooperative solution is found.
The status quo is defined as being a composition of the outcomes preferable to
players in the noncooperative case. The cooperative solution is found in an itera-
tive process starting from the status quo point.
The main menu is presented in Figure .11.11. By selecting F2 and F3,
respectively, players 1 and 2 can activate the first phase.
The first phase deals with the noncooperative case, in which the players
look for preferable outcomes assuming independent realizations of the develop-
ment programs. Each player determines Pareto-optimal outcomes and selects
the preferable one. This is done in two steps. In the first step, the player defines
reference points in his objective space according to his preferences. The system
calculates related Pareto-optimal outcomes using the approach described in Sec-
tion 42.3. In the second step, the player selects the preferable outcome among
the obtained outcomes. Figure .e.9 shows the status quo (first phase) menu, and
Figure .e.• illustrates an example of results obtained by player 1. Having seven
points characterizing the Pareto set in numerical and in graphic forms, the
player has selected the seventh one as the preferable outcome. Player 2 acts in
the first phase in an analogous way. After that, by selecting F4 in the main
menu, the players go to the second phase.
The second phase deals with the cooperative case. It proceeds in a number
of iterations. Each iteration consists of two stages (see Figure .11.5, the negotiate
menu):
(1) Both players define their desired, preferable directions for outcomes
improvements.
(2) The system calculates the cooperative outcome on the basis of the status
quo point and the directions of improvement specified by the players
according to the solution concept presented in Section 42.4.
In the first stage, each player tests directions improving his outcome and
selects a preferable one. This is done in three steps (see Figure .e.6 the find
player direction menu). In the first step, the player defines a step coefficient. In
the second step, the player defines improvement directions according to his
preferences. Then the system calculates related improved outcomes, assuming
that the improvement direction of the counter player does not change (Le., the
direction of the counter player is assumed to be the same as in the previous
iteration). In the third step, the player selects the preferable direction among
the tested directions. Figure .e.7 gives an example of the results obtained by
player 1. The player has selected the fourth direction as the preferred one.
The cooperative outcome is calculated in the second stage (activated by F4
of the negotiate menu). The cooperative outcome can be pictured by F2-F3 of
the calculate agreement point menu (see Figure .11.8).
The process is repeated until a Pareto-optimal outcome is reached. In the
example presented, the session consists of four iterations. The results obtained
are shown in the players report, Figures .11.9 and .11.10.
The System aids two players to find
an acceptable cooperative solution. This is
done in two phases:
firsl - a status quo is derived.
second - a cooperative nondominated
solution is found.
The status quo is defined as being
a co~position of the preferable players
outcQmes in a noncooperative case.
The cooperative solution is found in an
process starting from the status quo.
MAIN MENU
-) Fl - Information
-) F2 Find Player 1 Status Quo
-) F3 Find Player 2 Status Quo
F4 Negotiate Cooperative Solution
F9 Quit
Select option
Figure -It.t. Main menu of the experimental system of bargaining support.
---_._-----_._•.._._._-.__ .. " _ .
This phase deals with the noncouperalive
case .The play~r tests Pareto uutcomes dnd
selects the preferable one. Tid:> is done ill
two steps:
first - the player def i ne~; his l'refereur.es
as references points in his obj~ctive
space. The System calculates related
Pareto outcomes,
second - the player selects amony obtained
Pareto outcomes the preferable on~.
PLA~ER STATUS QUO MENU
-) Fl .. Information
-) F2 Test Pareto Outcomes
F3 Select Preferable Outcome
F9 Return to Main Menu
._---_._._------------
Select option
Figure -It.S. Status quo menu.
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"0 H.,f"rence Poinl Snlulion1 2 3 1 2 :J
1 3'1.118 4.1111 1.811 19.19 4.:1" J.SS
2 !i1l.1l8 3.58 &.811 25.88 3.119 3.118
3 211.1111 &.1111 8.1111 11.52 4.'Jf:I 4.f)1
'I !".II11 &.88 8.88 :1. '/8 !J.b(' &.115
!J L'1.1111 1.88 3.811 :'III.'1Z l.'18 1.UII
I.. &4.118 8.58 1.118 51.12 2.111 8.01
'I 64."8 3.511 &.llll 20.44 ~.&3 2.6'/
Your preferable solutiou is:
7 20.44 3.&3 2.&1
j>LAVERSTATUS QUO MEKU--------------
-> F1 - InfOrMation
F2 Test Pareto Outcomes
F3 Select Preferable OutcOMe
-> F9 Return to MaIn Melin
Select option:
.'
.' "..
.'
1 ~ ..
o ('~:j-')-Q~-,~,-u~--.,.....,-,....,...-~--~·;:rll
.. I ,,~,
I h
Figure ie.i. Example of results obtained by player 1 after selecting F2 from the main
menu.
This phase deals with the COOI'I:I·.~tivH Citse.
At each iteration of this phase:
first - both pla~ers define their desir't:d
rlirectiolls for outcomes iMpr'ovp.Mcnts,
secolld - a new agreement point is calculdt.l:rl
from previous one accordin!l to
I'la~ers directions.
I'IEGOT I ATE MEI'IU
-) Fl - Information
-) F2 Find Pla~er 1 Directioll
-) F3 Find Pla~er Z Direction
F4 Calculate l'Iew Agrep.Ment Point
F'l Ileturn to Maill Melin
Select option
Figure ie.5. Negotiate menu.
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T-" i s -~-il~~;-f-i~~-;t;;;-~f:--t);;'-'H~-~oti ~t;-------I
Phase. The player tests directions improviny
his outcome and selects the preferable one.
This is done in three steps:
first - the player defines step coefficient
second - the player defines directions
according to his preferences.
The System calculates relat.ed
in'l'roved out.comes (a counterp layer
dction is assumed)
three - the player selects among the tested
directions the preferable one.
FIHD-PLAVER DIRECTION MENU
-) Fl - Information
-) F2 Define Step
F3 Test Improvement Directions
F4 Select Preferable Direction
F9 Return to Negotiate Menu
Select option
Figure .It.6. Direction menu.
Nu Direl:t io"
t 2
1 1. HII 1.IIH
2 1I111.lIlI 1. 811
J t8.lIlI 1. 811
4 5.88 1.118
J
1. bH
511.lI"
Z.""5.88
SIIlul iun
I.
:l.12
:1.'.-1
:1.1.'1
:i. '/11
I
lon. 'j]
2'J. ~,IJ
1.'1.lIJ
211.611
J
I.. '/',
:l./.l
I..ll!
J.lI:l
"
<D'
.,
.'
: ,~ -.---I--,---.,....----,---r-,.-.--+::~ II
." ~ '0 :i: IS ~ (, l Iv I
Chosen step: 8.2888
Your preferable dIrection is:
4 5.88 1.88 5.88
FIN-DiLAYER-DI REfr-'-6ri-"U:NU - -..------- --- --
-) Ft - Infor-atlon
F2 - Define Step
F3 - Test I.prov_e"t Dir""tiuns
F4 - Select Preferable Dire'.tiu"
-) F9 - Return to N"90li"t" Menu
Select option:
'."
..
.;,'.
<D'
. "
... o::~ .._...,------, ....----.---,--__ ,.----::.-;.~ II
• -i''t ~Jl~ In i.(q Iv l
Figure .It. 7. Results obtained by player 1 after selecting F4 from the direction menu.
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This is tlw secon<\ :otage od tllp Negotiat.e
Phase. The SljsteM h,•. s Ci,klll<ltetl -the new
agreement point for hoth players.
-) /0"1
-) Fl.
-) FJ
) F'l
luformatinn
PI i"/er 1 RHI'or·l
Player l Hf:POl'i
Re t.urn 1.0 Negpl ; i1te Mf'1l1l
Figure 4£.8. Calculate agreement point menu.
PlalJer Status Quo:
28.44 3.63 2.67
Successive AgreeMent Points:
1 28.88 3.78 3.83
2 29.33 3.75 3.66
3 29.59 3.77 4.87.
4 29.79 3.78 1.4~
Cooperation phase is finished
3 .... c
3 _~:
• : ----1"- ---r--~--,---.,---- r"
:::'+ ~. E:~ 2 . ~'+
'II:"I
'1 1't
'I",
~l,:·'l I I
T--- _. r'
;;:.: I" t
::I",llli
--r·----y-·--~--T-· . T r
. ~ 1. • ~ ~ ;. It ! 1
Press an'~ ke., to cont i nul' ...
Figure 4£.9. Player's report for player 1.
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P I",!",' ~;t" tllS flow:
:~I1.q4 ';.41 :1.1'1
~lIo.:(;I.:S', iVI; (I~ ,'.,,:rnent p" i Ills:
31. !,'l S.!lH J. ')II
2 11.91 5.!lb 4.2~
J 3L.hl 5.59 4.4"
4 32.1U 5.66 4.7z
Cuul'erdtion phase is finished
Pres:> alll! kUl! to cuntiuue ...
Figure ,IfUO. Player's report for player 2.
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APPENDIXB
Summary of the IIASA Conference on the
Processes of International Negotiations
The nASA Conference on the Processes of International Negotiations, held on
18-22 May 1987 at nASA, Laxenburg, brought together high-level researchers
and practitioners with experience in international negotiations from international
organizations, the diplomatic community, and multinational enterprises. The
Conference was organized by the nASA PIN Project, which is funded by a grant
from the Carnegie Corporation (USA).
The Conference succeeded in bringing together researchers and practition-
ers - in total over 80 participants from 19 countries and three international
organizations - in an interactive and quite unique manner, and was a step on
the road to bridging the gap between these two groups involved in the processes
of international negotiations. This was accomplished through the panels, the
discussions on the papers presented, and informal exchanges.
The Conference also provided a vehicle for increasing understanding and
communication between various research disciplines and approaches, e.g.,
between those working on quantitative or mathematical analyses and on the
qualitative or institutional analyses of international negotiations. Researchers
from various countries were able to learn about work going on elsewhere and to
discuss what their approaches have in common and where they differ.
The Conference not only brought out differences between researchers and
practitioners, as well as among various branches of research, but also modalities
to bridge these gaps. Specifically, it provided a basis for forward-looking propo-
sals and for approaching the problem in a comprehensive manner to meet the
interests and requirements of all those concerned with the processes of interna-
tional negotiations. The interaction between these groups highlighted the impor-
tance of further research and of enhanced communication between researchers
and practitioners and among researchers, at a level commensurate with effective
action and measures to improve the processes of international negotiations.
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This Conference dealt with many of the most importance aspects of inter-
national negotiations including the role of international organizations and other
multilateral mechanisms; cultural, political and linguistic factors; international
trade negotiations; theory and methodology; and education and training. An
area that seems to be of growing interest, and of specific relevance to nASA, is
the use of decision support systems, knowledge and data bases, and computer-
aided negotiations tools to assist negotiators and the negotiating process,
perhaps as a neutral third party. This is inevitable, at a time when both infor-
mation and information technology and its applications are experiencing explo-
sive growth.
The Conference brought out the need for an infrastructure to facilitate such
research and communication, among countries and researchers, and between
theorists and negotiators. The nASA-PIN Project and its PIN networks within
nASA's National Member Organizations (NMOs) can provide such an interna-
tional, multidisciplinary infrastructure. In this way the impact of national con-
siderations and of different economic, political and social systems can also better
be taken into account in international negotiations. The PIN infrastructure and
mechanism is conducive to the elucidation of the these factors and could thus
provide unique advantages and possibilities for advancing the understanding and
improving the processes of international negotiations.
Thus, the Conference was an important learning experience for the
processes of international negotiations, and a forum for acquiring a unique focus
on this increasingly important topic.
This summary of the Conference on the Processes of International Negotia-
tions cannot and will not be exhaustive. It covers some of the main issues
addressed, results of discussions and proposals for possible future activities to be
undertaken by the nASA-PIN Project and its NMO-PIN networks. These will
constitute some of the many inputs to nASA's planning process.
The key points and ideas that emerged may be summarized as follows.
Negotiations can and should contribute to predictability, equity and secu-
rity among states. In achieving such goals, negotiations also become important
confidence-building measures. Thus, negotiations will have an increasing role to
play in maintaining a dynamic stability in the relations among states.
It became clear that an agreed common framework or representation of the
processes of international negotiations does not exist now. But the differences
are not so large as they may appear, since all are looking at the same process. It
is important to try to move toward a common understanding at least of what the
similarities and differences are, and to try to approach, to the extent possible, a
more unified agreed representation or paradigm of the processes of international
negotiations. In so doing, one must bear in mind that any theory or representa-
tion will of necessity shed light on some facts and be silent about others, since
theorizing means simplifying. The mark of a good theory or paradigm is to be
able to encompass and explain, as well and as simply as possible, the largest
number of facts and phenomena.
In this sense it was felt useful to study problems in as comprehensive a
manner as possible, taking into account the inherent complexities and intercon-
nectedness of the various functions and processes of international negotiations,
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and the need for more coherence between increasingly interdependent interna-
tional negotiations issues and activities.
International organizations play a key and growing role in international
negotiations. As instruments established by governments, they respond to their
needs. The use of international organizations cannot be pushed by their secre-
tariats, but the efficient functioning, initiatives and innovative proposals of these
international secretariats are important factors determining whether or not
governments will choose to use a particular international organization or other
multilateral mechanism as a negotiating framework.
Negotiations are important mechanisms for dealing with the international
transboundary effects of technological risk, and the impacts of technological
development in general.
There are many basic similarities and differences between commercial and
other types of international negotiations, in terms of parties involved, issues and
goals. Increasingly important are negotiations for joint ventures involving
developed and developing countries, and countries with different economic sys-
tems.
The processes of international negotiations do not come to an abrupt halt
with the signing of an agreement. A need exists for pre- and post-agreement (or
contract) negotiations. While the provisions and mechanisms to ensure compli-
ance must be clearly delineated in an agreement, it was felt useful to look at the
advantages of agreements having a defined degree of flexibility to permit jointly
agreed adaptation to changing circumstances and requirements.
Education and training are important for improving both the processes of
international negotiations, and communication among those involved. The input
and involvement of practitioners is considered essential for the most effective and
relevant research, education and training (design, implementation and evalua-
tion). Research should be used as part of the training process. Mechanisms
should be devised for the collaboration of practitioners and researchers on
specific tasks in both research and training activities.
An area of growing interest and importance is the use of decision support
systems and computer-aided negotiations tools to enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of the processes and outcomes of international negotiations. In this
connection it was emphasized that expert systems and knowledge bases cannot
and will not replace experts, or their knowledge and experience.
Much was learned a,bout the work and interests of the NMO-PIN networks.
Their activities often have a wide area of overlap and complement each other
usefully. This diversity of activities can increase the chances for generating inno-
vative ideas. The PIN Project can serve an important function in coordinating
and enhancing collaboration and coherence between the networks' research and
other activities.
Many fruitful possibilities emerged from this Conference which could be
pursued by nASA and its NMO-PIN networks. Possible modalities for imple-
mentation of these research and other activities include: the nASA-PIN Project;
the NMO-PIN networks, coordinated by nASA-PIN; and external collaborative
projects with periodic meetings both in the NMO country and at nASA to assess
results and discuss future directions for work. Since the PIN Project is based on
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networking activities, IIASA will continue to rely on the support and input of the
NMO-PIN networks.
Proposals for further PIN activities and research included the following;
(1) It was agreed that it would be very useful to study how the role and
effectiveness of international organizations and other multilateral mechan-
isms in international negotiations could be enhanced. In connection with
this, it is important to identify the characteristics of a good international
organization and international secretariat. For example, to what extent are
the real actors in a given issue area represented and committed to particip-
ing in the organization? How can the capabilities of an international
organization be strengthened in order to take anticipatory as well as reac-
tive measures to deal with disputes and issues through international nego-
tiation?
(2) Also important is a study of the existing network or system of international
negotiations, and the list and scope of issues to be dealt with by interna-
tional negotiations. Specifically, it was proposed to make an inventory of
potential future issues (regional and global) requiring international negotia-
tions - Le., to identify opportunity areas for future international negotia-
tions.
(3) Another essential task is to identify the common patterns and denomina-
tors of international negotiations, and the reasons for their success or
failure. It would thus be useful to study the institutionalization of interna-
tional negotiations and their characteristics in terms of specific agreed cri-
teria.
(4) It would be important to understand evolution of procedures, especially
decision-making procedures such as consensus, in international negotiations
(in the context of the UN, CSCE, etc), and the role of presiding officers.
(5) The role of mediators and other third parties is another worthwhile study
area.
(6) How does public opinion affect the processes of international negotiations?
(7) An important input into the processes of international negotiations for joint
ventures would be the development of case studies that address such key
factors as the legal, financial and organizational implications and impacts
both at the country and enterprise levels.
(8) Another key task for research is to look at ways and means - including
computer-aided training tools - to enhance the capabilities and results of
education and training in the field of international negotiations. Important
training goals include how to help negotiators to develop further their capa-
bilities for adaptation to and innovation in negotiations processes; and to
master the art of "catching the ball in the air" - Le., recognizing and
responding to unexpected signals, moves, etc., that could prove important
for advancing the negotiations process.
(9) An area of widespread interest for research and increasing importance for
international negotiations is the application of computer systems to facili-
tate the processes of international negotiations. This includes the develop-
ment of agreed international, and internationally accessible, databases, and
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studying which computer-aided negotiations tools (such as interactive
models and computerized conference systems) could be developed. (It
should be noted that some international organizations already have such
international databases). Supporting this could be a joint investigation of
whether and how common understandings or agreed definitions of key
terms and concepts in international negotiations could be developed.
(10) It is an important aim of research to increase the applicability of decision
science methodologies and analytical techniques to real-life problems by, for
example: integrating the contributions of various analytical methods;
developing existing techniques of decision sciences for application in the
framework of contradictory or conflicting interests; encouraging practition-
ers and researchers to work together on specific tasks; associating the user
in analytical work; testing via simulations how analyses translate into real-
ity; and using an intermediary between researchers and practitioners (for
formulation of real problems, interpretation of results, etc.)
(11) An interesting and potentially useful study, which could improve
knowledge of both the processes of international negotiations and the
strengths and characteristics of various theories and methodological
approaches, would involve taking one or two carefully selected international
negotiations and using various theories or methodologies to analyze them.
Then the results of the various approaches could be compared.
The results and proposals of the Conference taken together indicate that
this approach to the study of international negotiations could become a vehicle
and spearhead for reconciling the quantitative and qualitative methods of
analysis, as well as the abstract versus practical- or user-oriented studies and
approaches. This could be accomplished through the "operationalization" of
theoretical approaches, taking into account the complexity and interconnected-
ness of international negotiations.
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